RADICAL SHI'ISM IN LEBANON: WESTERN GOVERNMENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN DEALING WITH HOSTAGE INCIDENTS, 1982-1992

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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

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MAGNUS RANSTORP

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ABSTRACT

The responses by the American, French, and British governments, in efforts to secure the release of their citizens taken hostage in Lebanon, have demonstrated the difficulty for Western states in reconciling their firmly-held principles of no-negotiations and no-concessions in dealing with either the Hizb'allah or its patrons with the actual and practical realities governing any resolution to the hostage-situations in Lebanon. This case-study on the dynamics of the Hizb'allah and its interaction with Iran and Syria provides a basis for the evaluation of the effectiveness of Western government responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon using crisis management techniques.

This study shows that the abduction of Western citizens by Hizb'allah was motivated either by internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and Iranian interests, and that mechanisms for the resolution of the hostage-crisis were subject to continuous interaction between Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria influenced by internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. The Western responses to the hostage-crisis showed limited effectiveness as the crisis management techniques were poorly adjusted in timing and direction to the actual crisis environment. With the exception of the French response, the overall employment of Western crisis management techniques showed disregard for the opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Iran as well as the political environment within Lebanon which the Hizb'allah operates and exists. This was clear by their failure to rely on either Iran or Syria as the only channel in negotiations over hostages without regard to their individual ability to exert its influence over the movement in accordance with shifts in their ties to Hizb'allah's command leadership between 1987-1991 and to the status of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as displayed by the friction between 1986-92. This study provides a new approach in the study of terrorism by merging a case-study of the dynamics of the hostage-crisis with an evaluation of Western responses through crisis management techniques in order to more closely resolve the dilemma of the fulfillment of these states' duty to protect their citizens taken hostage abroad, without major sacrifices in the conduct of foreign policy.

DECLARATIONS

I, MAGNUS RANSTORP, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 110,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No.12 in February 1990 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in February 1990; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1990 and 1994.

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I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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PREFACE

> "Thereupon I discovered an ventured divers answers; I distinguished between ages, degree of rank among individuals; I departmentalized my problem; out of my answers there grew new questions, inquiries, probabilities - until at length I had a country of my own, a soil of my own, an entire discrete, thriving, flourishing world, like a secret garden the existence of which no one suspected".[1]

> "[Lebanon] is a country which - in the eyes of the West at least - has made the study of Islam and 'international terrorism' indistinguishable".[2]

> "Terrorism denies the distinction between state and society, public and private, government and individual, the distinction that lies at the heart of humane belief. For the terrorist, as for the totalitarian state, there are no innocent bystanders, no private citizens. Terrorism denies that there is any private sphere, that individuals have any rights or any autonomy seperate from or beyond politics. There are thus no standards according to which the individual citizen, or the threatened society, can attempt to come to terms with the totalitarian terrorist. There is no way to satisfy his demands".[3]

The picturesque Scottish seaside town of St Andrews would seem unlikely to naturally lend itself to the study of religious fundamentalism in any form. Yet, the historical remnants of the this medieval town today, which predates the origins of the University of St Andrews in 1411, bear witness to a period of fervent religious fundamentalism at the very heart of the town's existence, whose first victim of the Scottish reformation became the martyred university student Patrick Hamilton. Any sense of detachment from the study of religious fundamentalism was also lost with the discovery of the fact that I belonged to the post-graduate college of St Leonard, the patron saint of hostages adopted by noblemen and soldiers away on the Crusades, most notably Bohemund the first prince of Antioch, who were held captive in Muslim hands in the battles between Christendom and Islam in the Middle Ages.[4] Notwithstanding the power of saints to those unjustly imprisoned and forgotten as hostages in solitary confinement for several years, the release of hostages either during the Crusades or in contemporary Lebanon

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[1] Friedrich Nietzche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York, NY.: Vintage, 1969).

[2] See: As'ad Abu Khalil: "Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.27, No.3 (July 1991): p.390.

[3] Senator Daniel Patrick Moyhnihan, quoted in Time, April 14, 1986.

[4] This was revealed to the author in a sermon delivered by Father Fergus Kerr in commemoration of St Leonard, St Leonard's Chapel, University of St Andrews, November 3, 1991.

home to pay a ransom for their release. While the abduction of Bohemund during the Crusades embodied an effort by Islam to contain militant Christendom from recovering the holy place of Jerusalem from Muslim rule, the abduction of Westerners in Lebanon encapsulated the resurgence of a wider pan-Islamic effort to expel foreigners from the region in an attempt to liberate Jerusalem under non-Islamic control. Although the practise of hostage-taking has an old tradition in the Middle East, dating back to the early days of the Crusades, contemporary Western efforts to understand or deal with the hostage-incidents in Lebanon have been a surprising failure given that the "rules of the game" for the resolution of the hostage-crisis have changed little since Bohemund's days. The West's fear and inability to comprehend the enemy's willingness to sacrifice their own lives was also surprising given our own practise of martyrdom during the Crusades.

Despite the many historical parallels, the decision to adopt the Western hostage-crisis in Lebanon as a subject for research was more due to a personal ambition to confront the inner dynamics of one of the most important, yet least understood, terrorist organisations in the Middle East, whose activity has continously constituted a major foreign policy problem for Western governments for over a decade, rather than any intitial or real understanding of the enourmous complexity of the subject matter itself. A project of this magnitude could not have been completed without the assistance of patient and supportive colleagues, friends and family, to whom I would like to publicly express my gratitude to for services beyond any call of duty or responsibility. I am deeply grateful and indebted to staff and colleagues at the Department of International Relations, whom have offered invaluable ideas, criticism and suggestions. Three staff members, in particular, deserve special mention to whom I have incurred personal debts to as they were present with advice and encouragement during this long haul and across the finishing line. First, and foremost, I owe special gratitude to my supervisor Professor Paul Wilkinson, who provided me with invaluable and endless encouragement as well as advice throughout the research. I will always be indebted to his personal enthusiasm and kind consideration for my academic ability and for other research opportunities he provided to me during my enjoyable stay in St. Andrews. I am also deeply grateful to Mrs Gina Wilson, the Departmental secretary, who deserves a sainthood for her assistance in administrative and personal matters, always with great humour and diligence. I would also like to extend gratitude to my friend, Dr Myles Robertson, for his linguistic expertise and patience in reading my thesis as well as for his sound advice and laconic endurance of everything-anyone-could-ever-want-to-know-about-the-Hizb'allah. A number of colleagues also deserve special thanks for encouragement and advice at some stage of my research, most notably Gus, Guy, Charlie, Robin and others. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable comments made by my colleague and friend Gus Xhudo in the introductory chapter.

Apart from research in the United Kingdom, I also had an opportunity to make several research trips to Israel, France, Egypt, and the United States to interview government, intelligence and security officials with special knowledge of the Hizb'allah and the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. Many of these interviews provided invaluable and unique insights into the organisation as events unfolded and I am deeply grateful to those whom I have meet, some who due to the nature of their profession would prefer to remain anonymous. To those I can mention, I owe special thanks to (in Israel): Uri Lubrani, head of IDF activity in Lebanon; Yossi Olmert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yigal Charmon, Prime Minister's Advisor for Counter-terrorism; Dr Martin Kramer, Dr Ariel Merari and Maskit Burgin of the JCSS at Tel Aviv University; (in France): Xavier Raufer, l'Institut de Criminologie de Paris; (in the United States): Professor Richard Schultz and Professor Robert Pfalzgraff, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; National Security Fellows at

the JFK School of Government, Harvard University; Dr Bruce Hoffman, RAND Corporation and to many others unnamed who have assisted this project. I am particularly grateful to my friends the Norwegian Ambassador, Per Thelin Haugestad and his wife, whose hospitality and kindness during my two visits to Cairo is second to none and who provided me with an opportunity to meet with some of the key players in the Israeli-PLO peace negotiations.

To Ellen, my friend, whose unfailing support, inspiration and understanding proved not only essential throughout the writing process but also made life endurable outside the office, I am eternally grateful and indebted to.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the inexhaustible support and encouragement of my parents, especially my father, whose unending belief in my ability was equally matched by generous financial support. I dedicate this work to them and to my grandparents, Carl and Esther, who provided me early at home with an atmosphere of intellectual inquiry, for their endless encouragement and love through the years.

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"Muster against them [the believers] all the men and cavalry at your disposal, so that you may terrorize the enemies of Allah and the faithful"[1]

"Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom: until the war lays down its burden"[2]

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Thesis Topic

The seizure of American diplomats as hostages at the U.S. embassy in Teheran in 1979, and their subsequent incarceration for 444 days, was widely considered, at the time, an anomaly in the conduct of contemporary international relations and unique to the dynamics of revolutionary efforts by Iranian clerics to use the hostage-crisis in the foreign policy arena for internal gains in the establishment of a theocratic regime.[3] While the handling of the U.S embassy siege demonstrated the vulnerability of a Western democracy to this special form of terrorism used by a non-Western adversary as a foreign policy instrument and the difficulty in applying conventional tools of statecraft to deal with this new form of foreign policy crisis,[4] it also

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[1] The Holy Qur'an, Surat al-Anfal ch.7:60. A Hizb'allah leader, Ibrahim al-Amin, has cited this verse from the Qur'an to justify the organisation's terrorist activity against the enemies of Islam.

[2] The Holy Qur'an, ch.47:4. As laid down by the laws of *Shari'ah*, once the taking of "prisoners of war" brings the enemy under control: either generosity (i.e. the release of prisoners without ransom) or ransom is the only ordained conduct under Islamic law. Also see: Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1984).

[3] For an overview of the functions of the hostage-crisis for the consolidation of the Islamic revolution in Iran, see: Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York, NY.: Basic Books, 1984): pp.71-91; and Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran", in David Menashri (ed.) The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990): pp.61-2. President Carter viewed the Iranian hostage crisis as: "[u]nprecedented in human history", see: Public Papers of the President, November 28, 1979.

[4] See: Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1985); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York, NY.: I.B. Tauris, 1985); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the

represented a landmark event in which hostage-taking situations would become a permanent feature in Middle East politics for Western governments, especially within the context of the civil war in Lebanon.[5] In a ten-year period, between 1982 and 1992, almost one hundred foreign citizens were abducted in Lebanon by a number of enigmatic pro-Iranian Shi'ite organisations, seemingly loosely or closely affiliated with the Hizb'allah movement.[6] Unlike the 1979 U.S. embassy siege in Teheran, the hostage-taking of foreign citizens in Lebanon differed in many ways in the prolongation and complexity of the incidents.[7] While the preceeding hostage-crisis involved 52 American diplomats used collectively by revolutionary clerics in Iran in an extremely aggressive confrontation with the United States, the abduction of foreigners in Lebanon was perpetrated by non-identifiable groups with pro-Iranian affiliation, operating within the confines of a protracted civil war, in the pursuit of an array of demands ranging from each respective group's own requirements to the advancement of specific foreign policy objectives either directly or in-

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Carter Presidency (New York, NY.: G.P. Putnam's Son, 1982); and Gary Sick, October Surprise (New York, NY.: Random House, 1991).

[5] See: Robert Fisk, Pity The Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Xavier Raufer, Atlas Mondial de L'Islam Activiste (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1991); Oliver Carre and Paul Dumont et al. Radicalismes islamiques (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985); Pierre Pean, La Menace (Paris: Fayard, 1987); and Xavier Raufer, La Nebuleuse le Terrorisme du Moyen-Orient (Paris: Fayard, 1987).

[6] For a useful overview, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, JCSS Memorandum no.25 - August 1988 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies): pp.42-50; and Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, "The Kidnappings in Lebanon", TVI Report, Vol.7, No.4 (Fall, 1986): pp.2-11.

[7] While the maximum confinement of any hostage in the 1979 Iranian incident was 444 days, the average time of confinement of hostages in Lebanon was 782 days see: Appendix I. Whereas the 1979 Iranian hostage-situation involved a clearly defined barricade/siege in a hostile country, the complexity of the Lebanese hostage-incidents relates to the multitude of groups and states involved in these incidents as well as the anarchial environment of Lebanon's civil war, see: Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers - A History of the Lebanese Civil War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993).

directly benefitting Iran and Syria.[8] In many cases, these Lebanese hostage-taking situations caused major crises for Western governments in the conduct of foreign policy in the regional and international arena.[9] Although most Western governments, whose citizens are held hostage, pursue an official declared policy of no-concessions to terrorists,[10] their actual conduct towards the foreign hostage-crisis in Lebanon has often had a chequered history with secret concessions to secure the release of some of their hostages.[11] Over the last decade the balance-sheet for responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon also underlines the inherent difficulties for Western democratic states to resolve the dichotomy between the duty to protect its citizens abroad and the governmental obligation in hostage-taking situations to maintain the national interest in the conduct of foreign policy.[12] This problem

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[8] For conditions of the relationship between sponsor and proxy, see: Grant Wardlaw, "Terror as an Instrument of Foreign Policy", in David C. Rapoport (ed.) Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 1988): 237-59. Also see: Con Coughlin, Hostage (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1992); and Sean K. Anderson, "Iranian State Sponsored Terrorism", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.11, No.4 (Fall 1991): pp.19-34.

[9] See: Conor Gearty, Terror (London: Faber and Faber, 1991): pp.80-93.

[10] According to official U.S. policy: "[t]he U.S. government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage terrorism", see: Public Report of the Vice-President's Task Force on Terrorism (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, February 1986): p.7. The Council of Europe adheres to the principle of: "no concessions to the coercion of terrorists and those who support them", see: Gilbert Guillaume, "France and the Fight Against Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): p.134.

[11] For example, see: Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair (New York, NY.: The Free Press, 1988); Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1991); L. Chauvin, "French diplomacy and the hostage-crises", in B. Rubin (ed.) The Politics of Counter-Terrorism: The Ordeal of Democratic States (Washington, DC.: The John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1990): pp.91-104; Nicolas Tenzer and Franck Magnard, "Le terrorisme et la politique de la France au Moyen-Orient", Le Débat, Vol.45 (Mai-Sept., 1987): pp.90-101.

[12] This has been aptly demonstrated by David Clinton: "[a] state whose leaders and people forget or dismantle the ties that bind them into a community with a recognized national interest does more than run the risk of an internal 'war of every man against every man'. As the recent example of Lebanon and the American hostages makes clear, it also becomes a danger to any international ties, since its inability to maintain civil order allows internal violence to spill over into the outside world and threaten innocent third parties. What international society there is relies on states to undergird it by safeguarding their own national

has been present regardless of the adoption of either a resolute hardline approach, as in the case of measures adopted by Great Britain characterized by firmness and refusal to make any concessions despite executions of hostages, or a softer approach, as in the case of the American and French dual-track measures characterized by the pursuit of a public hardline position while engaged in secret negotiations and concessions to secure the release of its hostages.[13] In both cases, the targeted governments have been viewed as weak, incompetent and discredited through diminished public trust and confidence in the government in conjunction with maintaining a publicly enunciated policy by the abandonment of their citizens abroad or by the disclosure of the existence of negotiations or even deals.[14] As a unique crisis or problem in the foreign policy arena, the nature of the foreign hostage-incidents in Lebanon as well as responses by Western governments have not only appeared to be enigmatic and secretive to the public and policymakers, even with the benefit of hindsight after the complete dénouement of the hostage-file in 1991-2,[15] but have also been inadequately dealt with by academic research and within decision-making circles in studies of the management of these situations and in the application of prescribed lessons for any future incidents under similar conditions.[16] This must be considered quite surprising given

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interests as functioning communities", see: W. David Clinton, "The National Interest: Normative Foundations", Review of Politics, Vol.48, No.4 (1986): p.506

[13] See: Rex Hudson, "Dealing with International Hostage-Taking: Alternatives to Reactive Counterterrorist Assaults", Terrorism, Vol.12 (1989): pp.321-78.

[14] See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: p.155-7.

[15] Information about hostage-incidents have been classified as national security matters. In the American case, this was confirmed to the author in replies to official requests, under the Freedom of Information Act, from U.S. Department of State; U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency; and Defense Intelligence Agency.

[16] A useful start has been made by the application of crisis management to "controllable" barricade/siege hostage-taking situations. However, these differ fundamentally on the micro (law enforcement) and macro (foreign policy) level.

the duration and significant ramifications of these hostage-taking incidents on the conduct of foreign policy by Western democratic states in an atmosphere of crisis over the last decade.[17] As a consequence, the hostage-crisis in Lebanon underlines both the complexity and the difficulty in the successful resolution of hostage-situations for many Western governments and the importance of devoting considerable academic and policy attention to this issue in view of its ability and continued potential for affecting international relations.[18]

This study examines, through a case-study approach, the complex nature and dynamics of the foreign hostage-crisis in Lebanon perpetrated by the Hizb'allah organisation with special reference to the multiple abductions of American, British, and French citizens between the period of 1982-1992. It also addresses the multi-tiered relationships between the Hizb'allah and its patrons, Iran and Syria, as a prerequisite for the accompanying evaluation of the corresponding policies and responses adopted by the United States and the two European states within the framework of the application of crisis management requirements and techniques.

This present chapter examines the nature of hostage-taking as a unique form of foreign policy crisis for Western governments and the theoretical applicability of crisis management as an instrument to confront it. It also provides the methodological raison d'etré for the study as well as a literature review of past and present material.

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[17] As aptly stated by Ariel Merari: "[a] considerable part of academic writing on terrorism is simply irrelevant to government decision-making", see: Ariel Merari, "Academic Research and Government Policy", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 1991): p.98. This has been echoed by Martha Crenshaw: "[s]tudies of international terrorism are rarely linked to the literature politics", see: Martha Crenshaw, "Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.15, No.1 (January-March 1992): p.4.

[18] See: Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: New Modes of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1983): p.2.

In the second chapter, an indepth historical background of the formation of the Hizb'allah movement in 1982 is provided to explain the close deference by the movement to Iran and the metamorphosis of a traditionally non-activist Shi'a community into an extremly militant Islamic movement with a pan-Islamic ideology.

A third chapter provides analysis of Hizb'allah's organisational structure and its connections with Iran's clerical establishment and with Syria in order to establish the influences on the movement's decisionmaking process. These influences are superimposed onto Hizb'allah's practise of hostage-taking of American, French, and British citizens, within the framework of the movement's interaction with the constantly changing internal Lebanese environment.

The fourth chapter analyses the basis for the dynamics of the Iranian-Syrian relationship and its impact on the Hizb'allah within Lebanon with reference to opportunities and constraints in the abduction and release of foreign hostages.

A fifth chapter provides analysis of the performance of crisis management responses by the American and two West European states to the hostage-crisis. It draws on the analysis of the previous chapters to which Western governmental performance in these crises are evaluated in accordance with conformity to the established requirements for successful crisis management and to the dynamics of the hostage-crisis as presented through the case-study.

The sixth and final chapter draws conclusions from the preceeding evaluation of the hostage-crisis and the application of crisis management techniques in order to assess the effectiveness of Western responses and its applicability for future hostage-incidents in the Middle East.

1.2 Definition of Hostage-Taking:

The act of "hostage-taking" is among the most common manifestations of political terrorism. Its practitioners has been uniformly codified in inter-

national law as:

"Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any acts as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage."[19]

By employing the definition provided by the Hostage Convention, it is possible to discern certain key characteristics of hostage-taking in order to separate it from other forms of political terrorism.[20] In this context, the term hostage-taking will only relate to acts which are international in nature. An act of hostage-taking can be considered international when it is; "(1) directed at foreigners or foreign targets; (2) concerted by the governments or factions of more than one state; or (3) aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government."[21] Within the framework of this definition, it is possible to obtain and identify four constitutive elements indispensable to the act of hostage-taking on the assumption that the dynamics of hostage-taking acts and the behaviour of all parties involved will be governed by the same fundemental priniciples and processes which apply to all

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[19] International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, [Article 1(1)], annexed to GA Res 34/146 of 17 December 1979, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.46, pp.245-47, UN Doc A/34/46 (1980). As of August 1989, the Convention had 56 signatories. Neither Lebanon, nor Iran and Syria, are parties to the Convention.

[20] While there is still disagreement within academia over definitions of terrorism, the most comprehensive has been provided by Alex Schmidt: "terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought", see: Alex P. Schmidt, Albert Jongman, et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1988): p.28.

[21] See: Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1977): p.174.

social interactions.[22] As a consequence, the hostage-takers are treated as rational actors, in which rationality only implies that the actor has a reason for the execution of his actions and that the actor believes the action itself is not only useful in obtaining his goals but also that it maximises effect and possible outcomes.[23]

The first of the four necessary elements of hostage-taking is the seizure or detention of another person. Although acts of hostage-taking may assume a wide variety of ways in which the actual seizure or detention may be carried out, it is useful to classify hostage-incidents into two major categories: barricade/siege and hostage concealment situations.[24] The distinction between these two types of hostage-situations is necessary as both differ in logistical and physical terms and require almost inevitably different policy and tactical responses.[25] In a hostage barricade/siege situation, the hostage-takers and their victims are besieged in a location known to and controlled by the authorities.[26] This severely restricts the mobility of the hostage-takers and often the duration of the incident.[27] In a hostage con-

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[22] See: Clive C. Aston, "Political Hostage-taking in Western Europe", in William Gutteridge (ed.) The New Terrorism (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1986): p.59.

[23] See: Kent L. Oots, "Bargaining with Terrorists: Organizational Conciderations", Terrorism, Vol.13, No.2 (March-April 1990): pp.146.

[24] See: Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion (London: MacMillan, 1987).

[25] See, Reuben Miller, "Game Theory and Hostage-Taking Incidents: A Case Study of the Munich Olympic Games", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.10, No.1 (Winter 1990):pp.12-33. Also see: Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson and David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, P-5905, July 1977).

[26] See: Jerome R. Corsi, "Terrorism as a Desperate Game", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.25, No.1 (March 1981): pp.47-85.

[27] See: Alastair C. MacWillson, Hostage-Taking Terrorism (London: MacMillan, 1992): p.172.

cealment situation, the perpetrators detain hostages at an unknown location. These incidents are usually longer in duration as they provide the hostage-takers with anonymity, security and mobility.[28] In relation to the situation in Lebanon, the concealment of the hostages is not only a function of efficient operational secrecy by the terrorist organisation but also can be attributed to the chaotic environment caused by the protracted civil war which complicates the process of any response by governments. As such, the hostage-crisis in Lebanon is unique and precedent-setting since it does not conform to previous models of hostage-taking as the concealment is merely a technique or mechanism rather than an end itself.

A second element of the act of hostage-taking involves the threat to kill, to injure or to continue the detention of a hostage in order to compel a third party. A major underlying assumption of hostage-taking is that the act itself is carried out in order to affect the choices of a third party.[29] The selection of choices by a third party are dependent on the expected response of the hostage-taker to a particular decision and its preference for humanitarian values.[30] The death of a hostage is threatened by the hostage-taker, as a last resort, in order to compel a third party to comply with any demand[s].[31] This rests on the presumption that a third party must consider

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[28] See: R. Reuben Miller, "Negotiating with Terrorists: A Comparative Analysis of Three Cases", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.5, No.3 (Autumn 1993): p.103.

[29] As stated by Thomas Schelling: "[h]ostages represent the power to hurt in its purest form", see: Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influences (New Haven, CN.: Yale University Press, 1966): p.6.

[30] See: Clive C. Aston, A Contemporary Crisis: Political Hostage-Taking and the Experience of Western Europe (London: Greenwood Press, 1982): pp.33-45.

[31] See: Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, "Terrorism and Signalling", European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.9 (1993): pp.383-97.

the death of a hostage to be worse than complying with the demand[s].[32] Consequently, the threat in itself requires credibility which means that a third party will resist compliance to demands if the threat to kill hostages is not believable.[33] Herein, the hostage-taker faces the dilemma that the credibility to carry out the threat is actually undermined by the fact that a third party's compliance with any demand is dependent on the survival of the hostage. However, this dilemma may be resolved by multiple abduction of hostages while the credibility of a threat can be enhanced through sequential killings of hostages, whereby the hostage-taker increases the costs for a third party for non-compliance.[34] In the case of the abductions in Lebanon, the hostage-takers repeatedly threatened to execute their hostages to force compliance to its demands, yet only a relatively limited number of hostages were executed.[35] While only a few bodies of hostages were found, the hostage-takers used the presumed deaths of hostages and through silence regarding the hostage, as a means of reinforcing the credibility of their threats.[36]

The third element of hostage-taking is that the aforementioned threat against hostages compels a third party to do or abstain from doing specified act[s]. All acts of hostage-taking must be considered goal-oriented activity,

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[32] See: E.F. Mickolus, "Negotiating for Hostages: A Policy Dilemma", Orbis, Vol.19, No.4 (1976): pp.1309-25.

[33] See: Clive C. Aston, (1982), op.cit.: pp.33-46.

[34] See: H.E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, "To Bargain or not to Bargain: That is the Question", American Economic Review, Vol.78 (1988): pp.16-20.

[35] Between 1982 and 1992, only five Western hostages either died or were executed by the Hizb'allah. These were: Michel Seurat (1986); Peter Kilburn (1986); William Buckley (1985); William Higgins (1988); and Alberto Molinaro (1992). For comparison, see: Appendix I.

[36] For a useful overview, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz (1988), op.cit.: p.14-7.

either motivated by economic, financial and/or political reasons.[37] It is also assumed that all hostage-takers genuinely seek compliance rather than resistance from a third party in response to any demand[s].[38] In the bargaining process between a hostage-taker and a third party,[39] the hostage-taker faces two options in any attempts to achieve concessions from a third party: either to raise the level of the threat for a third party to force submission or, subsequently, reward any compliance.[40] In turn, the main goal of the hostage-taker is to compel a third party to either take any action or refrain from certain activity.[41]

A final element of hostage-taking is compliance by a third party to the demands of the hostage-taker as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage[s]. It is important to recognize that the outcome of a hostage-incident, regardless of the nature of demands, is implicitly or explicitly the *quid pro quo* for the submission of the third party to the compulsion.[42] The process of bargaining in hostage-taking incidents assumes that a hostage-taker attempts to achieve maximum objectives, while the third party

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[37] See: Grant Wardlaw (1989), op.cit: p.151. Also see: W.L. Waugh, "Integrating the Policy Models of Terrorism and Emergency Management", Policy Studies Review, Vol.6, No.2 (November 1986): pp.287-300; and K.L. Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1986).

[38] See: Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as A Product of Strategic Choice", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): p.21.

[39] See: Scott E. Atkinson, Todd Sandler, and John Tschirhart, "Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.30 (1987): pp.1-21.

[40] See: T. Sandler and J.L. Scott, "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.31, No.1 (March 1987).

[41] See: Clive C. Aston, "Political Hostage-Taking in Western Europe", in William Gutteridge (ed.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.57-84.

[42] See: Bruce D. Fitzgerald, "The Analytical Foundations of Extortionate Terrorism", in Terrorism, Vol.1, No.3-4 (1978): p.350.

seeks to resolve the situation by conceding the minimum amount possible.[43] As a consequence, the relationship between the hostage-taker and a third party is conducted through a zero-sum framework, whereby if one party wins then the other must necessarily lose.[44]

1.3 Hostage-Takings in Lebanon as a Form of Foreign Policy Crisis

Over the last decade, incidents of hostage-taking of foreigners in Lebanon have had a disproportionate effect on foreign and domestic policy for many Western governments compared to other forms of crisis in foreign affairs, given the nature of the problem and the actual number of victims involved in these incidents.[45] Even in comparison to other forms of international terrorism and in relation to incidents carried out in previous years, the phenomenon of hostage-taking in the 1980s neither increased significantly in number of incidents or fatalities.[46] Despite the reality of the low-level threat posed by hostage-taking to vital national interests and security of Western governments, there has been a close association of the hostage-taking incidents in Lebanon with the notion of "crises".[47] Although the prolonged

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[43] See: S.E. Atkinson, T.Sandler, and J. Tschirhart, (1987), op.cit.: p.3; and Nehemia Friedland, "Hostage negotiations: types, processes, outcomes", Journal of Negotiation, Vol.2, No.1 (January 1986): pp.57-72.

[44] See: Marek Hessel, "Bargaining costs and rational behavior: a simple model", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.25, No.3 (September 1981).

[45] See: Jeffrey D. Simon, Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat, R-3423-RC (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, June 1987).

[46] A comparison between the data-bases of Mickolus A (1968-1980) and Mickolus B (1968-1987) reveals that hostage-taking incidents with a concealed nature increased only three percent from 6% to 9% of the total number of types of terrorist events, see: Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979 (London: Aldwych Press, 1980); Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, A Chronology of Events, 1980-1987 (London: Aldwych Press, 1989); A.J. Jongman, "Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968-1988", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.26-76.

[47] This has been reinforced by the rhetoric of major Western political leaders in response to the hostage-incidents in Lebanon. President Reagan stated that: [i]f we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like cancer, eating away at civilized societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere, see: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21 (1985): p.859. For the French political candidates in the national elections in 1986 and 1988,

hostage-incidents in Lebanon have presented foreign governments with unique and unprecedented foreign policy problems as well as challenges, it is essential to determine the degree of conformity of these hostage-taking acts to necessary criteria of what constitutes a crisis in the foreign policy arena and to determine the way in which hostage-taking differs from other more conventional foreign policy crises.

The term "crisis" itself is frequently used indiscriminately by journalists, academics and policymakers alike to describe conditions of conflict and disagreement in international politics. While agreement exist that crisis, stemming from the etymology of the word, involves a turning-point from a condition of peace to the possibility of war,[48] there is no generally agreed definition of the term.[49] In fact, as conceded by many analysts, the concept of crisis has been rendered hollow and useless as it is applied to all situations which are difficult to diagnose, distressful to confront, and whose course is unpredictable with any great degree of certainty.[50] The main reason for the wide variety of definitions of the term stems not only from the methodological approach adopted[51] but also from the actual context within

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the issue of the hostages became a "veritable obsession", see: Le Monde, May 6, 1988.

[48] For the etymology of the word crisis, see: André Béjin and Edgar Morin, "Introduction", Communications, No.25 (1976): pp.1-3. For general agreement that crisis involves a turning-point or decision-point, see: Oran Young, Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crisis (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968): pp.6-15.

[49] According to Robinson, a crisis is a "lay term in search of a scholarly meaning", see: James A. Robinson, "An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories", in Charles F. Hermann (ed.) International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York, NY.: The Free Press, 1972): p.510. Also see: A.J.R. Groom, "Crisis management in long range perspective", in Daniel Frei (ed.) International Crisis and Crisis Management (London: Saxon House, 1978): pp.101-117.

[50] See: Edgar Morin, "Pour une crisologie", Communications, No.25 (1976): p.149-63; and James A. Robinson, "Crisis", in D.L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia for Social Sciences, Vol.3 (New York, NY.: Macmillan, 1968): pp.510-14.

[51] For various approaches, see: Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21 (March 1977): pp.39-40.

which the crisis occurs, in terms of the diverse actors and means as well as the length of the struggle in many grey areas of conflict.[52] From the etymological roots of the term crisis and its subsequent development, it is possible to discern a number of recurring components. Apart from the notion of decision and turning-point, crises also signify a threat to vital goals and objectives, a moment of truth for those confronted with it, short time for decisions, as well as a sense of opportunity, the last most evidently revealed by the Chinese definition of crisis depicted by a double ideogram representing both danger and opportunity.[53]

While scholars have offered a wide range of definitions of crisis, usually dependent on the context, the term has been defined descriptively in accordance to certain key traits or sets of characteristics.[54] As most attempts to define crisis focus on high-threat situations restricted to the military and security areas alone between two or more *state* actors, especially within the context of the conventional application of crisis management,[55] it is necessary to find suitable and broad definitions of crisis for situations created by non-territorial political groups against territorial entities, especially within the context of the so-called "grey areas" of

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[52] For the context-dependency of crisis-management, see: Alexander George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management", in Alexander L. George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991): p.23.

[53] See: Randolf Starn, "Métamorphose d'une notion. Les historiens et la 'crise', Communications, No.25 (1976): pp.4-18. Also see the twelve general attributes of crisis formulated by Anthony J. Wiener and Herman Kahn cited in: Charles F. Hermann, "Some issues in the study of international crisis", in C.F. Hermann (ed.), (1972), op.cit.: p.21.

[54] For a useful review of crisis literature, see: Michael Haas, "Research on International Crisis: Obsolescence of an Approach?", International Interactions, Vol.13, No.1 (1986): pp.23-58.

[55] For example, see: Gilbert R. Winham (ed.) New Issues in International Crisis Management (London: Westview press, 1988).

conflict.[56]

Among the most frequently used and classical definitions of crisis has been offered by Charles Hermann, who defines it as a "situation that (1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit; (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed; and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence."[57] While this definition has been valuable for the decision-making approach to crisis behaviour, some argue it is limited as it cannot be applied to many situations which fail to conform to "stringent requirements of coherent decision-making by a group perceiving itself to be in a situation of high threat, short time and surprise."[58] The application of this definition to the hostage-situation in Lebanon reveals its limitations due to the longevity of the situation, in many cases hostages had been held for several years, as well as by the recurring repetition of these abductions which minimised any element of surprise. As a consequence, it is more useful to adopt a broader definition which includes two characteristics of any crisis, commonly accepted by the scholarly community as: [1] a severe threat to important values and [2] a finite time for coping with the threat.[59]

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[56] According to Alexander George, crisis situations are heavily context-dependent, see: Alexander F. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, MA.: Little-Brown, 1971): p.217. For a useful discussion of the grey areas, see: Xavier Raufer, "Grey Areas: A New Security Threat", Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures and Intelligence Report, No.20 (Spring 1992); and National Strategy Information Center, The Grey Area Phenomenon: Report of a Research Seminar (Washington, DC.: US GPO, July 1992).

[57] See: Charles F. Hermann (ed.), (1972), op.cit.: p.13.

[58] See: A.J.R. Groom, "Crisis management in long range perspective", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978): op.cit.: p.102. Charles Hermann recognized himself the limitation of surprise and later dropped it as a necessary condition of crisis, see: Jonathan Wilkenfeld, et al., Crises in the Twentieth Century, Vol.II (Oxford: Pergamon, 1988): p.3

[59] See: Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision Makers Viewed Psychologically: 'Cognitive Process' Approaches", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.) In Search of Global Patterns (New York, NY.: Free Press, 1976).

The assessment of the level of the threat of the Lebanon hostage-taking acts is based on various components: [1] what are the important values for decision-makers of Western governments, whose citizens have been held hostage in Lebanon?; [2] they must be placed within the context of the perceived degree of the threat to national interests; [3] this will be influenced by the previous experience in countering terrorism; and [4] the constraints imposed by the dynamics of the incident itself for governments in responding effectively and rapidly for its resolution.[60]

At its core, acts of hostage-taking constitute a direct assault on commonly held principles and values of all citizens within liberal democracies, most notably the maintenance of order by a state to ensure that the lives of it's citizens are secure against violence.[61] As such, a government has a required responsibility, especially in hostage-taking situations, to be viewed as doing all in "its power to defend the life and limb of its citizens" not only within its own borders but also abroad.[62] In this task, the concerned government faces a fundamental dilemma to balance its individual responsibility towards its citizens taken hostage abroad with its requirement

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[60] For aspects on perception of threats and its different interpretations by actors from different cultural contexts, see: D.B. Bobrow, and J.A. Kringen St. Chan, "Understanding How Others Treat Crises", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21 (1977). For a definition of national interest, see: Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the notion of 'interest' in international relations", International Organization, Vol.36, No.1 (Winter 1982): pp.1-30.

[61] According to Hedley Bull, all societies attempt to sustain order through the pursuit of three primary goals: "[t]o ensure that life will be in some measure secure against violence resulting in death or bodily harm...that promises, once made, will be kept, or that agreements once undertaken, will be carried out...pursue the goal of ensuring that the possession of things remain stable to some degree, and will not be subject to challenges that are constant and without limit", see: Hedley Bull, The Anarchcial Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977): pp.4-5.

[62] See: Paul Wilkinson, (1977): op.cit.: p.124. The claim that the state has a duty to protect its citizens and their welfare rests on the reciprocal duty by the citizen, as a priviledge of receiving this protection, to risk his or her life for the state, at certain times, see: Ingrid Detter De Lupis, "The Legal Position of a Hostage", in Magnus D. Sandbu and Peter Nordbeck (ed.) International Terrorism (Lund: Juristförlaget, 1989): pp.96-98.

to safeguard the maintenance of other collective national interests.[63] An underlying reason for this dilemma has been that many governments have moved to integrate their strategy to confront and combat international terrorism as, inturn an integral component of their foreign policy.[64] As a consequence, the handling of the hostage-issue in Lebanon by governments has not only been influenced by efforts to confront state-sponsored terrorism by proxy but has also been closely affected by internal Lebanese, regional and international affairs.[65] While the integration of efforts to confront terrorism as components of foreign policy has made the issue of handling the hostage-situation in Lebanon susceptible to the opportunities and constraints arising from the conduct of wider foreign policies in the Middle East, it has also been subject to a wide variety of pressures, most notably associated with the perceptions of the threat and lack of available options for its resolution based on the previous assessment.[66]

The salience of the hostage-situation in Lebanon to Western governments' foreign policy agendas was inextricably linked to the perceived serious challenge of the rise and spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the

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[63] See: M. Sassoli, "International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism", in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds.) Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987): p.466; and Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.155-7. It should be the case, according to George F. Kennan, that: "[g]overnment is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience", see: George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (Winter 1985/6): p.206. Also see: William Gutteridge, "Countering Terrorism: Evaluating the Options", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, Vol.6 (April 1988).

[64] See: Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (ed.) Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1985).

[65] The influence of these factors were briefly explored in: Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism, R-3783-USDP (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, March 1990); and Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (London: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

[66] See: Jeffrey Simon, (1987), op.cit: p.5.

Middle East, embodied in the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Iran and in its drive to export its revolution beyond its borders, to the detriment of regional stability and against Western interests in the broader Muslim world.[67] While Iran's most direct and sustained influence pertained to their co-religionists in Lebanon, direct violent acts under the banner of militant Islam against Western citizens and property, coupled with anti-Western demonology and promises of a holy war against the enemies of Islam, exacerbated the perception among Western policy-makers and publics that Islam could be equated with fanaticism and terrorism.[68] This image was reinforced by the October 1983 twin-suicide attacks against American and French Multinational Forces (MNF) contingencies in Lebanon, resulting in the deaths of 300 servicemen, which elevated the problem of Islamic terrorism to the level of a major national security issue.[69] While the incidents were symptomatic of the problems faced by the West in their involvement in Lebanon and in attempts to find a resolution to the intractable civil war,[70] their impact was also compounded by the subsequent systematic abduction of foreign citi-

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[67] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): pp.730-49; Alvin H. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States", Orbis, Vol.30 (Spring 1986); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1985); R.K. Ramanzani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); Dr. Millward, "The Rising Tide of Islamic Fundamentalism (I)&(II), Commentary, No.30/31 (April 1993).

[68] For a discussion of these stereotypical images between Islam and the West, see: John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): pp.168-215. For the operational significance of ethnic differences, see: Hans Binnendijk (ed.) National Negotiating Styles (Washington, DC.: Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987).

[69] See: Bonnie Cordes et al., Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983, R-3183-SL (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, August 1984): p.1; and David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York, NY.: Harper Row, 1988).

[70] See: Husseiyn Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict, Adelphi Papers 243 (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1989).

zens by shadowy pro-Iranian groups, operating under the cover of an anarchial environment.[71] Although these incidents were closely reminicent of the 1979 Iranian hostage-crisis for policymakers and public, the hostage-situation in Lebanon differed from the previous situation both in complexity and longevity.[72]

As a manifestation of the threat of Iran's attempts to spread Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, the hostage-taking incidents in Lebanon were viewed by Western policymakers through the application of a narrow Western ideological prism depicting Islam against the West.[73] This approach ignored the causes of the rise of the Shi'a community in Lebanon, from political queitism to militant activism against the background of confessional warfare, and consequently suffered from the misperception of the Hizb'allah as merely a creation of revolutionary Iran, orchestrated and directed from Teheran in a holy war against the West.[74] This image of the adversary, as fanatical and dangerous, and the nature of its links with Iran was also reinforced in the West by Hizb'allah's public deference to Iran in all spheres of its activities.[75] As a consequence, the hostage-issue in Lebanon became

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[71] See: Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology, Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, November 1986).

[72] For a brief comparison, see: Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin, 1990). For the impact of hostage-crisis on decisionmaking, see: Betty Glad, "Personality, Political, and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis", International Political Science Review, Vol.10, No.1 (January 1989): pp.35-62.

[73] See: Amir Taheri, Holy War: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Sphere Books, 1987).

[74] This has been observed by Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.) The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL.: Florida International University Press, 1990): p.121.

[75] See: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.) The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990): p.111-2.

not only viewed as a logical extension of the West's wider foreign policy efforts to contain Iranian influence in the region but also contributed to its treatment by Western governments as an issue both of assault on individual lives of its citizens and on national integrity.[76]

While the treatment by the West of the hostage-incidents in Lebanon within the confines of wider foreign policy efforts to contain Iran naturally elevated the issue of the hostages on the foreign policy agenda, the nature and dynamics of these incidents contributed to the athmosphere of crisis in efforts by their governments to extract Western hostages.[77] The elevation of the hostage-incidents to the status of foreign policy crisis stemmed from pressures on Western decision-makers in failing to effectively confront and rapidly secure the release of their own citizens from captivity.[78] Apart from the sensational and spectacular nature of these acts, the pressures faced by Western governments from within their own borders were related to the public discrepancy between the expression of concern for the welfare of citizens taken hostage abroad as well as promises made for their safe return and a publicly enunicated firm policy of "no concessions" to any terrorist demands. While the publicly enuniciated policy no concessions redu-ced government

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[76] See: Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Hostage taking, the Presidency, and Stress", in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, op.cit.: p.212.

[77] See: Stanley S. Bedlington, Combatting International Terrorism: U.S.-Allied Cooperation and Political Will (Washington, DC.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, November 1986). For example, after the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair, President Reagan's approval rating dropped from 67 percent to 46 percent, the largest single drop for a president ever, see: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking of the President (Boston, MA.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1988): p.292.

[78] See: John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report (New York, NY.: Bantam Books and Times Books, 1987): p.79. Also see: Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of moral disengagement", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism, op.cit.: p.166; and James A. Bill, "The U.S. Overture to Iran, 1985-1986: An Analysis", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (ed.) Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1990): pp.170-3.

flexibility in the handling of the hostage-crisis, as credibility would be seriously damaged by the subsequent disclosure of any dealings with terrorists, it also increased the pressure on government decisionmakers from the public and media, who regarded their respective governments as weak and soft, in concurrence with the continued prolongation of these incidents despite assurances of a rapid resolution.[79] The creation of heightened and unrealistic expectations by governments in dealing with the hostage-taking incidents when, in reality, there were no simple solutions, underlined the unique contradictory pressures created by hostage-taking situations on governments compared to other forms of foreign policy crisis.[80] A distinguishing pressure for decision-makers in dealing with these hostage-incidents relates to the human dimensions of the crisis, most notably the identification of an individual predicament.[81] The knowledge by a government leader of the actual identity of a particular Western hostage incarcerated in Lebanon removed any bureaucratic sense of impersonality towards the issue and in the application of any delineated policies and principles.[82] In turn, these

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[79] See: Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 1992): pp.33-6.

[80] The cost inflicted by abandonment of previous public rhetoric and promises has been described by Doris Graber as: "[l]osses in credibility and prestige which may impair the defaulting parties' political effectiveness", see: Doris A. Graber, Verbal Behavior and Politics (Urbana, IL.: University of Illinois Press, 1976): pp.66-7. Also see: Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", in Margaret G. Hermann (ed.) Political Psychology (San Francisco, CA.: Jossey-Bass, 1986); and O. Rosenthal, P.T. Hart, and M. Charles, Coping with Crisis: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism (Springfield, IL.: Charles Thomas Books, 1989).

[81] For a very useful overview of these influences, see: Gary Sick, "Taking Vows: The Domestication of Policymaking in Hostage Incidents", in Walter Reich (ed.), op.cit.: pp.230-44. Also see: Ariel Merari, "Government Policy in Incidents Involving Hostages", in Ariel Merari (ed.) On Terrorism and Combatting Terrorism (Frederick, MD.: University Publication of America, 1985): p.166. For the impact of stress on decision-makers, see: Jerrold M. Post, "The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers", in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991): pp.471-96.

[82] For example, see: Washington Post, November 16, 1986; and Le Monde, May 6, 1988. Also see: Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1987): p.439. In his memoirs, President Reagan admitted that he: "[f]elt a heavy weight on (his) shoulders to get the hostages home", see: Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New

pressures were continuously reinforced by the terrorists, through the release of personal appeals by the hostages, through intense scrutiny of any action or in-action by targeted governments by the media and by the victims' families, through various pressure groups.[83] This was further compounded by the perceived innocence of the suffering hostages themselves, only guilty of being at the wrong place at the wrong time.[84]

Unlike most other forms of foreign policy crisis, the hostage incidents were also extremely long in duration. As a crisis, the degree of intensity was closely dependent on the nature of threats by the terrorist for the execution of a hostage unless the government meet certain political demands. While the sense of urgency was dependent on the credibility of the hostage-taker to carry out the threat, it also led to constant readjustment of escalation and de-escalation along the crisis ladder by governments in response to new abductions, threats, and demands by the terrorists over an extensive period of time.[85]

As a unique form of foreign policy crisis, the hostage-incidents in Lebanon have constituted a serious problem for many Western governments,

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York, NY.: Simon & Schuster, 1990): p.510.

[83] For discussion of the role of media, see: Carol Winkler, "Presidents Held Hostage: The Rhetoric of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan", Terrorism, Vol.12, No.1 (1989): pp.21-30; Russell F. Farnen, "Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Systematic Analysis of a Symbiotic Process", Terrorism, Vol.13, No.2 (March-April 1990): pp.99-143; and Ronald H. Hinckley, "American Opinion toward Terrorism: The Reagan Years", Terrorism, Vol.12, No.6 (1989). As admitted by Thomas Twetten to the Tower Commission: "[t]he real thing that was driving this was...a lot of pressure from the hostage families...and there were articles in the magazines about the forgotten hostages, and there were alot of things being said about the U.S. Government isn't doing anything...And there [was] alot of fear about the yellow ribbons going back up and that this President would have the same problems that the last President had had with the Iranian hostages", see: John Tower, et.al.,(1987), op.cit.: p.96.

[84] For the moral justification of the seizure of hostages by the Hizb'allah, see: Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism, op.cit.: pp.131-160.

[85] For threats, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: pp.14-9.

which at the core underlines the fundamental dilemma for liberal democracies in finding a remedy for the inbalance between safeguarding its moral obligation towards protecting its individual citizens while maintaining long-term foreign policy interests.[86] In response to the search for an equilibrium between interests and obligations in these hostage-crises, Western governments have usually vacilliated between the extremes of either underreacting or overreacting in a seemingly ad hoc manner in response to pressures from the public and from foreign states or for the advancement of foreign policy agendas and the fortunes of individual political leaders.[87] Although hostage-incidents exhibit unique pressures for decisionmakers compared to other more conventional crises, all types of crisis restrict the maneuverability of government responses.[88] As the primary goal of all governments in response to any type of crisis must be to contain and minimize the effects of a crisis while maximizing their available initiatives,[89] the employment of traditional principles and techniques of crisis management to the handling of a hostage-crisis by governments can provide a useful instrument for the evaluation of the crisis itself as well as a guideline in order to cope and manage these complex forms of crisis more effectively and successfully.[90]

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[86] See: D.J.C. Carmichael, "Of Beasts, Gods, and Civilized Men: The Justification of Terrorism and of Counterterrorist Measures", Terrorism, Vol.6 (1982): pp.1-26. Also see: Stephen Sloan, Beating International Terorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, December 1986): pp.49-51. The obligation to protect "the lives, liberty and property of the people composing it, whether abroad or at home" in the United States is legally enshrined in: Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451, 454, 8 Fed. Cas. 111 (no.4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).

[87] See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989) op.cit.: pp.65-75, 147-60.

[88] See: Patrick Lagadec, Preventing Chaos in a Crisis: Strategies for Prevention, Control and Damage Limitation (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 1992).

[89] See: Clive C. Aston, (1982), op.cit: p.137.

[90] This has been previously argued by Clive C. Aston in response to siege/barricade situations, see: Clive C. Aston, "Political Hostage-Taking in Western Europe", in William Gutteridge (ed.), (1986), op.cit.: p.62. Also see: William L. Waugh Jr. "Integrating the Policy Models of Terrorism and Emergency Management", Policy Studies Review, Vol.6, No.1

1.4 Crisis Management and Its Application to Hostage-Crises

The term "crisis management" has been indiscriminately employed in the field of social sciences by academics and policymakers in attempts to exercise control over an array of "crisis" situations, ranging from nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers to terrorism incidents and natural disasters.[91] Although the literal meaning of the term "management" itself denotes efforts "to control" and "to take charge of" crisis situations, it has been regarded as somewhat misleading for the activity at hand.[92] At its core, the inherent paradox and dilemma of crisis management has been the necessity of taking certain actions in order to protect one's vital interests while avoiding actions that may result in undesired costs and risks.[93] While the conventional application of the craft of crisis management has centered on efforts to minimize chances of crisis-situations between two or more state-actors from escalating into war,[94] which led to the establishment of

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(August 1986): pp.287-301; Uriel Rosenthal and B. Pijnenburg (eds.) Special issue on multiple scenarios for crisis management and decision making, International Journal of Contemporary Crises, Vol.14, No.4 (December 1990).

[91] For example, see: C.V. Raghaulu, "Research Trends in Crisis Management and Organisation Theory", Indian Journal of Administrative Science, Vol.2, No.1 (January-July 1991): pp.21-35. Also see: Paul Hart, "Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management", Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol.1, No.1 (March 1993): pp.36-50.

[92] As pointed out by Coral Bell: "[t]he overtones of the word "management" imply a rational, dispassionate, calculating, well considered activity, conducted with judgement and perhaps even at a leisurely pace with a view to long term as against short term interests. Actual crisis decisonmaking is not usually at all like that: it is improvised at great pressure of time and events by men working in a fog of ambiguity, see: Coral Bell, "Decision-making by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.51.

[93] Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," Survival (September/October, 1984): p.224.

[94] The term "crisis management" was an American concept which developed from the Cold War years in the 1950s in the use of coercive bargaining between the two superpowers in competitions short of war. The faith in the concept increased significantly in stature by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as demonstrated by Robert McNamara's statement that there was no longer any such thing as strategy only crisis management, see: Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (London: Oxford University Press, 1971): p.2. Also see: Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System

certain conventions and instruments in the management of crisis,[95] it is possible to discern and apply a number of these underlying principles of crisis-management to violent crisis-situations, most notably in response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.[96]

The most central task of crisis management is to ensure the resolution of a crisis on a satisfactory basis, in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected, through a process of coercion and accommodation in order to achieve effectively a maximum amount of concession from the adversary and, at the same time, maintain one's own position relatively intact.[97] The process of coercion and accomodation must be carefully balanced in order to prevent either the escalation of a crisis or capitulation to the wishes of the adversary at any price.[98] In this task, the ability to manage the crisis for a policymaker is dependent on the understanding of the nature

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Structure in International Crises (Princeton, CT.: Princeton University Press, 1977);

[95] See: Coral Bell, ibid: pp.73-98. For an overview of the state of crisis management as a discipline, see: Michael Brecher and Patrick James, "Patterns of Crisis Management", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.32, No.3 (September 1988): pp.426-56; William I. Zartman, Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management (Paris: World Congress XIII, 15-20 July 1985); Arthur W. Gilbert and Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Management: An Assessment and Critique", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.24, No.4 (December 1980): pp.641-64; Ole R. Holsti, "Historians, Social Scientists, and Crisis Management: An Alternative View", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.24, No.4 (December 1980): pp.665-82; and R. Tanter, "Crisis Management: A Critical Review of Academic Literature", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1 (Fall 1975): pp.71-101.

[96] The need for the employment of crisis-management to the problem of international terrorism was briefly considered in: Ottino Caracciolo di Forino, et al. A Study in Crisis Management (Bruxelles:Institut Europeen Pour la Paix et la Securite, April 1987). Also see: Charles F. Hermann, "Types of Crisis Actors and Their Implications for Crisis Management", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.37; U. Rosenthal et al. (eds.), (1989), op.cit.; and Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and Stephen Sloan, Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management (New York, NY.: Pergamon Press, 1980).

[97] See: Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (New York, NY.: Wiley, 1972): p.30.

[98] See: Charles F. Hermann (ed.), (1972), op.cit.; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.16 (1972): pp.131-65; and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing (eds.), (1977), op.cit.: p.196.

and degree of threats to his country's interests in order to gain control over the crisis situation and in the evaluation of employment of instruments and policy preferences, an assessment of the way in which the adversary views the crisis situation, and a determination of the probable consequences of different courses of action designed to influence the adversary's behaviour in order to secure specific objectives in a crisis.[99] While crisis management involves the ability to communicate resolve and intent to an adversary, the instruments for this purpose can be distinguished into two basic categories in confronting a specific crisis involving hostage-taking, namely physical acts and verbal statements of intent.[100] The verbal dimensions of crisis management may preceed the actual application of the instruments but are always present as reinforcement used in combination with the physical acts.[101]

The physical instruments of crisis management in a hostage-crisis involve either military actions or nonmilitary instruments of statecraft.[102] The military dimensions of crisis-management in hostage-crisis situations involves the movement of military forces to designated positions as a signal of commitment and resolution.[103] This may involve the threat or actual use of limited violence against the adversary either to force a change in its position to achieve concessions or to punish for non-conciliatory beha-

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[99] See: I.L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management (New York, NY.: Free Press, 1989).

[100] See: Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr. "Crisis Management", in Werner Kaltefleiter and Ulrike Schumacher (eds.) Conflicts, Options, Strategies in a Threatened World (Kiel: Institute of Political Science, Christian-Albrechts-University, 1987): p.29-30.

[101] See: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: pp.73.

[102] For a typology of crisis management instruments and techniques, see: Jonathan Wilkenfeld, et al. (1988), op.cit.: pp.70-3.

[103] See: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: pp.73-98.

viour.[104] In order to achieve control over the application of military force to avoid an unwanted escalation of the crisis, it is important to recognize the limited applicability of the use of military instruments, either in isolation of other nonviolent instruments of statecraft or for the resolution of the crisis itself.[105] Although the use of military force must be closely integrated with a diplomatic strategy, avoidance of the application of military force is also appealing as an inexpensive approach in that it reduces the political and psychological costs involved in the crisis.[106]

The other physical instrument of crisis management assumes greater importance than violent means and must be considered more complex as it involves the combined use of an array of political tools of statecraft. While these can be broadly categorized within the field of diplomacy, economics, and international law,[107] their use is far more flexible and applicable to a hostage-crisis situation, than just applying military force, as they consist of a variety of combined resources, utilized within the framework of a crafted strategy to alter the behaviour of an adversary in accordance with

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[104] See: G. Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990); Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1989); and Neil C. Livingstone and Terell E. Arnold, (1986), op.cit.

[105] See: North Atlantic Assembly Political Committee Working Group on Terrorism, Interim Report, November 1986: p.39. According to Casper Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense, five basic conditions, reminicent of just war theory, must be met before applying military force to a situation: "[t]he force must be timely, appropriate, have public support, have a high probability of success and should be used only as a last resort", see: Brian M. Jenkins, "The US Response to Terrorism: a Policy Dilemma", TVI Journal (1985): p.34.

[106] See: Paul Wilkinson, The Fight Against Terrorism, Mackenzie Paper No.14 (Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute, 1989): p.15.

[107] See: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: p.77. Also see: Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for Government and International Responses to Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol.5, Nos.1-2 (January-April 1981): pp.161-93; and Paul Wilkinson, "State-sponsored International Terrorism: the Problem of Response", The World Today, Vol.40, No.7 (July 1984): pp.201-9.

one's own interests.[108] This strategy relies on a mixture of these political instruments of crisis management, either in isolation or in combination, through a process of "persuasion, coercive threats or actions, accommodative offers and concessions".[109] While the components of the political instruments of statecraft may assume a coercive nature, ranging from the rupture of diplomatic relations with states closely associated with the hostage-takers to the active apprehension and prosecution of hostage-takers in accordance with domestic or international law, or may become conciliatory, ranging from lifting economic sanctions to the release of imprisoned terrorists, the actual application of these instruments to a crisis situation involves the techniques of crisis management.[110] The exact nature of these techniques vary from crisis to crisis as crisis management is highly context-dependent, subject to the interplay of all involved actors and to an array of important factors affecting the crisis situation.[111] As a consequence, the application of a crisis management approach to hostage-situations in Lebanon will have to be adapted to the individual character of the crisis, in terms of actors as well as to the dynamics of the situation, which will determine the political constraints and opportunities under which to apply different techniques

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[108] See: Alexander L. George, "Strategies for Crisis Management", in Alexander George (ed.) (1991), op.cit.: pp.377-394.

[109] See: Alexander George, (1984), op.cit.: p.225. Also see: Russell J. Leng and Stephen G. Walker, "Comparing Two Studies of Crisis Bargaining: Confrontation, Coercion and Reciprocity", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.26, No.4 (December 1982): pp.571-91.

[110] Bell distinguishes between techniques and instruments of crisis management: a technique indicates how an instruments is used, see: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: p.73. For a useful discussion of the use of these instruments, see: Kim Richard Nossal, "International sanctions as international punishment", International Organization, Vol.43, No.2 (Spring 1989): pp.301-22.

[111] This astute observation was made by Alexander George in crisis situation involving armed conflicts between two states and can be invariably related to all other types of crisis, see: Alexander George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management", in Alexander George, (1991), op.cit.: pp.23-4.

of crisis management. While crisis management involves the choice between coercion and accommodation, or a mixture of the two, any application of crisis management techniques is dependent on the employment of a strategy.[112] As the hostage-crisis in Lebanon involved not only the Hizb'allah organisation itself but also two identifiable state-actors, Iran and Syria, the application of crisis management instruments through various techniques as well as the devising of any strategy for their employment had to be conducted at two levels, accounting for both the advancement of Hizb'allah's own interests and the interests of its two patron states. This differentiation becomes necessary as both Iran and Syria have been not only closely involved in the activities of the Hizb'allah but also have exploited their roles as intermediaries in the hostage-crisis, in which these two states have actively used their influence over the Hizb'allah to release Western hostages through coercion and accommodation, in order to gain substantial advancements in their own foreign and domestic policy agendas.[113] While the interests of Hizb'allah may converge with the interests of its patrons, as a range of demands by the organisation is presented in conjunction with those of the sponsoring states, it is necessary to clarify the salience of these demands to either adversary in order to discern the necessary strategy and direction of the application of crisis management techniques.[114] This issue underlines the existence of certain requirements of crisis management in order to select

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[112] The concept of strategy conforms to the ideas of Thomas Schelling that it needs to be broadly based in terms of how one actor attempts to get another actor to do something it might not otherwise do, see: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[113] See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: pp.42-50.

[114] In fact, the selection of a strategy must be appropriate to the character of the crisis which offers a reasonable chance of achieving required political objectives in a crisis situation, see: A.L. George, D.K. Hall, and W.E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1971): pp.228-44. The direction of crisis management instruments involves the necessary intelligence estimates of a crisis situation, see: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Crisis Management Under Strain, Science, No.225 (August 21, 1984).

appropriate instruments of statecraft, to deploy these through effective techniques, and to devise a useful strategy for their deployment with a view to achieving the successful resolution of the crisis itself in accordance with clear and obtainable political objectives.[115] Although the requirements of crisis management vary in different types of crisis, these should be regarded as general principles for more effective management of hostage-crisis situations for policy-makers rather than necessary conditions in the stricter sense.[116] These political and operational requirements of crisis management in terrorist crisis situations, within the framework of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, can be limited to: the limitation of political objectives pursued in a crisis; the limitation of means employed in pursuit of these objectives; accurate and timely intelligence on the adversary and on the crisis situation; the maintenance of communication with the adversary; access to and experience with crisis management machinery; search for a broad platform of support; and consideration of the precedent effect of crisis behaviour.[117]

The first requirement of the limitation of political objectives in a crisis for effective crisis management means that a policymaker must realize that in most cases it will be unable to achieve its maximum political objec-

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[115] See: Alexander George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations", op.cit.: pp.225-6.

[116] This point has been stressed in all major works of crisis management. For example, see: Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.23-26.

[117] These requirements of crisis management were adapted from a wide variety of sources as recurrent components without the elements of war, see: Richard Clutterbuck, International Crisis and Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1993); Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.; Harlan Cleveland, "Crisis Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs, Vol.41 (July 1962/63); U. Rosenthal, et al., (1989), op.cit.; Alastair Buchanan, Crisis Management (Boulogne sur Seine: Atlantic Institute, 1966); Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.; Hilliard Roderick, Avoiding Inadvertent War: Crisis Management (Austin, TX.: L.B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1983).

tives.[118] It can be expected that the increased intensity of the pursuit of political objectives at the expense of the adversary will be proportional to the increased will to resist by the adversary.[119] It is also necessary to define the political objectives in a crisis within the framework of opportunities and constraints in the given crisis environment for the establishment of the boundaries for the application of crisis management.[120]

A second requirement for effective crisis management, the limitation of means employed in pursuit of these political objectives, is essential in order to avoid an unnecessary escalation of a crisis situation.[121] This must entail a cost-benefit analysis that posits the risks to be run in pursuit of these political objectives as well as the costs of compromising these same objectives.[122] It is also crucial to provide various ways in which the adversary can retreat without losing face in order to provide an avenue for the resolution of the crisis itself without too much cost.[123] This may be achieved by the involvement of an international organisation or through mediation by a third party.

The third requirement of crisis management, accurate and timely intelligence on the adversary and on the crisis-situation, involves the identifica-

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[118] See: I.L. Janis, (1989), op.cit.

[119] See: Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crisis, op.cit.

[120] See: J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Management", in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: p.415.

[121] See: Alexander George (ed.), ibid.: pp.23-4.

[122] See: Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing (ed.), op.cit.; and Christopher C. Joyner, "In Search of an Anti-Terrorism Policy", Terrorism, Vol.11, No.1 (1988): pp.29-42.

[123] See: Coral Bell, "Decision-making by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.54.

tion of the adversary and the dynamics of the crisis as a fundamental prerequisite to base any application of crisis management.[124] As the failure to provide reliable and timely intelligence at the onset of the crisis and through its development leads to major errors in estimating an adversary's intentions in the crisis and reactions to employed responses, it is critical to rely on accurate and timely intelligence in order to determine whether the selection of crisis management instruments are likely to be effective in eliciting a favoured response, where to apply these instruments, and when the application of these techniques is likely to be effective.[125]

A fourth requirement of crisis management, the maintenance of communication with the adversary, is imperative as a means to avoid misunderstanding and miscommunication with the adversary, either through the means of direct channels or through an intermediary.[126] As crisis management involves the signalling of coercion and accommodation, means of communication with the adversary become more valuable during a crisis as the likelihood of being misunderstood is greater.[127] In order to utilize the crisis management instruments, even in the absence of diplomatic relations with an adversary, it is necessary to find alternative means of communication in order to maintain the balance between coercion and accommodation. Often the employment of a third party as an intermediary is advantageous in situations which pre-

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[124] See: Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle (eds.) Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985; and Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfalzgraff, Jr., Richard H. Schultz, Ernest Halperin and Igor Lukes (eds.) Hydra of Carnage (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1986).

[125] For a useful overview of intelligence as a requirement for crisis management, see: Jeffrey Smith, (1984), op.cit.; and Stan A. Taylor and Theodore J. Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management", in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.395-412.

[126] See: Charles F. Hermann, "Types of Crisis Actors and Their Implications for Crisis Management", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: pp.29-30.

[127] See: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton, CT.: Princeton University Press, 1976): p.58.

vents direct negotiations with an adversary and as a shield to delay the urgency of the crisis.[128] In order to maintain communication channels and to reduce the possibility of escalatory effects of a crisis, there must be restraint in the use of language through avoidance of ideological and moralising posturing towards the adversary and the crisis itself.[129]

The fifth requirement of crisis management, access to and experience with crisis management machinery, is essential for preparedness and effectiveness in any given crisis-situation.[130] The existence of crisis management machinery will directly affect the outcome of success or failure in any efforts to employ various instruments and techniques to a crisis and to limit the effects of the situation for policymakers.[131] In order to be effective, the crisis management machinery must serve as the operational and support requirement for crisis management and negotiations as well as be able rapidly and accurately to adapt itself to the changing dynamics of the crisis-situation.[132]

A sixth requirement of crisis management, the search for a broad plat-

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[128] See: Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in the Modern World (Medina, OH.: Alpha Publications, 1990): pp.137-9.

[129] See: Coral Bell, "Decision-making by Governments in Crisis Situations", Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.55. For a useful overview of the importance of this in the Middle East, see: Xavier Raufer, "Middle East Terrorism: Rules of the Game", Political Warfare, No.18 (Fall 1991): pp.1 & 11-13.

[130] See: Richard Clutterbuck, "Negotiating with Terrorists", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.263-287; and Uriel Rosenthal, et.al. (1989), op.cit.: p.3-33.

[131] See: Alastair C. MacWillson, Hostage-Taking Terrorism: Incident-Response Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1992): pp.81-152..

[132] It has been suggested that the functions of bureau-politics of crisis management must put crisis and crisis-relevant agencies to the test, avoid single-mindeness and group-think, and explore the potential relevance of open strategies for crisis management, see: Uriel Rosenthal, Paul 't Hart and Alexander Kouzmin, "The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management", Public Administration, Vol.69 (Summer 1991): pp.211-33.

form of support, is crucial in the domestic and international context in order to obtain endorsement of measures already implemented or planned in the future.[133] In the domestic context, it is necessary to educate the public over the inherent difficulties of responding to the crisis in order to limit the effects of the crisis on the political leadership as well as to search for political support for any course of action prior to and throughout the crisis.[134] In the international context, it is necessary to seek political support from allies for the co-ordination and implementation of any course of action in order to avoid tension and cross-purpose activity.[135]

The final requirement of crisis management, consideration of the precedent effect of crisis behaviour, must be present in order to avoid setting unfavourable precedents for similar situations in the future.[136] Apart from ensuring the legality of adopted measures in accordance with domestic and international law, the course of action adopted and implemented must be in accordance with previous agreements entered into with other states in order to avoid undermining either the credibility of promises made with allies or the actions of other states confronted by a similar crisis.[137] An assessment must be made whether the behaviour in the handling of the crisis either en-

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[133] See: Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: Lessons from the Past, in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.8-9.

[134] See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.322-30.

[135] See: Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for Government and International Responses to Terrorism", in idem (ed.) British Perspectives on Terrorism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).

[136] See: Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: Lessons from the Past", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.13-4;

[137] See: L. Paul Bremer III, "The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.255-262.

courages or discourages more crisis situations of a similar nature.[138]

These requirements of crisis management should serve as a guideline in the task of formulation of an effective strategy which takes into account the necessary diplomatic desiderata in order to reconcile, as closely as possible, the policy dilemmas of crisis management, namely the dichotomy between the protection of national interests in a crisis and avoidance of measures that would escalate any crisis to undesirable and uncontrollable levels.[139] They can also serve as a useful guideline to the evaluation of any government performance in confronting the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. Using crisis management instruments and techniques as adherence to these requirements should make for a more effective and consistent policy as well as path in efforts to resolve the dilemma of fulfillment of the duty by a state to protect its citizens abroad taken hostage without sacrifice of its national interests in the conduct of foreign policy.[140]

1.5 Methodology of Study:

In any field of academic study there exist an array of levels of analysis, each distinguished by different concepts, research questions and methodologies. While insight into any one level will illuminate a particular segment of analysis, although valuable in itself, it is the *linkage* of the findings at all levels into an aggregate whole that provides the ultimate challenge for academicians.[141] A main point of departure for this study is that the focus on a single and one-dimensional level of analysis is deficient

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[138] See: Paul Wilkinson, (1977), op.cit.: p.129.

[139] See: Alexander George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management", in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: p.23.

[140] For example, see: Clark McCauley, "Terrorism, Research and Public Policy: An Overview", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 1991): p.139.

[141] See: Michael Brecher and Hemda Ben Yehuda, "System and Crisis in International Politics", Review of International Studies, Vol.11 (1985): p.29.

as a framework for full comprehension of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. An examination of the dynamics of the crisis itself, and the application of crisis management to it, through the employment of a multi-layered case-study approach, would enable us to move beyond the position of blind men attempting to grasp the elephant.[142]

Any methodological approach to study the hostage-crisis in Lebanon would seem to lend itself naturally to the use of a systems analysis in order to discern definable and regular patterns of interaction between the constituent actors.[143] Using systems theory as a framework for understanding the hostage-crisis in Lebanon could provide academics with an analytical tool to identify, measure, and examine the interaction between Hizb'allah, Syria, and Iran within the environment of a regional subsystem.[144] Although systems theory has valuable merits as an approach with wide application, it also has some severe limitations from a foreign policy approach in dealing with the complex interactions between the triangular relationship between Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria.[145] As systems theory is geared towards determination of predictability

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[142] As aptly observed by North: "[a]s research scholars and would-be theorists in international relations we might all derive at least three useful lessons from the old fable about the blind men and the elephant. The first is that the elephant [crisis] presumably existed; the second is that each of the groping investigators at the unit and system levels, despite sensory and conceptual limitations, had his fingers on a part of reality; and the third is that if they had quieted the uproar and begun making comparisons, the blind men might - all of them - have moved considerably closer to the truth", see: R.C. North, "Research Pluralism and the International Elephant", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.11 (December 1967): p.394.

[143] For definition of system analysis, see: Anatol Rapoport, "Foreword", in Walter Buckley (ed.) Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientists (Chicago, IL.: Aldine, 1968): p.xvii. Also see: Michael Banks, "Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.13, No.4 (December 1969).

[144] For a list of propositions about regional subsystems, see: William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1 (March 1973): p.93.

[145] See: J.W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968): p.6.

in the interaction between the constituent actors within the regional subsystem as well as with the international system,[146] it has been criticized for failing to achieve this objective.[147] A major problem with systems analysis, as deliniated by Stanley Hoffman, is the construction of a model of the behaviour of interacting groups within a system on certain hypotheses, which are often questionable, abstract, and arbitrarily derived and thus far removed from reality.[148] In theory, this flaw can be effectively demonstrated by treating systems analysis as a broad-based funnel, which originates at its widest base with all actors involved in a particular hostage-crisis situation and begins with some general assumptions by policymakers, based upon preconceived notions and information about a particular actor or several actors.[149] Moving along the narrower base of the funnel towards the crisis situation itself, these general assumptions become increasingly modified in order to adapt to a particular situation or actor. However, as the move away from the broad-based original assumptions occurs through modification, it often leads to the application of a new set of assumptions, at times in total contradic-

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[146] See: Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Analysis: International Systems", in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York, NY.: The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968): p.481.

[147] See: James E. Docherty and Robert J. Pfalzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (London: Harper & Row, 1990): pp.172-5.

[148] See: Stanley Hoffman, "Theory as a Set of Questions", in Stanley Hoffmann (ed.) Contemporary Theory of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1960); and Stanley Hoffman, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory", in James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, NY.: The Free Press, 1961).

[149] In crisis situations, Richard Ned Lebow argues that policymakers are often strongly committed to particular policies from the outset of the crisis and either ignore or interpret any new information to make it consistent with own expectations, see: Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins University Press, 1985): p.183. According to Pfaltzgraff, a major problem for US policymakers is: "[t]he tendency to rely upon faulty preconceptions and assumptions about societies whose cultures, values, and foreign policy goals differ drastically from those of the United States", see: Robert Pfalzgraff, "Intelligence in the Formation of Defense Policy", in Roy Godson (ed.) Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1986): p.81.

tion to the original broad-based theory.[150] In the event that this occurs across a general area, it leads to a series of several assumptions with no linkage between each other as the original base has been perverted.[151] In practise, this can be demonstrated by the systems analysis approach adopted by the Western policymakers to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, both in terms of assumptions about the relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran as well as the applicability of traditional hostage-negotiation strategy and tactics to the situation. A major original and broad-based belief among Western policy-makers has been that Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran has been monolithic and static, as the movement was considered merely an Iranian autonom.[152] Another assumption has been that traditional counter-terrorism policy and techniques, crafted and applied to the broader areas of confronting state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East and other forms of political violence elsewhere, were not only applicable but also adequate for effective responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.[153] As these original and broad-based

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[150] For example, the question of the relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran has vacilliated between total control and total independence. For example, see: Alvin B. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States", Orbis, Vol.30 (1986): pp.149-67; Independent, August 30, 1989; New York Times, December 18, 1986; and Newsweek, February 27, 1989.

[151] The perversion of the base of original assumptions may explain some of the reasons for the failure to pursue a coherent policy throughout the hostage-crisis, see: J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Management", in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.413-42.

[152] For remarks by William J. Casey, CIA director, "International Terrorism: Potent Challenge to American Intelligence", Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 17, 1985. Also see: William B. Quandt, "The Multi-Dimensional Challenge of Terrorism: Common Misperceptions and Policy Dilemmas", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (London: Macmillan, 1990): pp.74-80. Also see: James A. Bill, "The U.S. Overture to Iran 1985-1986: An Analysis", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: p.176

[153] For the range of counter-terrorism tools, see: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.66-8. This flawed assumption has been demonstrated by Richard Clutterbuck from his statement that: "[t]hese kidnaps appear to have achieved nothing at all for Hezbollah and Iran other than an image of barbarism", see: Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World (London: Routledge, 1994): p.156.

assumptions moved towards the narrower base of the funnel in interaction with the multitiered dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, it resulted in a series of new uncoordinated assumptions for policymakers, fundamentally different from the assumption from which policy and approach were based upon originally. This problem has been eloquently echoed by Paul Wilkinson that the tendency to oversimplify and generalize tends to produce simplistic and dangerous proposals for panaceas.[154] As a consequence, this fundamental problem necessitates a different type of approach, namely that: "[i]ndividual cases rather than a series of abstract assumptions can credibly constitute the 'building blocks' of theory formation".[155] In terms of this study, using a case-study approach to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, through the employment of the same funnel from systems analysis, translates into a "bottom-up" approach without any general assumptions from the start.[156] A case-study analysis of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon involves a thorough study of the particular situation at hand and the multitiered dynamics of all involved actors [Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria], all interconnected at various levels, in order to evaluate and formulate a specific policy for a particular situation.[157] In the event that this can be done with several individual hostage-

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[154] As stated by Paul Wilkinson: "[c]ontext is all in the analysis of political violence. In view of the enormous diversity of groups and aims involved, generalizations and evaluations covering the whole field of modern terrorism should be treated with considerable reserve", see: Paul Wilkinson, "Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism and the Rule of Law", Harvard International Review, Vol.7 (1985): pp.11-15.

[155] See: George Andreopoulos, "Studying American Grand Strategy; Facets in an Exceptionist Tradition", Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.42, No.7 (July 1991): p.226.

[156] As Uri Bar-Joseph has aptly described the problem: "[t]hat the best methodology is no substitute for common sense, and that basic errors in selecting propositions and in testing them through inappropriate case-studies will yield erroneous conclusions", see: Uri-Bar-Joseph, "Methodological Magic", Journal of Intelligence and National Security (October 1988): p.134.

[157] For the various levels of analysis, see: J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.) The International System (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1961): pp.77-92.

crises with similar dynamics, the various crises can be examined for linkage and commonality which, in turn, forms the framework for a new broad theory.[158]

The employment of systems analysis with a high degree of generalization will automatically also not achieve the expected positive results or predictability of using crisis management to the hostage-crisis.[159] This can be explained by the fact that the generalizations of systems analysis fail to account for the dynamics of a continuous fluctuation in the environment vis-á-vis the interaction between Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria.[160] The configuration of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon is reminiscent of a cobweb in which the interaction of the Hizb'allah with its environment; the interaction between Hizb'allah and Iran and Syria, respectively; and the interaction between Iran and Syria superimpose themselves on the ground in Lebanon, resulting in a multitiered system of constant interaction, a process vital to the understanding of the mechanics of the hostage-crisis itself and, in particular, to the application of any crisis management techniques.[161] In order for

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[158] This can be considered in alignment with the ideas for theory formation advanced by Schmid and Jongman through case-studies to make any theoretical progress, see: Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, (1988), op.cit.: pp.61-130. For the development of theory through the use of case-studies, see: A.L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison", in P. Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy: New Approaches (New York, NY.: Free Press, 1979): pp.43-68.

[159] As stated by J.L. Gaddis: "[f]or in coping with unsimulatable situations, theory - which is only past experience projected forward - is, and should be, of little help: variables overwhelm the capacity for generalization; generalizations, if attempted, are almost certain to mislead", see: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): p.192. For example, in a memorandum for the U.S. President, entitled "Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran" (January 17, 1986), John Poindexter advocated that the approach through Iran was the only way to achieve the release of the American hostages, see: Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified Story (New York, NY.: The New Press, 1993): p.233.

[160] While identifying the *breadth* of linkages between Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria becomes essential for any analysis of the hostage-crisis, it is equally important to understand its *depth*.

[161] See: Gregory A. Raymond, "Comparative Analysis and Nomological Explanation", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et.al. (eds.) International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975): pp.41-51.

policy-makers to avoid a one-dimensional general approach, it is necessary to opt for an integrated multilayered framework of analysis as a base for a case-study from which it is possible to superimpose the instruments and techniques of crisis management used by Western governments to evaluate its effectiveness in the past and its applicability for the future.[162] A main underlying criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of crisis management is not only adherence to certain requirements of effective crisis management strategy but also its employment in accordance with the dynamics of the crisis situation itself.[163] As a consequence, in agreement with Robert Jervis, when not only many factors are at work, but also the relationships among them are varied, case studies will make the greatest contribution to understanding.[164]

1.6 Literature Review:

The literature on the hostage-crisis in Lebanon can be characterized by the discrepancy between the enormous quantity of sources available in the public domain and the relatively limited quantity and quality of analysis pursued by academics and policymakers on the subject. While the quantitative aspects of the hostage-crisis literature can be related to the sensational nature of this form of foreign policy crisis, the hostage-issue has been

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[162] As aptly described by Charles Kegley, Jr.: "[m]erely asking the question, 'Is a particular act of terrorism accounted for by domestic or external influences?' requires us to consider the possibility that it was not determined exclusively by only one set of factors, but by a number in combination. This allows complexity to be captured and serves as an antidote to inaccurate stereotypes and invalid inferences", see: Charles W. Kegley, Jr.: International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, op.cit.: p.98.

[163] As aptly stated by Coral Bell: "[c]risis management must certainly be thought of as an art or craft, not a science, and as in other arts, success may depend on the imaginative capacity to disregard rules and precedents. I would therefore be doubtful of any ambitious effort to attain a high level of abstraction in the analysis of crisis. Abstraction requires simplification: to simplify realities that are in fact very complex is to falsify them", see: Coral Bell, "Decision-Making by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel Frei (ed), (1978), op.cit.: pp.51-2.

[164] See: Robert Jervis, "Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, No.1 (Spring-Summer 1990): pp.81-101.

amplified as a subject, as it occured within a protracted civil war environment, but has also suffered from constraint by the same environment, in terms of the availability and scope of information on the hostage-taking organisations acting under the umbrella of the Hizb'allah.[165] Although the complexity of operating within the chaotic environment of Lebanon's civil war has contributed to the difficulty in accurately identifying the nature of the hostage-takers themselves, it has been compounded by the obsession of the Hizb'allah movement for operational secrecy.[166] The lack of accurate intelligence on the Hizb'allah movement, exacerbated by an abundance of rumours, has presented academic analysts and journalists with special barriers to overcome in order to provide a composite picture over the dynamics of the hostage-crisis.[167] While these inherent problems have led most academics to dismiss the possibility of unravelling the inner dimensions of Hizb'allah activity in any meaningful way for a fuller and better understanding of the hostage-crisis, it has also contributed to a countless array of unreliable Western journalistic accounts based on unconfirmed rumours and faulty assumptions.[168] The lack of in-depth analysis by academics into the Hizb'allah movement have forced them into no other avenue than reliance on systems theory to provide

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[165] While most studies on Lebanon's civil war only mention Hizb'allah in passing, the best account of the movement can be found in: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.; and Andreas Rieck, Die Shiiten und der Kampf um den Libanon, Politische Chronik 1958-1988 (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1988).

[166] For Hizb'allah's secrecy, see: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); and Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.

[167] For example, see: Daniel Pipes, "Dealing with Middle Eastern conspiracy theories", Orbis, Vol.36, No.1 (Winter 1992): pp.41-56.

[168] See: John Calabrese, "Iran II: the Damascus connection", The World Today (October 1990); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 1992); John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY.: Syracuse University Press, 1991); and Martin Kramer, "La morale du Hizbollah et sa logique", Maghreb-Machrek, 119, (janv.-mars, 1988): pp.39-59.

a general approach to a complex subject. Herein lies the inherent inconsistency of analysis for those who study these movements, such as academics, and, more importantly, policymakers, who are handcuffed into making specific crisis management decisions with only a general composite picture.[169] Like a giant jigsaw puzzle, the real dilemma for any serious scholar has been not only to decipher the valuable information from either dis- or misinformation as well as seperating facts from fiction, but also to describe and interpret the bigger picture, especially the contexts of international and domestic politics present during the crisis. The need to conduct post-mortems of Western responses to the hostage-crisis are obvious given the failure of most states to adequately minimise its impact on domestic and foreign policy affairs and its destabilizing effect during the last decade on intra-state relations in the international system which has served to perpetuate past and present Middle East conflicts.

A number of valuable scholarly contributions exists on the the transformation of the Lebanese Shi'a community from political quietism to militant activism, shedding light on the conditions that facilitiated its active political and military entry within a civil war environment.[170] Yet, this only contributed to a limited amount of direct academic analysis on the

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[169] As accurately pointed out by the eminent Middle East scholar John Esposito: "[m]ore often than not, Islamic movements are lumped together; conclusions are drawn based on stereotyping or expectation than empirical research. The problem owes less to the secrecy of individuals and organizations than to more mundane factors: the less we know, the more we tend to generalize or deductively conclude from that which we do know", see: John L. Esposito, "Presidential Address 1989 - The Study of Islam: Challenges and Prospects", Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol.24-5 (1990-1): p.5.

[170] Among the most valuable are: Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1987); Martin Kramer (ed.) Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1987); Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.) Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1986); Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr & the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and James Piscatori, The Fundementalism Project (Chicago, IL.: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1992).

Hizb'allah movement itself.[171] While few academic studies have dealt with certain aspects of Hizb'allah's practise of terrorism and hostage-taking, more recent efforts have focused on Hizb'allah's political readjustment within Lebanon's post-civil war environment.[172]

The exisiting academic literature on Hizb'allah and its use of political violence against foreigners make valuable individual contributions to the overall picture of the true nature of the movement and its activity.[173] While a few studies have concentrated on exploration of certain aspects of the movement's relationship with Iran,[174] most small fragments of information on

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[171] For a journal article on the origins of Hizb'allah, see: Shimon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizballah", The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol.46 (Spring 1988). Among the most valuable work on the movement has been conducted by Martin Kramer, mainly on the ideological dimensions of the movement, see: Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, op.cit.: pp.131-57; and Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in Martin Kramer (ed.) The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990). For a useful overview of Hizb'allah's position vis-á-vis other Shi'ite movements in Lebanon, see: Marius Deeb "Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social basis, and Links with Iran and Syria", Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): pp.683; and Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology, Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC.: Georgetown University, November 1986).

[172] A useful overview of Hizb'allah's political aspirations in Lebanon, see: A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation", Third World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (1993): pp.321-37.

[173] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, op.cit.; As'ad AbuKhalil, "Ideology and Practise of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.27 (July 1991); Xavier Raufer, Atlas Mondial de L'Islam Activiste, op.cit.; Shimon Shapira, "Shi'ite Radicalism in Lebanon: Historical Origins and Organizational, Political and Ideological Patterns", M.A. thesis (Hebrew; Tel Aviv University, May 1987); George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.) Iran and the International Community (London: Routledge, 1991); Xavier Raufer, La Nebuleuse: le Terrorisme du Moyen-Orient, op.cit.; and Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad", in E.M. Martin and Scott Appleby (eds.) Fundementalisms Observed: The Fundementalist Project, Vol.3 (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1991): pp.539-56.

[174] For the academic studies on Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran, see: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993); Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.) The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, op.cit.; Sean K. Anderson. "Iranian State-Sponsored Terrorism", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.11, No.4 (Fall 1991); Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.) The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL.: Florida International University Press, 1990); and

the dynamic interaction between Hizb'allah and its environment as well as with Iran and Syria must be extracted from other more general academic studies on Middle East politics and from domestic as well as foreign press reports.[175] The dénouement of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon in 1991, coupled with a more openess of the Hizb'allah as a parliamentary political party from 1992, has made the study of the movement not only more feasible and accessible in terms of new information about the movement than previous academic attempts to overcome the secrecy barriers of the subject, but also more salient in terms of providing a broad and in-depth understanding of a phenomenon that plagued the conduct of foreign policy for most Western governments for over a decade.[176]

In contrast to information surrounding the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, the academic literature on the subject, as opposed to theory, of crisis management and its application to specific hostage-situations in unknown environments is still in its infancy. This is due to the fact that many of these hostage-crisis situations are not fixed, rather part of an ongoing process. As such, they remain static which means that indepth comprehensive and accurate accounts of their study are subject to scrutiny. While previous analysis

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Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism R-3783 USDP (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1990).

[175] For a range of book and journal sources used in this study, see: bibliography. Over 104 newspapers and periodicals over a ten-year period were used as sources in the study of Hizb'allah and were cross-checked for accuracy with other sources. A majority of information and its validity about the nature of the movement was also confirmed in interviews (1990-94) by the author with intelligence, counterterrorism, and government officials from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Israel, Soviet Union, and Sweden. Interviews were also conducted with a number of Lebanese journalists with close contacts to highranking Hizb'allah members in August 1991 as well as with a senior PLO official with knowledge about Hizb'allah's SSA, most notably of Imad Mughniya, and with the movement's links with other Islamic organisations in April 1994. For an extremely useful exposé of the merits of using newspapers in academic and scholarly analysis, see: Paul Wilkinson, "Contributing to Broadcast News Analysis and Current Affairs Documentaries: Challenges and Pitfalls", in Cheryl Haslam and Alan Bryman, Social Scientists Meet the Media (London: Routledge, 1994): pp.138-50.

[176] For example, see: The Middle East, February 1993; and The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993).

has focused on the mechanics of using crisis management machinery to specific barricade/siege situations, the void in the academic field of using crisis management as an applied instrument and guideline for the evaluation of Western government response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon needs to be filled in order to bridge efforts to reconcile the inherent policy dilemmas displayed by the chequered history of Western government response to this form of foreign policy crisis. Apart from the inherent tendency by these Western governments to veil their past performance to the hostage-crisis in complete secrecy, the emerging literature on uncovered secret initiatives by policymakers are useful not only as a justification that performance in managing hostage-taking situations needs to be significantly enhanced in order to limit its effect in the conduct of foreign policy, but also as a rich source of information to the whole range of problems facing policymakers trying to extract themselves from these forms of crisis.[177] While the majority of these exposés, most notably the Iran-Contra debaclé, have provided fuller insights into the inner sanctum of foreign policy-making in hostage-crisis situations, few have drawn valuable lessons for the improvement of Western government responses in the past or for the future. This study intends not only to contribute to a fuller understanding of the labyrinthine complexity of the dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon but also to bridge the gap between a detailed case-study of a terrorist group, sponsored by outside states, and the evaluation of Western government responses to this foreign

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[177] The most valuable studies or reports are: Peter Kornblum and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York, NY.: The New Free Press, 1993); Executive Office of the President. President's Special Review Board 1987. Report of the President's Special Review Board [Tower Commission Report] (Washington DC.: GOP, February 26, 1987); Scott Armstrong, Malcolm Byrne, and Tom Blanton, The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras (New York, NY.: Warner Books, 1987); Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1989); Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs, op.cit.; Pierre Pean, La Menace, op.cit.; Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, Guerres Secretes au Liban (Paris: Gallimard, 1987); Yves Loiseau, Le Grand Troc: Des Otages Francais au Liban (Paris: Hachette, 1988); and Gilles Delafon, Beyrouth: Les Soldats de l'Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989).

policy crisis using crisis management as an instrument to evaluate their effectiveness and success.

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE HIZB'ALLAH IN LEBANON

2.1 Introduction:

Prior to the organisational formation of Hizb'allah in June 1982, the Lebanese Shi'a community was largely regarded, by other militias as well as outside observers, as politically irrelevant in Lebanon.[1] Apart from the Amal movement, founded in 1974 by Imam Musa al-Sadr,[2] the Shi'a of Lebanon remained a predominatly poor and disorganized religious community.[3] Although certain signs of Shi'a political and socio-economic grievances began to surface during the 1970s, through increasing politicization and involvement in a number of multiconfessional leftist and Communist groups, the mobilization of the Shi'a into militant Islamic movements was largely overshadowed by the dimensions of civil war in Lebanon. Subsequently, the emergence of Hizb'allah in 1982 was perceived by the West largely within the context of Iran's revolutionary efforts to export its revolution following Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.[4] However, it would be erroneous, as pointed out by Augustus

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[1] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Changing Actors and Leadership Among the Shiites of Lebanon", The Annals of the American Academy of Political Sciences, Vol.482 (November 1985: pp.109-121).

[2] The Amal movement [Harakat AMAL - Movement for the Dispossessed] was formed by Imam Musa al-Sadr, the president of the Higher Shi'i Islamic Council from 1969 until his disappearence in Libya in August 1978. See: Marius Deeb, "Lebanon: Prospects for National Reconciliation in the mid-1980's", The Middle East Journal, Vol.38 (1984): pp.268-9. Also see: Shimon Shapira, "The Imam Musa al-Sadr: Father of the Shiite Resurgence in Lebanon", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.44 (Fall 1987): pp.121-44.

[3] For a detailed analysis of the socio-economic status of the Shiites, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Harakat Amal (The Movement of Hope)", in Myron J. Aronoff (ed.) Religion and Politics, (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1984): pp.105-31.

[4] For prominent examples of this view, see: Alvin H. Bernstein, (1986), op.cit.: pp.149-67; Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.2-11; and Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.692.

Richard Norton, to assume that the Shi'a emerged to prominence on the Lebanese scene in 1982 as a mere creation by Iran.[5] Although recognizing that Iran played a decisive role in the emergence of Hizb'allah, from being initially a small group spearheaded by senior Shi'i clergy without a distinct organisational apparatus to a full-fledged participant in the mainstream of Lebanese politics, the political mobilization of Lebanon's Shi'i community has occurred in stages which preceeded Hizb'allah's entry as a radical and militant organisation in June 1982 by several decades.[6]

Although the actual *creation* of the Hizb'allah movement occurred in June 1982 when a breakaway faction from Amal, the *Islamic Amal* party, merged with a network of radical Shi'ites from other Lebanese movements, such as the *Lebanese al-Da'wa*, the *Association of Muslim Uluma in Lebanon*, and the *Association of Muslim Students*, the various strands of these Shi'ite movements and organisations which formed into one political entity under the umbrella of Hizb'allah could trace its origins to the activities during the 1960-70s of the Shi'i religious academies in the south of Iraq most notably in the Shi'i shrine city of Najaf,[7] and was closely associated and connected with the emergence of the Iraqi underground movement *al-Da'wah al-Islámiyah* (the Islamic Da'wa).[8] At these theological schools, a cadré of young Shi'ite

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[5] Augustus Richard Norton, (1990), op.cit.: p.121.

[6] As accurately recognized by Richard Schultz, Jr., see: R. Schultz, Jr., Iranian Covert Aggression: Support for Radical Political Islamists Conducting Internal Subversion Against States in the Middle East/Southwest Asia Region, unpublished manuscript (Summer 1994): p.17.

[7] Both Najaf and Karbala contain shrines pre-eminently holy for the Shi'is. While Najaf is the burial site of Imam Ali, thought by the Shia to have been the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammed, the shrine at Karbala contains the body of Imam Ali's son Hussein, the third Imam. For the role of Najaf and Karbala in the Shi'ite world, see: Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984): p.142.

[8] See: Hanna Batatu, "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya and al-Mujahidin", in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: p.191; and Le Monde Diplomatique,

scholars from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon were educated and influenced by radical Islamic theories from prominent senior Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a clergy.[9] As Islam does not recognize the concept of nationality, leading to the foundation of a pan-Islamic ideology, it was natural that most senior clergy and their students at Najaf and Karbala forged close and personal friendships. In fact, the activity of the Shi'i clergy in Najaf has been at the heart of most revivalist movements in the Muslim world and has contributed to most of Islam's current political vitality.[10] In particular, it was in Najaf that Rúhallah al-Khumayyní spent fourteen years in exile and where he formulated his own revolutionary brand of Shi'i Islam which was transformed into reality with the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and has subsequently served as a great source of inspiration and guidance to Lebanon's Shi'a community and to contemporary Islamic movements across the Middle East and beyond.[11] While the religious indoctrination of radical Islamic theory that the future Hizb'allah clerics received at Najaf provided the ideological foundation for

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April 1984, p.15. While the exact date of origin of al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya is unknown, Ayatollah Mahdi al-Hakim has dated the origin of the organisation to 1958 or briefly thereafter. For interview with al-Hakim, see: Impact International, April 25 - May 8, 1980.

[9] The leading Iraqi Shi'i clergy at Najaf included; Muhsin al-Hakim and Abu'l-Qasim al-Khu'i [two most senior legal authorities in Iraq]; and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. For details of Shi'i fundamentalists in Najaf, see: Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, "Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Arab World", Harvard Middle East Papers, V (1987). For an historical overview of the activity at the spiritual center of Najaf, see: Elie Kedourie, "The Iraqi Shi'is and Their Fate", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.135-7. Also see: Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Underground Shi'a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects", Middle East Studies, Vol.35, No.4 (Autumn 1981).

[10] See: Abbas Kelidar: "The Shii Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.1 (January 1983): pp.3-16.

[11] See: Chibli Mallat, Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon, Papers on Lebanon, no.7 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, April 1988). Also see: Amazia Baram, "The Impact of Khomeini's Revolution on the Radical Shi'i Movement of Iraq", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit.

the organisation and led to the forging of close-knit relationships and networks between eminent leaders of the Shi'a community across the Middle East, the involvement of Lebanese Najaf-educated clerics, who later became prominent Hizb'allah leaders, with other radical clergy in the activities of the Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-Islámiya* directly influenced the Shi'a resurgence in Lebanon.[12] In particular, the confrontation with the Ba'athi regime had a strong influence on the political mobilization of the Shi'a community.[13] Apart from an extensive campaign of repression against Shi'i clergy and institutions in Iraq, the Ba'th regime launched a policy resulting in the massive deportation of foreign clerics.[14] As a consequence, a number of Najaf-schooled Lebanese clerics returned to Lebanon where they established Shi'ite educational institutions, based on the Najaf model, to a young generation of students, indoctrinated in radical Islamic theory.[15] Other Najaf-educated clerics returned to Lebanon where they formed a Lebanese twin organisation of the Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyah*, the *Lebanese al-Da'wa* party.[16] This party, under the spiritual guidance of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein

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[12] See: Hanna Batatu, "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya and al-Mujahedin", in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.179-200. Also see: Chibli Mallat, "Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm", Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): pp.699-729.

[13] Following the Ba'ath coup d'état of 1969, the secular regime unleashed a campaign of repression against Shi'i clergy and their institutions. Fearful of the growing influence of the radical uluma in Najaf and Karbala, the Ba'ath regime directed this campaign towards curbing Islamic institutions through persecution of Shi'i clergy and imposition of strict cencorship on religious publications, see: Ofra Bengio, "Shi'is and Politics in Ba'athi Iraq", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.21, No.1 (January 1985).

[14] Amazia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'athist Iraq: 1968-89 (New York, NY.: St. Martins Press, 1991): p.138.

[15] See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.130. Also see: The Times, April 3, 1986; al-Nahar, January 19, 1989; al-Nahar, March 21, 1989; and Xavier Raufer, (1987), op.cit.: pp.160-1.

[16] See: al-Shira, March 15, 1986.

Fadlallah,[17] would later become a core component in the establishment of the Hizb'allah movement in 1982.[18] It is, therefore, essential to understand that the Najaf-background of most members of Hizb'allah's command leadership as well as the activity of Iraq's *al-Da'wa al-Islamiya*, as a forerunner to the creation of the Hizb'allah, was the antecedent to the revolutionary ideological basis of, and the organisational evolution of, the current movement in Lebanon as well as the influence of the close friendships forged between Hizb'allah clergy and members of Iran's clerical establishment.[19]

The background to the establishment of Hizb'allah can also be attributed to an array of other factors and events both within and external to Lebanon. Parallel to the activities of the religious academies in Iraq and *al-Da'wa al-Islámiya*, the Lebanese Shi'a community emerged as a major political and military force against the background of social exclusion and economic deprivation within Lebanon. While the history of the Lebanese Shi'ites had

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[17] Sheikh Fadlallah was born in 1934 in Najaf. A descendant of a family of clergymen, Sheikh Fadlallah hails from Aynata, a southern Lebanese town near the Shi'ite center of Bint Jbail. For a full biographical account of Sheikh Fadlallah, see: Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", Orient: German Journal for Politics and Economics of the Middle East, Vol.26, No.2 (June 1985): pp.147-49; and "Leadership Profile: Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly (June 23-29, 1986): p.7 Sheikh Fadlallah used the bi-montly al-Muntalaq, published by the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students, as the main vechicle to distribute his radical-activist ideas, see: Emmanuel Sivan, "Sunni Radicalism and the Iranian Revolution", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.21 (1989): p.27. In Islam and the Logic of Force, Sheikh Fadlallah used the Quranic idea of uniting believers into Hizb'allah and unbelievers into Hizb'al-shaytan as a response to the threat of Islam, see: Olivier Carré, "Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh", Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol.37, No.4 (August 1987): pp.478-501; and idem, "La 'révolution islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh", Orient: German Journal for Politics and Economics of the Middle East, Vol.29, No.1 (March 1988): pp.68-84.

[18] The *Lebanese al-Da'wa* dissolved in 1980 as it was considered to be divorced from the masses of the Shi'a community as it emphasized secrecy and underground activity, see: al-Muntalaq, October 1985.

[19] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189.

been traditionally marked by political submission and lament, the advent of Imam Musa al-Sadr's leadership over the Shi'a community transformed it into one of rebellion and social protest.[20] Yet, Shi'a activism was not only the product of political and socioeconomic grievances combined with an effective charismatic religious leadership, that used key religious symbolism to mobilize Shi'i Muslims into protest and revolutionary movements.[21] It was also profoundly influenced between 1975 and 1982 by a number of major events.[22] Apart from the breakdown of the Lebanese state signified by the onset of civil war in 1975, a number of events, both within and external to Lebanon, changed the Shi'i community from a marginal entity to a major political and military force within Lebanon. Three major events, preceeding Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, transformed the Shi'a into political action: firstly, the disappearence of the Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978 became a focal point for the mobilisation and radicalisation of the Shi'a community.[23]

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[20] See: Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit. Also see: Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a Community (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992); Salim Nasr, "Mobilisation communitaire et symbolique religieuse: l'Imam Sadr et les Chi'ites du Liban (1970-1975)", in Oliver Carré and Paul Dumont (eds.) Radicalismes Islamiques (Paris, 1984); and "Imam Musa al-Sadr", in Bernard Reich (ed.), Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa (Westport, CT.: Grenwood Press, 1990): pp.460-7.

[21] See: Fouad Ajami, "Lebanon and Its Inheritors", Foreign Affairs, Vol.63 (Summer 1985): pp.778-99; and Elizabeth Picard, "Political Identities and Communal Loyalties: Shifting Mobilization Among the Lebanese Shi'a Through Ten Years of War, 1975-85", in Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen (eds.), Ethnicity, Politics and Development (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986).

[22] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a in Lebanon", in Emile Saliyeh (ed.) Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (New York, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1990): pp.229-241.

[23] For many Shi'ites, the event was reminiscent of the Shi'i doctrine of the Hidden Iman, the occultation of the twelfth Imam who would return to restore a just order and it elevated Musa al-Sadr as a national hero. For Musa al-Sadr's disappearence, see: Augustus Richard Norton, Harakat Amal and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a of Lebanon, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1984); idem, "Political Violence and Shi'a Factionalism in Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol.3, No.2 (1983): pp.9-16; and Salim Nasr, "Roots of the Shii Movement", MERIP Reports (June 1985); and Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit.

Secondly, Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978, with the consequent loss of Shi'i lives and destruction of their homes, revitalized Amal and reinforced the image of Israel as the enemy of Islam,[14] and thirdly, the establishment of a Shi'a Islamic state in Iran, which followed Khumaynī's successful overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979,[15] reverberated among the Shi'a community in Lebanon and provided them with an effective model for political action. The manner in which these internal Lebanese events affected and contributed to the Shi'i resurgence in Lebanon, in combination with the activity by the radical clergy in Najaf and the revolutionary underground movement, the *al-Da'wa al-Islámiya*, as an antecedent to the ideological foundation and organisational framework of the Hizb'allah, were important components to the transformation of a politically assertive Shi'a community into a militant Islamic movement in Lebanon, as embodied in the Hizb'allah.[16] It also provides a vital assessment of the movement's close personal ties to their co-religionists in Iran as well as its ready assimilation of Iranian post-revolutionary Shi'ite ideological principles in the struggle against an

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[14] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a of Lebanon", Emile Sahliyeh (ed.), Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (New York, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1990); idem, "Militant Protest and Political Violence under the Banner of Islam", Armed Forces and Society, Vol.9, No.1 (Fall 1982); idem, "The Origins and Resurgence of Amal", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.; Asad AbuKhalil, "Syria and the Shiites: Al-Asad's Policy in Lebanon", Third World Quarterly, Vol.12, No.2 (April 1990); and Helena Cobban, The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon, Occasional Paper No.2 (Washington, DC.: American Institute for Islamic Affairs, 1985).

[15] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988); Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.; and R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in John L. Esposito (ed), (1990), op.cit.

[16] A whole overview of this process is provided in Appendix III.

array of enemies and in their ideological commitment to the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.

Although the political mobilization of the Shi'i community was accelerated by these factors and events, the 1982 Israeli invasion became a seminal event as it facilitated not only Iran's direct involvement with the Shi'a community, through the deployment of a small Iranian contingent to the Biq'a area of Lebanon, but also led to the proliferation of a number of radical and militant Shi'a movements. These groups merged into the establishment of a main revolutionary Shi'a movement, the Hizb'allah, an organisational umbrella composed of a coalition of radical movements under the leadership of small select group of Najaf-educated clergy.

2.2 The Influence of Israel's 1982 Invasion For the Creation of Hizb'allah

Israel's invasion of June-September 1982 and its subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon profoundly influenced the political mobilization and radicalization of the Shi'a community. Although the Lebanese Shi'a community initially welcomed Israel's decision to eradicate the PLO presence, any Shi'a euphoria soon developed into resentment and militancy following the realization that Israel would continue to occupy southern Lebanon.[27] The reaction of Amal's Nabih Berri to the Israeli invasion, seeking political accomodation rather than military confrontation to the crisis, precipitated a major split within the Amal movement by more radical officials, who were actively encouraged by official Iran to establish an Islamic alternative to Amal.[28]

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[27] For the attitude of the southern Shi'i population following Israel's invasion, see: Le Matin, July 5, 1982; Washington Post, July 10, 1982. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol.3, No.3 (January-February 1984): pp.1-19.

[28] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.182-3. The inability of the *Lebanese al-Da'wa* party to mobilize the Shi'i community into political action had led to the

A major event, which led to division within Amal's hierarchy between moderates and those adopting a hardline Islamic approach, occurred when Nabih Berri decided to join the National Salvation Committee, which was formed by president Ilyas Sarkis in mid-June 1982 to deal with Israel's occupation and siege of Beirut. For the more radical Amal members, who were inspired by Ayatollah Khumayyni and viewed Amal as the vanguard of revolutionary struggle in Lebanon based on the model and ideals of the Iranian revolution, Nabih Berri's participation was not only contrary to the line adopted by Amal at its fourth congress but also judged un-Islamic.[29] The most vocal opposition came from Husayn al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of the movement, who not only openly opposed Berri's decision but also directly challenged the Amal leadership by calling for Iranian arbitration of the matter.[30] While the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Moussa Fakhr Rouhani, requested Berri's withdrawal from the Committee, Iran's ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, became involved as arbitrator and issued a ruling on the matter in favor of al-Musawi.[31] Subsequently, when Berri did not abide by the Iranian ruling, al-Musawi resigned from the Amal movement.[32]

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decision to use Amal as a vechicle to dissimenate revolutionary ideas by infiltrating former *al-Da'wa* members into the Amal. While Iran urged increased political activism from Najaf-educated clergy, it also used its penetration of Amal, through the *al-Da'wa* trend in the movement and other radical members, to challenge the secular and moderate orientation of Amal, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Malaf al-Shira', Al-harakat al-islamiyya fi lubnan (Beirut: Dar Sannin, 1984): p.222. Also see: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.

[29] See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.12; and Malaf al-Shira, Al-harakat al-islamiyya fi lubnan [Islamic Movements of Lebanon] (Beirut, 1984): pp.222-3.

[30] See: al-Safir, June 10, 1982; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wa-al-duwali, June 10-16, 1985.

[31] See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.391.

[32] Although Amal officials claim that al-Musawi was expelled (as reported in al-Safir, July 8, 1982), most sources indicate that he simply resigned from Amal. See, Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: p.88.

Disillusioned with Amal's political moderation and actively encouraged by Iran, al-Musawi and some other members, mostly residents of the Biqa, left Amal's Beirut headquarters and moved to Baalbek.[33] When Berri participated at the first session of the six-man National Salvation Committee, on 21 June 1982, al-Musawi announced from Baalbek the creation of his own movement, the *Islamic Amal*.[34] While al-Musawi denounced Amal's Berri for having deserted the Islamic line of Imam Musa al-Sadr, which necessitated the creation of *Islamic Amal*, he clearly emphasised that *Islamic Amal* was not a rival movement but rather assumed the role of the authentic Amal.[35]

Another challenge to Nabih Berri's participation in the National Salvation Committee came from Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, Amal's representative in Iran. After unsuccessful appeals to Nabih Berri from the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Moussa Fakhr Rouhani, Iran encouraged Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin to challenge Berri's decision.[36] Simultaneous with the announcement by al-Musawi's of the creation of *Islamic Amal*, Sheikh al-Amin criticised Nabih Berri at a press conference in Teheran and announced his split from Amal.[37]

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[33] See, Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), (1988), op.cit.: p.63.

[34] See: The Times, April 3, 1986.

[35] Al-Musawi referred to Musa al-Sadr's pledge at Amal's first congress, held in Tyre in 1976, when he stated: "It is an Islamic movement and its ideology is Qur'anic Islam". Also see: Middle East Reporter, September 14, 1982.

[36] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit. p.183.

[37] See: Sharif al-Husaini, al-Shira, March 17, 1986; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; and As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.392.

As demonstrated by the defections of al-Musawi and Sheikh al-Amin from Amal, the split within Amal was symptomatic of the fact that the movement was a broad-based and loose organisation, which reflected the geographical areas it represents.[38] This was exacerbated by Berri's secular and moderate policies opposed by the more fundamentalist elements within Amal, who with Iranian support managed to not only defect but also remove a sizeable number of followers from the mainstream movement, especially in the Biq'a area.[39]

While Iran actively seized the opportunity to use its influence with pro-Iranian and leading Amal members to provoke a serious internal challenge within the movement over Berri's secular orientation, especially concerning his decision to participate with the National Salvation Committee, Israel's invasion provided Iran with another opportunity to exert direct involvement and influence over their Shi'a co-religionists in Lebanon through the deployment of an Iranian contingent of Revolutionary Guard Corps units (IRGC or Pasdaran) to the Biq'a valley. The Iranian presence in Lebanon through the Pasdaran directly contributed to ensure the survival and growth of Husayn al-Musawi's newly-created small militia, *Islamic Amal*, and the Pasdaran actively supervised in the formation and development of Hizb'allah in late 1982.[40] In the formation of the Hizb'allah, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, who served as Iran's ambassador to Syria and would later become Iran's minister of the interior, played a pivotal role as he supervised the creation of the movement

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[38] Amal was dispersed into three regions: the South; the Northern Biq'a; and Beirut. See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: pp.688-9

[39] See: al-Masira, January 3, 1987: p.12; al-Watan al-Arabi, June 6, 1987. For Nabih Berri's concern that he was losing control over Amal, see: Le Monde, September 20, 1983.

[40] See: Nader Entessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Hooshang Amirahmadi & Manoucher Parvin (eds.) Post-Revolutionary Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988): pp.69-70.

by merging the *Lebanese al-Da'wa*; the *Association of Muslim Students*; *al-Amal al-Islamiyya*; and other radical movements within the framework of the Department for Islamic Liberation Movements in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[41]

2.3 The Establishment and Expansion of the Hizb'allah

The establishment of Hizb'allah, with active Iranian supervision, in Lebanon occurred in three phases and the movement divided its operations into three main geographical areas: the Biq'a; Beirut; and the South.[42] Each of these regional divisions were lead by high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy with local background and affiliation.

Phase I: The Establishment of Hizb'allah in the Biq'a

Immediately following Israel's invasion, Iran sent a high-ranking delegation to Syria which was spearheaded by Colonel Sayyad Shirazi, the commander of the Islamic Army's Ground Forces, who urged Syria to allow the deployment of a small Iranian contingent into Lebanon and also to turn the war in Lebanon into a religious war against Israel.[43] As a result of the threat posed by the Israeli invasion, Syria signed a military agreement with Iran which allowed the entry of Iranian Pasdaran into Lebanon in return for Iranian oil supply.[44] Initially, Syria allowed the establishment of an

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[41] See: John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: pp.146-51; and Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, Les Maîtres Espions (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1994): pp.412-3. Mohtashemi had spent considerable time in Najaf with his mentor Ayatollah Khumayyni until his expulsion from Iraq and had forged close relationships with Hizb'allah members during this time, see: Independent, October 23, 1991.

[42] See: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, August 1989: Ha'aretz, September 22, 1986; al-Shiira, April 2, 1986; and al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[43] The Shirazi-led delegation arrived on the second day of Israel's invasion. See: R.K. Ramazani, (1986), op.cit.: p.156. A year earlier, in June 1981, Iranian Majlis approved legislation which allowed Iranian Pasdaran to go and fight Israel in southern Lebanon. Also see: Teheran Domestic Service, February 13, 1984.

[44] This military agreement was revealed by Ali Rida Ma'iri, an assistant to the Iranian prime

Iranian headquarters in the Syrian border village of Zebdani[45], while a second contingent of 800 Iranian Pasdaran, led by Mohsen Rafiqdoost, were deployed into Ba'albek.[46] This contingent was later reinforced by another 700 Pasdaran, who were distributed in a number of villages in the Biq'a valley. Although the Iranian contingent was largely composed of military instructors and fighters, it also included clergy from the "Cultural Unit of the Revolutionary Guards" who engaged in religious indoctrination.[47] Despite the Iranian contingent's proximity to IDF frontlines in the southern part of the Biq'a, coupled with Iran's call for a jihad against Israel, the Pasdaran did not engage in any military combat with Israel which underlined that the main nature of Iran's mission was geared towards aiding the formation of an organisational basis for a new revolutionary Shi'a group.[48]

While the Iranian Pasdaran provided regular military training to the militiamen of *Islamic Amal*, it concentrated mainly on the systematic re-

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minister. See: al-Nahar, May 23, 1986. Also see: Le Point, May 11, 1987; and Liberation, March 19, 1985. In the terms for the 1982 accord between Iran-Syria, Iran agreed to supply Syria with 9 million tons of free bartered discounted crude oil per year, see: The Economist, April 30, 1983.

[45] The Zebdani headquarters was the Pasdaran's single largest base outside Iran, see: New York Times, October 4, 1984; and Le Point, May 11, 1987.

[46] Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: pp.108-9; Radio Free Lebanon, November 21, 1982; Radio Free Lebanon, November 23, 1982; Voice of Lebanon, December 10, 1982; and Voice of Lebanon, March 17, 1983.

[47] See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.123; Ronald A. Perron, "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps", Middle East Insight (June-July, 1985): pp.35-39; al-Amal, May 19, 1984; and al-Dustur, November 6, 1989. The importance of the Iranian clergy within the Pasdaran in the process of ideological indoctrination for the Hizb'allah was discussed in an interview between the author and Martin Kramer at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, September 1, 1991.

[48] See: Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), (1988), op.cit.: p.68. Also see: L'Orient le Jour, November 25, 1982.

cruitment and ideological indoctrination of radical Shi'ites in the Biqa area.[49] Under guidance from the Pasdaran, leading Najaf-educated Lebanese clerics with local background spearheaded the formation of a nucleus leadership of the new revolutionary Shi'a organisation and began the process of recruitment and indoctrination of Shi'i residents in Ba'albek.[50] The two individuals most closely identified as the initial founders of the Hizb'allah were Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, who both founded religious institutions and were regarded as the spiritual leaders in Ba'albek.[51] These religious figures were closely supported by units of Iranian Revolutionary Guards not only in the creation of a first Hizb'allah military unit in the Biq'a but also in the imposition of Islamic fundamen-

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[49] The base of the Iranian Pasdaran for indoctrination was the Imam Muntazar School, east of Ba'albek, see: International Herald Tribune, January 10, 1984. Also see: Robin Wright, "A Reporter at Large", The New Yorker, September 5, 1988. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin was closely involved with the Iranian Pasdran in the formation of Hizb'allah, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[50] See: Shimon Shapira, Shi'ite Radicalism in Lebanon: Historical Origins and Organizational, Political and Ideological Patterns. M.A. thesis (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv University: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Affairs, May 1987). Also see: Politique International, April 1984; al-Dustur, November 6, 1989; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; and Liberation, March 29, 1985.

[51] Abbas al-Musawi, who was born in 1952 in Nabishit near Ba'albek, studied at the Institute for Islamic Studies in Tyre between 1969-70. Thereafter he moved to Najaf where he studied under Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr until his return to Lebanon in 1978. See: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Shira, March 17, 1986. Abbas al-Musawi heads the Islamic College in Ba'albek, see: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984. For biography of members of the al-Musawi clan, see: Washington Post, February 14, 1986. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, who was born in 1948 in Brital near Ba'albek, spent nine years studying theology in Najaf and briefly in Qum (Iran) and was also a student of Baqer al-Sadr. On his return to Lebanon, Sheikh al-Tufayli participated actively in the creation of the Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council and was considered to be the highest religious authority in Ba'albek. For details, see: Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; and al-Nashra, December 5, 1983.

talism on all citizens of the Ba'albek.[52] On December 26, 1982, Sheikh al-Tufayli was appointed as the "president of the Islamic Republic" in Ba'albek.[53]

Although the activities of the Iranian Pasdaran rapidly transformed the Biq'a area into a citadel for the Hizb'allah and *Islamic Amal*, they encountered resistance from segments within the Shi'i community and, more importantly, from the Lebanese armed forces.[54] A key factor in the successful transformation of the Biq'a area was Syria's acquiesence to anarchy in a territory under its control and responsibility. Apart from the Iranian-Syrian military agreement for the deployment of Iranian Pasdaran to Lebanon, Syria's lack of effort to control the activities of the various Shi'a groups, buttressed by the Iranian Pasdaran, was based on the desire not to offend its Iranian ally, especially in the confrontation with the Americans and the Lebanese government over the May 17 Agreement.[55] Although the Lebanese government severed diplomatic relations with Iran, on 23 November 1983, after many attacks by the Iranian Pasdaran on the remaining Lebanese army units in

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[52] For example, Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal, supported by the Pasdaran, enforced strict Islamic dress-codes; banned alcohol and western music; and were left free to impose their own rule through kidnapping and harassment. See: William Harris, "The View from Zahle: Security and Economic Conditions in the Central Bekaa 1980-1985", Middle East Journal, Vol.39, No.3 (Summer 1985): pp.270-86; Time, August 15, 1984; and AP, April 24, 1984. For Pasdaran military training, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[53] See: Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984. Another important Hizb'allah cleric is Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, who founded an Islamic Academy in Ba'albek, and is currently official spokesman of the main Majlis al-Shura, see: al-Nahar, February 20, 1989.

[54] For Shi'a opposition, see: al-Nahar, December 6, 1982; Voice of Lebanon, November 27, 1982. On November 22, 1982, (Lebanon's Independence Day) Pasdaran units attacked the Lebanese army barracks in Ba'albek, see: Radio Free Lebanon, November 23, 1982; AP, August 15, 1984; and Beirut Domestic Service, November 25, 1983.

[55] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey 1983-84: Also see: "The Path of Shi'ite Militancy", Middle East International (March 22, 1985): pp.6-7.

the Biq'a, Syria began only to reassert its authority and restrain the activity of the pro-Iranian groups and the Pasdaran after the abrogation of the May 17 1983 Agreement in March 1984.[56] Prior to mid-1984, Hizb'allah and *Islamic Amal*, in concert with Iran's Pasdaran, were able to rapidly recruit and indoctrinate a large number of Shi'a followers as the Iranian contingent was also supported by large Iranian funds.[57] These substantial funds were used by the Iranian Pasdaran to support the Hizb'allah in running an array of social and financial services for the Shi'a community, including religious schools, clinics and hospitals, and agricultural co-operatives, which boosted the popularity and growth of the pro-Iranian movement in the Biq'a.[58] The funds were also used to provide sophisticated armaments and military training for young Hizb'allah and *Islamic Amal* militiamen.[59] In particular, newly-

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[56] For al-Musawi's responsibility for the attacks on the Lebanese army, see: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.; and Associated Press, March 25, 1983. Lebanon's military prosecutor demanded the death penalty for 75 Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal members, most notably al-Musawi and al-Tufayli, for a March 4, 1983, ambush which killed six Lebanese army soldiers in Ba'albek. The Lebanese government issued an ultimatum to Iran to leave the Biq'a in 3 days after the October 1983 bombings, see: Beirut Domestic Service, November 25, 1983.

[57] Iran has provided Hizb'allah with an average of $10 million per month, see: al-Shira, September 19, 1988. Also see: al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987; Voice of Lebanon, October 29, 1987 - BBC/SWB/ME, October 30, 1987; Jerusalem Post, July 22, 1987. The estimates of Iranian aid to Hizb'allah in 1985 totalled $30 million and in 1987 reached $64 million. See: Middle East Defense News, May 16, 1988. For Iran's financial assistance to Hizb'allah, see: Bassma Kodmani-Darwish, `L`Iran, Nouvel Acteur Fort au Liban', Liban: Espoirs et Réalités (Paris, 1987): pp.153-64; Liberation, March 19, 1985; and International Herald Tribune, October 26, 1987.

[58] See: Jim Muir, "Buying Hearts and Minds", Middle East International, No.315 (December 19, 1987): pp.6-7; and Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.126-27. For an interview with the General Director of the Beirut office of the Martyrs' Foundation, see: al-Ahd, no.135 (January 23, 1987). Approximately $225,000 is distributed monthly to martyrs' families, see: "Details about 'Hizballah' and Its Leaders", Middle East Reporter, March 22, 1986. Also see: Financial Times, July 25, 1987; al-Dustur, October 14, 1985; Jerusalem Post, July 22, 1987; and al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987.

[59] Iran's deputy foreign minister, Hossein Sheikholislam Zadeh, supervised arms shipments and military funding for Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal in coordination with General Ghazi Kaan'an, head of Syria's Military Intelligence in Lebanon. Hizb'allah member, Mustafa Mahmud Mahdi, was responsible for the arms shipments received from Iran at the Sheikh Abdallah Barracks in the Biq'a,

trained Hizb'allah and *Islamic Amal* fighters received approximately £200 per month.[60]

Parallel to the creation of Hizb'allah and its subsequent rapid growth in the Biq'a, under the leadership of Sheikhs Abbas al-Musawi and Subhi al-Tufayli, the movement spread to other areas heavily populated by Shi'a, to the southern suburbs of Beirut and to the villages and towns in southern Lebanon.

Phase II: Hizb'allah's Expansion Into in Beirut

In Beirut, Hizb'allah's natural source for organising Shi'ites was to work within the framework of existing radical Shi'ite organisations and religious institutions. Apart from recruiting more fundamentalist elements within Amal, who followed the example set by the departure of Husayn al-Musawi and Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, the involvement of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah proved to be important for Hizb'allah as he commanded a considerable number of Shi'a followers in the Bir al-'Abed quarters of southern Beirut and wielded unrivalled influence over the activity of religious movements, most notably within the *Lebanese Muslim Students' Union* and among former Lebanese *al-Da'wa* members.[61] As one of the three most prominent Shi'i clergymen in Lebanon, Sheikh Fadlallah's active involvement in the Lebanese political arena, through his criticism of foreign intervention in Lebanon and appeals for the establishment of an Islamic Republic, led to the emergence

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see: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987. In July 1984, the Iranian Pasdaran established six military centers in the Biq'a for training Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal fighters, see: Radio Free Lebanon, July 6, 1984.

[60] See: The Times, November 14, 1987. Hizb'allah members under military training in the Biq'a earned $140 a month and junior commanders received $300 a month, see: Independent, August 3, 1989.

[61] See: Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizb'allah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.122

of Sheikh Fadlallah as the spiritual guide and the most senior cleric associated with the Hizb'allah.[62] Although Sheikh Fadlallah had rejected the claim of "spiritual guide" of the movement, his role as the leader of the defunct *Lebanese al-Da'wa* meant that his standing within the Hizb'allah was bolstered by the fact that a considerable number of its newly recruited members in Beirut had previous affiliation with the *al-Da'wa*.[63] A number of other prominent clergymen in Beirut joined the Hizb'allah, who brought with them their own memberships and followers which merged within one organisational framework.[64] Among the initial founders of the first Hizb'allah units in Beirut were Sheikh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq and Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, who used their prominent *hawzat* in Beirut *(Hawzat al-Rasul al-Akram)* as a base for recruitment, and Sheikh al-Amin, who returned to Beirut to act as Hizb'allah's official spokesman.[65] These clergymen managed to

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[62] The other two senior clergy are Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, the deputy of the Supreme Shi'i Islamic Council, and Sheikh Abid al-Amir Qabalan, the leading Shi'i mufti. For Sheikh Fadlallah's position as the spiritual guide, see: Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", op.cit.: pp.147-49; al-Shiraa, August 4, 1986; "Leadership Profile: Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly (June 23-29, 1986): p.7. For an example of Sheikh Fadlallah's views on foreign intervention and the creation of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon, see: Olivier Carré, "La 'Révolution Islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh", op.cit.: pp.68-84; and Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "Islam and Violence in Political Reality", Middle East Insight, Vol.4, Nos. 4-5 (1986): pp.4-13.

[63] For denials by Sheikh Fadlallah over his role within the Hizb'allah, see: Al-Ittihad al-Usbu'i, January 30, 1986; al-Nahar, October 3, 1984; For Sheikh Fadlallah's role as leader of al-Da'wa, see: Ali al-Korani, op.cit.: p.172; al-Muntalaq, October 1985: pp.4-12; and Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.127.

[64] For example, the Rally of Muslim Clergymen (Tajammu' al-'uluma' al-muslimin) was created in Beirut during the Israeli invasion. This group, supported by the Iranian embassy in Beirut, attempted to bridge differences between the Shi'is and Sunnis in Lebanon. When Hizb'allah organized in Beirut, members of the Rally of Muslim Clergymen joined the Hizb'allah but maintain their own identity within the movement. See: al-Nahar, June 1, 1985; al-Nahar, June 7, 1985; and al-Wahdah al-islamiyya, June 21, 1985. For its identity within Hizb'allah, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and al-Hayat, November 27, 1989. Also see: Ali al-Korani, Tariqat Hizballah fi-l-'Amal-il-Islami (The Method of Hizb'allah in Islamic Action (Beirut, 1986).

[65] See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.127. Sheikh al-Khaliq is Ayatollah Montezari's representative in Lebanon, see: al-Nahar, February 6, 1989. For information on Sheikh Nasserallah,

expand their influence not only through the religious Shi'ite academies in Beirut but also with Iranian technical and financial assistance through Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus.[66] Furthermore, the Hizb'allah was assisted by the expansion of the Iranian Pasdaran from Ba'albek into Beirut beginning in April 1983.[67]

While the influx of Iranian Pasdaran and substantial financial support, coupled with Iranian assistance in the indoctrination and recruitment process, contributed to the rapid growth of Hizb'allah in Beirut, it was also assisted by the suicide attacks against the US and French contingents of the Multinational Force (MNF) on October 23, 1983.[68] Although the identity of the bombers remain uncertain[69], the alleged complicity of Hizb'allah promoted the movement as the spearhead of the sacred Muslim struggle against foreign

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see: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; AFP, 1520 gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB ME/1309, February 20, 1992. For information on Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, see: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Independent, August 30, 1989; and Liberation, March 19, 1985.

[66] For Sheikh Fadlallah's close cooperation with the Iranian embassy in Beirut, see: Ma'aretz, January 11, 1984; and Ha'aretz, June 3, 1986. For the role of Iran's ambassador to Syria, Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi, in coordinating Iran's activity in Lebanon, see: The Economist: Foreign Report, No.1841, September 27, 1984. For Iranian elements in Beirut, see: Ma'ariv, March 27, 1983.

[67] See: Israeli Defence Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, January 1, 1984. For Sheikh Fadlallah's relationship with Iranian Pasdaran in Beirut, see: Ha'aretz, June 3, 1984.

[68] For details concerning the Hizb'allah attacks, see: Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. Admiral Robert L. Long, USN (Ret.), chairman. (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984). Also see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 14-20, 1984.

[69] According to unconfirmed reports, an Iranian (code-named Abu Musleh) was the individual responsible for the bombings. Iran's deputy foreign minister, Husayn Shaykh al-Islam, in co-ordination with the Syrian government, gave the final order to Husayn al-Musawi to execute the twin-suicide attacks. For further details, see: Foreign Report, October 27, 1983; Ma'ariv, October 28, 1983. For al-Musawi's role, see: Washington Post, February 14, 1986; Die Welt, September 22, 1984; and International Herald Tribune, September 22-23, 1984.

occupation.[70] The subsequent withdrawal of the United States and France from Lebanon was hailed as a major victory for the Hizb'allah, both in terms of establishing itself as a revered militia and in driving away foreign enemies of the Lebanese Shi'ites.[71] The Hizb'allah attacks, which went under the nom de guerre *al-Amal al-Islami*, also underlined the major role of Iranian support and guidance to the movement's activities, especially in Beirut. Apart from logistical support provided by Iran's diplomatic representatives in Lebanon and Iranian Pasdaran, Hizb'allah enjoyed close cooperation with Iran's embassy in Syria, most notably with its ambassador, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi.[72]

Phase III: Hizb'allah's Expansion Into Southern Lebanon

In southern Lebanon, Hizb'allah's expansion was hindered initially by the dominance of Amal's authority.[73] However, the failure of Amal to confront the challenge posed by Israel's military presence in southern Lebanon led to the emergence of more militant organisations in the spring of 1983, led by local radical clergy with ideological ties to Iran, which united under the banner of the *Association of the Uluma of Jabal Amil*.[74] Beneath this coalition was

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[70] See interview with Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987. Also see: Radio Free Lebanon, November 29, 1983. Also see: AFP, October 24, 1983.

[71] See interviews with Husayn al-Musawi in: al-Nahar, September 7, 1985; Voice of Lebanon, October 28, 1983; Kayhan, July 29, 1986; Le Figaro, September 12, 1986; and Le Monde, November 2, 1983. See interview with Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin: Kayhan, October 19, 1985. See interviews with Sheikh Fadlallah: al-Ittihad, June 7, 1985; and Washington Post, February 2, 1984.

[72] Mohammed Nurani, the charge d'affair in the Iranian embassy in Beirut between 1981-1985, was liaison with Hizb'allah, see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987. For Mohtashemi's role as coordinator of Iranian activities in Lebanon, see: al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, October 23, 1983; and Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984.

[73] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Israel and the South Lebanon", American-Arab Affairs, Vol.4 (Spring 1983): pp.23-31.

[74] Prominent among the local leaders were: Sheikh Rageb Harb of Jibshit; Abd al-Karim Shams

a number of small organized Shi'i cells, headed by Sheikh Rageb Harb, who both planned and carried out persistant resistance attacks against Israel.[75] These young and fire-brand clerics provided the core foundation for the extension of Hizb'allah in the South and their resistance activity not only undermined the influence of Amal in the area but also seriously challenged Israel's presence, especially through self-martyring operations.[76] Although the growth of the Hizb'allah units in the South can be attributed to the infusion of Iranian aid and the arrival of Iranian Pasdaran,[77] it was also due to the increased militancy by these units both in response to Israel's military activity and, more importantly, to raised prospects for an Israeli withdrawal.[78] This was fuelled by Israel's withdrawal from the Shouf

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al-Din of Arab Salim; and Sa'id Ali Mahdi Ibrahim of Adlun, see: Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: p.112; Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.128. Other local leaders are: A'bd al-Karim Abid Mohamad and Afif Nabalsi, see: Israeli Defense Force Spokesman, February 19, 1986.

[75] See: Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.128; Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.128-29; and Liberation, March 19, 1985.

[76] For a detailed account of Shi'ite self-martyring operations against Israeli targets, see: Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1991): pp.30-47; W.A. Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.7, No.3 (1987): pp.22-35.

[77] The links with Iran was highlighted by Sheikh Ragib Harb, who stated: "[m]y house in Lebanon is the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran". See: Ettela'at, December 21, 1983; and The Times, February 23, 1984.

[78] See: Andreas Rieck, Die Schiiten und der Kampf um den Libanon. Politische Chronik 1958-1988 (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1989); Augustus Richard Norton, "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF and South Lebanon", Middle East Insight, no.3 (1984); and Clinton Bailey, "Lebanon's Shi'is After the 1982 War", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp. 219-36. Also see interview with Sheikh Hamid Sadiqi, a representative of the Iranian embassy in southern Lebanon: al-Nahar, November 9, 1987.

Mountains in September 1983 and the decision by Sheikh Shams al-Din's to issue a *fatwa*, calling on all Muslims to conduct "comprehensive civil opposition" to the Israeli occupation, following Israel's desecration of the Shi'a Ashura commemoration in Nabatiya.[79] The deadly effectiveness of Hizb'allah suicide attacks, as manifested by the destruction of IDF headquarters in Tyre on 4 November 1983, not only earned the movement prestige among the southern Shi'a residents but also directly contributed to Israel's decision to announce a withdrawal in January 1985.[80] The military wing of Hizb'allah, which adopted the name of *Islamic Resistance (al-muqawama al-islamiyya)*,[81] claimed that Israel's withdrawal was achieved by its persistent attacks and was a major victory for Islam as well as a direct prelude for the liberation of Jerusalem.[82]

The rapid growth and popularity of the Hizb'allah in these three regions was achieved not only by a successful combination of ideological indoctrina-

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[79] On the Nabatiya incident, see: Augustus Richard Norton, External Intervention and the Politics of Lebanon (Washington, DC.: Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984): pp.12-3.

[80] Hizb'allah's Islamic Resistance claimed that the bombing had been executed by Ahmad Qusayr, see: al-Ahd, May 24, 1985; and al-Ahd, November 14, 1986. Also see: al-Amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya: Watha'iq wa-suwar [The Self-Martyring Operations: Documents and Photographs] (Damascus, 1985).

[81] Hizb'allah's military branch in southern Lebanon, the Islamic Resistance, was organized by Iranian Pasdaran officers into the structure of a regular army. This army was composed of smaller units, headed by young members who knew the territory well as they are recruited from local villages, see: Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987.

[82] For Hizb'allah's claim of credit, see: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila al-mustad áfin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb'allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World), February 16, 1985, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, op.cit.: pp.171-73. Also see interview with Iranian Ayatollah Karrubi, see: al-Nahar, June 5, 1985. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Nahar al-arabi wa-al-duwali, March 18-24, 1985.

tion and material inducement by Hizb'allah through the infusion of Iranian aid and military assistance. It was also achieved by the ability of the Hizb'allah leaders to mobilize the Shi'i community and unite it within the framework of an organisation with clearly defined and articulated political objectives. Apart from providing a social and financial infrastructure for the Shi'i community, which was deeply affected by the economic crisis exacerbated by Israel's 1982 invasion,[83] the Hizb'allah effectively gained supporters as the movement projected itself as the spearhead of the struggle against the enemies of Islam, namely the United States and Israel.[84] In this task, the Hizb'allah exploited central Shi'a symbols, especially through the Ashura commemorations, to enlist support while it displayed ideological deference to Ayatollah Khumayyní's pan-Islamic vision, in which the movement would expel foreign influence from Lebanon, establish an Islamic regime based on social justice and set the stage for the liberation of Jerusalem.[85] When Hizb'allah successfully forced the departure of the multi-national force from Lebanon and the retreat of Israel into a narrow zone in southern Lebanon, through a combination of relentless guerilla warfare and self-martyring operations, it was viewed a major achievement by Hizb'allah and Iran as no

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[83] The Biq'a area had already suffered due to the Zahla crisis of December 1980 - June 1981, see: as-Safir, June 24, 1984. The Biq'a region and southern Lebanon faced severe economic problems with the Israeli invasion and occupation. In southern Lebanon, militant Islamic movements appeared in regions most affected economically, namely the regions southeast of Sidon, north and northeast of Tyre, and west of Nabatiya. Israel's siege of Beirut led to severe economic crisis and rising unemployment. Many found employment with the local militias. See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.4; and Middle East Report, January-February 1990.

[84] See: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Ahd, March 7, 1986; Monday Morning, September 14, 1986; and "An Open Letter: The Hizballah", The Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.11-16.

[85] For the centrality of the Ashura for Hizb'allah, see: al-Nahar, October 5, 1984; Libération, September 26, 1985; and Ayla Hammond Schbley, "Resurgent Religious Terrorism: A Study of Some of the Lebanese Shi'a Contemporary Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol.12 (1989): pp.213-47. For details concerning Hizb'allah's grand strategy, see: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986.

other force had been able to accomplish the expulsion of both the United States and Israel from its soil.[86] It also boosted the popularity of Hizb'allah and enhanced the movement's credibility as the promoter of the sacred struggle against foreign occupation.[87]

2.4 The Ideological Foundation of the Hizb'allah:

Hizb'allah's radicalization of the Shi'a community, through the exploitation of Shi'i symbols, and its declared allegance to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ayatollah Khumayyní, underlined the movement's close ideological and spiritual deference to Islamic Iran's pan-Islamic vision and authority. At its simplest level, the very adoption of the name of Hizb'allah derived from the Quran, which denotes the body of Muslims, symbolizes the revolutionary character of the movement, namely that the followers of Allah *(hizb'allah)* would triumph over the followers of Satan *(hizb-ush-Shaytan)*.[88] Sheikh Fadlallah, in his book Islam and the Logic of Force, referred to this Islamic struggle between *Hizb'allah* and *Hizb-ush-Shaytan* when he called on Muslims to organize along party lines in order to safeguard the survival of Islamic values and movements against the threat of powerful secular par-

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[86] According to Ayatollah Karrubi, only Hizb'allah has been able to drive Israel out of southern Lebanon which is a major accomplishment as Israel has won the four previous wars with the Arabs, see: al-Nahar, June 5, 1985. Also see: al-Ahd, January 2, 1988; and al-Ittihad, June 7, 1985.

[87] See: James P. Piscatori, "The Shia of Lebanon and Hizbullah, the Party of God", in Christine Jennett and Randal G. Stewart (eds.) Politics of the Future: The Role of Social Movements (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989).

[88] The term Hizb'allah, meaning "the party, or adherents, of God", originally appeared in the Holy Quran (V,61/56; LVIII,22) which promises triumph for believers (Party of God) over the unbelievers Hizb al-shaytan (Party of the Devil). For further explanation of the Arabic term Hizb'allah, see: Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1988): p.123. The symbol of the Hizb'allah involves the writing of "Hizb'allah" integrated into: [1] an arm wielding an automatic assault rifle (symbol of armed movement); (2) the Holy Q'uran (symbol of Islamic faith); (3) the branch (symbol of renewal); and (4) the globe (symbol of pan-Islam and the universality of the movement).

ties.[89] In this task, the ideologists of Hizb'allah justified not only the leadership structure of the movement but also most of its activities on the Quranic tenents.[90]

A fundamental feature of the Hizb'allah leadership structure was the central role of the *uluma* within the movement. Although many Hizb'allah leaders maintained that the movement was "not an organisation, for its members carry no cards and bear no specific responsibilities",[91] the leadership of the movement was strictly composed of *uluma* and the structure based on the doctrine of "the centralism of the *uluma*".[92] Accordingly, the central role of the *uluma* in Hizb'allah concentrated all powers to a small elité clerical group which ensure strict discipline and obedience by the followers to the rulings and orders of their religious leaders, whose decisions flows from the uluma down the entire community. In this structure, decisions made by the collective clerical Hizb'allah leadership were reached through consensus and delegated to a regional *alim* of a certain district, who presents his followers with the required actions and their general outlines. In turn, the manner in which a certain act is executed is left to the initiative of these

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[89] See: Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-Jam'iyya li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi', 1981 (2nd ed.)): p.246. Also see: Malaf al-Shira, Al-harakat al-islamiyya fi lubnan (Beirut: Dar Sannin, 1984): p.298. See interview with Mohammad Nurani: Monday Morning, January 14, 1985.

[90] See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fi-l-'Amal-il-Islami (The Method of Hizballah in Islamic Action, 1986); and al-Ittihad, June 7, 1985.

[91] Instead Husayn al-Musawi claims: "It is a 'nation' of all who believe in the struggle against injustice and all who are loyal to Iran's Imam Khomeini". See: al-Nahar al-arabi wal-duwali, June 10-16, 1985. Also see: La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985.

[92] The only non-clerical member of the highest ruling body, Majlis ash-Shura, is Husayn al-Musawi, see: Independent, August 30, 1989. For the basis of Hizb'allah's organi-sational principles, see: Ali al-Kurani, al-Harakat al-Islamiyaa fi Lubnan (Beirut: 1984): p.122; and As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.394.

followers under the guidance of the *alim*.[93]

As in Iran, the prominent role of the *uluma* within Hizb'allah's leadership confers them with religio-political legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. Apart from ensuring strict obedience by followers to decisions taken by the Hizb'allah leadership, the authority of the Hizb'allah *uluma* extends all the way to the religious and political authority of Iran's Ayatollah Khumayyní, to whom they appeal for guidance and directives in cases when Hizb'allah's collective leadership fail to reach a consensus.[94] The ultimate authority and allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Khumayyní by the Hizb'allah was most evidently displayed by the publication of an official manifesto in February 1985 in which they pledged absolute loyalty to Khumayyní, whom they described as their leader *(al-qa'id)*.[95] In fact, the absence of an opinion and ruling by Ayatollah Khumayyní on certain matters created divisions within, and problems for, Hizb'allah's clerical leadership in the execution and justification of actions within the framework of Islamic law.[96] A clear example of this dilemma was Hizb'allah's practise of suicide attacks and the abduction of foreign citizens which seemed to violate some principles of Islamic law. In the former case, the problem

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[93] Ali al-Kurani, al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984). This information was confirmed in an unattributable interview with a former Israeli military intelligence officer, Tel Aviv, August 28, 1991.

[94] See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.16.

[95] See: "An Open Letter: The Hizb'allah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.111-16. For Hizb'allah's allegiance to Khomayyni, see: al-Ahd, April 24, 1987; al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984): p.150; al-Ahd, February 7, 1986; and Monday Morning, October 15-21, 1984.

[96] For a useful discussion of these problems, see: Martin Kramer, "La Morale du Hizballah et sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, No.119 (January-March, 1988): pp.39-59.

centered around the strong Islamic prohibition against suicide, and in the latter case that the seizure of innocent hostages was irreconcilable with Islamic law.[97] As Ayatollah Khumayyní has offered no formal opinion on the legality of these issues, primarily because Iran has disawoved any direct involvement, the most senior Hizb'allah leaders have offered their own interpetation in accordance with what they perceive to be the tacit approval of the Imam.[98] In this task, Sheikh Fadlallah emerged an important figure for Iran and the rank and file of Hizb'allah as he offered Iran a medium for translating and conveying the Islamic Republic's message to the Hizb'allah followers as well as providing them with spiritual guidance on specific matters. Sheikh Fadlallah's importance as the locus of spiritual and political authority of the Hizb'allah, as it's most senior and learned cleric, and his deference to Ayatollah Khumayyní was evidently revealed by the fact that he was refered to as the "Khumayyní of Lebanon".[99] While Sheikh Fadlallah occupied a crucial position as a bridge between Hizb'allah's Iranian patrons and its Lebanese clients, he also pursued his own independent agenda which created considerable tension with Iranian leaders as well as with other leading clerical leaders of Hizb'allah. A main area of contention being the feasibility of establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon in the near

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[97] See: Franz Rosenthal, "On Suicide in Islam", Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol.66 (1946): pp.24; and Mehdi Mozaffari, La Violence Shi'ite Contemporaine: Evolution Politique (Aarhus: Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus, 1988).

[98] For Sheikh Fadlallah's justification of the Hizb'allah method of suicide attacks, see: al-Ittihad, June 7, 1985; al-Majallah, October 1, 1986; Middle East Insight, Vol.4, No.2 (June-July 1985): pp.10-11; and Monday Morning, December 16, 1985. For Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin's views, see: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987; and Kayhan, February 9, 1986. For Hizb'allah leaders justification of hostage-taking, see: al-Ahd, September 6, 1985; al-Ittihad al-usbu'i, December 4, 1986; and La Revue du Liban, July 27, 1985.

[99] Sheikh Fadlallah considered this comparison a great honour, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, August 20-26, 1984.

future. Yet, this only served to highlight that Hizb'allah was not a monolithic body with total subservience to Iran but rather a coalition of clerics, who each had their own views and networks of followers as well as ties to Iran's clerical establishment.

The concentration of the supreme powers of the Hizb'allah movement in the hands of a select few, coupled with the mechanism of implementation of decisions through delegation at a lower level, reflected not only the ability of Hizb'allah to protect its leaders from persecution and elimination in an extremely hostile environment but also the depth of Hizb'allah's clerical relationship with Iran. Although leading Hizb'allah clergy and Iranian officials deny that the movement had a clearly defined organisational structure, the Hizb'allah was secretly governed on the national and local level by the supreme political-religious leadership, composed of a small and select group of Lebanese *uluma*.[100] The supreme decision-making bodies of the Hizb'allah were divided between the *Majlis al-Shura* (the Consultative Assembly), which was headed by 12 senior clerical members with responsibility for tactical decisions and supervision of overall Hizb'allah activity throughout Lebanon[101], and the *Shura* (the Deciding Assembly), headed by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and composed of eleven other clerics with respon-

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[100] For Hizb'allah and Iranian denials of an organisational structure, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); Monday Morning, January 14, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 10, 1986.

[101] See: "Hizballah", in Terrorist Group Profiles, US Department of Defense (DOD), Washington DC. (November 1988): p.15; Independent, August 25, 1989; and The Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991. The most prominent members of the Majlis al-Shura included: Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi; Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli; Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah; Sheikh Haj Hussein al-Khalil; Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin; Sheikh Muhammad Raad; Sheikh Naim Qassem, Sheikh Muhammad Fennish; Sheikh Muhhamad Yazbek; and Hussein al-Musawi. For further details, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; al-Shiira, March 16, 1986; al-Anba, November 11, 1989; Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, April 2, 1986; and al-Qabas, July 20, 1989.

sibility for all strategic matters.[102] Within the *Majlis al-Shura*, there existed seven specialized committees dealing with ideological, financial, military, political, judicial, informational and social affairs.[103] In turn, the *Majlis al-Shura* and these seven committees were replicated in each of Hizb'allah's three main operational areas (the Biq'a, Beirut, and the South). They functioned as the principal governing body on daily activity while advising the main *Majlis al-Shura* on the result of their efforts.[104] Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran was also represented in the *Majlis al-Shura* by one or two Iranian military and diplomatic representatives from either the Pasdaran or Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus.[105] The presence of Iranian officials within the *Majlis al-Shura* underlined the close co-operation and supervision of activities between Iran and Hizb'allah.[106] In fact, Hizb'allah's *Majlis al-Shura*, which was instituted by Iran's Fazlollah Mahallati in 1983, meet infrequently until 1986[107], which would suggest that

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[102] Unattributable interview with high-ranking Israeli military official, August 28, 1991. Also see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[103] See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.397. Also see: Da'var, January 11, 1987.

[104] See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.693. Also see: IGPO, July 5, 1985.

[105] Most prominent of Iranian diplomatic representatives on the Majlis al-Shura have been: Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi (Iran's Ambassador to Syria between 1981-85); Muhammad Nurani (Iranian charge d'affair in Beirut); Ali Akbar Rahimi and Mohammed Javad (diplomatic staff at Iran's embassy in Beirut), see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Independent, March 7, 1990; Israeli Defence Force Spokesman, February 19, 1986; and US News and World Report, March 6, 1989. Most prominent Pasdaran officials have been: Ahmad Kanani, Mohsen Rafiqdoost and Mohsen Reza'i, see: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; Ronald Perron, "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps", Middle East Insight, op.cit.: p.39; Paris Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; and Washington Post, July 8, 1987.

[106] See: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit. Also see: Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ma'aretz, November 10, 1987; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; Washington Post, June 21, 1985; Washington Post, August 1, 1985; and Washington Post, July 7, 1988.

[107] See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125. For meetings of Hizb'allah's Majlis al-Shura,

Iran was able to exert more direct control over Hizb'allah activity, especially during Ayatollah Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi's tenure as Iran's Ambassador to Syria.[108] However, the supreme governing body of the Hizb'allah assumed a more central and independant role with the intensity of factionalism within Iran's clerical establishment and following the death of Ayatollah Khumayyní in 1989.[109]

The composition of the *Majlis al-Shura* underlined the close personal affiliation between Hizb'allah's clerical elite and Iran's clerical establishment, as most of the members of Hizb'allah's leadership received their education at the Najaf religious academies and were influenced by Ayatollah Khumayyní, both before and after his departure in 1978. Apart from Sheikh Fadlallah, who returned to Beirut in 1966 after his studies under Abu al-Qasem al-Musawi al-Khoi, the most senior clergy of the Hizb'allah leadership are all graduates of the Najaf religious academies who returned to Lebanon in the mid-1970s.[110] Both Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, who spearheaded the formation of Hizb'allah and the movement in the Biq'a

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see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987. Hojjat ol-Eslam Fazlollah Mahallati had trained in the PLO guerilla training camps in Lebanon and was appointed Pasdaran Supervisor until his death in a 1986 plane crash, see: Nikola Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1987): p.119-21.

[108] See: New York Times, August 27, 1989; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 22, 1989.

[109] In October 1989, over 200 leading representatives of Hizb'allah and its military wing, the Islamic Resistance, assembled in Teheran for a special convention in response to major changes in the internal and external environment for Hizb'allah, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[110] As Augustus Richard Norton has phrased it: "[i]f the Shii seminaries in Najaf published yearbooks, they would contain pictures of Ibrahim al-Amin, Abbas Musawi, Hasan Nasrallah, Subhi Tufayli, and Raghib Harb (assassinated in 1984), leading figures in Hezbollah who studied in Najaf during the 1970s". Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.125. Also see: Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah", in Walter Reich (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.134-35.

area, spent respectively eight and nine years studying theology in Najaf.[111] The Najaf experience of the Hizb'allah leadership explains both the depth of personal ties between leading Hizb'allah and Iranian leaders as well as the movement's ready assimilation of, and adherence to, Islamic Iran's ideological doctrines.[112]

While Hizb'allah's structure were based on a close-knit and secret leadership and a broad based political movement[113], which made it more capable of engaging in successful covert operations while shielding the movement's leaders from elimination, the method of organisation was not only fashioned after but also closely reflected the ideological principles of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In particular, Hizb'allah's close ideological identification and its adherence to the line and authority of Ayatollah Khumayyni, was most evidently displayed by the movement's subscription to the principle of government by the *just jurisconsult (al-wali al-faqih)*.[114] Hizb'allah's adoption of this political theory, made famous by Ayatollah Khumayni during his exile in Najaf and enshrined in the 1979 constitution of the Islamic

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[111] See: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; and al-Nashra, December 5, 1983.

[112] For a brief exploration of this issue, see: Martin Kramer, "Muslim Statecraft and Subversion", Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol.8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: JCSS, 1986): pp.170-3.

[113] The secretive nature of Hizb'allah's leadership was critized by a prominent member, Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizb'allah fi-l-'Amal-il-Islami (The Method of Hizballah in Islamic Action). To become a Hizb'allah member, a prospective candidate pass through the stages of 'mobilisation' (al-Tabia) which means at least a year's education during which the individual is closely observed. After this, actual membership (al-Intizam) involves further responsibili-ties, see: al-Shira, March 17, 1987; and Ha'aretz, May 31, 1985.

[114] For Hizb'allah's adherence to the principle of al-wali al-faqih, see: Nass al-risala al-maftuha allati wajjahaha Hizballah ila al-mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: pp.167-87. Also see: al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; and al-Ahd, September 12, 1985.

Republic of Iran, makes it a duty for the movement to obey the decisions and authority of the *just jurisconsult* in the absence of the twelfth Imam.[115] As Hizb'allah clerics professed absolute allegiance to the authority of Ayatollah Khumayyní, the movement also embraced many other principles of Iran's Islamic ideology.[116] Following Iran, Hizb'allah viewed itself as a movement under the guidance of Imam Khumayyní and struggling against the injustices of imperialism and colonialism, followed by the stand of "no-East and no-West, only Islam".[117] In Hizb'allah's ideology, all disasters which have befallen the historically oppressed Muslims can be attributed to foreign imperialists, especially the United States and its regional manifestation, Israel.[118] In a dialectic fashion, Hizb'allah divides the world into the oppressors *(mustakbirun)* and the oppressed *(mustad'afun)* in which the struggle for justice and equality can only be achieved through a revolutionary process and activism.[119] To this end, an important instrument employed

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[115] For Hizb'allah's position, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, September 12, 1985; al-Ahd, December 12, 1986; al-Ahd, December 19, 1986; al-Ahd, April 24, 1987; and al-Ahd, November 7-28, 1987.

[116] Hizb'allah's allegiance to Ayatollah Khumayní was declared clearly in Hizb'allah's only published manifesto: "[w]e abide by the orders of the sole wise and just command of the supreme jurisconsult who meets the qualifications, and who is presently incarnate in the Imam and guide, the Great Ayatollah Khomeini, may his authority be perpetuated - enabler of the revolution of the Muslims and harbinger of their glorious renaissance". As reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. Also see: al-Ahd, April 10, 1987; and Le Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985.

[117] See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.694. Also see: al-Shira, December 5, 1983.

[118] For Hizb'allah's militancy against the United States, Israel and other NATO members, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, October 28-November 2, 1985; al-Ahd, July 24, 1987; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, February 9-15, 1987; and La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985.

[119] Hizb'allah's use of Iranian revolutionary rhetoric is evident in the movement's official manifesto, entitled: Open letter to the 'disinherited of Lebanon and the world, and in the daily statements of the movement's clerics. For example, see: al-Ahd, June 12, 1987.

by both Iran and Hizb'allah has been the martyrdom of Imam Husayn as a symbol for the struggle against all contemporary tyrants.[120] This symbolism used during the Ashura processions heightens the feelings of deprivation and injustice of the Shi'a community and revives annually Shi'i commitments to struggle against the enemies of Islam.[121] In order to relieve the oppressed from the socio-economic reality of the Shi'a community, as well as take revenge on the oppressors, Hizb'allah's revolutionary ideology calls for a comprehensive "*jihad*" under the guidance of leading religious officials, the *Shi'i uluma*.[122]

The central position of the *Shi'a uluma*, as the vanguard of revolutionary struggle and social change, stems from its perceived independence from political rulers and tyrants and an closeness to the oppressed Shi'a masses.[123] As such, the Lebanese *Shi'a uluma*, under the divine guidance of Ayatollah Khumayyni, has rejected the Western secular model of separation between church and state as it has caused the political, military, economic, and social ills of Muslim societies.[124] As a result, Hizb'allah's declaratory

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[120] For the political significance of the Ashura commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in both Iran and Lebanon, see: Emmanuel Sivan, op.cit.: pp.1-30. Also see: al-Ahd, August 15, 1985; al-Nahar, October 5, 1984; and Libération, September 26, 1985.

[121] See: Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, "Les Interprétations d'un Rite: Célébrations de la 'Achoura au Liban", Maghreb-Machrek, No.115 (January-March 1987): pp.5-28. For a useful historical overview of Ashura in Islam, see: Yitzhak Nakash, "An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of "Ashura", Die Welt des Islam, Vol.33, No.2 (1994): pp.161-81.

[122] Until the creation of an Islamic umma, there exists a state of war between the dar al-Islam (the empire of Islam and peace) and dar al-Harb (empire of war), see: Richard Hartmann, "Islam und Nationalismus", Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin, 1946): pp.4-47.

[123] See: al-Ahd, August 8, 1985; al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; and al-Liwa, March 16, 1984. Also see: Fuad Khuri, "The uluma: a comparative study of Sunni and Shi'a religious officials", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.23, No.3 (July 1987): pp.291-312.

[124] See: Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: 1981); Oliver Carré,

aim has been the complete overthrow of the confessional system and the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon governed by *Sharia* law.[125]

Although disagreement exist within Hizb'allah ranks over the feasibility of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon in the near future, the movement's central doctrine of rule by the just juristconsult, whereby Hizb'allah subject itself to authority from outside their own nation-state, means that it rejects the idea of nationalism.[126] Instead, Hizb'allah's revolutionary vision of the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon must be viewed within a larger pan-Islamic context.[127] As the principle of rule by just juristconsult occupies a central position within the Hizb'allah's ideology, the movement does not recognize limitations of territorial boundaries in the quest for the creation of an Islamic state.[128] On the contrary, Hizb'allah's embrace of a pan-Islamic identity means that the movement viewed itself as an extension of a worldwide Islamic movement under the guidance of Ayatollah Khumaynî.[129] As such, Hizb'allah's strategy of creating an Islamic state in

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"La 'Révolution Islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh", Orient, op.cit.: p.68-84; and al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984).

[125] See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, April 10, 1987; Kayhan, July 27, 1986; al-Shira, September 28, 1989; La Révue du Liban, January 30, 1988; and al-Safir, August 29, 1987.

[126] For disagrement within Hizb'allah ranks over feasibility, see: See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya (Beirut, 1984); Ma'aretz, February 21, 1988; Middle East Insight, June-July 1985; al-Hawadith, May 24, 1985; and al-Ahd, May 22, 1987.

[127] See: James Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): pp.114-15; and Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.105-30.

[128] See: Malaf al-Shira, al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut: Dar Sannin, 1984); Kayhan, July 29, 1986; al-Ahd, March 7, 1986; al-Ahd, May 2, 1986; Liberation, March 19, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.

[129] For statements by Hizb'allah clerics, see: al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, February 7,

Lebanon was part and parcel of a grander design which aimed to establish an "all-encompassing Islamic state" uniting the entire region.[130] Hizb'allah's grand strategy is closely linked to not only the internal conditions within Lebanon's borders but, more importantly, to regional Islamic victory in adjacent territories.[131] As a result, Iran's war with Iraq was viewed by the Hizb'allah as an Islamic struggle between "Truth and Falsehood", in which Iranian victory would not only result in Islam's triumph in Iraq but also set the stage for Hizb'allah's own victory in Lebanon.[132] After Iran's acceptance of UN resolution 598 in 1988, the Hizb'allah substituted the setback in the Gulf war, in terms of achieving its pan-Islamic vision, with the revival of Islamic fundamentalism within the Palestinian uprising *(intifada)* in the Israeli occupied territories.[133] As such, Hizb'allah viewed the internal conflict in Lebanon not within the confines of confessional strife but rather as a battle for the liberation of Quds (Jerusalem).[134]

Hizb'allah's grand strategy of implementing "the one Islamic world

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1986; and La Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985.

[130] See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; and al-Ahd, May 29, 1987.

[131] See: La Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985; and Kayhan, July 27, 1986.

[132] See: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987.

[133] See: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; and al-Anwar, January 1, 1988.

[134] See: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987; A number of sacred Islamic sites are located in Jerusalem and Palestine. The control of these by Israel is regarded by the entire Islamic world as unlawful usurpation of Islamic territory by non-Muslims and as an affront to the sanctity of these sites. See: Christine Rajewsky, "Der Gerechte Krieg im Islam", Friedensanalysen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980). Hizb'allah's uncompromising position on the liberation of Jerusalem was revealed by Sheikh Fadlallah, who stated that: "[w]e must persecute Israel for one hundred years if necessary", see: Monday Morning, September 14, 1986.

plan"[135] was set to proceed in four stages: armed confrontation with Israel; overthrow of the Lebanese regime; the liberation of any form of intervention by the Great Powers in Lebanon; and finally the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon which will be joined by other Muslims in the creation of a single Islamic community *(umma)*.[136] While the order of priorities were continously redefined by leading Hizb'allah ideologists, reflecting the changing internal and external context for Hizb'allah, the pan-Islamic premise of the movement furnished the ideological raison d'etré for most of Hizb'allah's political and military activity. As a result, Iran occupied a central role as the vanguard for Hizb'allah since it embodied both the revolutionary struggle and model that the movement itself was attempting to achieve in Lebanon.[137] In turn, Hizb'allah received major support and guidance from Iran not only because it defended and disseminated Iran's pan-Islamic message among the Shi'a community but also as it performed important functions for Iran's foreign policy in the Lebanese, regional and international arena.

2.5 Hizb'allah's Pan-Islamic Ideology and Strategy:

The pan-Islamic premise of Hizb'allah was a defining characteristic of the movement's relationship with Iran. While Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic strategy reflected the specific conditions of the Lebanese Shi'a community,

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[135] See: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; al-Majallah, July 15-26, 1987; al-Ahd, December 30, 1988; al-Hawadith, February 13, 1987; and al-Nahar, August 10, 1986.

[136] Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.119. Also see: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and Kayhan, October 19, 1985.

[137] Hizb'allah's identification with Iran has been described by a Hizb'allah cleric as the following: "The Islamic Republic is our mother; its place is in our hearts, we receive our inspiration from it", see: FBIS, February 14, 1984. According to Husayn al-Musawi: "[t]he Islamic Republic is our mother, our religion, our Mecca, our blood, our arteries", see: al-Ahd, April 10, 1987.

which led to the establishment of radical Shi'a movements, it was also predicated in a larger context on the ideological and political unity between the Hizb'allah and the Islamic revolution in Iran.[138] Apart from professing absolute allegiance to the authority of Ayatollah Khumayni, Hizb'allah's implementation of its pan-Islamic strategy was closely linked to Iran's ability to project successfully its foreign policy of exporting the Islamic revolution abroad while consolidating and protecting it at home. In a pan-Islamic context, this symbiotic relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran manifested itself in many different ways in Lebanon.

The pan-Islamic goal of liberating Jerusalem through armed confrontation against Israel had been not only a reflection of suffering by the Shi'a community, following Israel's invasion and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon, but also used by Hizb'allah as a pretext to mobilize support for the overthrow of the secular Lebanese regime and the establishment of an Islamic state.[139] Hizb'allah's successful and relentless guerilla activity, which led to Israel's withdrawal in 1985, served to enhance the movement's role as protector of the Shi'a community in southern Lebanon while it bolstered the movement's support and image, among both followers and adversaries alike, as an implacable foe of Israel and other enemies of Islam.[140] While Hizb'allah succeeded initially to fill the power-vacuum created by Israel's withdrawal

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[138] For Hizb'allah and Iranian unity, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); and Monday Morning, October 15-21, 1984.

[139] In March 1985, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din declared a "defensive jihad" that made it a religious duty for all Muslims to fight against Israel as long as it occupied any part of Lebanon, see: FBIS, March 5, 1985. For Hizb'allah's justification, see: Ali al-Kurani, Tarikat Hizballah fil-Amal al-Islami (Beirut, 1986); al-Safir, January 22, 1988; and al-Ittihad al-Ubus'i, July 2, 1987.

[140] See: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985.

at the expense of Amal, the race for the leadership of the Shi'a community in southern Lebanon was not only a battle between the Hizb'allah and Amal but also between Iran and Syria. Apart from expanding Iran's position within the Shi'a community through Hizb'allah, by a successful combination of ideological indoctrination and material inducement, Iran's support for Hizb'allah was also based on Lebanon's geo-strategic position allowing Iran to participate actively in the wider context of Middle East politics, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a stumbling block to Syria's plans for the future of Lebanon, Iran actively promoted the destabilisation of security in southern Lebanon in order to obstruct any prospects for accommodation in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[141] The anarchic situation in the South also provided Iran with a forum to expand its influence in other areas of regional politics while paving the way for the Hizb'allah in the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. As a result, both Iran and Hizb'allah were vehemently opposed to UN resolution 425, as the continous deployment of UNIFIL obstructed the jihad against Israel, and were opposed to the implementation of the 1989 Ta'if Accord, which attempted to end the civil war through the disarmament and dissolution of Lebanon's militias under Syrian auspices and

[141] For example, prior to the 1991 Madrid meeting, the increased militancy of the Hizb'allah was a joint effort with Iran to sabotage the scheduled Middle East peace process. In meetings with Sheikh Mohammad Jawad Khonsari, director of the Middle East and African department at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the Hizb'allah discussed the coordination of the resistance work to liberate the south and holy Jerusalem, see: Voice of the Oppressed 1430 gmt 9 Sept 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1176, September 13, 1991.

control.[142] In the latter case, Hizb'allah's permission to maintain their armed presence in the South and in the eastern Biq'a, as the Hizb'allah claimed to be a resistance movement rather than a militia, came as a result of a modus vivendi between Iran and Syria.[143] This underlines that the fate of Hizb'allah was not only been dependent on the regional relationship between Iran and Syria with regards to Lebanon but also that the movement's position vis-á-vis Israel reflected both its own internal agenda as well as Iran's foreign policy interests.

Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic goal of overthrowing the secular Lebanese regime was inspired by the revolutionary achievement set by the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. While Iran proved that it was possible to achieve the impossible in the face of oppression and injustice, Hizb'allah's rejection of the confessional system was based on the adherence by the movement to governance by the *just juristconsult (al-walih al-faqi)* as its ideological foundation.[144] As such, Hizb'allah viewed its revolutionary struggle in Lebanon not within the confines of geographical borders but

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[142] Hizb'allah initiated a political and military campaign against UNIFIL in August 1986 as the movement regarded the deployment as a de facto implicit recognition of Israel, see: al-Nahar, August 29, 1986; and al-Nahar, August 30, 1986. For a useful overview of Hizb'allah's position vis-á-vis UNIFIL, see: Alan James, Interminable Interim: The UN Force in Lebanon (London: The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies) No.210 (April 1988): pp.21-5. For Iran's and Hizb'allah's opposition to the Ta'if agreement, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over?", Middle East Journal, Vol.45, No.3 (Summer 1991): pp.457-473; and al-Shira, September 28, 1987.

[143] For Hizb'allah concerns over disarmament, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1030, March 26, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1068, May 10, 1991. For agreement between Iran and Syria, see: Financial Times, February 17, 1992; and Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1061, May 2, 1991.

[144] See: Muhammad Zu'aytar, Nazrah 'ala Tarh-i-l-Jumhuriyya-l-Islamiyyah fi Lubnan [A Look at the Presentation of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon], (Beirut, 1988); al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); and al-Ahd, May 2, 1986. According to Sheikh Fadlallah: "[t]he Iranian revolution proves that an Islamic movement can materialize the wishes of a nation and disproves the myth of the invulnerability of the big powers of the world", see: IRNA, January 19, 1988.

rather as a chapter in the liberation of Jerusalem and the establishment of one great Islamic *umma*.[145] Although Iran and Hizb'allah shared the conviction that Islamic rule will ultimately triumph in Lebanon, there existed divergence over methods and their feasibility, even within Hizb'allah ranks.[146] The Hizb'allah sceptics, with Sheikh Fadlallah at its fore, acknowledged that the conditions in Lebanon were both more complex and difficult than those which existed in pre-revolutionary Iran. Unlike Iran, the situation in Lebanon was complicated by the multiplicity of, and opposition by, other religious militias supported by powerful foreign involvement.[147] In particular, Syria was alarmed over Hizb'allah's emergence not only as its agenda was directly juxtaposed with Syria's hegemony in Lebanon but also as the movement posed the only real challenge to Asad's attempts to resurrect the defunct Lebanese political system.[148] As Syria showed uncompromising determination to reassert its suzerainty over Lebanon, especially within the framework of the Ta'if Accord[149], Hizb'allah readjusted its grand strategy of overthrowing the secular regime through armed struggle towards a willingness to participate in mainstream Lebanese politics, a move partly inspired by the decisive

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[145] See: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; al-Ahd, March 6, 1986; al-Ahd, April 10, 1987; Le Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.

[146] See: al-Ahd, May 22, 1987; Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.: pp.36-7.

[147] See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight, June-July 1985.

[148] In October 1989, Iran assembled Lebanese groups in Teheran to counter the Ta'if meeting, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and al-Hayat, November 27, 1989. For Iranian and Hizb'allah opposition, see: Andreas Rieck, "A Peace Plan for Lebanon?: Prospects After the Taif Agreement", Aussenpolitik, No.3 (1990): pp.297-309.

[149] See: al-Watan al-Arabi, November 24, 1989.

victory in the Algerian elections of the Muslim fundementalist grouping, the *Islamic Salvation Front*.[150] Hizb'allah's readjustment demonstrated not only flexibility within the movement in the post-Khumayyní era, with diminished Iranian support and limited maneuverability in the post-civil war period in Lebanon, but also its susceptibility to changes in the regional and international arena. As such, the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon has been dependent on Hizb'allah's willingness to abandon violence and patiently work within the Lebanese confessional system, and perhaps more importantly, by tempering their pan-Islamic zeal both in terms of expansion into Syria and willingness to accept the present *Pax Syriana* in Lebanon. In addition, the prospects for an Islamic state in Lebanon, and to a larger extent, the future of Hizb'allah is predicated on not only Iran's ability to sustain its support for the movement but also the direction of Islamic Iran's foreign policy and the intensity of factionalism within Iran's clerical establishment.

Hizb'allah's third pan-Islamic goal of "the liberation of Lebanon from any form of political and military intervention by the Great Powers"[151] mirrors Islamic Iran's foreign policy of exporting the revolution as well as the continued Shi'a predicament in Lebanon and the country's vulnerability to foreign interests and foreign intervention.[152] While the Lebanese Shi'a

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[150] See: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 3 Jan 92 - BBC/SWB ME/1269, January 4, 1992. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah on the possibility of Hizb'allah participation in democratic elections: AFP in English 2038 gmt 8 Jan 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1274, January 10, 1992.

[151] See: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and Nass al-risala al-mafthua allati wajjahaha ila al-mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, op.cit.: pp.167-87. Also see: al-Ahd, March 11, 1986; al-Qabas, June 15, 1988; al-Hawadith, February 13, 1987; al-Nahar, August 10, 1986; and al-Ahd, April 21, 1988.

[152] For Islamic Iran's ideological worldview, see: R.K. Ramazani, (1988), op.cit., For a useful overview of Lebanon's militias and their foreign support, see: Hussein Sirriyeh, (1989), op.cit.; and Kenneth J. Alnwick & Thomas A. Fabyanic (eds.), Warfare in Lebanon (Washington, DC.: National Defense University, 1988).

community's anti-Western hostility was deeply rooted in the historical legacy of Western colonialism and intervention, it was exaggerated by the dynamics of a protracted civil war; the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation; and the imposition of Western political and military order.[153] Hizb'allah's hostility was most evidently demonstrated towards the American and French participation in the Multinational Forces, deployed after the massacres in the West Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. The movement regarded the MNF not as a peace-keeping force but rather as support and protection for the Gemayel regime.[154] In an effort designed to end any foreign military presence and political influence, the Hizb'allah executed a series of suicide attacks, with active support from Syria and Iran, most notably against the headquarters of the US and French contingents which led to their withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984. Hizb'allah also spearheaded the armed campaign which led to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf Mountains and Beirut to a security zone in South Lebanon, while it contributed to the political climate that pressured Amin Gemayel to abrogate the 1983 May 17th Agreement with Israel.[155] Although the Hizb'allah was successful in precipitating the American and Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon, which earned the movement prestige and revolutionary credence among the Shi'a community, the achievement also underlined the close co-operation and convergence of interests

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[153] See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June-July 1985); and La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985. Also see: Martin Kramer, Hezbollah's Vision of the West, Policy Papers, No.16 (Washington DC.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1990).

[154] See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.252.

[155] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey 1983-84: pp.545-65; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; and David A. Korn, "Syria and Lebanon: a Fateful Entanglement", The World Today (August/September, 1986): pp.137-142. Also see: Edgar O'Ballance, "The Lebanese Sea of Trouble", RUSI (December 1984): pp.40-3.

between Hizb'allah, Syria, and Iran. For Syria, the activity of Hizb'allah's activity contributed to the re-emergence of Syria's political and military dominance in Lebanon after its influence had been diminuated by military defeat, following Israel's 1982 invasion and occupation of areas formerly controlled by Syria, and by foreign intervention, which secured US hegemony in Lebanon.[156] For Iran, Hizb'allah's activity provided it with both a means to participate actively militarily in the Arab-Israeli conflict by proxy and a forum to confront Israeli and American designs in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East.[157]

In the aftermath of the American and Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon, Iran's and Syria's operational co-operation against common enemies, through Hizb'allah as their proxy, was pursued through the abduction of foreign citizens, both as a means to influence Western policy in Lebanon and as a way to exploit the issue for their own foreign policy agendas in the regional context. While the abductions by Hizb'allah forced the departure of Westerners from Lebanon, particularly after the January 1987 incidents, the decision to initiate the hostage-takings was primarily based on Iranian foreign policy calculations and interests, which in most cases coincided with Hizb'allah's own agenda.[158] As such, both Iran and Hizb'allah were able not

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[156] See: Patrick Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1988); Moshe Ma'oz, Assad: The Sphinx of Damascus (New York, NY.: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); and R. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985) (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1986).

[157] See: al-Nahar, September 7, 1985; Washington Post, February 1, 1984; La Revue du Liban, July 27, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, February 9-15, 1987.

[158] In January 1987, Hizb'allah abducted an unprecedented number of ten Western citizens which prompted the Syrian armed intervention into West Beirut a month later. It seems the arrest of one Hizb'allah member in West Germany and another one in Italy precipitated some of the abductions.

only to remove military and political obstacles for the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon but also use the hostage issue against their common enemies for a wide array of political purposes. Although the hostage-takings by Hizb'allah and its militancy against Western targets was motivated by the movement's own agenda in Lebanon, Iran was able to use the foreign hostages as a useful instrument to extract political, military and financial concessions from the Western world.[159]

Syria's acquiesence to Hizb'allah's practise of hostage-taking, as it controled the Biq'a area from which Iranian Pasdaran and Hizb'allah operated, was been based primarily on its relationship with Iran. Although Hizb'allah activity was indirectly serving Syria's ambition for local hegemony, by the expulsion of foreign military and political presence from Lebanon, the hostage issue has also proved to be a liability for Syria. In its vigorous efforts to establish a *Pax Syriana* in Lebanon, Syria's close identification with the Hizb'allah undermined its ability to attract economic support from the Western world and shed its regional and international isolation. In addition, the abduction of foreign hostages by Hizb'allah, coupled with the movement's attacks against Israel, not only damaged Syria's ability to control activity within Lebanese territory but also threatened to bring Syria into an armed confrontation with Israel in and over Lebanon.[160] As a result, Syrian protection and support for Amal was used to counter any uncontrolled Hizb'allah militancy against Israel and in the struggle for

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[159] For Sheikh Fadlallah's own admission of the linkage between the Western hostages and regional/international affairs, see: al-Mustaqbal, December 17, 1988; and al-Mustaqbal, March 3, 1988.

[160] See: William Harris, "Syria in Lebanon", in Altaf Gauhar (ed.) Third World Affairs 1988 (London: Third World Foundation, 1988).

control of the Shi'a community in southern Lebanon. This intra-Shi'i warfare over the control of Shi'i regions in Lebanon culminated in February 1988, following the kidnapping of US Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, and continued until January 1989 when Iran and Syria cosponsored an agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah, which outlined their respective "zones of influence".[161] However, Syrian restraint towards, and at times complicity with, Hizb'allah hostage-taking activity underlined that Syria's tolerance was based on its larger converging interests with Iran, as long as an enlarged Iranian role in Lebanon through Hizb'allah did not threaten either to spill over the borders and encourage Islamic movements to challenge the Asad regime nor limit Syrian designs in Lebanon, rather than based on bowing to regional and international pressures.[162]

Hizb'allah's final pan-Islamic goal of linking the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon as part in the creation of a single Islamic community underscored not only that Hizb'allah's revolutionary struggle rejected the principles of Arab and Persian nationalism, which divides the Muslims along artificial lines, but also that the movement is incorporated in a larger Islamic strategy led by the *just jurisconsult* Ayatollah Khumayyni.[163] As the

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[161] For information on the kidnapping and Amal-Hizb'allah clashes, see: Ha'aretz, February 18, 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1988; Ma'aretz, February 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 28, 1988. For the agreement between Hizb'allah and Amal, see: Radio Free Lebanon 0545 gmt 15 Jan 89 - BBC/SWB/ME/0360, January 17, 1989; Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 28 Jan 89 - BBC/SWB/ME/0371, January 30, 1989.

[162] In fact, Syria's ties to Iran and Amal conferred the Alawites with legitimacy within the Shi'a community following Imam Musa al-Sadr's fatwa in its support, see: Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit. For Shi'a relations with Syria's Alawis, see: Martin Kramer, "Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.237-254.

[163] For Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic goal, see: Kayhan, July 29, 1986; al-Ahd, February 7, 1986; al-Ahd, February 28, 1986; al-Ahd, March 7, 1986; al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, April 10, 1987; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; and Kayhan, July 27, 1986.

Hizb'allah viewed itself as a component of a larger movement composed of all downtrodden Muslims who struggle under the guidance of Ayatollah Khumayyní against the injustices of imperialism and colonialism, the movement's wider ideological outlook was a reflection of a total identification with Ayatollah Khumayyní's revolutionary vision and the vanguard position of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[164] Within this ideological framework, Hizb'allah viewed Arab nationalism as a complete failure since it has led not only to Arab disunity, especially in terms of a resolution to the Palestinian issue, and Arab accommodation with Israel, as exemplified by the 1979 Camp David Accords, but also to worsened socio-economic difficulties for the Arab masses due to weak and illegitimate Arab political systems.[165] A manifestation of Hizb'allah's rejection of Arab nationalism was the way in which the movement viewed the war between Iran and Iraq. In accordance with Iran, Hizb'allah adopted a pan-Islamic justification for Iran's continuation of its war with Iraq, in which the problem was viewed as a wider battle against the usurper of the *dar al-Islam* rather than within the confines of a conflict between the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the Iranian government.[166] When Ayatollah Khumayyní's accepted UN Resolution 598, Hizb'allah abandoned the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime as a necessary first step to restore control of Quds (Jerusalem) to the *dar al-Islam* and substituted it with the role of

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[164] See: "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, op.cit.: pp.111-16; al-Ahd, May 2, 1986; al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, September 12, 1985; and Ali al-Kurani, al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984).

[165] See: al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, February 28, 1986; al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; and al-Nahar, June 5, 1985.

[166] See: Mohssen Massarrat, "The Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism versus Pan-Arabism", in Hooshang Amirahmadi & Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.28-41; and al-Ahd, August 29, 1985.

Islam in the Palestinian uprising.[167] Hizb'allah's concentration on Palestine reinforced the movement's pan-Islamic premise as the struggle for the liberation of Palestine not only drew attention to the dominance of the United States and Israel in the region but also because it was directly predicated on the liberation of Jerusalem.[168]

In a similar manner, Hizb'allah also rejected Persian nationalism in order to bridge the differences between Arab and non-Arab Muslims under the unified banner of Islam.[169] As such, Hizb'allah functioned as an important conduit for Iran in efforts to spread Ayatollah Khumayyní's universalist message across ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian barriers, both in terms of disseminating Iran's political views and in educating the Arab masses about its Islamic ideology.[170] Hizb'allah's refutation of secular nationalism, be it Arab or Iranian, as an alien ideology derived from the West and harmful to the unity of the Islamic *umma*, means that the movement repudiates the idea

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[167] For Ayatollah Khomayyni's justification for acceptance of UN Resolution 598, see: al-Muntalaq, September 1988. Also see: al-Nahar, July 22, 1988; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; and al-Ahd, January 23, 1987.

[168] For Hizb'allah solidarity with the Intifada, see: al-Ahd, March 18, 1988; al-Anwar, January 1, 1988; al-Ahd, September 9, 1988; al-Ahd, September 16, 1988; al-Diyar, December 4, 1989; Ha'aretz, January 25, 1989; and Monday Morning, June 18, 1989.

[169] See: David Menashri, "Khomeini's Policy Toward Ethnic and Religious Minorities", in Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1988). Also see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, February 28, 1986; and al-Ahd, September 5, 1986.

[170] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Islamic Iran and the Arab World", Middle East Insight, Vol.5, No.3 (1987); and Shireen T. Hunter, (1987), op.cit.: pp.741-2.

of Iran as a distinct state with its own interests.[171] While Iranian pan-Islamists have been compelled by the constraints of realpolitik to subordinate the radical philosophy of the revolution for the pragmatic interests of the state (as exemplified by the Iran-Contra affair and the acceptance of a cease-fire with Iraq in 1988), the Hizb'allah showed greater loyalty to the pan-Islamic vision not only by the fact that it can afford to be as a revolutionary movement but also as it has been dependent on pan-Islam for its sense of purpose and mission.[172] However, Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic revolutionary struggle has been predicated on Islam's triumphs in adjacent territories, spearheaded by the Islamic Republic of Iran and under the guidance of the Ayatollah Khumayyní.[173] As a result, while Iran has been forced to demonstrate greater flexibility in its revolutionary dogma, in terms of the transnational notion of a *Pax Islamica*, in order to safeguard the very survival of the Islamic regime, Hizb'allah not only veiled its own revolutionary struggle in pan-Islamic motifs but also linked it to the success of Iran's ability to export its revolution.

While Hizb'allah's ruling elité viewed its revolutionary struggle in Lebanon through the ideological prism of pan-Islam, which was reflected by the linkage of its activity with Islamic Iran's foreign policy within Lebanon

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[171] Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.118. Also see: al-Ahd, May 2, 1986; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.

[172] For the compromise between Khumayyní's ideological dogma and reality, see: David Menashri, "Iran: Doctrine and Reality", in Efraim Karsh (ed.), The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications (London: Macmillan, 1989). For Hizb'allah's difficulty in justyfying Iran's secret contact with the US and Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598, see: al-Ahd, November 21, 1986; al-Ahd, July 24, 1987; al-Ahd, July 31, 1987; al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; al-Nahar, July 22, 1988; Ma'aretz, August 24, 1988; al-Ahd, September 9, 1988; and al-Ahd, September 16, 1988.

[173] See: Le Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985; Kayhan, July 29, 1986; al-Ahd, March 7, 1986; and al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984).

and on the regional and international level, the rank and file of the movement was also deeply affected by the realities imposed by Lebanon's confessional problems, as manifested through, and exacerbated by, a decade of protracted warfare.[174] As such, Hizb'allah viewed the possibility of the final implementation of a *Pax Islamica* as occurring only through the completion of all constituent elements or parts of Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic strategy.[175] Unlike Iran, the confessional nature of Lebanon[176], given the opposition from an array of other religious communities with powerful foreign support, had forced Hizb'allah to readjust the movement's pan-Islamic priorities in accordance with the varying conditions of feasibility.[177] Although all pan-Islamic goals of the Hizb'allah are intertwined with each other, the Islamic resistance in southern Lebanon, and its eventual extension into the liberation of Jerusalem, served as a basic premise for the movement's political actions.[178] Apart from providing Hizb'allah with legitimacy, the movement's resistance activity and pursuit of the liberation of Jerusalem, was not only secondary to but also the pretext for a more pressing concern:

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[174] See: Marius Deeb, (1984), op.cit.; and Fouad Ajami, (1985), op.cit.

[175] See: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.; al-Shira, September 28, 1987; al-Ahd, May 22, 1987; and al-Shira, November 4, 1987.

[176] See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June-July, 1985); and al-Hawadith, May 24, 1985.

[177] See: al-Ahd, March 7, 1986; al-Ahd, November 14, 1986; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; and Le Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985. Also see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[178] See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); and Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1983. Also see: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987; and al-Ahd, March 18, 1988; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.

the struggle for Lebanese power and the establishment of Islamic rule.[179] As such, Hizb'allah's resistance activity can be seen as an instrument to enhance the movement's popularity and credibility among the Lebanese Shi'a community in a wider effort to achieve the implementation of an Islamic regime. Hizb'allah's order of priorities must also be seen within the context of conducive elements that determines the level of achievement of these pan-Islamic goals in the near future. In terms of the liberation of Jerusalem, Hizb'allah recognized that the elimination of Israel was a protracted pan-Islamic strategy extending over many years.[180] Hizb'allah's re-orientation towards, and solidarity with, the Palestinian Intifada, through its support and co-operation with the *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad*, was a manifestation of raised expectations within the movement for the near accomplishment of the liberation of Jerusalem.[181] Similarly, the Hizb'allah has been divided over the feasibility for the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic republic in the near future.[182] The division within Hizb'allah ranks reflected not only scepticism over the applicability of the Iranian model within Lebanon's multiconfessional system but also the necessity of a readjustment in the

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[179] For Hizb'allah resistance activity as a means to the establishment of an Islamic state, see: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.: 35-37.

[180] See: al-Safir, May 13, 1986; and Monday Morning, September 14, 1986.

[181] See: Elie Rekhess, "The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990b), op.cit. pp.189-206; Robert Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising", Policy Focus, No.7 (October 1988); Jean-Francois Legrain, "Islamistes et Lutte Nationale Palestinne dans les Territories Occupés par Israël", Révue Francaise de Science Politique (April 1986): pp.227-47; and Alain Navarro, "Palestiniens: l'Expansion Islamiste", Les Cahiers de l'Orient, No.7 (1987): pp.51-66.

[182] See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Muntalaq, May 1986; al-Muntalaq, September 1987; al-Shira, September 28, 1987; and George Nader, "Interview with Mohammad Husein Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June-July 1985).

movement's pan-Islamic strategy to ensure its own survival, especially in the post-Khumayyní period and under the Ta'if Accords with the extension of a *Pax Syriana* in Lebanon.[183] As a result, Hizb'allah's military activity was confined to southern Lebanon, where it escalated its attacks against Israel in order to justify its armed existence as a resistance movement rather than a militia,[184] while the movement's political wing participated in the autumn 1992 Lebanese elections, in which they scored a surprising electoral success.[185]

2.6 Conclusion

An understanding of the historical antecedent to the formation of the Hizb'allah is a fundemental prerequisite for the application of crisis management to the hostage-crisis for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Najaf origins of the movement and its subsequent development within Lebanon provides a frame of reference for the extent to which the close personal friendships forged between future Iranian and Hizb'allah leaders have been instrumental not only in governing the Lebanese movement's ideological deference to Iran but also that its past and present activities are guided

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[183] See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; al-Shira, November 11, 1989.

[184] For insights on Hizb'allah concerns over disarmament, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1030, March 26, 1991. Also see interview with Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli: Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1068, May 10, 1991. For Hizb'allah's justification of retaining its armed presence in the south, see: Voice of Lebanon 1715 gmt 21 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1053, April 23, 1991; Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 4 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1064, May 6, 1991. In the first six months of 1991, Hizb'allah attacks against South Lebanese Army (SLA) and IDF targets in southern Lebanon doubled compared to the same period the previous year, see: The Jerusalem Report, August 5, 1991: p.38.

[185] Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi stated "[h]e could envisage the day when Hizb'allah would elect deputies to parliament and have cabinet ministers to defend the interests of Lebanese Shi'a", see: Financial Times, February 17, 1992. Also see: al-Hayat, February 14, 1991. Hizb'allah and Amal, joined together by a "Liberation List", won overwhelming victory in southern Lebanon of the 23 seats contested. See: Financial Times, September 9, 1992.

more by the evolution of a series of complex clerical networks than bound by a duty to profess absolute obedience to any Iranian orders. Apart from the close allegiance between Hizb'allah's clerical elite and members of Iran's clerical establishment, rooted in their shared theological experience at Najaf and previous assistance to the anti-Shah revolutionary activity, the rank and file of the movement is also far from monolithic but rather bound and guided by a complex web of relationships, extending from the elité clerical leadership down to ties with family, neighbourhoods and individual religious clergy.[186] This has meant that the movement's members have been not only divided over loyalty to Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic vision over their collective Lebanese identity but also over the nature of authority, as manifested through different allegiances by its members and frequent disagreements within the movement as well as towards its relations with Iran.[187] The existence of varying allegiances within the Hizb'allah and towards Iran are essential to gauge to the advantage of crisis management at a general level, to understand the depth and breadth of clerical networks, and at a more specific level, to monitor fundemental divisions within the movement and areas of disagreements with Iran. This determines the willingness of Hizb'allah to act on behalf of Iranian orders or more independently.

Secondly, the evolution of the movement and its ideology within the Lebanese environment is also a necessary prerequisite for comprehending its

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[186] See: Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizb'allah", in Walter Reich (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.134; and Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-Amal al-Islami (Beirut, 1986).

[187] See: Ahmad Nizar Hamzah, Conflict in Lebanon: A Survey of Opinions and Attitudes (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1986). In this study only 3.4% of the Shii respondents named the Islamic Republic of Iran as the most favourable political system in Lebanon. Also see: Hilal Kashan, Antiwestern Perceptions among Lebanese Shii College Students (Ph.D. dissertation, American University of Beirut, 1987).

animosity towards the West, as displayed by its violent behaviour, and its wider relationships with other internal actors, most notably within the Shi'a community. However, the anarchial Lebanese environment has led to a latent tension between Hizb'allah's ideological vision for Lebanon, and its recent exercise of caution and restraint in safeguarding its existence and achievements as a militant Islamic movement. Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity provides the most revealing area in which these constraints and opportunities have been displayed.

CHAPTER THREE: HIZ'BALLAH AND THE HOSTAGE CRISIS WITHIN LEBANON

Introduction:

In a ten-year period, between 1982 and 1992, a number of enigmatic and obscure organisations, seemingly loosely or indirectly affiliated with the Hizb'allah organisation in Lebanon, not only launched spectacular and deadly suicide operations against the Western presence but also engaged in political acts of hostage-taking of Western citizens. While the shadowy Hizb'allah movement has denied any active involvement in these acts of terrorism, though applauding these operations in concert with Iran, its self-proclaimed main enemies of the United States, Great Britain, and France,[1] collectively sustained casualties of over 300 individuals killed by the organisation while it has held over 45 citizens in captivity for various lengths of time over a ten-year period.[2] While the chaos and insanity of the fifteen-year protacted civil war in Lebanon contributed to the difficulty in extricating the Western hostages from among a multitude of confessional militias, it also led to the association and image of Hizb'allah in the West as a crazy and fanatic religious group, bent on martyrdom through suicide-operations, and engaged in the random abduction of foreigners, under the assumed strict control and direction of Iran's clerical establishment.[3]

Although the West crossed paths in Lebanon with the radical and mili-

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[1] For Hizb'allah's manifesto, see: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila mustad áfin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World), February 16, 1985. Also see: "An Open Letter: Hizballah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.111-16.

[2] See: Ariel Merari and Yosefa (Daiksel) Braunstein, "Shiite Terrorism: Operational Capabilities and the Suicide Factor", TVI Journal, Vol.5, No.2 (Fall 1984): pp.7-10; and Con Coughlin, Hostage (London: Little and Brown, 1992).

[3] For Iran's domination, see: Alvin H. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States", Orbis, Vol.30 (Spring 1986): pp.149-167; Daniel Pipes, "Death to America in Lebanon", Middle East Insight, No.4 (March/April 1985): pp.3-9; Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.; and Robin Wright, (1985), op.cit..

tant aspects of the Shi'a community and the Islamic Republic of Iran through Hizb'allah's abductions of foreign citizens, the highly complex nature of the internecine conflict involving an array of confessional warring factions with foreign patrons, prevented a clearly defined understanding of the Hizb'allah's motives and organisation from emerging. In the murky underworld of Lebanon's civil war, where conduct was regulated by regional, national, sectarian and family interest, the nature of the shadowy groups, acting under the umbrella of Hizb'allah, further compounded the complexity of the hostage-crisis and the involvement of Iran. The ambiguous nature of the organisation itself and its affiliation with Iran lead to an array of misperceptions and miscalculations by Western governments and outside observers in their attempts to both understand and confront the prolonged hostage-crisis in Lebanon, at times with disastrous consequences.[4]

The problems of looking at hostage-taking by the Hizb'allah are:

Firstly, any complete analysis of the hostage-crisis requires a comprehensive understanding of Hizb'allah as an organisation and its *relationship* with elements within Iran's clerical establishment as well as *interaction* with Iranian institutions.[5] While information provided by hostages on their release yield limited insight into the way in which the Hizb'allah operates as well as interacts with Iran,[6] previous analyses dismiss the possibility

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[4] For example, see: Abbas Alnasrawi and Cheryl Rubenberg, Consistency of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Gulf War and the Iran-Contra Affair (Belmont, MA.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates Press, 1989); Michael C. Hudson, From Lebanon to "Irangate": A Review of Recent American Middle East Policy, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University (Washington, DC.: CCAS Publications Program, 1987); Nicolas Tenzer and Franck Magnard, (1987), op.cit.: pp.90-101.

[5] As advanced by John Calabrese: "[f]rom the days of Musa Sadr, the Iranian-Lebanese Shia connection has been built on a network of personal contacts and relationships. Hezbollah as an 'organisation',Iran as a 'state', and the 'association' between them have been, and still are, impenetrable and unfathomable: knowing what they are depends on knowing who the key personalities are within them, and how these key players relate to one another", see: John Calabrese, "Iran II: The Damascus Connection", World Today (October 1990): p.189.

[6] The hostages' accounts reveal limited insight on the workings of the Hizb'allah, see: Benjamin M. Weir, "Reflections of a Former Hostage on Causes of Terrorism", Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.9, No.2 (Spring 1987): pp.155-161; Benjamin and Carol Weir, Hostage Bound,

of unravelling the dimensions of the network of personal contacts and relationships between Hizb'allah and Iranian clergymen.[7]

Secondly, the approach of viewing both Hizb'allah and Iran as unitary rational actors is not only based on a misconception but ignores the political reality of the internal dimensions of Lebanon's civil war as well as the permanent projection of clerical factionalism in Iran onto the Lebanese arena through the Hizb'allah's activity, especially in terms of hostage-taking of foreigners.[8] As a militant Islamic organisation, the Hizb'allah is far from a uniform body as displayed by continuous *clerical factionalism* between its leading members over the direction of the movement and the constant readjustments of the movement's position within Lebanon's warring factions.[9] This is influenced by the dynamics of the relationship with Iranian

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Hostage Free (Philadelphia, PA.: Westminister Press, 1987); Charles Glass, Tribes With Flags (London: Secker & Warburg, 1990); David Jackobsen, Hostage: My Nightmare in Beirut (New York, NY.: Donald I. Fine, 1991); Jackie and Sumni Mann, Yours Till the End (London: Heinemann, 1992); Terry Waite, Taken on Trust (London: Routledge, 1993); Terry Anderson, Den of Lions (New York, NY.: Crown Publishers, 1993); and Roger Auque, Un Otage A Beyrouth (Paris: Filipacchi, 1988).

[7] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; and Martin Kramer, "La Morale du Hizbollah et sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, no.119 (Janauary-February-March 1988): pp.39-59. According to Martin Kramer: "[t]he role of Iranian support and guidance in Hizballah's growth is obvious, although the precise linkages still constitutes secret histroy", see: Martin Kramer, (1990), op.cit.: p.105. According to Augustus Richard Norton: "[m]uch ink has been spilt on the issue of who leads Hezbollah, but the only conclusive statement that can be made is that the movement subsumes many factions and cliques", see: Augustus Richard Norton, (1990), op.cit.: p.128. Also see: Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.90-106.

[8] See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; and Le Monde, October 25, 1986. The importance of understanding clerical factionalism in Iran was aptly described by Graham Fuller: [t]he Iranian political and social systems decree that one deal with personalities and not with institutions, the personal relationship to this day transcends any formal or institutionalized relationship", see: Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe": The Geolpolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991): p.20. Also see: Reza M. Behnam, Cultural Foundations of Iranian Politics (Salt Lake City, UT.: Utah University Press, 1986).

[9] See, for example, Hizb'allah's 1989 conference: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, November 30, 1989 [hereafter cited as FBIS]; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

clerical factions and institutions at work within the movement.[10]

Thirdly, the hostage-crisis is also influenced by multi-layered Lebanese, regional, and international politics.[11] This influence affects the process of the hostage-crisis as Westerners are abducted and released for *individual* Hizb'allah motives or *in convergence* with Iranian and, to a lesser extent, Syrian interests.[12]

Fourthly, in terms of Hizb'allah as an organisation, it requires deciphering the affiliation and position of the shadowy sub-groups under its umbrella, who claim responsibility for these abductions. It is also necessary to examine the nature and dynamics of Hizb'allah's *command leadership* and its *decision-making* with reference to the process of hostage-taking of Westerners.

Finally, this must be balanced against the dynamics of Hizb'allah's institutionalized relationships with Iran and Syria in Lebanon in accordance with internal Lebanese factors and external developments, creating opportunities and constraints in the practise of hostage-taking.

3.2 Use of Covernames and Concealment in Hizb'allah Abduction of Foreigners

A myriad of different names have appeared attributed to organisations claiming responsibility for the abduction of Western hostages in Lebanon. This has led to a great deal of confusion among policymakers and academics alike in attempts to determine whether the perpetrating group has acted with-

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[10] Although valuable, other studies on the hostage-crisis have examined the organisation and Iran's involvement in a vaccum without regard for the impact of clerical factionalism in Iran on Hizb'allah activity and the internal environment in which Hizb'allah operates, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, Anat Kurz, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, JCSS Memorandum no.25 - August 1988 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1988). Also see: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit.: p.105; and FBIS, December 5, 1989.

[11] As briefly demonstrated by: Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 1992).

[12] See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; al-Shira, March 16, 1986; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

in the framework of Hizb'allah's umbrella, semi-independently, or completely independently.[13] As these groups have managed to maintain almost complete secrecy surrounding their identity and operations, any determination of their status and affiliation to Hizb'allah is a difficult task.[14] Nevertheless, it is necessary and, more importantly, possible to discern the raison d'etré by the perpetrating organisation for the concealment of their identity as well as their connection with the Hizb'allah.

Although Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, debunked the idea of *taqiyya*, or dissimulation, when he urged his followers to organize along party lines with the publication of Islam and the Logic of Force in 1976,[15] the Shi'a tradition of concealment, as practised by the Shi'a minority when religiously persecuted in ancient times, has been frequently used by the Hizb'allah when operating covertly, especially in the abduction of foreigners.[16] The use of different cover names during covert operations has shielded the Hizb'allah movement and its leaders from perse-

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[13] For useful examples of the confusion within academia and policy circles in analysing these groups, see: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, "The Kidnappings in Lebanon", TVI Report, Vol.7, No.4 (Fall, 1986): pp.2-11; Robin Wright, In the Name of God (New York, NY.: Simon & Schuster, 1989): p.160; and John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY.: Syracuse University Press, 1991): p.253. For a cross-section of the shifts and different views within the mass media, see: Ma'aretz, December 16, 1983; Ha'aretz, April 16, 1984; Le Point, July 30, 1987; Independent, August 30, 1989; Sunday Times, June 30, 1985; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990.

[14] This secrecy was even critized by a leading Hizb'allah member, see: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); and Davar, January 30, 1987. For the difficulty in mapping individual responsibility with Hizb'allah's command leadership see: Martin Kramer, "La Morale du Hizbollah et sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, no.119, (janv.- mars, 1988): pp.39-59.

[15] See: Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-Jam'iyya li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi', 1981): p.246-7.

[16] See: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Keyhan, February 12, 1987. For the practise of taqiyah, see: Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.28-29. For a useful exposition of concealment in Shi'ism, refer to lecture by Prof. Etan Kohlberg, Hebrew University, delivered at the Tel Aviv University, May 23, 1993. Also see: Xavier Raufer, "Ideology of Radical-Islamic Groups: European Implications", in Brenda Almond (ed.) Terrorism in the New Europe (Hull: The University of Hull, May 15-17, 1992).

cution and reprisals, while the the cover names themselves have been employed not only to confuse the enemy but also to signify the currents inside the movement at a particular time.[17] While the nom de guerre of *Islamic Jihad*, or "Holy War", emerged in connection with Hizb'allah's multiple suicide operations in 1983, many Hizb'allah leaders openly admitted both involvement in *Islamic Jihad* operations[18] and that the organisation did not exist as such, but rather was merely a "telephone organisation",[19] whose name was "used by those involved to disguise their true identity".[20] The use of the term *Jihad* by the Hizb'allah denoted the combat activity against the enemies of Islam and lent revolutionary credence to the movement in the eyes of the Shi'ite community.[21] It was also used by the Hizb'allah in the abduction of foreigners from 1984 until mid-1985, which symbolically reflected the movements accelerated efforts to expel any Western political and military presence in Lebanon.[22] Therefore, it was not surprising that *Islamic Jihad* as a cover name ceased to be used in new abductions of foreigners after Hizb'allah's

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[17] See: Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i, February 26, 1987; al-Dustur, November 6, 1989; and al-Dustur, September 11, 1989.

[18] For statements by Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, admitting involvement, see: al-Nahar, September 7, 1985; La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985. According to al-Musawi, "in his eyes it is an honour to be called terrorist whenever the goal is to harass and expel oppressors", see: Nehzat, July 18, 1985.

[19] See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.19. For statement by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: Monday Morning, October 15-21, 1984.

[20] For statement by Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, see: Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i, December 4, 1986. For a statement by Hussayn al-Mussawi, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 10, 1985; and Ha'aretz, July 30, 1985. Also see: Ma'aretz, December 16, 1983; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Associated Press, October 5, 1984; Ma'aretz, April 2, 1985; Le Point, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, August 28, 1988; Nouveau Magazine, July 23, 1988; and New York Times, November 13, 1986.

[21] The Quranic notion of *Jihad* signifies the battle against evil and means the struggle to spread and to defend Islam, see: Patrick J. Bannerman, Islam in Perspective (London: Routledge, 1988). For Hizb'allah's use of *Jihad*, see: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit..

[22] See: Kayhan, July 29, 1986; and Liberation, March 16, 1985.

successful victory in forcing not only the earlier departure of the Multi-national Forces but also Israel's partial withdrawal from Lebanon in June 1985.[23]

The emergence of another organisation, using the nom de guerre of the *Revolutionary Justice Organisation*, in claiming responsibility for the abduction of foreigners during 1986, signified Hizb'allah's concern over the imprisonment of a number of its members in France as most abductions involved French citizens. When the cover name was used in abductions of three Americans in September-October 1986, (shortly preceeding the revelation of the US-Iran arms-for-hostages deal) it was believed the name signified a split within the Hizb'allah which mirrored Iranian clerical factionalism.[24] As later revealed by the confinement of these French and American hostages with other hostages held by *Islamic Jihad*, coupled with the unified position within Hizb'allah rejecting any US-Iranian rapproachement,[25] this was not the case.

Apart from a single abduction of a French citizen in January 1987 by the *Revolutionary Justice Organisation*, Hizb'allah's shift towards using the nom de guerre *Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine* reflected not only solidarity with imprisoned Hizb'allah and Shi'ite Palestinians held by Israel but also the movement's political and military orientation in the struggle for the "liberation of Jerusalem" through armed confrontation in southern Lebanon.[26] This also signified Hizb'allah's co-operation with *Fatah* elements

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[23] See: Washington Post, February 1, 1984; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; and al-Dustur, March 31, 1985.

[24] See: New York Times, November 13, 1986; Davar, January 11, 1987; New York Times, December 18, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1987.

[25] For Hizb'allah's opposition, see: al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd, November 21, 1986.

[26] For the use of the name: *Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine*, see: Ma'aretz, November 3, 1987; and Ma'aretz, November 4, 1987.

instituted in 1987 for the escalation of the armed confrontation with Israel.[27] While a number of other cover names were subsequently used by Hizb'allah, the common feature of these names signified the release of imprisoned Hizb'allah members, as evident by the use of the names *The Organisation for the Defense of Free People* or *Holy Strugglers for Freedom*, and, more importantly, symbolized the fate of the Shi'a as a deprived and humiliated community, as evident by the use of the title *Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.*[28] This is evidently apparent by the choice of name of Hizb'allah's own radio station, *Voice of the Oppressed.*[29]

While the employment of these cover names by Hizb'allah reflected the concerns and direction of the movement in Lebanon, the fact that many hostages were held with other hostages taken by different groups is evidence that the names have not necessarily represented separate and different groups, either within or outside the organisational structure of the Hizb'allah.[30] In fact, as demonstrated by the testimony of many former hostages, the core group of kidnappers of Western hostages seemed only involved a dozen men from various Hizb'allah clans, most notably the Mugniyya and Hamadi clans.[31] The fact that these two clans have been continuously pin-

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[27] See: Ma'ariv, November 3, 1987; Richochets, Israel Defence Forces Spokesman, July 1990; al-Diyar, December 4, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 5, 1989; and International Herald Tribune, January 1, 1990.

[28] See: International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988.

[29] Hizb'allah's radio station, *Radio of Islam - Voice of the Oppressed*, is broadcasted from the Biq'a valley and was first monitored on January 14, 1986. Another radio station, Voice of Faith, which appeared in November 1987, is supportive of Hizb'allah, see: BBC/SWB/ME/0024, December 12, 1987. For information on Hizb'allah's TV-station al-Manar (the Beacon), see: Sunday Times, July 19, 1992.

[30] See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: pp.11-2. Also see: Washington Post, September 21, 1984; and Washington Post, August 1, 1985.

[31] See: Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1989; Independent, January 28, 1987; Israeli TV (NER), February 16, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Independent, October 9, 1991; and Le Figaro, December 4, 1989. For difficulty in exactly pin-pointing the identity of hostage-takers, see: Independent, December 1, 1991.

pointed by authorities for alledged involvement in the kidnappings of foreigners underlines not only the importance of the Lebanese clan system as a basis for Hizb'allah's organizational structure and activity but also the personal and ideological loyalty within the Hizb'allah to higher religious authority. This has led to an extremely close-knit structure capable of engaging in successful covert operations.[32] While clan loyalty[33] and individual clerical relationships have provided the basis for the movement and the framework for its hostage-taking activity,[34] it functions under the jurisdiction of a centralized and well organized leadership structure.[35] Although leading Hizb'allah clergy deny the movement has a clearly defined organisational structure, the Hizb'allah is secretly governed on the national and local level by a supreme political-religious board of authority, composed of a small and select group of Lebanese *uluma*.[36] Due to the absolute nature of the supreme religious authority of the Hizb'allah's command leadership, all decisions or activities relating to hostage-taking by regional or clan

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[32] For IDF Military Intelligence (AMAN), Hizb'allah has been admittingly difficult to infiltrate as the whole organisation is based on religious or family bonds. Apart from its "compartmentalized ultrasecretive cells and cryptic communications", full-fledged membership meant being born into the organisation, see: Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1992): p.319; and Newsweek, February 27, 1989: p.27. Also see: Associated Press, October 5, 1984.

[33] See: Nouveau Magazine, July 23, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, May 15, 1988; and Hurriyet, November 17, 1986.

[34] See: Le Quotidien de Paris, January 27-28, 1990; and Le Point, June 1, 1987. For recruitment procedure as a non-operational Hizb'allah member, see: Ha'aretz, May 31.

[35] See: Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Associated Press, October 5, 1984.

[36] For Hizb'allah leaders denial of an organisational structure, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); Monday Morning, January 14, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 10, 1986.

leaders had to be approved at the highest level.[37] As a result, the idea that Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity were pursued independently by individual Hizb'allah clans, either without the knowledge of leading clergy or not through a chain of command, ignores not only the nature of religious authority exercized over every aspect of the movement's activity but also the institutionalized cooperation and coordination with both Iran and Syria in some of these operations.[38] Although a number of abductions of foreigners were initiated in alignment with individual interests of certain Hizb'allah clans, all acts of hostage-taking also coincided with the collective interest of the organisation as a whole. As a consequence, it is necessary to analyse the nature of Hizb'allah's command leadership, its decision-making structure as well as policy with specific reference to the movement's hostage-taking activity. It is also necessary to examine the nature of the involvement of Iranian clergy and institutions at work in Lebanon as well as Syrian military and intelligence services in terms of their influence within and over Hizb'allah activity.

3.3. Hizb'allah's Command Leadership[39]

On the first anniversary of the martyrdom of Sheikh Ragheb Harb, on February 16, 1985, Hizb'allah publicly announced for the first time not only its ideological progamme and strategy in a manifesto[40] but also appeared as

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[37] Unattributable interview with senior Israeli official in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel, August 1991. Also see: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and al-Shira, March 17, 1986.

[38] According to Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), all the different names adopted by Hizb'allah are merely covers for its operational wing, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Keyhan, February 12, 1987. For *Islamic Jihad* operations, see: Associated Press, October 5, 1984.

[39] For a chart of the organizational structure of the Hizb'allah, see: Appendix I.

[40] For a full text of the manifesto, see: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila al-mustad áfin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World), reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.167-87.

a unified organisation with the assembly of the entire Hizb'allah command leadership.[41] Although the Hizb'allah revealed only the position of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin as its official spokesman, the movement was secretly governed by a supreme religious body, which had been instituted by Iran's Fazlollah Mahallati in 1983, fashioned after the upper echelons of Iran's clerical leadership.[42] The composition of the highest authority within this supreme religious body in Lebanon reflected the core group of individual Shi'ite clergy who assisted in the foundation of the Hizb'allah in July 1982.[43] Apart from the position of Husayn al-Musawi, as the only non-clerical member of the religious leadership, the composition of Hizb'allah's leadership council was also reflective of the religious authority of these clergymen in terms of their command of a substantial number of followers in each of the three main Shi'ite regions in Lebanon: the Biq'a; Beirut; and southern Lebanon.[44]

In the Biq'a area, the Hizb'allah is headed by Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli,[45] who was considered the highest religious authority in Ba'albek as evident by his nomination of "president of the Islamic Republic" in Ba'albek in 1984,[46] and Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi. Along with Husayn al-Musawi and his

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[41] Hizb'allah's command leadership attended a meeting in Shyah in the southern suburbs of Beirut, where Hizb'allah's official spokesman read the "Open Letter Addressed by the HizbAllah to the Oppressed/Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World", see: Gilles Delafon, Beyrouth: Les Soldats de l'Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989): p.90.

[42] See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125. Also see: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit..

[43] See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.114-30; and al-Dustur, November 6, 1989.

[44] See: Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and Davar, January 11, 1987.

[45] Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli was born in 1948 in the village of Brital in the Bi'qa area, see: Davar, November 25, 1983; al-Nashra, December 5, 1984; Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984; al-Dustur, March 31, 1985; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; and International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987.

[46] See: Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984; and al-Nashra, December 5, 1983.

Islamic Amal,[47] these two religious figures occupied not only the most senior positions as spiritual leaders of the Hizb'allah in the Biq'a but also played an instrumental role as liaison with the Iranian Pasdaran and Iran while maintaining overall control over Hizb'allah's irregular and semi-regular military units.[48] While Sheikh al-Tufayli acted as the head of the Hizb'allah headquarters in Ba'albek and was the movement's main liason with Teheran,[49] Sheikh al-Musawi was operational head of the Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus and the movement's military wing, the *Islamic Resistance*.[50] Another main leader of Hizb'allah military activity in the Biq'a was Sheikh Husayn al-Khalil, who maintained a senior position within Hizb'allah's command leadership.[51] Al-Khalil acted as operational co-ordinator of Hizb'allah's military units in co-operation with *Islamic Amal*, which was subordinated organisationally within Hizb'allah from 1984 onwards under the personal

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[47] See: Ma'aretz, October 24, 1983; Ma'aretz, November 6, 1983; al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 10, 1985; Washington Post, February 14, 1986; Nouveau Magazine, November 15, 1986; al-Nahar, November 14, 1986; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Safir, August 17, 1987; al-Shira, August 8, 1988; and Independent, August 30, 1989. Husayn al-Musawi is related to Abbas al-Musawi, see: Davar, November 25, 1983.

[48] See: al-Dustur, March 31, 1985; al-Ittihad, December 4, 1986; International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987; La Revue du Liban, January 30, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988; Independent, August 30, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[49] See: International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988. Sheikh Tufayli is also responsible for Hizb'allah's financial assets, see: Ha'aretz, August 21, 1991.

[50] See: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; Davar, October 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, October 2, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and Independent, March 7, 1990. Al-Musawi was head of internal security within Hizb'allah SSA from 1983-85. In late 1985 until April 1988, al-Musawi was the head of the Islamic Resistance. For Hizb'allah-Pasdaran military march in Ba'albek, see: Radio Monte Carlo, December 14, 1987. In June 1987, Abbas al-Musawi was transferred from Biq'a area to Tyre to set up hideouts to which hostages could be transferred from Beirut and to weaken Amal's position in the area, see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987.

[51] See: Independent, August, 30, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989. Sheikh Husayn al-Khalil became also the head of the Politbureau in 1989/90, see: Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993).

authority of Husayn al-Musawi.[52] A lesser Hizb'allah figure in the Biq'a with an important function was Mustafa Mahmud Madhi, who is responsible for the arms shipments received from Iran at the Sheikh Abdallah barracks.[53]

In Beirut and the surrounding suburbs, the Hizb'allah was headed by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the overall spiritual guide of the movement, who mustered a substantial following within exisiting Shi'ite religious institutions and other Shi'ite radical movements.[54] While Sheikh Fadlallah denies any official position within Hizb'allah, the main leaders were seen to be Sheikh al-Amin, the official spokesman,[55] and Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, who mustered support from the activists within the movement and were operationally responsible for certain aspects involving military and terrorist operations.[56] Both Sheikh al-Amin and Sheikh Nasserallah acted as

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[52] See: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1987; and al-Anba, February 18, 1984. The military leader of Islamic Amal is Abu Yahia, see: Associated Press, November 18, 1983; Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, February 3, 1984.

[53] See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987. According to Augustus Richard Norton, the Hizb'allah had in 1985 M-113s [armored personell carriers], Sagger anti-tank weapons, GRAD rockets, armored personal carriers and artillery pieces, see: Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, op.cit.: p.205 n.36. Also see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.147. On November 28, 1991, the Hizb'allah used for the first-time a shoulder-held SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile made in Eastern Europe at an Israeli C-47 aircraft, see: Foreign Report, December 5, 1991. It also uses ex-Soviet Sagger-3 anti-tank missiles and American M72 light anti-tank weapons, see: Foreign Report, May 20, 1993. For Hizb'allah possession of LAW (Light Anti-Tank Weapon) shoulder-fired missiles, see: Jerusalem Domestic Service, August 28, 1984.

[54] See: Da'var, November 25, 1983; Ma'aretz, October 30, 1983; Ha'aretz, November 27, 1983; Ha'aretz, February 2, 1984; and Ha'aretz, June 3, 1984.

[55] Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin was born in 1952 in the village of Nabi Ayla near Zahle, and educated in Najaf and Qum. Al-Amin was formerly the representative of the Amal movement in Iran until he attacked Nabi Berri for participating in the National Salvation Committee, see: Washington Post, December 13, 1983; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Independent, August 30, 1989; and al-Hayat, November 27, 1989. Also see: al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1986; and Liberation, March 19, 1985.

[56] Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah was born in 1953 in Bazuriyah in southern Lebanon and is considered one of the founders of Hizb'allah. He returned to Beirut in the early 1970s, after graduating from both the religious academy of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran, see: AFP, 1520 gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992; and Independent, June 15, 1992. Also see: Ma'aretz, June 14; al-Qabas, July 20, 1989; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Foreign Broadcast Information

liaison officers with Iran through its embassy in Beirut,[57] most notably with Mohammad Nourani, the chargé d'affair between 1981-1985.[58] Another senior Hizb'allah cleric was Sheikh Muhammad Ismail Khaliq, who is the personal representative of Iran's Ayatollah Montazeri in Lebanon.[59]

In southern Lebanon, the Hizb'allah was headed by Sheikh Raghib Harb until his death in 1984.[60] While he was succeded by Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid as Imam of Jibshit and occupy a position within Hizb'allah's command leadership,[61] the regional leadership of the movement is divided between local commanders and religious clergymen in the Hizb'allah districts of Nabatiya and Sidon-Zahrani in southern Lebanon, most notably under the direction Sheikh `Afif al-Nabulsi and Sheikh Muhammad Fannish.[62] Hizb'allah's military units in southern Lebanon are headed by local commanders, who recruit young

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Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, November 30, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989. Nasserallah has considerable influence over Hizb'allah activists in west and south Beirut and in the Islamic Resistance, see: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[57] See: Independent, March 7, 1990; and al-Shira, March 17, 1986.

[58] See: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987 and al-Shira, September 19, 1988.

[59] See: al-Nahar, February 6, 1989. For a useful discussion of al-Khaliq's influence within Hizb'allah, see: Shimon Shapira, op.cit..

[60] Sheikh Ragheb Harb was born in 1952 in the village of Jibshit. Apart from having studied under Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, Sheikh Harb played a prominent role in Iran as one of the drafters of Iran's Constitution, see: Chibli Mallat, "Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia paradigm", Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): p.721. Also see: Politique International, April 1984; and Liberation, March 19, 1985.

[61] See: al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Independent, August 30, 1989; and Jerusalem Post, July 30, 1989.

[62] See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Israeli Government Press Office, July 5, 1985; al-Nahar, June 7, 1985; al-Nahar, June 9, 1985; Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, February 19, 1986; al-Nahar, June 16, 1985; and US News & World Report, February 9, 1987. Also see: Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology, op.cit.: p.18-19.

Shi'ites from the villages with in-depth knowledge of the local terrain.[63] The military units of *Islamic Resistance* are composed of a total of 300-400 core fighters and at least 1,500 armed sympathisers.[64] While Hizb'allah's military actions against Israel were initiated by the local commanders, all military activity was subject to approval by Hizb'allah's military command, headed by twelve Hizb'allah clergymen.[65]

These prominent regional Hizb'allah clergymen and commanders were represented on the *Majlis al-Shura*, the supreme decision-making authority of the Hizb'allah on the national level, that first adjourned on May 28, 1986, on a regular basis.[66] Within the *Majlis al-Shura*, there are seven specialized committees dealing with ideological, financial, military, political, judicial, informational and social affairs.[67] In turn, the *Majlis al-Shura* and

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[63] See: Ha'aretz, May 13, 1987; Ha'aretz, May 15, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987; Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; and Le Point, August 3, 1987. According to various estimates, Hizb'allah's military strength numbers: 2,500 in the Biq'a, 1,000 in Beirut, and 500 in southern Lebanon, see: Jerusalem Post, January 8, 1988; and Ha'aretz, September 22, 1986.

[64] See. Foreign Report, December 5, 1991.

[65] See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; and Ha'aretz, May 15, 1987. In 1988, the Hizb'allah decided to form secret cells to execute specific military operations under cultural and religious cover, see: Voice of Lebanon, April 14, 1988. Decision-making authority is divided between section commanders and military forces headquarters in Ba'albek, see: Da'var, January 11, 1987. Until his death in August 1988, assassinated by Amal, Sheikh Ali Karim was the head of Hizb'allah operations center in south Lebanon, see: Foreign Report, August 13, 1988. Muhammad Fannish has also been the commander for southern Lebanon, see: US News and World Report, February 9, 1987. In 1993, the Islamic Resistance became a seperate and ultra-secret organisation with a new command structure which conceals the identity of the three or four top leaders. The new structure came as a result of a security review in the aftermath of security breaches, see: Foreign Report, May 13, 1993.

[66] See: al-Shira, April 2, 1986; Ha'aretz, April 2, 1986; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987. The members of this meeting of the *Majlis al-Shura* were: Ibrahim al-Amin; Ibrahim al-Laquim; Zuheir Kanj; Imad Mughenya; Hassan Nasserallah; Ali Yasin; Hassan Malik; Yussef Sbeit; Khaidar Tlais; Ali Atwa; Haj Hussein Khalil; Muhammad al-Hamsa Suleiman Yahfufi; Ali Karim; Abbas al-Mussawi; Subhi al-Tufayli; Ali Yunes; Hassan Trad; Muhammad Mikdad; Waal Ramadan; Said Shaaban; and Hussein al-Musawi.

[67] See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.397. Also see: Davar, January 11, 1987.

these seven committees are replicated in each of Hizb'allah's three main regional and operational areas. They function as the principal governing body on local daily activity while advising the main *Majlis al-Shura* on the result of their efforts.[68] All Hizb'allah activity is regulated by decisions taken by the main *Majlis al-Shura*, which issued general directives to the regions, which in turn were left to implement the decisions on the operational level. While Sheikh Fadlallah presided over the national *Majlis al-Shura* as its overall leader in his capacity as spiritual leader of Hizb'allah, the main clergymen who excerise control over the movement are the ones responsible for a specific committee or portfolio.[69] The restructuring of the movement in 1989 with the addition of an new organ, the *Executive Shura*, which ranks after the *Majlis al-Shura* as the second highest leadership authority, and a *Politbureau*, a supervisory organ which co-ordinates the work of the various committees under the *Jihad al-Bina'* (Holy Reconstruction Organ) have meant a "Lebanonization" of the Hizb'allah where the control of the overall organisation has been made more open and expanded while the control of specific portfolios have become more important and increasingly subject to factionalism.[70] Although Hizb'allah's newly established central decisionmaking body has led to a greater openess within the organisation, in conjunction with an

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[68] See: Marius Deeb, "Shia movements in Lebanon: their formation, ideology, social basis, and links with Iran and Syria", Third World Quarterly, op.cit.: p.693. Also see: "Hizballah", in US Department of Defense (DOD), Terrorist Group Profiles, November 1988: p.15.

[69] Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, Israel, December 30, 1991. Also see: Da'var, January 11, 1987.

[70] Under the new structure, the *Consultative Shura* is composed of the following positions: Secretary-General; Deputy Secretary-General; Head of *Executive Shura*; Head of *Politbureau*; a spokesman; and two other members. The *Executive Shura* is composed of the follwing positions: Head of *Executive Shura*; Finance; Education; Health; Trades Union Affairs; Social Affairs; Security; Military Affairs; and Information, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6. Under the leadership of Sheikh al-Tufayli, the Majlis al-Shura expanded to over twenty members. For membership, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987. This number was reduced to eight by Sheikh al-Musawi.

effort by Hizb'allah to raise its profile and move into mainstream Lebanese politics, it has continued to maintain strict operational secrecy in the field of military and security affairs.[71]

Within the military committee on Hizb'allah's main *Majlis al-Shura* and in the three regional areas, there exists a separate body, the so-called Special Security Apparatus (SSA), responsible for intelligence and security matters.[72] In turn, the Hizb'allah's security apparatus is divided into three subgroups: the central security apparatus, the preventative security apparatus and an overseas security apparatus.[73] While Sheikh al-Musawi was the overall head of Hizb'allah's SSA until late 1985,[74] the central security apparatus is headed by Imad Mughniya and Abd al-Hadi Hamadi and is responsible for Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity of foreigners.[75] On the operational level, it was mainly family members from both the Mughniya and Hamadi

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[71] It is estimated that the Islamic Resistance is composed of approximately 5,000 fighters in 1994, see: Independent, May 8, 1994.

[72] For information concerning Hizb'allah's SSA, see: Rolf Tophoven, "Der Tod eines Terroristen - Hintergründe und Konsequenzen", Terrorismus, Nr.3 (March 1992): pp.1-4; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; New York Times, March 14, 1986; Washington Post, May 15, 1990; Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Independent, April 26, 1988; and Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988. In addition, information on the Hizb'allah SSA was collected by the author during interviews with high-ranking Israeli officials in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tel Aviv, August 25 - September 10, 1991.

[73] Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, Israel, December 30, 1991. This was also confirmed in unattributable interviews with senior IDF officials in Israel [August/September 1991] and a senior counter-terrorism official at the Department of State, Washington DC, September 4, 1993. The central security apparatus is further divided into two groups responsible for either East or West Beirut, see: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.485.

[74] See: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1986; Independent, March 7, 1990; and al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[75] See: Independent, October 9, 1991; Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Yediot Aharanot, June 24, 1988; Independent, April 26, 1988; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, January 16, 1989; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Jerusalem Post, January 25, 1987; al-Shira, June 27, 1987; al-Ittihad, January 31, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; FBIS, November 30, 1989; Ma'aretz, February 27, 1986; Ma'aretz, February 2, 1987; Independent, January 28, 1987; and Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988.

clans that were involved in the hostage-takings which ensured loyalty to the senior commanders and secrecy surrounding the operations.[76] Apart from Mughniya and Hamadi, other senior members of the national central security apparatus were Sheikh Hussein Ghabris, who acted as Mughniya's deputy, and Sheikh Hussein Khalil, who was the main liaison between Hizb'allah's security and intelligence.[77] This division of Hizb'allah's SSA has also been effective in the infiltration of its own members within rival movements and in the elimination of military and political opponents in Lebanon.[78] Hizb'allah's national preventative security apparatus was headed by Salah Nun and Muhammad Hammud and was in charge of the personal security of prominent Hizb'allah clergymen.[79] The functions of Hizb'allah's central security apparatus and the overseas security apparatus, in charge of special operations abroad, overlapped as Hussein Khalil, Ibrahim Aqil, Imad Mughniya, Muhammad Haydar, Kharib Nasser and Abd al-Hamadi, were the senior commanders of the Hizb'allah operations in Europe.[80] Waid Ramadan acted as the chief coordinator of

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[76] See: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; and Le Figaro, December 4, 1989. Another prominent leader is Muhammad Ali Mikdad, see: Ma'aretz, June 28, 1987; and Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987.

[77] For information on Nun and Khalil, see: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Davar, February 8, 1989; Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; FBIS, November 30, 1989; Radio Free Lebanon, January 27, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989. Also see: Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.485. For Khalil's close relationship with Qassem, see: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989.

[78] For example, the Amal movement dismissed a number of leading members after discovering their dual allegiance to Hizb'allah, see: BBC, April 13, 1988. A leading Amal official, Mustafa Dirani, the then head of Amal's security service, defected in 1988, see: Ha'aretz, December 4, 1988.

[79] See: Radio Free Lebanon, March 22, 1986; Radio Free Lebanon, September 9, 1986; and al-Watan al-Arabi wal-Duwali, December 11, 1987. For dismissal of Hizb'allah security after infiltration of Hizb'allah and a foiled assassination attempt on Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in 1989, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Hadashot, October 25, 1989; and FBIS, December 17, 1989.

[80] See: Le Point, June 1, 1987; al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 21, 1991; Le Quotidien de Paris, January 27-28, 1990; Yediot Aharanot, July 1, 1987; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Defense & Armament Heracles, November 1989; Independent, March 7, 1990; and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 17, 1986.

Hizb'allah with Iran concerning these European operations.[81] During the frequent absence of Mughniya from Lebanon, the influence of his de facto deputy, Ali Karekeh, increased within the SSA.[82]

While Hizb'allah's SSA managed to maintain operational secrecy due to its employment of mainly family and clan members, this can also be attributed to the previous experience by some of its commanders in Fatah Force 17, the PLO's intelligence and security organisation.[83] In particular, Imad Mughniya had been not only the personal bodyguard of Sheikh Fadlallah before he was elevated in position within the Hizb'allah after the successful hijacking of TWA 847, but also served with Force 17 as a lieutenant prior to Israel's invasion in 1982.[84] The decision by Hizb'allah's SSA to abduct foreign citizens is usually initiated at the highest level in the main *Majlis al-Shura* within the Hizb'allah through consultation with its senior clergy and two permanent representatives from Iran.[85] After reaching consensus of the future nationa-

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[81] See: Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Le Point, August 3, 1987.

[82] See: Foreign Report, August 22, 1991. For Mughniya's absence from Lebanon (October-December 1987 in northern Iran; in January 1988 in Qom; and his return to Lebanon in July 1990), see: Voice of the Oppressed, September 6, 1991; Ma'ariv, October 11, 1991; and Reuters, October 4, 1991.

[83] See: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; Jerusalem Post, April 14, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 14, 1988. Another important Hizb'allah clans with close ties to Force 17 is the Mikdad family, see: Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987. This was also confirmed in an unattributable interview with a former senior Fatah advisor in Cairo, Egypt, who had personally known Imad Mughniya until his defection to Hizb'allah (Cairo, Egypt, April 1994).

[84] For Imad Mughniya's position, see: Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988; Davar, May 6, 1988; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Da'var, May 6, 1988; Independent, April 26, 1988; and Ma'aretz, February 27, 1986. Also see: Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the PLO (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1990): pp.262-70. For Hizb'allah's relationship with Force 17, see: Ma'ariv, October 17, 1986; Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ma'aretz, March 31, 1987; and Keyhan, February 12, 1987.

[85] Unattributable interview with senior official in Israel's Ministry of Defense, August 27, 1991, Tel Aviv, Israel.

lity of the hostage, Hizb'allah's *Majlis al-Shura* delegated either specific details of a certain individual intended for abduction or broadly issued directives relating to the nationality and profession of victim to the commanders of Hizb'allah's national SSA.[86] A similar method was used with regard to military operations by the *Islamic Resistance*, formed in 1983, whereby the attacks were initiated by local commanders with confirmation from the supreme *Majlis al-Shura*.[87]

In the execution of the abductions authorized by Hizb'allah's national SSA, the operational officers maintained close liaison with official representatives from Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus as well as with Pasdaran officials.[88] While Muhammad Haydar was Hizb'allah's main liaison with the Pasdaran, three senior Hizb'allah operatives maintained liaison with Iranian intelligence, VEVAK, most notably Hussein al-Khalil.[89] Apart from the well-known and close role of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, former Iranian Ambassador to Syria and Interior Minister, in both the formation of the Hizb'allah and continued guidance over the movement,[90] Iranian diplomatic staff provided intelligence on targets while the Iranian Pasdaran supplied weaponry and

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[86] Unattributable interview with senior official in US Department of State, Washington DC, October 4, 1993.

[87] See: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit.. Also see: Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987; and Ha'aretz, June 21, 1986.

[88] See: Ronald Perron, "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps", Middle East Insight (June/July 1985): pp.35-39; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; New York Times, December 29, 1989; Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987; and Le Point, August 3, 1987.

[89] See: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.485.

[90] For Mohtashemi's role, see: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: p.122. Also see: Washington Post, May 15, 1990.

training.[91] While Iran's embassy in Beirut was previously active with Hizb'allah under the helm of Muhammad Nurani, the Iranian chargé d'affair, most of the liaison for security reasons between Hizb'allah and Iran occured through the Iranian embassy in Syria.[92] However, Ali Akbar Rahimi and Mohamed Javad of the Iranian embassy in Beirut maintained close liason with Hizb'allah's national SSA.[93] The role of the Iranian embassy in Beirut assumed increased importance over the mission in Damascus due to the constraints imposed by the Amal-Hizb'allah clashes.[94] While Iran's military attaché in Damascus co-ordinated activities between Iran's Pasdaran contingent in Ba'albek and its headquarters in the Syrian border village of Zebdani,[95] the Pasdaran contingent and Iran's military attaché in Beirut were involved not only in supplying the cadres of Hizb'allah SSA with training and military equipment but also in its hostage-taking activity, as evident by their role in the intitiation as well as interrogation and housing of some of the foreign hostages.[96] The role of the Pasdaran with Hizb'allah was formally institutionalized through, and controlled by, the presence of a high-ranking

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[91] See: Yediot Aharonot, June 24, 1988; Le Quotidien de Paris, January 27-28, 1990; Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987; Ma'aretz, July 7, 1987; and Ma'aretz, June 28, 1986. In particular, Ambassador Sastmalchian personally supervised the directives and weaponry supplied by Iran Air flights to Beirut. For Pasdaran establishment of military centers in the Biq'a, see: Radio Free Lebanon, July 6, 1984.

[92] See: Independent, March 7, 1990; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; and Foreign Report, July 30, 1987. Also see: Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism, op.cit.: p.125-6. Muhammad Nurani served as charge d'affaires in the Iranian embassy in Beirut between 1981-1985. He returned to Beirut in May 1987, see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987.

[93] See: Independent, March 7, 1990.

[94] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.14 n.4.

[95] See: Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; al-Amal, May 19, 1984; Le Point, May 11, 1987; and Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987.

[96] See: Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; Washington Post, January 19, 1992; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; and FBIS, August 28, 1990.

IRGC representative on the *Majlis al-Shura*.[97] Despite attempts by Iran's clerical establishment to impose a degree of clerical control over the Pasdaran,[98] the Lebanese contingent has shown a capacity for institutional autonomy and radicalism by its previous and present commanders, most notably under the command of Hosein Deqan,[99] in terms of conforming to the wishes of the political leadership in Iran, especially vis-á-vis the release of Western hostages.[100] In particular, this was evident by the efforts of Iran's Rafsanjani to assign a more loyal and pliable IRGC unit to the Pasdaran contingent in 1989.[101]

The Hizb'allah command leadership and its security and intelligence service were also in close liaison with Syrian military intelligence.[102] While Syrian intelligence actively participated in the planning of Hizb'allah actions until the withdrawal of the Multinational Forces from Beirut in early

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[97] See: al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Independent, March 7, 1990; and Da'var, January 11, 1987. For IRGC recruitment of Hizb'allah operatives in Iran's embassy in Beirut, see: IDF Radio, October 13, 1987.

[98] See: Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guards, op.cit.

[99] See: Middle East Reporter, September 1, 1984; and Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984.

[100] See: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; Agence France Presse, May 16, 1988; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, April 23, 1990; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; New York Times, December 29, 1989; New York Times, October 10, 1989; and New York Times, May 22, 1989. Also see: Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guards, op.cit.

[101] See: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; The Echo of Iran, No.26 (February 1990): p.12; and Farhang Jahanpour, "Iran I: Wars Among the Heirs", The World Today (October 1990): p.186.

[102] In the early 1980's, Syrian officials from Rifa'at Assad's "Special Forces Brigades" trained Hizb'allah and *Islamic Amal* members in the Biq'a area, see: Middle East Defense News, May 16, 1988. Also see: Ma'ariv, September 22, 1986; and al-Qabas, June 15, 1988; Independent, June 22, 1988; al-Anba, April 7, 1990; and Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986. Also see: Carl Anthony Wege, "Assad's Legions: The Syrian Intelligence Services", International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 1990): pp.91-100.

1984,[103] Syria pursued a calibrated policy of tacit co-operation with Hizb'allah and support for its abductions of foreigners, as long as they were in accordance with Syrian strategic interest in Lebanon. Simultaneously it was forced to clampdown on Hizb'allah in order to reassert Syrian hegemony and to limit Iran's influence and avoid a military confrontation with Israel.[104] While Syria has pursued a public poliy of disassociation from Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity, its relationship with the movement's SSA was pursued by Syrian military intelligence, under the command of Brigadier Ghazi Kan'an.[105] As Syria has been in firm control over the Biq'a area from which Pasdaran and Hizb'allah operate, Syrian military intelligence not only facilitated the transfer of hostages to Ba'albek from Beirut, but also acted as a conduit for the release of the foreign hostages through the hands of Syrian military intelligence officers.[106] A main liaison between Hizb'allah and Syrian military intelligence was Mustafa al-Dirani, the former

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[103] See: Ma'ariv, March 27, 1983; and Foreign Report, October 27, 1983. Also see: R. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985) (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1986).

[104] See: Yosef Olmert, (1990), op.cit.: pp.171-188; William Harris, "Syria in Lebanon", in Altaf Gauhar (ed.) Third World Affairs 1988 (London: Third World Foundation, 1988); Also see: al-Anwar, February 27, 1987. For example, Syria warned Hizb'allah in 1985 about its overt activity, urging the establishment of an Islamic Republic, by threatening to kill Sheikh Fadlallah unless this activity was ceased, see: Ma'aretz, March 10, 1985; and Ma'aretz, March 19, 1985.

[105] See: al-Dustur, March 5, 1990; Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; IRNA, October 25, 1991; and Jeune Afrique, April 25, 1984. For a useful overview of Syrian intelligence, see: Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked (London: Yale University Press, 1991): pp.38-51.

[106] In June 1988, a Hizb'allah delegation [Ibrahim al-Amin; Subhi al-Tufayli; Hussein al-Musawi; and Hussein Khalil] held consultations with senior Syrian officials on future operations, see: al-Qabas, June 15, 1988. For Syria's role as conduit in the release of hostages, see: Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; International Herald Tribune, November 1, 1986; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988; al-Aharam, March 26, 1987; Ha'aretz, May 4, 1986; Jerusalem Post, August, 7, 1989; Die Welt, March 3, 1987; Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, September 11, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1987; Ma'aretz, March 18, 1987; International Herald Tribune, October 4, 1988; Ma'aretz, February 24, 1989; Ma'aretz, June 22, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1987.

head of Amal's security service who defected from Amal in late-1988 and joined the Hizb'allah in 1989.[107]

The relationship between Hizb'allah's SSA and Syrian military intelligence has been characterized by periods of conflict and cooperation, largely dictated by the shifting internal situation in Lebanon.[108] While Syrian sanction for the presence of Pasdaran and tolerance towards Hizb'allah activity had often been dependent on its relationship with Iran, coupled with Syrian complicity in drug-trafficking in Lebanon,[109] the friction between Syria and Hizb'allah has been manifest by retaliatory abductions and the threat, or

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[107] Mustafa Dirani was defected from Amal after the February 1988 kidnapping of US Marine Corps officer Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins. For information of Dirani's role, see: Ma'aretz, February 24, 1989; Davar, February 28, 1988; Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, July 15, 1985; Davar, November 10, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot, February 25, 1988. Another leading Amal member, who defected to the Hizb'allah, is Akel Hamiye. He was responsible for six hijackings between 1979-82 and was appointed Amal military commander in 1984. Hamiye emerged as a leading figure during the negotiations over TWA 847 hijacking. In 1985, he established with Mustafa Dirani, the *Believers Resistance Movement*. Hamiye defected from Amal in 1987 and was appointed leader in the Hizb'allah, see: Ha'aretz, February 17, 1987; Da'var, November 10, 1987; Da'var, November 13, 1987; Washington Post, October 8, 1988; and Yediot Aharanot, February 25, 1988.

[108] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993): pp.198-216.

[109] In Lebanon's Syrian-controlled Biq'a Valley, Hizb'allah clans openly cultivate hashish and opium, which are refined and sent on to be distributed through the Dahiya suburban district of Beirut, see: Foreign Report, October 11, 1990; and Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1988. Another transit point is Syria and Syria's Defense Minister, Mustafa Talas, revealed that he provided transit documents with his signature to drugtraffickers in Ba'albek in order to provide free passage for them between Lebanon and Syria, see: Hadashot, May 10, 1991. Hizb'allah clergymen encouraged the drug trade as it serves to weaken the three great enemies of Islam, see: Foreign Report, October 11, 1990. For Syria's involvement in drug-trafficking, see: Middle East Defense News, May 16, 1988. Also see: Le Point, September 11, 1989; al-Shira, February 5, 1990; Yediot Aharonot, February 5, 1992; Ma'ariv, June 26, 1987; and Le Figaro, May 30-31, 1992. Also see: Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism (New York, NY.: Basic Books, 1990): pp.52-73; and U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC.: Bureau of International Narcotics Matter, March 1988): pp.218-20.

actual use, of military force.[110] Apart from direct Syrian military intervention or through the use of its proxy, Amal, in the search for foreign hostages, Syria increased the pressure on both the Hizb'allah and the Pasdaran by confining them to the Biq'a area or searched for the hostages in Hizb'allah safe-houses in Beirut and its southern suburbs.[111] However, frictions between Syria and Hizb'allah over the hostage-taking of foreigners were the exception rather than norm, as displayed by their co-ordination of military operations against Israel[112] and co-operation in the release of hostages. At any rate, Syria controlled the surrounding territory of the Biq'a and authorized not only the presence of the Pasdaran and the Hizb'allah, but also their movement beyond this area.

Apart from the Hizb'allah decision-making apparatus and the institutionalized relationship with Iran and Syria through military and civilian channels at work in Lebanon, Hizb'allah's mechanism for hostage-taking of foreigners was also subject to influence from clerical factionalism within the organisation itself and to a web of clerical relationships extending from members of the national *Majlis al-Shura* to various clergy within Iran's civilian and military establishment.[113] While the clerical factionalism within Hizb'allah can be monitored by the ascendancy or demotion of clergyman over

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[110] For incidents of Hizb'allah-Syrian frictions, see: Jerusalem Post, November 29, 1987; Le Matin, November 28, 1987; Ma'aretz, February 13, 1987; Washington Post, June 30, 1987; International Herald Tribune, March 4, 1988; Observer, December 8, 1991; and Ma'aretz, March 2, 1987. A prominent example is the Syrian arrest warrent against Imad Mughniya, see: Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988.

[111] See: BBC, December 3, 1988; International Herald Tribune, June 20, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1987.

[112] For example, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli meet Syrian leader, Hafez al-Assad, who promised support and supply of weapons for the organisation. The two also agreed that all Hizb'allah military operations would be coordinated with the Syrian headquarters in Lebanon, see: al-Shira, June 14, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987.

[113] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; and FBIS, December 5, 1989.

the leadership of the movement, as manifest by the election of a new Hizb'allah Secretary-General every two years, it is also a guide to not only the direction of the movement in Lebanon but also to the affiliation and loyalty of Hizb'allah's leadership with clerical factions and institutions in Iran.[114] Although the Hizb'allah command leadership is a cohesive organisation, the main differences between leading Hizb'allah clergymen are over methods rather than aims, as evidently displayed by the 1988 dispute between Sheikh al-Tufayli and Sheikh Fadlallah over the question of the feasibility of the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon.[115] Similarly, Sheikh al-Tufayli has been at the core of a dissident faction within the command leadership over the issue of a new leader of the movement, in the wake of the February 1992 assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi, and which vehemently objected to Hizb'allah members participation in the Lebanese parliamentary elections held between 23 August and 6 Septemeber 1992, in which the movement won 12 out of total 128 seats.[116] However, the position of the Secretary-General and his deputy are fundamental to monitor for an understanding of Hizb'allah as they directly control all the affairs of the movement and are ex-officio in charge, and have direct access to, clerical commanders of the regional Majlis al-Shuras.[117]

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[114] See: Liberation, March 19, 1985; Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986; and The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6-7.

[115] While Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, supported by Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, argued that an Islamic Republic should be established as soon as possible and all means should be pursued for this purpose, Sheikh Fadlallah disagreed, see: La Revue du Liban, January 30, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988; and Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987.

[116] Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli threatened that his supporters would burn voting centres in his home village of Brital, see: al-Shira, August 2, 1992. For rivalry over the post of Secretary-General of the movement, see: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992. For efforts by Sheikh al-Tufayli of undermining the position of Sheikh Nasserallah, see: Foreign Report, November 5, 1992.

[117] For example, the Deputy Secretary-General is in charge of the financal and military affairs of the movement, see: Foreign Report, June 13, 1991. The regional commanders of the Hizb'allah are: Hajj Abdallah Qassir [Beirut and the southern suburbs]; Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek [Biq'a]; and Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah [southern Lebanon], see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4,

While Hizb'allah's national *Majlis al-Shura* was established in 1986, no particular leading cleric emerged as undisputed leader until the ascendancy of Sheikh al-Tufayli in late 1987, a noted radical with particularly close personal ties with Ali Akbar-Mohtashemi in Iran.[118] Sheikh al-Tufayli's position as leader of the Hizb'allah remained uncontested until the death of Ayatollah Khomayyni in 1989, when the organisation faced unprecedented challenges within Lebanon and, consequently, displayed intensified rivalry between Hizb'allah clergymen over the position and direction of the movement.[119] As a result of meetings held in Teheran in October and December 1989, Hizb'allah submitted to a major structural changes, as evident by the establishment of a *Executive Shura*, also known as the Supreme Shura.[120] While the composition of the new *Executive Shura* corresponds with the the so-called *Consultative Shura*, or the *Majlis al-Shura*, the former decision-making body assumed the second highest authority of the Hizb'allah and set mainly strategic matters in the overall administration of the movement.[121] It also led

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No.3 (March 1993): p.6. Another key position within the Hizballah is the head of the *Executive Shura*.

[118] While Sheikh Fadlallah's position was temporarily diminished, the position of Sheikh al-Tufayli was bolstered as he served as a spokesman for the Iranian position in the organisation, see: Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987. Also see: al-Watan al-Arabi wal-Duwali, December 11, 1987; and MENA, November 3, 1987.

[119] This led to the assembly of over 200 Hizb'allah representatives from the Biq'a, south Beirut, the *Islamic Resistance*, the senior clergy within *Majlis al-Shura* and others in Iran, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989. For Hizb'allah factionalism in September/October 1989, see: Hadashot, October 25, 1989.

[120] The *Executive Shura* consists of nine leading Hizb'allah clergy, see: al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[121] Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, Israel, December 30, 1991. Also see: FBIS, November 30, 1989. The composition of the nine-man *Deciding Shura* is: Hajj Muhammad Hassan Yaghi [President]; Fadl Zayn al-Din [Finance]; Husayn al-Hajj Hasan [Education]; Nabil Sulayman [Helath]; Ghanim Salim [Trades Union Affairs]; Sultan As'ad [Social Affairs]; Hajj Abd al-Hadi Hamadi [Security]; Mustafa Badreddin [Military Affairs]; and Hajj Ali Rashid [Information], see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6.

to the establishment of a *"Politbureau"*, a supervisory committee composed of fifteen clergy in charge of Hizb'allah's co-ordination of recruitment, propaganda and support services on the regional and local level.[122] Although Sheikh al-Tufayli retained his position as Secretary-General of the Hizb'allah in December 1989, the meetings underlined strong clerical factionalism within the Hizb'allah's hierarchy.[123] In particular, the meetings revealed intense rivalry between the nominated leadership and elements from *Lebanese al-Da'wa*, the *Islamic Resistance*, and members of the Special Security Apparatus, as evident by their rejection of the main Hizb'allah decisions at the meeting and the delay in the reappointment for another two years of Sheikh al-Tufayli until the December 1989 meeting.[124] The militant position of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah was also revealed by his vocal opposition to compromises made to Amal in 1989 by his clerical colleagues.[125] The

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[122] The first chairman of the *Politbureau* was Mohammad Fannish (later Husayn al-Khalil and the other members correspond to the composition of the real decision-making body, see: Foreign Report, June 13, 1991. The other members of the *Politbureau* are: Sayyid Ammar Musawi [Vice President]; Sheikh Ali Taha; Sheikh Khodr Tlays; Sheikh Hassan Badran; Sheikh Khodr Nurredine; Sheikh Hassan Izzidin; Hajj Ali Ammar; Hajj Muhammad Fannish; Hajj Muhammad Ra'ad; Hajj Muhammad al-Khansa; Hajj Wafiq Safa; Hajj Husayn Shami, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6.

[123] The clerical factionalism developed into three main conflicting positions supported by members of the movement. The first position, led by Subhi al-Tufayli; Abbas al-Musawi; and Hussein al-Musawi, called for a public and open declaration of Hizb'allah's position and for cooperation with pro-Syrian leftist organisations in Lebanon as well as with pro-Iranian Muslim organisations. They also called for the establishment of a collective leadership. The second position, led by Hassan Nasserallah and Ibrahim al-Amin, called for the establishment of a centralized party structure, tighter party discipline, while rejecting the formation of an open and public leadership apparatus. This position also opposed any extension of Hizb'allah's involvement in the developments in the wider Lebanese arena and urged a jihad against those who opposed their efforts for an Islamic Lebanon. The third position, led by Naim Qassem; Hussein Korani; Muhammad Raad; and Hussein Khalil, rejected the suggestion of an overture of the leadership. For Hizb'allah factionalism at the meetings, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; al-Hayat, October 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989. This was also confirmed in an unattributable interview with senior IDF official, Tel Aviv, September 1991.

[124] See: FBIS, November 30, 1989; and Assaf Kfoury, Arabies, December 1992.

[125] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1988: pp.193-4.

structural changes within Hizb'allah's leadership also led to the dismissal of four leading Hizb'allah officials while it bolstered the positions of Sheikh al-Tufayli, Sheikh Naim Qassem, and Sheikh Nasserallah within the leadership of Hizb'allah's national Majlis al-Shura.[126] Under the renewed command of Sheikh al-Tufayli, the Hizb'allah leadership was considered closer to Iran's radical faction, led by Ali Akbar-Mohtashemi, than to Hashemi Rafsanjani.[127] While the tenure of Sheikh al-Tufayli as leader of Hizb'allah was marked by friction with Iran's newly-elected president, the election of Sheikh al-Musawi as the Secretary-General of Hizb'allah, and Sheikh al-Amin as his deputy, in May 1991[128] came after settlement of uncertainty within Hizb'allah ranks concerning disarmament of all militias in accordance with implementation of the Ta'if agreement.[129] The appointment of Sheikh al-Musawi, the former head of the *Islamic Resistance*,[130] came as a response to a quid pro quo arrangement between the organisation and Iran and Syria which permitted the movement to maintain their armed presence in the South and in the eastern Biq'a, as it claimed to be a resistance movement

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[126] The four dismissed leaders were: Ibrahim al-Amin; Hussein al-Musawi; Hussein Khalil; and Abd al-Hadi Hamadi. In the case of Khalil and Hamadi, a major reason for their dismissal was security infiltrations into party ranks, discovered after a failed assassination attempt on Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989.

[127] See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[128] See: Voice of Lebanon, Beirut 1015 gmt 21 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1079 23 May 1991. For Hizb'allah's "democratization process", see: Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991. Under Sheikh al-Tufayli's tenure as Secretary-General, the number of members of the *Majlis al-Shura* grew to include over twenty Hizb'allah members. However, with the appointment of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, the number was reduced to eight, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.7.

[129] For insights on Hizb'allah's concern over disarmament, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1030, March 26, 1991. See also interview with Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1068, May 10, 1991.

[130] For al-Musawi's position as leader of Hizb'allah's military wing, see: Ha'aretz, October 2, 1987; and Independent, March 7, 1990.

rather than a militia.[131] Unlike his predecessor, Sheikh al-Musawi appeared to be more pragmatic as evident by the fact that he presided over Hizb'allah through the dénounement of the Western hostage crisis while he readjusted the organisation's grand strategy from creating an Islamic Republic of Lebanon through armed struggle to a willingness to participate in mainstream Lebanese politics.[132] Although his pragmatism was a reflection of Hizb'allah's effort to confront the challenges posed by a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics[133] and that the position of Sheikh al-Musawi was closer to the line of Iran's Hashemi Rafsanjani than that of his clerical collegues within the Hizb'allah, it was also the result of increased Iranian influence and pressure.[134]

The assassination of Shêikh al-Musawi by Israel on February 16, 1992, after he and a number of other high-ranking Hizb'allah officials attended an annual memorial service in the village of Jihshit in order to mark the eight anniversary of the death of Sheikh Harb,[135] strengthened Hizb'allah's militancy and allegiance to Iran's more radical clergy.[136] While an attempt to

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[131] For agreement, see: Financial Times, February 17, 1992; and Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1061, May 2, 1991. For Hizb'allah's justification of retaining its armed presence in the South, see: Voice of Lebanon 1715 gmt 21 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1053, April 23, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 4 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1064, May 6, 1991.

[132] See: Financial Times, February 17, 1992; and Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991.

[133] A major strategy by the Hizb'allah was to: "mold the organizational body in a manner that makes it compatible with the emerging regional and international developments and harmonious with the new Iranian leadership", see: al-Hayat, May 25, 1991.

[134] Unattributable interviews with high-ranking counter-terrorism officials at Israel's Ministry of Defense, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 1991, and Office for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, October 1993. Also see: Foreign Report, June 13, 1991.

[135] For details concerning the assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi, see: Terrorismus, No.1, March 1992. For excerpts of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi's speech in Jibshit, see: Radio Free Lebanon, 1645 gmt 16 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1307, February 18, 1992.

[136] See: Terrorismus, No.1, March 1992; and Foreign Report, April 30, 1992.

assure its own cadrés that al-Musawi's death had not seriously affected the organisation, with immediately announcement of the election of Sheikh Nasserallah as its new leader,[137] internal rivalry within Hizb'allah between Nasserallah factions and those supporting al-Tufayli became apparent by the influence and intervention of Iran into the appointment of the new Hizb'allah leader.[138] An unsuccessful candidate in the Hizb'allah elections in May 1991, Sheikh Nasserallah had not only bolstered his own position within the *Majlis al-Shura* under Sheikh al-Musawi's leadership[139] but also maintained a far more closer relationship with Iran's revolutionist faction, most notably with Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, than his predecessor.[140] However, Iranian pressure to appoint Sheikh Nasserallah to the post of the incumbent Secretary-General of Hizb'allah over the hardline contender and previous leader, Sheikh al-Tufayli, led to an intense dispute by dissident factions loyal to al-Tufayli.[141] In particular, the internal rivalry within the Hizb'allah leader-

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[137] An announcement made by the Beirut-based pro-Hizb'allah radio, Voice of the Oppressed, 1250 gmt 18 Feb 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1308, February 19, 1992. The election had been conducted by the members of the *Supreme Shura* at a meeting in Ba'albek, see: Agence France Press in English 1520 gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992. The Hizb'allah was careful to underline that the decision by the *Supreme Shura* to elect Sheikh Nasserallah was unanimous, see: Voice of the People 1239 gmt Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1318, March 2, 1992.

[138] See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; and Foreign Report, October 8, 1992;

[139] For Sheikh Nasserallah's strengthened position under the tenure of Sheikh al-Musawi, see: al-Hayat, May 21, 1991. At the end of 1989, Nasserallah had bolstered his position with Iran, who wanted him to fulfill a senior role in the next stage of Iranian policy in Lebanon, see: al-Qabas, July 20, 1989.

[140] Unattributable interview with official in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 3, 1992. In an interview with Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, he is asked to elaborate on his links with Ayatollah Mohtashemi, see: Voice of the People in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1318, March 2, 1992.

[141] See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; and Foreign Report, November 5, 1992. Sheikh Nasserallah reshuffled some of the leaders of Hizb'allah's military wing to ensure loyalty. In particular, Ali Daoun replaced Hajj Hassan Hubollah as Hizb'allah's commander in south Lebanon. Nasserallah also promoted Sheikh Nuhad Kushman to head military-security affairs.

ship came over the decision by certain leaders to participate in Lebanon's parliamentary elections, held between 23 August and 6 September 1992, which the followers of the al-Tufayli faction vehemently objected to as evidence of abandonment of the movement's pan-Islamic goal of resistance against Israel by directing the movement's focus towards Lebanese internal politics.[142] While threats of sabotage by Sheikh al-Tufayli to Hizb'allah's participation in the parliamentary elections failed to materialize,[143] challenges to the leadership of Sheikh Nasserallah by al-Tufayli supporters in the Biq'a area assumed the form of independent resistance attacks against Israel immediately following the procurement by the Hizb'allah of 12 electoral seats out of 128 in the Lebanese parliamentary elections.[144] As a consequence, the divisions within the Hizb'allah, in the wake of the death of Sheikh al-Musawi, have been between Nasserallah's efforts to reorientate Hizb'allah more towards political rather than military activity through acceptance of the realities of Lebanon's systems and the dissident faction led by Sheikh al-Tufayli, supported by the Iranian revolutionist faction, towards undermining the more moderate position of the new Secretary-General and to press on with a perpetual *jihad* against Israel at all costs.[145] The

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[142] See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; Foreign Report, November 5, 1992; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993; al-Shira, July 13, 1992; and al-Shira, August 2, 1992.

[143] Sheikh al-Tufayli threatened to burn the voting-centres in his home-village of Brital, see: al-Shira, August 2, 1992.

[144] For the Hizb'allah operation, initiated by Sheikh al-Tufayli, near the village of Kaoukaba which killed 5 IDF soldiers and wounded 5 others on October 25, 1992, see: Foreign Report, November 5, 1992. In the parliamentary elections, Hizb'allah won four seats in the Ba'albek-Hermil area (Hizb'allah politbureau members: Ibrahim al-Amin; Ali Taha; Khodr Tlaiss; and Mohammad Yaghi); two seats in the southern suburbs of Beirut (politbureau members: Ali Ammar; and Mohammad Burjawi); and two seats in southern Lebanon (politbureau members: Mohammad Fannish; and Mohammad Raad). In addition, four seats were captured by non-Hizb'allah members who were loyal to Hizb'allah. For details, see: Foreign Report, September 17, 1992.

[145] See: Foreign Report, October 7, 1993.

internal rivalry between Nasserallah and al-Tufayli clearly demonstrated the existence of clerical factionalism within the hierarchy of the movement while it has also underlined the importance of understanding divisions among its leaders and their ability to muster a substantial number of followers as a guide to the activity of the movement as well as of dissident factions.[146] In the case of this particular rivalry, the fact that Sheikh Nasserallah comes from southern Lebanon rather than as his predecessors from the Biq'a area meant that he was more susceptible to losing control over the loyalty of commanders and fighters of the *Islamic Resistance*, most of whom comes from the Biq'a and pledge closer allegiance to Sheikh al-Tufayli.[147] This became apparent by Nasserallah's replacement of military commanders in southern Lebanon and to the separation of the *Islamic Resistance* from the political framework of the Hizb'allah for operational expediency and security after the assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi.[148] However, the failure of Sheikh al-Tufayli to regain the leadership post of the Hizb'allah in its leadership elections in May 1991, February 1993, and April 1993 have lead to an erosion in the influence of the extremist and radical camp of the movement which is parallel to the decline of its closest allies in Iran, the revolutionist faction under the leadership of Hojjatolislam Mohtashemi. As a result, Hizb'allah appointments of a new Secretary-General demonstrated that the

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[146] For example, the appointment of Hajj Husayn Khalil as the president of the Politbureau was in alignment with Hizb'allah's new profile in Lebanon as he was known for his close ties to Syria and as he had coordinated the movement's long-term relations with Damascus, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.7.

[147] See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992. This is also apparant by the relegation of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli to a position as a mere member of the main *Majlis al-Shura* without any specific portfolio. The composition of the *Majlis al-Shura* and responsibility are: Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah [Secretary-General]; Sheikh Naim Qassem [Deputy Secretary-General]; Hajj Muhammad Hasan Yaghdi [President of *Executive Shura*]; Hajj Hassan Khalil [Head of *Politbureau*]; Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek [Spokesman]; Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli and Muhammad Mikdad [members], see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 [March 1993].

[148] See: Foreign Report, May 13, 1993.

election of a particular senior Hizb'allah cleric was not only dependent on the applicability of his previous experience to a current situation confronting the movement within Lebanon and on the level of support and followers the candidate manage to muster within the movement but also to his links with factions and institutions within Iran's clerical establishments.[149]

Apart from the influence of close personal relationships, the conduct of both formal and informal consultations between Hizb'allah clergymen and Iranian officials occurs through a variety of channels and institutions.[150] While official Iran has attempted to exert influence over Hizb'allah activity through various Iranian agencies at work in Hizb'allah, ranging from the Pasdaran contingent and Iran's personal representatives in Damascus and Beirut to Iran's Foreign Ministry and the *Martyrs' Foundation*, Hizb'allah clergymen are also influenced by individual Iranian clergy with personal and political aspirations, at times, contrary to the official position and policy of Iran's ruling clerical elite.[151] The degree of divergence between Hizb'allah's subordination, in principle, to the supreme religious and political authority of Ayatollah Khumayyní, and the disobedience and disagreements displayed within Hizb'allah ranks towards Iran's official leadership and its willingness to sacrifice ideology to achieve pragmatic foreign and domestic policy objectives, is dependent on Hizb'allah's and individual clergymen's interaction with official Iranian institutions as well as on clerical factionalism in Iran. In turn, any discord or harmony in Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran is influenced by the impact of Iranian clerical factionalism on the institutions at work in Hizb'allah.

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[149] See: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6.

[150] See: US News & World Report, March 6, 1989.

[151] See: Martin Kramer, (1990), op.cit.: pp.105-31.

3.4 Hizb'allah's Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions

As a revolutionary movement, the pan-Islamic ideological position of the Hizb'allah and its command leadership is naturally attuned to the revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment.[152] While this closeness in radical ideology stemmed from the position of Ayatollah Khumayyni, it also mirrors the in-volvement by several Iranian members of the revolutionist factions with prominent Lebanese Shi'ite clerics both prior to and, more importantly, in the formation and development of Hizb'allah in Lebanon.[153] The personal relationships between some Iranian clergymen and Hizb'allah's command leadership, forged at the religious centers in Najaf and in Qoum as well as in Lebanon during the early 1970's, translated not only in their close involvement in the actual formation of Hizb'allah as an organisation in 1982, but also in the appointments of these Iranian clergy, to the official Iranian institutions at work in Hizb'allah.[154] While this facilitated the rapid growth and expansion of Hizb'allah as well as forged ties to the inner sanctum of Iran's clerical establishment, the movement also became gradually susceptible to clerical factionalism in Iran, as evident by the dismissal and appointment of Iran's radical clergy within these Iranian

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[152] The more doctrinnaire and radical faction within Iran's clerical establishment is led by: Hojjat al-Islam Muhammad Musavi Kho'iniha; Ayatollah Ali Meshkini; Ayatollah Montazeri; Mir Hussein Musavi; Hojjat al-Islam Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi; Musavi Khoeiniha; and Mehdi Hashemi, see: David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nationalism or World Order", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.48. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah", Foreign Policy, Vol.66 (Spring 1987); and Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Clerical Establishment in Iran, R-3788-USDP (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, June 1989).

[153] See: R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in John L. Esposito (ed.) (1990), op.cit.: p.43. Also see: Le Figaro, April 18, 1990; Lettre Persane, No.46 (June 1986); Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; Valeurs Actuelles, April 1, 1986; al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 1989; and al-Majallah, November 5-11, 1983.

[154] See: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: pp.132-3; al-Majallah, November 5-11, 1983; and Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986.

institutions.[155]

Among the most influential and strongest relationship between an individual Iranian clergyman and the Hizb'allah command leadership was the role of Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, the former Iranian ambassador to Syria and former Interior Minister.[156] Apart from his pivotal role in the creation of the Hizb'allah in 1982[157] and his role as liaison between Iran and the movement in Lebanon during his tenure in Syria until 1986,[158] Mohtashemi's radical position in ideological terms has resonated within the movement in Lebanon, especially when Hizb'allah has been at odds with the official Iranian leadership.[159] While Mohtashemi has cultivated a broad base of support within the movement, his closest relationship within Hizb'allah's command leadership has been with the radical activists, most notably Sheikh al-Tufayli and Sheikh Nasserallah.[160] Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Fadlallah, reportedly was not a supporter of Mohtashemi.[161] Although the promotion of

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[155] See: Keyhan, September 18, 1986; Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; and Le Monde, October 25, 1986.

[156] See: New York Times, August 27, 1989; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; and Independent, October 23, 1991. For Mohtashemi's stay in Najaf under Ayatollah Khumayyni and his closely forged friendships with future Hizb'allah leaders, see: Independent, October 23, 1991.

[157] For Mohtashemi's role in the establishment of Hizb'allah, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Davar, January 11, 1987; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Independent, March 7, 1990; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; and Washington Post, July 7, 1988.

[158] See: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985; New York Times, November 2, 1983; and New York Times, October 5, 1984.

[159] See: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; and Independent, October 23, 1991.

[160] See: Voice of the People in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1318, March 2, 1992; FBIS, November 30, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989.

[161] See: Jou Press, October 28, 1989; and al-Anba, November 29, 1989.

Mohtashemi as Interior Minister within Iran's clerical establishment in 1986 meant the loss of his position as Iranian representative within Hizb'allah's national *Majlis al-Shura*, he maintained an independent relationship with the movement's leadership, as evident from his frequent visits to Lebanon and Syria as well as his outspoken views on Hizb'allah's position with particular reference to the abduction and release of foreign hostages.[162] While the dismissal of Mohtashemi in the post-Khumayyní Cabinet, under the leadership of Hashemi-Rafsanjani, in 1989[163] weakened his influence within Iran's clerical establishment,[164] it also translated into an attempt by Mohtashemi to upstage Rafsanjani's pragmatic foreign policy, through Hizb'allah, by blocking the release of Western hostages.[165] Notwithstanding the prominent role of Mohtashemi in the initiation of abductions of foreigners, his influence over radical clergy within Hizb'allah provided him with an instrument to both sabotage moderate and pragmatic overtures by the Iranian leadership in the foreign policy arena as well as to bolster his position within the clerical factionalism in Iran.[166] However, Mohtashemi's ability to manipulate Hizb'allah activity was limited by changes in Hizb'allah's position within the Lebanese environment, as evident by the dénounement of the hostage crisis

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[162] For a debate within the Iranian Majlis on Mohtashemi's independent efforts, see: FBIS, September 23, 1988. Also see: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[163] See: Farhang Jahanpour, "Iran I: Wars Among the Heirs", The World Today (October 1990): pp.183-87. Also see: New York Times, August 26, 1990; and Washington Post, August 20, 1989. For a useful analysis of electoral power-struggle in Iran, see: Farzin Sarabi, "The Post-Khomeini Era in Iran: The Elections of the Fourth Islamic Majlis", Middle East Journal, Vol.48, No.1 (Winter 1994): pp.89-107.

[164] See: New York Times, October 10, 1989; and New York Times, March 14, 1990.

[165] See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; FBIS, November 30, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[166] See: Independent, October 23, 1991; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990.

in 1991 despite strong opposition from Mohtashemi, and by the presence of a more pragmatic Hizb'allah leader, Sheikh al-Musawi, in charge of the organisation.[167]

Another prominent Iranian cleric for the Hizb'allah is Khumayyni's designat-heir, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri.[168] Apart from his early active role in the promotion of Iranian involvement in Lebanon through Hizb'allah, Montazeri's position as supervisor of the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements*, operated by his relative Mehdi Hashemi and in charge of co-ordination of Iran's revolutionary support and activity abroad, provided him with an official channel to Hizb'allah's command leadership.[169] As the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements* had been originally a formal arm of the Revolutionary Guard until 1983,[170] it transformed into a semi-independent institution of the IRGC headed by Montazeri's protege, Medhi Hashemi, which coordinated the operational co-operation between Iran and the Hizb'allah.[171] While Hashemi's efforts to foment revolutionary activity and terrorism abroad damaged Iran's war effort with Iraq and led to his arrest in 1986, the retaliatory abductions of American hostages and revelation of the US-Iranian

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[167] See: al-Hayat, May 25, 1991; Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[168] For Hizb'allah's ties with Montazeri, see: Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; al-Ahd, November 31, 1986; Foreign Report, December 13, 1984; Financial Times, December 8, 1984; and International Herald Tribune, December 8-9, 1984.

[169] Both Mohammad Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi had obtained guerrila training in Lebanon before the 1979 and were deeply involved in promoting the Iranian Pasdaran's presence, see: Paris Lettre Persane, No.46 (June 1986): pp.6-10. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, (1988), op.cit.: pp.743-4; and Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad (New York, NY.: Harper Collins, 1994): p.284.

[170] See: FBIS, November 5, 1986. Also see: Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.412.

[171] See: Hazhir Teimourian, "The Mullah Goes Back to the Mosque", The Middle East (May 1989): pp.20-1; FBIS October 28, 1986; and New York Times, March 18, 1987.

arms-for-hostages deal by Ayatollah Montazeri's personal representative in Lebanon, Sheikh Ismail al-Khaliq,[172] coupled with the kidnapping of Iyad Mahmoud, the Syrian chargé d'affair to Iran, was a clear manifestation of the connection between Iranian clerical factionalism and Hizb'allah activity.[173] It also led to the final seperation of the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements* from the IRGC[174] and its transfer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1986, in an effort by Rafsanjani to achieve a greater degree of Iranian control over Hizb'allah activity.[175] This was also evident by Rafsanjani's appointment of Hojjat al-Islam Hadi Khosrowshahi in 1987 to head the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements*.[176] It meant that Hizb'allah's links to the revolutionary Iranian clergy were made more difficult.[177]

While Montazeri maintained relations with Hizb'allah through another Iranian institution, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance,[178] a number of radical Iranian clergy held senior positions within Iran's Minstry of Foreign Affairs

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[172] See: al-Shira, November 3, 1986; al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; and Hazhir - Teimourian, "The Mullah Goes Back to the Mosque", The Middle East (May 1989): pp.20-1.

[173] In 1982, Iyad Mahmoud had played an active role in the release of the American hostage, David Dodge, held by the Hizb'allah, see: Middle East (April 1987): pp.15-7; and Washington Post, February 4, 1987. Also see: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: p.85.

[174] See: IRNA, March 18, 1987. Also see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: p.26.

[175] See: Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; and Marmara, November 25, 1986.

[176] Khosrowshahi was a noted protogé of Rafsanjani, see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.: p.262. Also see: al-Dustur, June 11, 1990.

[177] See: "Inside Iran", Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Le Monde, October 25, 1986; and Hazhir Teimourian, "Succession Struggle Gathers Pace", The Middle East (April 1987): pp.15-17.

[178] See: Shireen T. Hunter, (1988), op.cit.: pp.743-4.

with strong allegiance to support the movement in Lebanon. Among the most supportive Foreign Ministry officials of the Hizb'allah has been Director for Arab Affairs, Hosein Sheikh-ol-Islam, who coordinated with the Pasdaran to position its members in Iranian embassies abroad and participation in Hizb'allah operations.[179] Another radical Iranian ally of Hizb'allah was Javad Mansuri, Undersecretary for Cultural and Consular Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who controlled the Iranian embassies abroad.[180] After the appointment of Rafsanjani in 1989, both Sheikh-ol-Islam's and Mansuri's positions were formally demoted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[181] As a consequence, Hizb'allah downgraded the role and influence of the Iranian Ambassadors to Syria and Lebanon on both its *Executive* and *Consultative* Shuras.[182]

Another influential Iranian institution at work within the Hizb'allah were the *Martyrs' Foundation*, under the command of Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi, and the *Foundation of the Oppressed*, headed by Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Ali-Rahmani.[183] While these two Iranian institutions have been responsible for helping the families of those killed in the revolution and the redistibution of material and financial assistance to lower class families in need,[184] with

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[179] See: US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Independent, July 1, 1987; Keyhan, December 5, 1985; Le Nouvel Observateur, October 30, 1983; and Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983. For the close relationship between Sheikh-ol-Islam and Mohtashemi, see: IRNA, November 7, 1982; and Radio Damascus, November 9, 1982.

[180] See: al-Dustur, February 12, 1990; and al-Dustur, October 16, 1990.

[181] See: Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1993): pp.125-6. Also see: al-Dustur, February 12, 1990.

[182] Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, Israel, December 30, 1991. Also see: FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[183] See: Xavier Raufer, (1987), op.cit.: pp.180-2. Also see: Times, June 1, 1985.

[184] See: Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (London: Yale University Press, 1989): p.50; Shaul Bakhash, (1984), op.cit.: 1984): pp.184 and 243; Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge, 1985): p.235.

funds from the government, religious trusts and income from confiscation of exiled Iranians' properties, it also served as a channel for Iran's substantial injection of resources to the Hizb'allah in Lebanon.[185] Iran's financial contributions, which averaged $60 million a year, were vital for the Hizb'allah in running an array of social and financial services for the Shi'a community, including religious schools, hospital clinics, agricultural co-operatives and building projects.[186] While the Hizb'allah religious *hawzats* and mosques have served a vital role in the indoctrination process of countless young Shi'ites, reinforced by Iranian support for Hizb'allah's three radio stations, one television station and two publications,[187] the Hizb'allah organ *Jihad al-Bina'* (Holy Reconstruction Organ) serves as the main co-ordinating body, divided into eight committees, for the social and financial needs of the movement's members.[188] Through Iran's generous financial support, the *Islamic Health Committee* established two major hospitals in Ba'albek and

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[185] See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: pp.104-5. Also see: al-Dustur, October 14, 1985; al-Shira, March 15, 1986; and Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.150.

[186] See: Middle East International, No.315 (December 19, 1987); Financial Times, July 25, 1987; al-Dustur, October 14, 1985; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Jerusalem Post, July 22, 1987; and al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990). In 1994, it was estimated that Hizb'allah received £40 million annually from Iran, see: Independent, May 8, 1994.

[187] The most important religious *hawzats* are: the Religious Hawzat of Siddikin (south Lebanon); the Centre for Youth Education in Jibshit (south Lebanon); the Educational Hawzat of Brital (Biq'a area); the Iranian Religious Centre in Tyre (south Lebanon); the Centre for Islamic Martial Arts in Kabrikha (south Lebanon), see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, September 19, 1989. Hizb'allah's television station is called *al-Manar* (the Beacon) while its three radio stations are called: *Voice of the Oppressed*; *Voice of Faith*; and *Voice of Struggle*. It's main publication is *al-Ahd* and a monthly publication *al-Bilad*.

[188] For a useful overview, see: A Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accomodation", Third World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (1993): pp.327-8. The eight committees are: Technical Administrative Committee; Agricultural Committee; Power Resources Committee; Water Resources Committee; Islamic Health Committee; Financial Aid Committee; Reconstruction Committee; and Environmental Committee. Also see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.7.

in the southern suburbs of Beirut in 1986 and an array of medical centres and pharmacies throughout the various regions in Lebanon.[189] *The Financial Aid Committee*, in close co-operation with the *Martyrs' Foundation*, distributed over $90 million between 1982-86 to families whose dependants had died or were wounded, and the *Martyrs' Foundation* provides approximately $225,000 monthly to martyrs' families.[190] Apart from aid to those who had fallen or were wounded in the fight against the enemies of Islam, the *Financial Aid Committee* has extended generous loans intended for marriages, school expenses, and small business ventures.[191] The importance of other committees have been obvious by the repair of over 1,000 homes in southern Lebanon damaged by Israeli attacks by the *Reconstruction Committee* in a period from 1988 to 1991.[192] Apart from Hizb'allah's dependence on Iranian financial support to sustain these services and projects, Hizb'allah's ability to capture the hearts and minds of the Shi'a community, through a skillful combination of financial inducements and ideological indoctrination, was partially dependent on the willingness by Iran to extend available resources, as the Pasdaran

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[189] Apart from the Khomeini Hospital in Ba'albek and Dar al-Hawra' for women and children in Beirut (examines and treats over 70,000 women and children annualy), the number of institutions operated by Hizb'allah's *Islamic Health Committee* is (medical clinics): eight in Beirut; six in southern Lebanon (including one mobile infirmary servicing 12 villages near the security zone); three in the Biq'a. The committee also operate two dental clinics in Beirut and three major pharmacies as well as six Civil Defense Centers. For a detailed overview of the institutions of the *Islamic Health Committee*, see: al-Ahd, August 1, 1989.

[190] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey (1987): pp.167-8. For an interview with the Director of the *Martyr's Foundation* in Beirut, see: al-Ahd, no.135 (January 23, 1987). Also see: "Details about 'Hizballah' and Its Leaders", Middle East Reporter, March 22, 1986. For a lower figure to martyr's families, see: Times, November 14, 1987.

[191] For details, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.127.

[192] See: al-Ahd, February 7, 1988; and al-Shira, August 31, 1992.

provided the Hizb'allah with other military-related equipment and sources.[193] While Iranian aid to Hizb'allah has steadily increased from $30 million in 1985 to over $64 million in 1988,[194] these institutions were subject to Iranian clerical factionalism.[195] In particular, the involvement of Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi in the 5 April 1988 hijacking of KU422 by Hizb'allah pointed to an effort by the Iranian cleric to influence the forthcoming Iranian *Majlis* elections.[196] The control over Iranian funds to Hizb'allah, through the leader of the *Martyrs' Foundation*, was also used by Hashemi-Rafsanjani in 1989 in an effort to control Hizb'allah, as evident by his move to downgrade support for the movement in Lebanon and by the dismissal of Ayatollah Karrubi, who was replaced by the only non-radical former IRGC Minister, Mohsen Rafiq Dust.[197] In the wake and the aftermath of the release of the remaining Western hostages in 1991, reports indicated a substantial reduction in Iranian aid to the Hizb'allah, in some cases as high a reduction of ninety percent.[198] However, while Iran has faced financial constraints after the 1988 end of the Gulf war, the extent of Hizb'allah's expansion of its social services and financial assistance to the Lebanese Shi'ites would indicate

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[193] See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987; Voice of Lebanon, October 29, 1987 - SWB/ME, October 30, 1987; and Jerusalem-Post, July 22, 1987. According to al-Dustur, approximately one-third of Iran's financial support for "liberation movements" is allocated to the Hizb'allah in Lebanon, see: al-Dustur, October 14, 1985.

[194] See: Middle East Defense News, May 1, 1988; and John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): p.147.

[195] See: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and Washington Post, September 22, 1988.

[196] See: FBIS, June 3, 1985; and New York Times, March 18, 1987.

[197] See: FBIS, September 7, 1989; Teheran Domestic Service, September 6, 1989; Washington Post, September 22, 1988; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989.

[198] See: Robin Wright, "Islam's new political face", Current History, Vol.90, No.552 (January 1991): p.28.

otherwise.[199]

Although Hizb'allah's command leadership has been affected by the availability of Iranian financial and materical resources, the institution of the *Revolutionary Guards* was least affected by Iranian clerical factionalism and remained the most reliable and loyal ally of the Hizb'allah.[200] As demonstrated by the Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon, it has remained the most radical and least pliable Iranian institution with close ties to Iran's clerical revolutionist faction.[201] The Pasdaran's semi-institutional autonomy from the civilian leadership in Iran has meant that Hizb'allah has been able to resist attempts of co-option by Iran through support from the IRGC.[202] Attempts by Iranian political leaders to exert pressure on the IRGC contingent in Lebanon, as evident by proposals for its withdrawal and the release of the remaining hostages in Lebanon in 1991, were unsuccessful.[203] The lack of control by Iran's political leadership over IRGC support for Hizb'allah was clearly revealed by the Pasdaran's close training and military support of the

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[199] See: Middle East, February 1993: pp.12-13; and Middle East, February 1992: p.13.

[200] See: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, April 23, 1990; New York Times, December 29, 1989; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; and New York Times, May 22, 1989.

[201] The most notable supporters are Ahmad Khumayyí and Mohtashemi, see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.; Nikola Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1987); and Washington Post, January 7, 1990..

[202] See: Jeune Afrique, January 1984; Washington Post, January 7, 1990; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Robin Wright, "A Reporter at Large", The New Yorker, September 5, 1988; and Nader Entessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran", in Hosshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (eds.) Post Revolutionary Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988).

[203] Rafsanjani offered more weaponry and authority to the Pasdaran, which would enable it to pursue more hardline political and military objectives in the strengthening of the Islamic revolution and its spread to other countries, see: Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1990; New York Times, October 16, 1991; Washington Post, November 21, 1991; Jane's Defence Weekly, November 16, 1991; New York Times, March 5, 1990; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and Washington Post, January 19, 1992.

Hizb'allah in its repeated armed clashes during 1987-1990 with Amal,[204] despite official efforts by Iran to broker an end to the conflict in order to preserve its relationship with Syria.[205] As the IRGC's Lebanon contingent was led and manned by the most ideologically radical military-officials and demonstrated a degree of institutional autonomy from civilian political control, it enabled Hizb'allah to exercise a certain amount of independence, at times in violation of specific orders, in terms of its activity in Lebanon, especially in the abduction and release of foreign hostages.[206]

Notwithstanding the various influences of factionalism within Hizb'allah and the Iranian clerical establishment, coupled with the movement's relationship with Iranian and Syrian military institutions, Hizb'allah and offical Iran co-ordinated some of the movement's abductions of foreigners, from a basis of convergence of mutual interest, through a formally defined chain of command from Iran to Hizb'allah.[207] At the highest level in Iran, the Islamic Republic's *Supreme Defense Council*, which is the central-decision making body of the military-security establishment,[208] is the main vehicle for poliy formulation, decisions and guidance to Hizb'allah relating to hostage-taking

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[204] It was reportedly activist members with *al-Da'wa* allegiance which initiated attacks on Amal, see: al-Nahar, January 19, 1989.

[205] The Iranian mediation team was lead by the Foreign Minister, Velyati and the only non-radical Pasdaran leader, Mohsen Rafiq Dust, see: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and Agence France Presse, May 16, 1988.

[206] See: Independent, July 1, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990.

[207] See: Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Ha'aretz, April 2, 1986; and al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[208] See: Washington Post, August 23, 1987; and Sean K. Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: p.29.

in Lebanon and operations abroad.[209] While this Council, composed of the Iranian President, Majlis Speaker and IRGC commander, is formally in charge of the policy formulation vis-á-vis Hizb'allah, the implementation of specific operational directives was delegated to the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements*.[210] In turn, the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements* delegated the specific tasks through Iran's diplomatic representatives in Damascus and, to a lesser extent, Beirut as well as to the Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon.[211] Although Iran's operational policy with Hizb'allah remained particularly close until the removal of Mehdi Hashemi in the autumn of 1986[212] and the reassignment of Mohtashemi from his post as Ambassador to Syria to Minister of Interior,[213] it became increasingly subject to clerical factionalism in Iran.[214] The reassignment of the *Office for Islamic Liberation Movements* to Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the appointment of Hojjat al-Islam Khosrowshahi to head the control-mechanism of Iran's official contacts with Hizb'allah,[215] underlined not only the clerical factionalism in Iran but also that control over Hizb'allah activity was excerised both

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[209] See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: pp.101-2. Also see: al-Shira, March 15, 1986; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Ha'aretz, October 12, 1989; Jerusalem Post, June 29, 1988; and al-Majallah, April 20, 1988.

[210] See: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.

[211] See: al-Shira, March 15, 1986; Ma'aretz, September 30, 1984; and Middle East Reporter, March 22, 1986.

[212] See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; and Marmar, November 25, 1986.

[213] See: New York Times, August 27, 1989; Independent, October 23, 1991; and US News & World Report, March 6, 1989.

[214] See: Jerusalem Post, June 29, 1988.

[215] See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; and Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.: p.262.

through official Iranian institutions and independent channels loyal to the revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment.[215] In particular, it has been suggested that Iran, in an attempt to control Hizb'allah abductions, recalled senior Hizb'allah SSA commanders to Iran in April 1987 either because of increased disagreements between Hizb'allah and Iran over the movement's claims for independence or as a safety precaution to prevent their capture by Syrian intelligence in Lebanon due to their involvement in attacks against Syrian armed forces in West Beirut.[217] It would seem likely that Imad Mughniya and Abd al-Hadi Hamadi remained in Iran for training and security reasons rather than for detention, as both were subsequently elevated within Hizb'allah's operational command leadership.[218] This hypothesis can be further supported by the parallel Iranian efforts to upgrade the Hizb'allah's military capability through increased funding and sophisticated weaponry.[219]

3.5. The Abduction of Foreigners by the Hizb'allah

As demonstrated, the nature of understanding Hizb'allah activity, such as its abductions of foreigners, involves analysis of a complex network of interactions both within and external to the movement in Lebanon.[220] Apart from the Hizb'allah's centralized decision-making apparatus, clerical fac-

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[215] Accordingly, it is incorrect, as stated by Sean K. Anderson, that the revolutionist faction operated through the *Office of Islamic Liberation Movements* after 1987, see: Sean K. Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: p.29. However, he is correct in his assessment that Hizb'allah operated on "personal loyalty within Iran's clerical establisment rather than to bureaucratic offices as such". Also see: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1987; Ma'aretz, November 10, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987.

[217] See: al-Ittihad, January 31, 1988; Da'var, February 1, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; al-Ittihad, January 15, 1988; and Da'var, November 13, 1987.

[218] See: Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Independent, April 26, 1988; al-Ittihad, January 15, 1988; al-Itthiad, January 15, 1988; and Radio Free Lebanon, July 5, 1990.

[219] See: al-Ray, December 27, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987.

[220] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189.

tionalism within the command leadership of the organisation was compounded by the influence of an array of Iranian and Syrian individuals and institutions at work within the movement.[221] In turn, these external influences on the movement affected its activity to varying degrees, as Hizb'allah showed disobedience and disagreement towards both Iran and Syria at different times.[222] Although Hizb'allah activity often converged with the interests of Iranian and Syrian official policy, it is necessary to examine the movement's hostage-taking activity in Lebanon in terms of its *own* organisational requirements and individual motivations by Hizb'allah members as well as interests by Iran and Syria.[223]

The majority of abductions of Western citizens by the Hizb'allah, with very few exceptions, occured within the framework of a specific and limited time period.[224] As these abductions occured within concentrated time periods, the decision by Hizb'allah's command leadership to abduct individual foreign citizens was intitiated in direct response to an array of factors affecting the organisation within Lebanon. Although these factors can be identified as a direct response by the organisation to a number of major events affecting its own position within Lebanon's civil war over a ten-year period, either for the purposes of survival or for the advancement of its pan-Islamic goals, it is equally important to recognize that Hizb'allah activity, as

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[221] Apart from individual Iranian clergy, these include: Iranian Pasdaran; Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Iran's Office of Islamic Liberations Movements; the Supreme Defense Council; Iran's Ministry of Guidance; Iran's Martyr Foundation; Iran's diplomatic representatives in Beirut and Damascus; and Syrian military and civilian Mukhabarat.

[222] In particular, see: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah, in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.113-117.

[223] This was made evidently clear by: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; Middle East Reporter, March 22, 1986; al-Shira, March 15, 1986: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: pp.147-51; Yossi Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.171-188; and Sean K. Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: pp.19-34.

[224] See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari & Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: pp.7-11.

manifested by the abduction of foreigners, was directly related to the collective as well as individual interests of high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy.[225] As a result, it is necessary to examine Hizb'allah hostage-taking activity not only in relation to the evolution of the organisation itself within Lebanon but also to the individual interests of high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy.[226]

Apart from the often converging interests between Hizb'allah as an organisation and the individual interests of its leading clergy, it is necessary to examine the influence and involvement of Iranian clergy and institutions at work in Lebanon on Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity. The convergence or divergence of Iranian interests in the abduction of foreigners by Hizb'allah must be understood within the context of the array of official and unofficial interaction between Iran and the Hizb'allah as manifest through hostage-taking.[227] The participation of Iranian clergy and institutions in Hizb'allah activity needs to be examined in order to understand the nature of these abductions in terms of being in alignment with the motivations of official Iran or as a manifestation of Iranian clerical factionalism.[228] In turn, this assessment must be balanced against Hizb'allah's own requirements for its position within the internal Lebanese environment.[229]

The abduction of American, French, and British citizens by the Hizb'allah have occured within specific phases:

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[225] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Dimension and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.116-137.

[226] See: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit.

[227] See: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.

[228] See: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.

[229] In particular, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.

* July 1982 - February 1984: the expansion of the movement and attacks against foreign presence;

* February 1984 - January 1985: the arrest of *Lebanese al-Da'wa* members in Kuwait;

* March 1985 - June 1985: the successful actions of the movement in seeking to bring about the expulsion of Western presence and Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon;

* February 1986 - May 1986: accelerated confrontation with Israel and UNIFIL in southern Lebanon;

* September 1986 - October 1986: undermining US-Iranian rapproachment through the revelation of the Iran-Contra scandal and anti-American abductions;

* January 1987 - January 1988: arrest of leading Hizb'allah members in Germany and increased armed confrontation with Amal in Lebanon;

* February 1988 - February 1989: challenges to Amal's authority in southern Lebanon;

* April 1989 -April 1991: confronting major internal challenges and clerical factionalism in Iran;

* May 1991 - December 1992: preparation for a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics, participation within the democratic process, and confrontation with Israel.

These phases have reflected not only the movement's own position within the Lebanese environment as a confessional group, but also the individual as well as the collegiate interests by leading Hizb'allah clergy in the abduction of Western foreigners. Apart from Hizb'allah's own requirements, these phases also reflect the interaction between Hizb'allah and Iranian clergy and institutions as well as Syrian influence over its activity. As a result, the examination of Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity provides a composite picture of the various influences imposed on Hizb'allah's decision-making process in decisions to abduct individual foreigners as well as the underlying raison d'etre for these abductions. This picture becomes increasingly complex as Hizb'allah developed within Lebanon and was subjected to an array of internal and external constraints as well as opportunities in its hostage-taking activity.

First Phase: July 1982 - February 1984

The first abduction by the Hizb'allah of a foreign Western citizen

occurred on July 19, 1982, with the kidnapping of David Dodge, the acting president of the American University of Beirut (AUB).[230] Apart from being the most prominent American citizen in Lebanon next to the US Ambassador, the abduction of David Dodge came directly in response to the previous kidnapping of four employees of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut by the Israeli-backed Phalangist militia.[231] The importance of these Iranian hostages for Iran became apparent with the revelation of their identity, most notably Ahmad Motevaselian, the Ba'albek commander of the Pasdaran contingent, and Mohsen Musavi, the Iranian chargé d'affaires to Lebanon.[232] While it seems clear that the abduction of David Dodge was initiated by the Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon in an effort to exert American pressure on the Phalangist militia to release their commander, Ahmad Mohtaveselian, the operation was executed by Husayn al-Musawi's *Islamic Amal*.[233] The involvement of the *Islamic Amal* in the abduction of David Dodge was seen not only by the fact that the militia spearheaded Hizb'allah's first military units but also by the confinement of the Pasdaran to the Biq'a area.[234] In particular, the close co-operation between *Islamic Amal* and Pasdaran was revealed by the immediate transfer of David Dodge from Beirut to the Biq'a area, where he was handed over to the

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[230] For information concerning the incident, see: Ma'aretz, July 20, 1982; International Herald Tribune, July 23, 1982; Observer, December 8, 1991; and Washington Post, July 20, 1982.

[231] The kidnapping of the four Iranians occured on July 4, 1982, see: Independent, March 26, 1990; and Washington Post, July 24, 1982.

[232] See: Middle East Reporter, July 22, 1983; and Middle East Reporter, November 14, 1990. The other two Iranians were Akhaven Kazem and Taqi Rastegar Moqaddam. Also see: Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 1992): p.33.

[233] For early allegations of the involvement of *Islamic Amal*, see: International Herald Tribune, July 23, 1982; Ma'aretz, September 20, 1983; New York Times, October 13, 1991; and Middle East Reporter, July 22, 1983.

[234] See: Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, January 1, 1984.

Pasdaran contingent in the Syrian border village of Zebdani.[235] Furthermore, the transfer of David Dodge to Iran in April 1983, where he was interrogated by senior Pasdaran officials while held at Evin prison, is evidence that the abduction of Dodge was not only closely coordinated by *Islamic Amal* and the Pasdaran but also initiated solely in accordance with Iran's interest in securing the release of its own captives.[236]

Although the abduction of David Dodge, who subsequently was released after Syrian intervention, on July 21, 1983, failed to achieve the release of the Iranian captives, it had no immediate repercussions and remained an isolated incident of hostage-taking by an Hizb'allah-affiliated organisation.[237] A main reason for the absence of any abductions of other foreign citizens, until the beginning of 1984, can be attributed to the concentration of efforts by the Hizb'allah in the expansion of the movement from Ba'albek into Beirut and southern Lebanon.[238] While Hizb'allah was able to recruit rapidly and indoctrinate a large number of Shi'ite followers in these areas, assisted by the expansion of the Pasdaran from Ba'albek into Beirut in April 1983,[239] the movement's activity was closely aligned with Iran. Notwithstanding the close co-ordination between Hizb'allah and the Pasdaran in the

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[235] For involvement of *Islamic Amal*, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Political Violence and Shi'a Factionalism in Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol.3, No.2 (1983): pp.9-16. See: The Times, July 22, 1987.

[236] See: Con Coughlin, (1993), op.cit.:pp.27-39; and Brian Michael Jenkins, (1986), op.cit.: p.2.

[237] For the release of David Dodge by Syrian military intelligence, see: Ma'aretz, September 20, 1983; and Associated Press, September 20, 1983; and Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1983.

[238] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Shi'ism and Social Protest in Lebanon", in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.172-3.

[239] See: Israeli Defence Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; International Herald Tribune, January 1, 1984; and Ha'aretz, June 3, 1984.

consolidation of the Hizb'allah movement's activities in Ba'albek and in Beirut, the major role of Iranian support and guidance over the movement was revealed by the co-operation between Hizb'allah's leading clergy and Iran's official representatives in Beirut and Damascus.[240] In particular, the pattern of Hizb'allah activity during this period, with special concentration on bomb attacks against foreign targets, underscored not only close alignment and convergence with Iran's foreign policy in Lebanon but also the heavy influence of certain Iranian revolutionary clergy within and over Hizb'allah's decision-making process.[241] This influence was also clearly demonstrated by the subsequent infrequent meetings of Hizb'allah's national *Majlis-al-Shura* from 1983 until 1986 during the tenure of Iran's Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi.[242] Apart from his prominent and active role in the establishment of the Hizb'allah, Mohtashemi appears to have played an active role, with the Pasdaran and Syrian military intelligence, in the supervision of Hizb'allah's suicide bomb attacks against the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the American and French contingents of the Multinational Force (MNF) in October 1983 and the American embassy annex in September 1984.[243] While this close influence over Hizb'allah activity by Iran continued until the reassignment of the *Office of Islamic Liberation* to Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1986, Hizb'allah's activity was also aligned with it's

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[240] See: Ha'aretz, February 7, 1984; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; New York Times, December 29, 1989; and Le Point, August 3, 1987.

[241] For further explanation of the close alignment, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: pp.15-19.

[242] See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Davar, January 11, 1987; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Independent, March 7, 1990; US News and World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; Washington Post, August 1, 1985; and Washington Post, July 7, 1988.

[243] See: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985; New York Times, November 2, 1983; and New York Times, October 5, 1984.

pan-Islamic strategy of expelling foreign influence and presence in Lebanon.[144]

Although Hizb'allah's open warfare against Western political and cultural imperialism in Lebanon began with the bombing of the American embassy on April 18, 1983,[145] which coincided with the arrival of Pasdaran to Beirut, the decision by Hizb'allah to confront the United States, France, United Kingdom and Israel in Lebanon was based not only on their status as the four principal enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran but also on their political and military intervention within Lebanon's civil war.[146] Apart from the traditional American and French support for the Christian-dominated Lebanese government[147], US and French military participation in the MNF, deployed after the massacres in the West Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, not only exacerbated Shi'i hostility but also served to obstruct any efforts to overthrow the confessional system and towards the establishment of an Islamic

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[144] See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: p.26; and Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.: p.262. Also see: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and "An Open Letter: Hizballah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, op.cit.: pp.111-16.

[145] Immediately after the incident, Lebanese authorities arrested four suspects and identified them as: Hussein Saleh Harb; Mahammoud Moussa Dairaki; Mohammad Nayef Jadaa; and Sami Muhmoud al-Hujji, see: AP, July 25, 1987. The Hizb'allah selected to strike at the US embassy as high-level CIA-officers convened with Lebanese operatives, whose mission was to steal a Soviet-supplied SA-5 missile in Syria, on April 18. Also, senior US diplomats Philip Habib and Morris Draper mediating an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty were expected to meet in the embassy on that day. For information, see: G. Delafon, Beirut: The Soldiers of Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989): p.45; and A. Basbous, Secret Wars in Lebanon (Paris: Gallimard, 1987): p.253.

[146] See: Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "Islam and Violence in Political Reality", Middle East Insight, Vol.4, No.4-5 (1986): pp.4-13; and Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad", in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) Fundementalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[147] For a useful overview, see: Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York, NY.: Random House, 1968); Helena Cobban, "The Growth of Shi'i Power in Lebanon and Its Implications for the Future", in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.) Shi'ism and Social Protest (London: Yale University Press, 1986): pp.137-155; and Jonathan Randall, The Tragedy of Lebanon (London: The Hogarth Press, 1990).

state in Lebanon.[248] For Hizb'allah, American and, to a lesser degree, French military participation, inserted to maintain peace between the warring factions in the absence of an effective Lebanese army, became increasingly associated with support for the discredited Gemayel regime as they became gradually drawn into the civil war as active participants.[249] The rejection by Hizb'allah of the American-sponsored 17 May agreement[250], coupled with direct military engagement between Hizb'allah and the American MNF contingent, backed by the presence off shore of massive US naval support,[251] led to a comprehensive effort by the Lebanese Shi'ite organisation to destroy any foreign military presence and political influence in Lebanon. Hizb'allah's execution of a series of suicide attacks, with the active support of Iran and Syria, against the American and French MNF contingents in Beirut on October 23, 1983, resulted not only in the disintegration of the MNF through the withdrawal of both the American and French contingents in the early months of 1984, but also earned the movement prestige and revolutionary credence in

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[248] See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Shira, September 28, 1989; La Révue du Liban, January 30, 1988; and al-Safir, August 29, 1987.

[249] See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June-July 1985); John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York, NY.: Syracuse University Press, 1991): p.252; Roger Owen, "The Lebanese Crisis: Fragmentation or Reconciliation?", Third World Quarterly, Vol.6, No.4 (October 1984): pp.934-47; and "An Open Letter: Hizb'allah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.111-16. For Shi'i hostility towards the MNF in Lebanon, see: US DOD Commission Report on Beirut, Intelligence, 20 December 1983, Part 4; Luigi Caligaris, "Western Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Lessons of the MNF", Survival, Vol.26, No.6 (November/December 1984): pp.262-68; and John Mackinlay, "MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.6, No.4 (Fall 1986): pp.15-26.

[250] See: al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; and David A. Korn, "Syria and Lebanon: a Fateful Entanglement", The World Today (August/September, 1986): pp.137-42.

[251] For incidents of Hizb'allah's confrontation with MNF's, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: pp.9-12.

its battle with Amal for the hearts and minds of the Shi'a community.[252] While the withdrawal of the MNF from Lebanon represented a major victory for the Hizb'allah, in terms of achieving its pan-Islamic goal of liberating Lebanon from all forms of political and military intervention by the Great Powers[253], the organisation accelerated its efforts to confront Israel's military presence through an armed campaign[254] while it concentrated on the removal of any remaining Western presence through attacks on, and kidnappings of, foreigners. This determination by Hizb'allah was clearly manifested in conjunction with the departure of the American MNF contingent through the assassination of Malcolm Kerr, who had replaced the kidnapped David Dodge as president of the AUB.[255] While the assassination of Malcolm Kerr occurred as a retaliatory response to Hizb'allah's armed conflict with the US Marines and the US Navy's 6th Fleet, it also served both as a direct affront on AUB, as the most clear remnant bastion of the United States' cultural and political presence in Lebanon, and as a message that all Western foreign citizens were no longer safe.[256]

Although the Hizb'allah would subsequently abduct an array of Westerners as a means of removing any remaining Western presence from Beirut, the organisation's next campaign of abductions was inextricably tied to the parti-

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[252] For a detailed overview of the competition between Hizb'allah and Amal, see: Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1991): pp.23-46; and Andreas Rieck, Die Schiiten und der Kampf um den Libanon. Politische Chronik 1958-1988 (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1989).

[253] See: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and Nass al-risala al-mafthua allati wajjahaha ila al-mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: pp.167-87.

[254] See: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.

[255] See: Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1984.

[256] For an interview with Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Khalij, June 28, 1986. Also see: Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York, NY.: Doubleday, 1989): pp.212-13.

cipation of individual Hizb'allah members with Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* elements in the multiple terrorist attacks in Kuwait, on December 12, 1983, most notably against the US and French embassies.[257] In particular, Hizb'allah's abduction campaign, between February and March 1984, of three American citizens and a Frenchman was initated in direct response to the arrest and conviction of two *Islamic Amal* members in Kuwait, who were relatives of high-ranking Hizb'allah and *Islamic Amal* officials in Lebanon. Notwithstanding Iran's close involvement in the Kuwaiti incidents with Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*[258] and in the abduction of the five Westerners in Lebanon by the Hizb'allah, the individual interests by some leading Hizb'allah clergy in the case of their imprisoned relatives in Kuwait dominated the decision by the organisation of regarding the nationality of future hostages as well as the ideal time for their abduction. In particular, all of these abductions in the next phase occurred as a direct response to decisions made concerning the fate of imprisoned Hizb'allah members.

Second Phase: February 1984 - January 1985

The second phase of Hizb'allah abductions in Lebanon came as a response to the arrest by Kuwaiti authorities, in the wake of the December 1983 multiple terrorist attacks, of 25 suspects, three of whom were Lebanese Shi'ites.[259] While it soon became apparent that the Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-*

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[257] Apart from the US and French embassies, the 90-minute series of explosions occurred at Kuwait International Airport; a US compound; the Ministry of Electricity and Water; and the Shu'ayba industrial oil refinery. These explosions killed four and injured 87 individuals. For further information on the incident, see: Arab Times, December 13, 1983; al-Watan, December 13, 1983; International Herald Tribune, December 13, 1983; The Times, December 13, 1983; Arab Times, February 11, 1984; and International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1984.

[258] For involvement by Iran, see: Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit: pp.180-83.

[259] The three Lebanese were named as: Elias Fouad Saab (23 years old: unemployed); Hussein al-Sayed Yousef al-Musawi (28 years old: employed at credit and saving bank as data processing supervisor); and Azam Khalil Ibrahim (28 years old: employed as car painter in the Finance Ministry garage). Saab was specifically charged with setting timers and detonators for the explosives while al-Musawi and Azam Khalil were charged with planting the bombs at the American offices and residential buildings, see: Kuwait Times, January 24, 1984; Kuwait Times, January 25, 1984; and Kuwait Times, March 28, 1984. Apart from the three Lebanese suspects,

Islamiyya, headquartered in Iran, was responsible for the attacks,[260] two of the three Lebanese Shi'ites arrested were related to Husayn al-Musawi, leader of *Islamic Amal*, and Imad Mughniyah, formerly a bodyguard of Sheikh Fadlallah as well as the operational leader of Hizb'allah's SSA.[261] While the involvement of these Lebanese *al-Da'wa* members, operating within the framework of *Islamic Amal* and Hizb'allah, in the Kuwaiti bomb attacks pointed not only to close co-operation with the Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* but also to co-ordination with Iranian officials, Hizb'allah's decision to abduct foreign citizens in Lebanon closely followed the conclusion of trial of the 21 *al-Da'wa* defendants in Kuwait.[262] In connection with the initiation of the trial of the 21 *al-Da'wa* defendants, on February 11, 1984, Hizb'allah retaliated with the abductions of American Frank Regier and Frenchman Christian Joubert

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Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 Iraqis, 3 Kuwaitis and two stateless persons, see: al-Khalij, December 13, 1983; International Herald Tribune, December 19, 1983; and AP, January 23, 1984.

[260] For *al-Da'wa's* responsibility, see: Arab Times, December 19, 1983; Financial Times, December 19, 1983; Le Monde, April 8, 1984; Middle East Report; and Teheran in Arabic for abroad 1430 gmt 31 Mar 84 - BBC/SWB/ME/7670/A/10, April 2, 1984.

[261] Hussein al-Sayed Yousef al-Musawi was a first-cousin to *Islamic Amal* leader Husayn al-Musawi. Elias Fouad Saab is the brother-in-law and cousin to Imad Mughniya. See: Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Ma'aretz, February 27, 1986; Da'var, May 6, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 14, 1988. See: International Herald Tribune, January 7-8, 1984; Financial Times, January 13, 1984; and International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1984. For information concerning Imad Mughniya's prominent role within Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus (SSA), see: Ma'aretz, February 2, 1987; Christian Science Monitor, June 25, 1987; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Da'var, November 13, 1987; US News & World Report, February 9, 1987; Da'var, February 1, 1988; Da'var, May 6, 1988; Independent, August 30, 1989; and Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, (1990), op.cit.: pp.265-275.

[262] Evidence would suggest that the planning for the Kuwaiti attacks began in October 1983 in the Bi'qa area, the same month the bombing plans for the US Marine and French installations in Beirut were completed and executed. In particular, the evidence was supported by the unscheduled arrival in Syria of Hossein Sheikh-ol-Islam Zadeh, Iran's deputy foreign minister and head of the Pasdaran contingents outside Iran, and his departure in conjunction with both the bomb attacks in Lebanon, on October 23, and in Kuwait, on December 12, 1983. See: International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1984; International Herald Tribune, September 22-23, 1984; International Herald Tribune, October 1, 1984; Foreign Report, October 27, 1983; and Foreign Report, December 15, 1983.

in Lebanon.[263] The decision by Hizb'allah to abduct an American and a French citizen mirrored not only alignment with Iran's foreign policy, most notably in an attempt to deter both the American and French administrations as well as Persian Gulf governments from extending financial and military assistance to Iraq,[264] but also as a means by the organisation to place dual pressure on Kuwait for either the release of the *al-Da'wa* defendants or, at least, receive leniency in treatment and sentencing.[265] As the *al-Da'wa* trial progressively moved towards conclusion, at the end of March 1984, Hizb'allah abducted two other American citizens, Jeremy Levin[266] and William Buckley[267]. In comparison to the previous kidnappings of Regier and Joubert, the Hizb'allah abduction of Levin and Buckley revealed not only careful selection of targets in order to maximize the pressure on Kuwait from the American administration but subsequently also close Iranian involvement, especially in the case of the abduction of William Buckley, the chief of CIA's Lebanese

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[263] For information concerning the abduction of Frank Regier [Professor of Electrical Engineering at AUB] on February 12, 1984, see: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1984; New York Times, May 28, 1984; Washington Post, September 21, 1984; al-Mustaqbal, May 8, 1984; Associated Press, March 16, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984. For information concerning the abduction of Christian Joubert [a French engineer working on a housing construction project] on February 14, 1984, see: Washington Post, March 17, 1984; Associated Press, April 15, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984.

[264] See: Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the Persian Gulf States", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.73-84; and Bahman Baktiari, "Revolutionary Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: The Quest for Regional Supremacy", in Hooshang Amirahmadi & Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.69-93.

[265] See: Financial Times, April 24, 1984.

[266] For information concerning the abduction of Jeremy Levin [CNN Bureau Chief] on March 7, 1984, see: New York Times, March 17, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; International Herald Tribune, May 10, 1984; al-Mustaqbal, May 8, 1984; and Jerusalem Post, February 17, 1985.

[267] For information concerning the abduction of William Buckley [CIA Station Chief] on March 16, 1984, see: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1984; Washington Post, September 21, 1984; al-Mustaqba, May 8, 1984; al-Qabas, March 28, 1985; Ha'aretz, October 6, 1985; International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1985; and Washington Post, December 13, 1985.

operations.[268] While the Hizb'allah abductions were motivated by the family connections between leading *Islamic Amal* officials and their imprisoned relatives held in Kuwait,[269] the nature of the close co-operation between Hizb'allah and Iran was reinforced by the transfer of William Buckley to Iran, through the hands of the Pasdaran contingent in the Biq'a area.[270]

In conjunction with the conviction of the *al-Da'wa* defendants, on March 27, 1984, most notably with the imposition of a death sentence on Elias Fuad Saab,[271] the Hizb'allah threatened to kill its hostages in an effort to prevent the Kuwaiti government from carrying through the planned execution of the *al-Da'wa* prisoners.[272] While the Hizb'allah kidnapped American Benjamin Weir in May 1984,[273] in another effort to pressure Kuwait to accede to its demands of freedom or leniency for the prisoners, there then followed a brief period in which no other Westerners were abducted until December 1984.

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[268] See: Washington Post, September 21, 1984; al-Mustaqba, May 8, 1984; Da'var, April 13, 1984; and New York Times, March 17, 1984. For details on Buckley's position at the US Embassy in Beirut, see: Washington Post, November 25, 1986.

[269] For demands, see: Washington Post, March 17, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; Washington Post, May 9, 1984; and New York Times, May 28, 1984.

[270] See: al-Qabas, March 28, 1985; al-Taqrir, March 28, 1985; Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 gmt 27 May 85 - FBIS, May 29, 1985; US Congress. Joint Committee. The Iran-Contra Affair. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 1987.

[271] On March 27, 1984, Kuwait's State Security Court sentenced Elias Fuad Saab to death, together with four Iraqi *al-Da'wa* members, while Hussein al-Sayed Yousef al-Musawi received life-imprisonment and Azam Khalil Ibrahim received 15 years imprisonment. See: Arab Times, March 28, 1984.

[272] See: al-Mustaqbal, May 8, 1985; Washington Post, September 21, 1984; and Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985.

[273] For information concerning the abduction of Benjamin Weir [pastor at the Near East School of Theology, AUB], on May 9, 1984, see: Mustaqbal, May 8, 1984; Washington Post, May 9, 1984; International Herald Tribune, May 10, 1984; Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; Yediot, September 19, 1985; Ha'aretz, September 20, 1985; Washington Post, October 13, 1985; and New York Times, December 25, 1986. Also see: Ben and Carol Weir, (1987), op.cit.

Although Hizb'allah's respite can be attributed to the lack of suitable Western citizens, as manifested by the drastic reduction of US official presence in Lebanon,[274] and to the focus by the movement on guerilla attacks against Israel, the resumption of kidnappings by the Hizb'allah occurred in connection with the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner, KU 221, by four members of the *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* on December 4, 1984, in another concerted effort to obtain the release of the imprisoned *al-Da'wa* 17 members in Kuwait.[275] The Kuwaiti hijacking and the abduction of Briton Peter Kilburn, which occurred the previous day in Lebanon,[276] appears to have been perpetrated by *Islamic Amal* with close Iranian involvement.[277] Evidence of close co-operation between *Islamic Amal* and Iran in the case of the Kuwaiti hijacking was supported by the hijackers' use of falsified Lebanese passports and, more importantly, by the previous presence of *Islamic Amal* representatives in Iran in a meeting with Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri under the auspices of the *Office of Liberation Movements*.[278] Despite alleged Iranian involvement with *Islamic Amal* in the hijacking, which explained the rapid conclusion of the incident as

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[274] By October 1984, official US presence in Lebanon had been reduced to six persons as compared with 190 the previous year, see: Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: p.110.

[275] For detailed information concerning the hijacking, see: Middle East Report, December 6, 1984. For a full statement by the hijackers, see: Teheran in Arabic for abroad 1536 gmt 7 Dec 84 - SWB/BBC/ME/7822/A/2, December 10, 1984.

[276] For information concerning the abduction of Peter Kilburn [AUB librarian] on December 3, 1984, see: Jerusalem Post, January 9, 1985; International Herald Tribune, January 15, 1985; International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1985; Washington Post, April 18, 1986; and New York Times, March 2, 1987.

[277] For allegations of Iranian complicity, see: International Herald Tribune, December 17, 1984; The Guardian, December 7, 1984; International Herald Tribune, December 8, 1984; and Paul Wilkinson, "Hezbollah: A Critical Appraisal", Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1993: p.369.

[278] This meeting occured on November 23, 1984, with representatives of al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya and Islamic Amal present in Iran. See: Foreign Report, December 13, 1984; Financial Times, December 8, 1984; International Herald Tribune, December 8-9, 1984; and Observer, December 9, 1984.

well as Iran's refusal to either prosecute or extradite any of the perpetrators, the next abduction of American Lawrence Jenco,[279] on January 8, 1985, by the Hizb'allah was initiated not only as an effort to increase the pressure on Kuwait with respect to the *al-Da'wa* prisoners but also preceeded an earlier effort by the Hizb'allah to abduct a French citizen. As manifested by the mistaken abduction of Eric Wehrli, Swiss chargé d'affaires in Lebanon, who was released after only four days in capitivity on January 7.[280] Apart from the close proximity of the Swiss embassy to the French embassy in Beirut, other evidence would suggest that Hizb'allah deliberately target Wehrli in order to obtain the release of Housein al-Talaat, a Hizb'allah member arrested at Zürich airport on December 18, 1984, with explosives in his possession intended for an attack on the American embassy in Rome.[281]

This phase of Hizb'allah abductions revealed the close connection between the hostage-takings and the fate of the 17 al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait. As these Lebanese *al-Da'wa* members, in co-operation with exiled elements from Iraq's *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, were acting on behalf and with the support of Iran, the involvement of Iran was not only evident in some of these abductions but also converged with the individual interests of leading Hizb'allah security officials, most notably Imad Mughniya.

Third Phase: March 1985 - June 1985

The third phase of Hizb'allah abductions of foreigners in Lebanon, between mid-March until the beginning of June 1985, was related to an accelera-

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[279] For information concerning the abduction of Lawrence Jenco [Priest at Catholic Relief Centre], see: Jerusalem Post, January 1, 1985; Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; International Herald Tribune, November 15, 1985; Ha'aretz, July 28, 1986; Ma'aretz, July 30, 1986; New York Times, July 27, 1986; and New York Times, December 25, 1986.

[280] For information, see: Jerusalem Post, January 6, 1985; and Jerusalem Post, January 8, 1985.

[281] See: Jerusalem Post, January 6, 1985; Jerusalem Post, January 8, 1985; and E. Büchler, "Terrorismus in der Schweiz: Waffen- und Sprengstoffbeschaffung für den Internationalen Terrorismus?", Seminararbeit MS II/86, Zurich, 1986: p.24-5.

ted effort by the movement to expel any remaining Western foreign influence or presence from Lebanon. Hizb'allah's release of an official manifesto in February 1985, in conjunction with the first commemoration of the death of Sheikh Ragheb Harb,[282] was symbolic of the major accomplishments by the movement in forcing not only the earlier departure of the MNF from Lebanon but also the gradual and unilateral retreat of Israel to the narrow security-zone in southern Lebanon.[283] While Hizb'allah's successful and relentless guerilla activity bolstered the movement's support and image, as an implacable foe of Israel and other enemies of Islam, the kidnapping of Westerners by Hizb'allah were directly related to issues surrounding the completion of Israel's retreat in Lebanon, most notably the transfer of hundreds of imprisoned Shi'ites from Ansar prison camp in Lebanon to Atlit in Israel.[284] Apart from Hizb'allah efforts to achieve the release of these imprisoned Shi'ites held by Israel, the abduction of Westerners was initiated not only as a response to the failure by Western governments to condemn Israel's military practises in occupied southern Lebanon, as manifested by the American veto of a Lebanese-sponsored UN resolution to that end, but also to the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Sheikh Fadlallah, on March 8, 1985, in the Bir al-'Abed quarter in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[285]

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[282] Apart from the central role of Sheikh Harb in Hizb'allah's resistance activities against Israel, he was known among the rank and file of the movement as "sheikh of the martyrs", see: Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.128; and Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.128-29. Also see: The Times, July 10, 1984.

[283] See: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila al-mustad áfin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World), February 16, 1985, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. Also see: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985.

[284] See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: pp.254-5; Financial Times, July 2, 1985; and The Times, July 4, 1985.

[285] See: The Guardian, March 8, 1985; and The Guardian, March 11, 1985.

The alleged involvement of Lebanese intelligence units, backed by the CIA, in the carbomb explosion near the residence of Sheikh Fadlallah, which killed at least 80 people and injured 200 others,[286] led to the Hizb'allah retaliatory abductions of two British hostages, Geoffrey Nash and Brian Levick.[287] While the early release of Nash and Levick, two weeks later, seems to indicate that their abductions had been made on the mistaken assumption that they were American citizens,[288] the attempt on Sheikh Fadlallah's life, in combination with the American veto of a Lebanese-sponsored resolution in the United Nations Security Council on March 12,[289] led to the abduction of American Terry Anderson on March 16, 1985.[290]

As the Hizb'allah intensified its anti-Israeli operations, mirrored by Shams al-Din's declaration of a defensive *jihad* against Israel,[291] French

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[286] For CIA co-operation with Lebanese intelligence in the attack, see: The Guardian, May 13, 1985; Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1985; Guardian, May 14, 1985; Middle East Reporter, May 17, 1985; International Herald Tribune, May 17, 1985; Guardian, May 18, 1985; and Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1985.

[287] For information concerning the abductions of Geoffrey Nash, on March 14, and of Brian Levick, on March 15, 1985, see: Da'var, March 15, 1985; New York Times, March 16, 1985; Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1985; New York Times, March 17, 1985; Jerusalem Post, March 18, 1985; Ma'aretz, March 28, 1985; New York Times, March 28, 1985; and International Herald Tribune, March 28, 1985.

[288] See: The Times, April 1, 1985 Financial Times, March 28, 1985; and Middle East Report, March 19, 1985.

[289] Great Britain abstained from voting. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah condemning British voting in the UN, see: Middle East Reporter, April 2, 1985. Also see: AP, March 22, 1985.

[290] For information concerning the abduction of Terry Anderson [AP journalist], see: Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1985; Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; Ma'aretz, November 8, 1985; International Herald Tribune, November 15, 1985; Ma'aretz, October 14, 1986; Ma'aretz, September 27, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1987.

[291] The declaration, issued in March 1985, made it a religious duty for all Muslims to fight against Israel as long as it occupied any part of Lebanon, see: FBIS, March 5, 1985; and Ali al-Kurani, Tarikat Hizballah fil-Amal al-Islami (Beirut, 1986). Between 1984 and 1985, over ninety percent of attacks against Israel was conducted by Hizb'allah's Islamic Resistance, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18, 1985.

condemnation of Israel's military practises in southern Lebanon failed to prevent the abduction of three French embassy employees, on March 22, 1985.[192] Although the decision by the Hizb'allah was motivated by considerations more aligned with Iran's foreign policy, most notably related to France's continued arms shipments to Iraq and outstanding financial debt to Iran,[193] it was also taken as a response to the presence of the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon and its perceived practise of failing to provide adequate protection to the local Shi'ite population.[194]

Another reason for Hizb'allah's concentration on the abduction of French citizens, as became evident by the kidnapping of Jean-Paul Kaufmann and Michel Seurat on May 22, 1985,[195] was an effort to obtain the release of Anis Naccache, imprisoned in France for the attempted assassination of the Shah's former Prime Minister Shapour Bakthiar in Paris in July 1980.[196] Apart from

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[192] For information concerning the abduction of Marcel Fontaine; Marcel Carton; and Danielle Perez, Carton's daughter, see: New York Times, March 23, 1985; Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; Ma'aretz, August 11, 1985; Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; Ha'aretz, November 20, 1985; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; and Da'var, March 29, 1985.

[193] Apart from repayment of a $1 billion loan made by the Shah to the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1974, the kidnappers demanded the cancellation by France of a deal with Saudi Arabia for the procurement of Mirage 2000 aircrafts, see: al-Watan, April 27, 1985; Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; and Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985.

[194] See: Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; and Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985.

[195] For information concerning the abduction of Jean-Paul Kaufman [a correspondent for the French weekly L'Evenement Du Jeudi], see: Washington Times, June 18, 1985; Ha'aretz, September 24, 1985; Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 12, 1986; Yediot, May 5, 1988; Da'var, May 8, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 18, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1989; and Ha'aretz, August 18, 1989. For information concerning the abduction of Michel Seurat [researcher], see: Ma'aretz, March 12, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 7, 1986; Ma'aretz, May 8 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1989; and Ha'aretz, August 18, 1989. Also see: Mary Seurat, Les Corbeaux d'Alep (Paris: L'Age d'Homme, 1988).

[196] See: Liberation, June 5, 1985; Ha'aretz, September 24, 1985; Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986; Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; Yediot, December 1, 1987; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; and International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1988. Apart from Anis Naccache, his four other accomplices were: Iranians Mehdi Nejad Tabrizzi and Mohamad Jawat Jeneb; Palestinian Fauozi Muhamad el Satari; and Lebanese Salaheddine el Kaara, see: Kayhan, July 28, 1990; and Teheran Times, July 28, 1990.

Bakhtiar's overall leadership status of the exile opposition movements to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main interest by the Hizb'allah in the release of Anis Naccache stemmed from both his role as head of the Iranian assassination team and his close personal friendships with both Ahmad Khumayyní, son of the Iranian revolutionary patriarch,[297] and Mohsen Rafiq Dust, IRGC commander in Lebanon.[298] Furthermore, factions within Hizb'allah's SSA had a close interest in achieving the release of Naccache as he was allegedly affiliated with Fatah Force 17,[299] and as several key operational leaders of Hizb'allah's own intelligence network had longstanding experience within Force 17.[300] Due to Imad Mughniya's close personal friendship with Naccache[301], coupled with official Iranian interest in the case, the Hizb'allah focused its efforts to achieve his release through the abduction of these five French citizens.

Apart from the individual interest of leading Hizb'allah clergy in the release of the *al-Da'wa* prisoners in Kuwait and Anis Naccache in France,

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[297] See: International Herald Tribune, July 28-29, 1990.

[298] See: L'Express, July 13, 1984; and Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28-April 3, 1986. Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.

[299] See: Independent, October 27, 1991.

[300] Imad Mughniya, born in 1942/1950? in the south Lebanese village of Dair Daba, grew up in the Bir al-Abed section of Beirut and was recruited by Fatah in 1975. Mughniya was selected to join Fatah Force 17 where he remained until 1982 under the guidance of Mahmud Natur (Abu Tayeb). Due to his experience in Force 17, Mughniya was recruited by the Hizb'allah under the influence of Sheikh Ahmad Mahamud Mughniya, the family's leading cleric who had studied with Khumayyní in Najaf. Mughniya became the personal bodyguard to Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah and later became the head of the operational unit within Hizb'allah's SSA. For Mughniya's affiliation within Force 17, see: NER, February 16, 1987; Da'var, May 6, 1988; Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988; Jou Press, March 7, 1989; Ma'aretz, April 14, 1988; and Ha'aretz, January 1, 1988.

[301] Imad Mughniya visited Paris a few times in 1983 and meet with Muslim fundamentalists closely affiliated with the Iranian embassy, see: Le Point, August 3, 1987; Independent, April 26, 1988; Le Quotidien de Paris, February 27, 1986; and Le Figaro, March 7, 1986.

Hizb'allah focused its efforts on the release of 766 mainly Lebanese Shi'ites, transferred to *Israel* in conjunction with its *withdrawal* from Lebanon, through the abductions of mainly American citizens, as demonstrated by the further kidnapping of David Jacobsen and Thomas Sutherland.[302] This was revealed most clearly by the Hizb'allah hijacking of TWA 847, which immediately followed the completion of Israel's departure from Lebanon, on June 14, 1985, the last and holiest Friday of Ramadan.[303] While the release of the 766 imprisoned Shi'ites dominated Hizb'allah demands, Iranian involvement with the hijackers, both in the supervision and planning of the incident itself[304] and as an active participant in the defusion and resolution of the hijacking through the intercession by Iran's Rafsanjani,[305] overshadowed the competition between Amal and Hizb'allah in the incident. Although the TWA-hijacking was executed by leading Hizb'allah members,[306] the incident was not only part of an effort to obtain the release of the 766 Shi'ite prisoners but also of a

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[302] For information concerning the abduction of David Jacobsen [AUB Administrator] on May 28, 1985; and Thomas Sutherland [AUB professor] on June 9, 1985, see: International Herald Tribune, June 11, 1986; Yediot, May 29, 1985; Ma'aretz, November 8, 1985; Jerusalem Post, November 10, 1985; Time, December 2, 1985; and al-Diyar, August 8, 1988.

[303] See: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: pp.134-35; and Bruce Hoffman, Shi'a Terrorism, The Conflict in Lebanon and the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 N-711685 (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1987).

[304] For evidence of alledged Iranian involvement in the hijacking, see: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985. A month prior to the hijacking, a number of Hizb'allah clerics had frequent meetings with high-ranking Iranian official clergy, most notably Hojatoleslam Khaleghi [Khomayyni's advisor on Arab Affairs]; Hojatoleslam Mahdi-Kharoubi [Director of the Martyrs' Foundation]; and Abbas Ramazani [first commander of the Iranian revolutionary guards in 1979]. Members of Hizb'allah's operational unit meet with Khaleghi and Muhammad Nurani, Iranian chargé d'affaires in Beirut, in April 1985.

[305] See: Washington Post, July 5, 1985.

[306] The Hizb'allah core group of hijackers was: Hassan Iz el-Din, who was also involved in the later hijacking of KU 422 in 1988; and Muhammad Ali Hamadi, whose brother was the head of Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus, see: Sunday Times, April 24, 1988; Jerusalem Post, January 1, 1987; al-Shira, June 27, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; and New York Times, April 16, 1988.

wider strategy by Hizb'allah to discredit Amal leader Nabih Berri in the Amal-Hizb'allah competition over southern Lebanon in the power-vacuum created by the withdrawal of Israel.[307] This intra-Shi'ite feud intensified with Amal's attack on Palestinians in the "war of camps"[308], under Syria's influence, and Hizb'allah's alliance with the PLO, supported by Iran, in order to keep the military option active against Israel in southern Lebanon.[309] Consequently, the abduction campaign was related not only to the interests of individual Hizb'allah clergy, as evident in the case of the *al-Da'wa* prisoners and Anis Naccache, but also to the movement's broader efforts to confront Israel in southern Lebanon and assume the role of protector of the Shi'ite community at the expense of the Amal movement.[310] Although the subsequent cessation in the abduction of Westerners by the Hizb'allah, which resumed in February 1986, has been explained by the secret dealings surrounding the Iran-Contra affair,[311] Hizb'allah's concentration of resistance in southern Lebanon and its competition with Amal over the Shi'ite community eclipsed any need for the capture of other Westerners. As demonstrated by the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages affair, Hizb'allah showed disillusionment regarding the prospects of any rapproachemant between Iran

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[307] See: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985; and Foreign Report, September 5, 1985. Also see: John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: p.150; and Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.117-19.

[308] See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.697. Also see: The Guardian, July 8, 1985.

[309] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi & Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: 187-88.

[310] See: James P. Piscatori, "The Shia of Lebanon and Hizbullah, the Party of God", in Christine Jennett and Randal G. Stewart (eds.) Politics of the Future: The Role of Social Movements (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989); and W.A. Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.7, No.3 (1987): pp.22-35.

[311] See: Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit.

and the United States.[312]

Fourth Phase: February 1986 - May 1986

The fourth phase of Hizb'allah abductions of Westerners, between February and May 1986, was directed mainly at French citizens and came as a response to the decision by France to expel two exiled members of *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* to Iraq and continued demands by the Shi'ite movement for the release of Naccache and other Shi'ite prisoners held in France. The abduction of seven French citizens was also initiated for the advancement of Iranian foreign policy in a range of outstanding disputes with France, which occurred in conjunction with a Hizb'allah bomb campaign in Paris in February and September 1986 and against the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon. Consequently, the concentration on the abduction of French citizens underlined the close co-operation between Hizb'allah's SSA and Iran. Apart from the French hostages, Hizb'allah also abducted two British citizens in reprisal for the American raid on Libya in April 1986.

Hizb'allah's decision to abduct Marcel Coudry[313] and a French four-man Antenne-2 television crew, on March 3,[314] was directly initiated in response to the expulsion of two pro-Iranian Iraqi dissidents to Iraq, Fawzy Harmza

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[312] For Hizb'allah reactions, see: al-Ahd, November 21, 1986; al-Ahd, July 24, 1987; al-Ahd, July 31, 1987; and al-Dustur, December 22, 1986.

[313] For information concerning the abduction of Marcel Coudry in February 1986, see: Newsweek, October 6, 1986; Yediot, November 12, 1986; Ha'aretz, November 11, 1986; Ha'aretz, November 11, 1986; Ha'aretz, November 12, 1986; International Herald Tribune, November 12, 1986, and New York Times, November 12, 1986.

[314] The four Antenne-2 crewmen were: Phillipe Rochot; Georges Hansen; Aurel Cornea; and Jean-Louis Normandin. For information concerning their abduction, see: Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986; Jerusalem Post, March 10, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 12, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 13, 1986; Ha'aretz, June 22, 1986; Newsweek, June 23, 1986; Ma'aretz, June 22, 1986; International Herald Tribune, June 24, 1986; Ma'aretz, December 25, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 17, 1987; Yediot, March 15, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; Yediot, November 29, 1987; Le Monde, November 29, 1987; International Herald Tribune, November 27, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1987.

and Hassan Kheir al-Din, belonging to the Iraqi *al-Da'wa*.[315] Although the Hizb'allah abductions were a reaction to the expulsions of 13 Muslims, including the two opponents of the Iraqi regime, coupled with the announcement by the Hizb'allah of the retaliatory execution of Michel Seurat[316], it underlined not only the continued close relationship between the Shi'ite movement in Lebanon and the Iraqi *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* but also that the Hizb'allah was well-attuned to the political climate in France, as the abductions and the Paris bombing campaign occurred in conjunction with the French national elections in March 1986. This maximized the pressure on the French government to accede to Hizb'allah demands not only with respect to the fate of the expelled Iraqis and in the case of Naccache but also for the advancement of Iranian foreign policy in a range of outstanding issues with France.[317]

Apart from the abduction of Marcel Coudry and the four Antenne-2 crewmen, the Hizb'allah applied additional pressure on the French government through its parti-cipation in a series of bomb attacks in Paris between February and September 1986.[318] While a shadowy group, using the nom de guerre of the "Comité de solidarité avec les prisonniers politiques arabes et du Moyen-Orient" (C.S.P.P.A), demanded the release of FARL leader George Ibrahim Abdallah; Anis Naccache; and Varadjian Garbidjian, the direct involvement of the Hizb'allah became clear with the arrest of its presumed members in March

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[315] See: Guardian, March 13, 1986; and Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986.

[316] For a full text of the announcement by *Islamic Jihad*, see: AP, March 10, 1986; Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1986; and Ma'aretz, March 13, 1986; Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.

[317] See: The Economist, March 15, 1986; International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; Le Monde, September 17, 1987; and Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989. Also see: Luc Chavin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.91-106.

[318] See: Time, October 6, 1986; Le Monde, July 15, 1986; and Le Monde, September 7-8, 1986.

1987, most notably Mohammad Mouhajer, a nephew of Hizb'allah leader Sheikh al-Amin[319], and Fouad Ali Saleh, a leader of Hizb'allah's network in France.[320] As Hizb'allah's involvement in the Paris bombings had been revealed by the previous arrest of Mohammad Ali Hamadi in West Germany,[321] evidence of complicity between Hizb'allah and Iran in the incident was clearly demonstrated by the involvement of high-ranking Hizb'allah intelligence officials, most notably Abd Al Hadi Hamadi and Ibrahim Aqil,[322] in co-operation with Iranian

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[319] For Mohammad Mouhajer's relationship with Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, see: Steve M. Berry, "The Release of France's Last Hostages in Lebanon: An Analysis", TVI Report, Vol.8, No.3 (1989): p.21; Le Soir, March 1987; International Herald Tribune, March 28-29, 1987; Liberation, March 26-27, 1988; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, April 3-10, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; and Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989. Mouhajer, who played a prominent role in Association islamique en France (AIF), was released on March 24, 1988, due to insufficient evidence, see: Washington Post, April 6, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988; and Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.102.

[320] Fouad Ali Saleh, a Tunisian-born French citizen and Hizb'allah member, was the on-site commander of Hizb'allah's operations in France and was arrested together with Mohammad Muhajer. He was convicted of involvement in the 1985-6 bombings in Paris on March 9, 1990, and sentenced to a maximum of 20 years in prison. For information on Saleh, see: International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Hadashot, March 29, 1987; al-Watan al-Arabi, November 12, 1989; Le Monde, April 27, 1987; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1987; Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988; International Herald Tribune, June 2, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; International Herald Tribune, November 24, 1988; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989; Liberation, March 17, 1988; and International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1990.

[321] In connection with the arrest of Hamadi, West-German authorities discovered a series of phone numbers leading to the arrested Hizb'allah suspects in Paris. Under the leadership of Waid Ramadan, the Hizb'allah smuggled explosives from Lebanon, through Cyprus and West-Germany, and narcotics in order to finance their activity in France, see: Le Monde, April 27, 1987; Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987; al-Watan al-Arabi, November 12, 1989; and Le Point, August 3, 1987. The Hizb'allah network was also ex-posed by the defection of a Tunisian, code-named Lofti, in February 1987, see: L'Evenement du Jeudi, June 11-17, 1987; Le Monde, September 17, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987.

[322] On April 27, 1989, a French magistrate issued arrest warrants for seven leaders of Hizb'allah involved in the Paris bombings. Apart from Hamadi and Aqil, the five other members were named as: Hassan Ghosn; Hussein Mazbou; Hassan Ali; Mizar Lelzein; and Muhammad Mehdi Diab. See: Jerusalem Post, April 24, 1989. For Iran's involvement, see: Le Monde, April 27, 1987; Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987; International Herald Tribune, June 6, 1987; Newsweek, June 8, 1987; Ha'aretz, July 22, 1987; Ha'aretz, July 24, 1987; Le Point, August 3, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, November 30, 1987.

embassy officials, Wahid Gordgy,[123] and Pasdaran officials, most notably Mohammad Salek and Ahmad Kan'ani.[124] This close relationship between Hizb'allah operatives and Iranian officials revealed that the Paris bombing campaign and the abduction of French citizens in Lebanon were motivated by the converging interests between Hizb'allah's own agenda in seeking the freedom of its imprisoned members and Iran's own foreign policy agenda aimed at extracting political and financial concessions from the French government.[125] This was confirmed by Sheikh Fadlallah, who linked the issue of the French hostages with French-Iranian relations.[126] Furthermore, Hizb'allah maximized efforts to pressure France by the abduction of another French citizen in Lebanon on May 7, 1986,[127] and, more importantly, through the initiation of an armed campaign against the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon. In the latter case, Hizb'allah's armed efforts was not only motivated by the desire to increase pressure on France to accede to its own and Iranian demands for the withdrawal of UNIFIL and abrogation of UN Security Council Resolution 425 but also mirrored the organisation's decision to confront

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[123] Wahid Gordji, a senior translator in the Iranian embassy in Paris, was the SAVAMA resident in France and overall supervisor of Hizb'allah's network in France for these terrorist operations, see: Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; and Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988.

[124] For the involvement of Mohammad Salek, deputy head of IRGC, and Ahmad Kan'ani, former IRGC commander in Lebanon, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, November 27, 1992; and Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986.

[125] See: Newsweek, June 23, 1986; International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1986; Jerusalem Post, December 1, 1987; Observer, December 6, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986.

[126] See: al-Nahar, March 24, 1986. Sheikh Fadlallah also stated that: "the abductors of the French hostages will release their captives as soon as the socialist regime in France collapsed.", see: al-Mustaqbal, March 23, 1986.

[127] For information concerning the abduction of Camille Sontag, see: Jerusalem Post, May 8, 1986; Ha'aretz, August 31, 1986; Yediot, November 12, 1986; International Herald Tribune, November 12, 1986; and New York Times, November 12, 1986.

actively Israel in southern Lebanon.[328]

While Hizb'allah's decision to abduct these French hostages was in alignment with both Iran's and the movement's collective interest, the decision to kidnap two British citizens, John McCarthy and Brian Kennan, in April 1986[329] was less clear beyond its retaliatory nature in response to Britain's tacit participation in the American raid on Libya.[330] However, the fate of the British hostages became intertwined with demands for the release by Israel of 260 Shi'ites held in al-Khiam prison in the security zone in South Lebanon and the release of the three Iranian hostages who disappeared in 1982.[331]

Fifth Phase: September 1986 - October 1986

A next short series of Hizb'allah abductions were directed against American citizens, beginning with the kidnappings of Frank Reed on September 9, 1986[332] and Joseph Ciccipio three days later,[333] and reached its culmination

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[328] See: Alan James, Interminable Interim: The UN Force in Lebanon (London: The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, April 1988), No.210: pp.21-24; and The Economist, September 27, 1986. For Hizb'allah's position on UNIFIL, see statements by Sheikh Fadlallah: Ha'aretz, October 30, 1986; Monday Morning, December 12, 1986; Ha'aretz, January 12, 1987; al-Shira, September 28, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 4, 1987.

[329] For information concerning the abduction of John McCarthy and Brian Keenan, see: New York Times, April 19, 1986; al-Nahar, November 22, 1986; Ha'aretz, December 9, 1986; al-Shira, December 31, 1987; Ma'aretz, August 6, 1989; and Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1990.

[330] See: Con Couglin, (1992), op.cit.

[331] See: Hadashot, June 23, 1988; Times, August 12, 1988; Times, August 12, 1988; and Washington Post, August 12, 1988.

[332] For information concerning the abduction of Frank Reed [Director of American College], see: AP, September, 9, 1986; New York Times, September 14, 1986; International Herald Tribune, September 10, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1987.

[333] For information concerning the abduction of Joseph Ciccipio, see: Washington Post, September 13, 1986; New York Times, September 13, 1986; Jerusalem Post, September 15, 1986; International Herald Tribune, September 13, 1986; and Ha'aretz, February 17, 1987.

with the seizure of Edward Tracy on October 21, 1986.[114] While Hizb'allah's decision to resume the hostage-taking of Americans, after a fifteen-month period of cessation, must be viewed in the context of efforts to replace released American hostages within the framework of the so-called Iran-Contra Affair, evidence suggests Hizb'allah had at best only limited knowledge of the arms-for-hostages deals, as evident by the organisation's vehement opposition to any US-Iranian rapproachement.[115] It seems more likely, however, that the abduction of these three Americans reflected clerical factionalism in Iran as the incidents shortly preceeded the revelation of the Iran-Contra Affair on November 3, 1986, by Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in Lebanon, Sheikh Ismail al-Khaliq, a leading Hizb'allah cleric.[116] Although it may be the case that Hizb'allah abducted these American citizens in an effort to both replace previously released hostages and discredit Rafsanjani's position in Iran, the alledged involvement of Hizb'allah leader Imad Mughniya in these abductions suggests that concern over the 17 *al-Da'wa* prisoners in Kuwait was a strong motivation for the resumption of the kidnapping of American citizens.[117]

These three anti-American abductions also signalled a growing rift between Hizb'allah and Iran, as evident by the reassignment of the *Office of*

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[114] For information concerning the abduction of Edward Tracy, see: Ma'aretz, October 22, 1986; New York Times, October 22, 1986; New York Times, January 18, 1987; Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1989; and Ma'aretz, August 6, 1989.

[115] For Hizb'allah's opposition, see: al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd, November 21, 1986. Also see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.: pp.137-8.

[116] The US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal was revealed by the Beirut-based al-Shira magazine. For the role of al-Khaliq, see: al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; and Arab News, December 6, 1986. Also, information about Robert McFarlane's visit to Iran had been previously printed in a small newsletter published by Hizb'allah-followers of Montazeri in Ba'albek, see: U.S. Congress, Committes Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987.

[117] See: Report of the President's Special Review Board, February 26, 1987: p.B-153, note 90.

Islamic Liberations Movements to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the arrest of its commander Mehdi Hashemi.[338] This made Hizb'allah's leadership more susceptible to Iranian clerical factionalism and provided the opportunity for some leading Hizb'allah operatives to pursue a more independent agenda in the abductions of foreigners.[339]

Sixth Phase: January 1987 - January 1988

The decision by Hizb'allah leaders to abduct a number of Western citizens in January 1987 came directly in response to the arrest of three leading Hizb'allah members in Europe. While the abduction of Frenchman Roger Auque, on January 13, appears to be related to the previous day's arrest of Bashir al-Khodour in Milan by Italian authorities, other abductions of Western foreigners came directly in response to the arrest of Mohammad Ali Hamadi in Frankfurt by West-German authorities.[340] Apart from his prominent role in the June 1985 TWA 847 hijacking, Mohammad Ali Hamadi's elevated position within the Hizb'allah was revealed not only by the retaliatory abductions of two West-German citizens, Rudolph Cordes and Alfred Schmidt,[341] but also by the fact that his brother, Abdul Hadi, was the chief of security for Hizb'allah.[342] The connection between the Hamadi clan's high-ranking position

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[338] See: FBIS, November 5, 1986; IRNA, March 18, 1987; and Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: p.24.

[339] See: Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; Marmara, November 25, 1986; and Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.10.

[340] Bashir Khadr was arrested on January 20, 1987, after 11kg of Semtex and 36 sophisticated detonators was discovered on him on arrival in Milan. He was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. For details see: New York Times, February 20, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 18, 1987; Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989; I Simerini, August 20, 1986; and Independent, Febraury 20, 1987.

[341] For Abbas Ali Hamadi's involvement in the kidnapping of Cordes and Schmidt, see: Ma'aretz, January 1, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 29, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 20, 1988.

[342] For information related to Abdul Hadi Hamadi as security chief of Hizb'allah, see: Jerusalem Post, January 25, 1987; Da'var, June 28, 1987; al-Shira, June 27, 1987; Yediot, January 7, 1988; Da'var, February 1, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 29, 1988; Jerusalem Post, April 28, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989. On June 27, 1989, a

within Hizb'allah's SSA and the abduction campaign of foreigners in Lebanon was made even clearer with the arrest of Mohammad Ali Hamadi's younger brother, Abbas, in West Germany.[343] The arrest of the two Hamadi brothers in January 1987, coupled with American extradition requests, led to the kidnapping of four American teachers in Beirut.[344] While Hizb'allah's abduction campaign was motivated by individual interests of leading Hizb'allah clergy, it was also a reflection of clerical factionalism in Iran in the aftermath of the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal,[345] as evident by the unprecedented number of abductions of foreigners by the organisation during January 1987.[346] This clerical factionalism was evident by the separation of the *Islamic Liberation Movements* from the IRGC in Iran in December 1986,[347] in an effort by Rafsanjani to strengthen Iran's control over

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French magistrate issued arrest warrants for Abdul Hadi Hamadi and six other leaders and members of Hizb'allah for staging a series of bombings in Paris in 1986, see: Jerusalem Post, April 28, 1989.

[343] See: Le Point, June 15, 1987; Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 18, 1987; and Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989.

[344] For information concerning the abduction of Jesse Turner; Alan Steen; Robert Polhill; and Sing Mithileshwar, see: Jerusalem Post, January 25, 1987; Ma'aretz, January 25, 1987; Jerusalem Post, January 30, 1987; Da'var, January 30, 1987; International Herald Tribune, January 26, 1987; and Ma'aretz, January 30, 1987.

[345] For clerical factionalism in Iran, see: International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1987; and Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: pp.31.

[346] Between January 12-26, Hizb'allah abducted ten foreign citizens in Lebanon.

[347] See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; and Foreign Report, December 18, 1986.

Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon.[348] Although the abduction of Terry Waite,[349] an Anglican clergyman mediating independently in the hostage-crisis, by the Hizb'allah may have been caused by his indirect association with the US-Iran arms-for-hostages deal, (which he publicly denied prior to his kidnapping)[350] it was mainly a consequence of his inability to affect the fate of the imprisoned 17 *al-Dawa* prisoners in Kuwait.[351]

Hizb'allah's demand for the return of 400 Shi'ite and Palestinian imprisoned in Israel as a precondition for the release of these hostages also mirrored the movement's escalatory efforts to confront militarly IDF and SLA positions in southern Lebanon. The concentration of Hizb'allah efforts was underlined by the organisations use of a hiterto unknown nome de guerre, the *Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine*, in claiming responsibilty for the abduction of Western foreigners. In response to these abductions, direct military intervention by Syria into the Muslim areas of Beirut in February 1987, in which twenty-three members of Hizb'allah were killed,[352] demonstrated not only a rift with Syria over Hizb'allah's hostage-taking acti-

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[348] See: G. Delafon, Beirut: The Soldiers of Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989): p.175; Marmara, November 25, 1986; and Bulvar, November 16, 1986.

[349] For information concerning the abduction of Terry Waite, on January 20, 1987, see: Ma'aretz, January 28, 1987; al-Shira, January 31, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, February 1, 1987; Ma'aretz, March 24, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot, April 5, 1987.

[350] On December 16, 1986, Terry Waite issued a written statement denying any involvement in dealings with money or arms in connection with hostages, see: Washington Post, December 17, 1986.

[351] See: Gavin Hewitt, Terry Waite: Why Was He Kidnapped (London: Bloomsbury, 1991); and Ma'aretz, February 4, 1987.

[352] See: Washington Post, February 12, 1987; New York Times, February 16, 1987; Washington Post, February 21, 1987; Middle East Economic Digest, February 28, 1987; and New York Times, March 11, 1987.

vity[353] but also the increased hostility between the Hizb'allah and its competitor Amal.[354] Apart from an isolated abduction of an American journalist, Charles Glass, in June 1987, the Syrian-imposed security plan in Beirut, coupled with Hizb'allah-Amal armed clashes in Beirut, the Biq'a and southern Lebanon, contributed to a reorientation of Hizb'allah's focus away from hostage-taking towards armed confrontation with both Amal, over the support of the Shi'a community, and Israel, in the struggle for the "liberation of Jerusalem".[355] This was particularly evident by Hizb'allah's display of sophisticated armaments during its parades in southern Beirut, Ba'albek, Sidon and Tyre on 14 May (anti-Zionist day) and on 22 May, "Jerusalem Day".[356] While Hizb'allah's shift towards armed struggle was supported by Iran's allocation of $90 million to the organisation in late 1987 for its military enhancement,[357] it was also evident by the existence and display of regular Hizb'allah *Islamic Resistance* military units, equipped with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.[358] The recall of several regional operational leaders of Hizb'allah from southern Lebanon to Ba'albek for extensive retraining in

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[353] See: New York Times, March 27, 1987; and Arab News, April 27, 1987.

[354] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.

[355] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1987: pp.418-19; 643-45. For clashes between Amal-Hizb'allah, see: FBIS, May 21, 1987; Approximately 40,000 Hizb'allah supporters marched through Ba'albek to mark Jerusalem Day in May, see: Arab News, May 24, 1987. For Hizb'allah's resistance activity against IDF and SLA, see: Washington Post, April 19, 1987; Arab News, May 28, 1987; Washington Post, June 1, 1987; and Arab News, June 2, 1987.

[356] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: p.129-30.

[357] See: al-Ray', December 27, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987. Also see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.147.

[358] See: Davar, January 11, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987; Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Nahar, January 19, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; Foreign Report, August 15, 1988; Ma'aretz, August 30, 1989; and Newsweek, August 24, 1987.

the latter half of 1987 indicated the employment of new tactics which combined guerilla warfare with regular military operations.[359]

This phase of Hizb'allah abductions revealed a more independent line of greater independence from Iran as the hostage-takings were aligned with the interests of individual high-ranking Hizb'allah SSA operatives over the fate of imprisoned relatives abroad and for the movement as a whole in its confrontation with both Amal and Israel. The lack of other additional abductions, with the exception of American Charles Glass, can be attributed to the Amal-Hizb'allah confrontation in Beirut and the South as well as the movement's concentration in the enhancement and projection of its military capability against Israel in southern Lebanon.

Seventh Phase: February 1988 - January 1989

Hizb'allah's military and political confrontation with Amal over Beirut and southern Lebanon escalated with the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins, the American Chief of the UN Truce and Supervision Organisation's observer group in Lebanon (UNTSO) on February 17, 1988.[360] Apart from the symbolic importance of the abduction, occurring on the fourth annual commemoration of the death of Hizb'allah leader Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Hizb'allah's decision to abduct Lt.Col. Higgins was not only directed against UNIFIL for impeding armed attacks against the Israeli occupation of the south but, more importantly, constituted a direct challenge to Amal's authority to maintain a stable security environment in southern Lebanon.[361] As the Amal launched a

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[359] See: Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987.

[360] For details of the abduction of Lt. Col. Higgins, see: Ha'aretz, February, 18. 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 23, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 19, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 10, 1988; and Foreign Report, March 17, 1988.

[361] In particular, Lt.Col. Higgins was abducted from his UN vechicle between Tyre and Nakara after a meeting with Abd al-Majid Salah, Amal's political leader of southern Lebanon, see: AFP, February 18, 1989. Amal informed UNIFIL that Lt.Col. Higgins was held in the village of Jibshit, see: FBIS, March 29, 1988.

major campaign to eliminate the Hizb'allah presence in the south, it became clear that Sheikh al-Musawi, the commander of Hizb'allah's *Islamic Resistance*, had been personally responsible for the abduction of Lt.Col. Higgins in close co-operation with both Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the local commander of Hizb'allah's military wing, and Mustafa al-Dirani, the former head of Amal's security service.[362] Although the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins remained an isolated incident, executed by Hizb'allah to challenge Amal's authority in the South and to obtain the release of Israeli-held Shi'ite prisoners,[363] the decision by the movement to hijack Kuwaiti airliner KU422 on April 4, 1988, highlighted the continued importance of the fate of the 17 al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait for leading members of Hizb'allah.[364] Apart from close Iranian involvement in the hijacking, the incident reflected a shift in Hizb'allah tactics as the movement's activity was constrained not only by Amal's control over Beirut but also through its armed confrontation with Amal in the South.

Although the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins served as a triggering mechanism for the armed confrontation between Amal and Hizb'allah, the intra-Shi'ite warfare in Beirut and southern Lebanon dominated Hizb'allah's agenda at the expense of any further abduction of Western foreigners. As Amal scored decisive military victories in the South against the Hizb'allah in the spring of 1988, leading to the expulsion of a number of Hizb'allah clergy to the

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[362] For Abbas al-Musawi's position as leader of *Islamic Resistance*, see: Davar, September 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, September 2, 1987; For al-Musawi's involvement in the kidnapping, see: Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; Ma'aretz, February 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 28, 1989. For involvement of Sheikh Obeid, see: Foreign Report, March 17, 1988; and International Herald Tribune, August, 3, 1988.

[363] For Hizb'allah demands, see: FBIS, February 22, 1988.

[364] For information concerning the hijacking and its relation to the 17 al-Da'wa case, see: New York Times, April 6, 1988; Washington Post, April 7, 1988; Washington Post, April 8, 1988; New York Times, April 8, 1988; New York Times, April 11, 1988; New York Times, April 13, 1988; New York Times, April 16, 1988; New York Times, April 20, 1988; Washington Post, April 24, 1988; and Washington Post, May 3, 1988.

Bi'qa, Hizb'allah itself reorganized its efforts towards armed confrontation with Amal in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[365] This led not only to the military defeat of Amal in Beirut in May, and to the infiltration within its ranks by Hizb'allah members and the defection of Amal members,[366] but also to Syrian political and military intervention in June 1988, in order to rescue Amal from defeat and to influence the forthcoming presidential elections in September 1988.[367] After Iranian proposal for the insertion into Beirut of a joint Syrian-Iranian force were rejected by both Syria and Amal, Hizb'allah leaders were assured that Syria would not clamp down on the movement if it left the Western hostages unharmed.[368] As a result, Hizb'allah leader Sheikh al-Amin claimed that this arrangement between Iran and Syria allowed Hizb'allah to resume activities in the south, the main objective by the movement for challenging Amal in the suburbs of Beirut.[369] As Hizb'allah's position was weakened in Beirut, it turned its attention to the challenge of

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[365] Elements within Hizb'allah and the Iranian Pasdaran established a joint command to assassinate high-ranking Amal officials and carry out operations against Amal checkpoints and centres, see: Voice of Lebanon, 0615 gmt 18 Apr 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0131, April 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, April 18, 1988. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah on the Amal-Hizb'allah warfare, see: Radio Monte Carlo, 1750 gmt 13 May 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0152, May 16, 1988. For Amal-Hizb'allah conflict, see: New York Times, May 7, 1988; Washington Post, May 9, 1988; New York Times, May 12, 1988;

[366] For infiltration of Amal by Hizb'allah members, see: FBIS, February 28, 1988. For Amal defections, see: Ha'aretz, April 1, 1987; Da'var, November 10, 1987; Ha'aretz, February 29, 1988; and Ma'aretz, November 10, 1987.

[367] For a useful discussion, see: Yossi Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.184; and Middle East International, March 2, 1990.

[368] Under the agreement, Hizb'allah and Amal bureaus were converted into "political and information offices". While Syria would maintain a cease-fire, both militias withdrew their gunmen and would maintain a military presence on the contact lines. See: New York Times, May 23, 1988; New York Times, May 27, 1988; FBIS, May 23, 1988; and al-Safir, May 27, 1988.

[369] See: New York Times, May 29, 1988; Voice of the Oppressed 0545 gmt 27 May 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0163, May 28, 1988; and Radio Free Lebanon 0545 gmt 28 May 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0164, May 30, 1988.

confronting Amal's supremacy in southern Lebanon.[370] The protracted conflict between Amal and Hizb'allah for the control of the major Shi'a areas in the South and Beirut continued with ferocity until late January 1989, when Syria and Iran intervened and announced an agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah.[371] Under this agreement, Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon was recognized while Hizb'allah was permitted to maintain only a nonmilitary presence through political, cultural, and informational programmes.[372]

The intensification by the Hizb'allah, through its military wing, of armed confrontation in southern Lebanon reflected not only the competition with Amal over military and political influence in the region but also the substitution of Hizb'allah's grand pan-Islamic strategy from the failure to achieve Islamic victory in adjacent territories, as demonstrated by the announcement of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in July 1988,[373] to solidarity with the revival of Islamic fundementalism within the Palestinian intifada in the Israeli occupied territories.[374] This was demonstrated not only by Hizb'allah's closer co-operation with local anti-Arafat Palestinian elements for operational expediency in the resistance struggle against Israel,[375] but also through involvement with Islamic groups within the

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[370] See: Voice of the Oppressed 0930 gmt 2 Jun 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0169, June 4, 1988.

[371] See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.256.

[372] For a full text of the Amal-Hizb'allah Accord, see: SANA in Arabic 1435 gmt 30 Jan 89 - BBC/SWB/ME/0373, February 1, 1989.

[373] For Hizb'allah reaction to Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598, see: al-Nahar, July 22, 1988; al-Muntalaq, September 1988; and Ma'aretz, August 24, 1988.

[374] For Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic identification with the liberation of Jerusalem as displayed by the Palestinian *intifada*, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut: 1984); al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; al-Ahd, January 23, 1987; al-Anwar, January 1, 1988; and al-Ahd, March 18, 1988.

[375] See: Ha'aretz, March 24, 1989; Foreign Report, September 15, 1989; Ma'aretz, November 3, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 25, 1989; al-Nahar al-Arabi, January 9, 1989; and Ma'aretz, November 4, 1987.

Israeli-controlled occuppied territories.[376]

As shown by Hizb'allah's rapproachement with Amal in January 1989, which was facilitated by Iranian-Syrian diplomacy, the change in Hizb'allah's position came under the threat of Syrian military intervention as Syria moved to extend its hegemony over Lebanon.[377] Apart from Hizb'allah's disillusionment with Iran's reversal of policy towards Iraq, it became clear that the Hizb'allah-Iranian relationship showed certain signs of strain as Iran moved to extend its relationships with Amal and other less militant Shi'ite organisations in Lebanon.[378] Although Iran's attempt to minimise Amal-Hizb'allah differences was made in order to close ranks against Iraq's accelerated injection of military support to militias in Lebanon after the cease-fire in the Gulf war, it failed as Amal remained the unconditional ally of Syria and Hizb'allah resumed its armed confrontation with Amal over the control of southern Lebanon.[379] The expansion of Hizb'allah's presence in the South proved important for both Iran and the movement itself as despite having a well-entrenched position in Beirut, it was unable to significantly exert political influence beyond the suburbs and as the movement's strong-hold in

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[376] Hizb'allah claimed it established an active arm in the territories and distributed a leaflet in east Jerusalem and Beit Lehem, urging the escalation of the Palestinian *intifada*, see: Ma'aretz, August 30, 1988. Also see: al-Anwar, January 1, 1988; al-Ahd, March 18, 1988; al-Ahd, September 9, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 25, 1989; al-Diyar, December 4, 1989; and Monday Morning, June 18, 1989.

[377] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) (1993), op.cit.: p.210.

[378] In mid-1989, Iran assembled fourteen Lebanese and Palestinian groups in Teheran with a wide variety of idelogical orientation and allegiances, see: Independent, August 29, 1989; Teheran Times, July 27, 1989. Also see: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World, op.cit.: pp.188-9; and Al-Mustaqbal, February 25, 1989.

[379] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: p.167; and Ha'aretz, December 20, 1987.

Ba'albek was encircled by Syrian military presence.[380] Apart from providing Iran with a direct means to participate in the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizb'allah's military option and political presence in the South would become increasingly significant, especially as Hizb'allah's position remained uncertain in the aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khumayyní in June 1989 and the conclusion of the Ta'if Accords for political reform in Lebanon in October 1989.[381]

Eight Phase: April 1989 - April 1991

Hizb'allah's abduction of British citizen, Jack Mann, in May 1989, was response to Iran's fatwa against Salman Rushdie for the publication of his book The Satanic Verses and, more specifically, for his refuge and protection in the United Kingdom.[382] The incident itself was soon overshadowed for the Hizb'allah movement by the death of Ayatollah Khumayyní on June 3, 1989, and the abduction of Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid, a senior Hizb'allah cleric and regional military commander of the *Islamic Resistance*, by elite Israeli military units on July 28, 1989.[383]

Apart from Hizb'allah's disagrement with Iran's clerical establishment

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[380] See: Ha'aretz, May 4, 1986; Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; and New York Times, January 23, 1990.

[381] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over?", Middle East Journal, Vol.45, No.3 (Summer 1991): pp.470-1. For text of the Ta'if Accord, see: FBIS, October 24, 1989.

[382] For Iran's *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie, see: John L. Esposito, (1993), op.cit.: pp.190-93. For Iran's animosity towards Britain, see: FBIS, August 7, 1989. Hizb'allah's Sheikh Fadlallah endorsed Khumayyní's call for assassination of Rushdie as: "[t]his book represents a method of aggression against Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. Our retaliation should be aggressive. A violent slap is necessary to all the aggression against Islam in the West.", see: International Herald Tribune, February 23, 1989; and New York Times, February 23, 1989. Also see: Independent, October 23, 1991.

[383] For details of IDF's military operation in the abduction of Sheikh Obeid, see: Samuel M. Katz, Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990): pp. ; and Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1992): pp.344; and Yediot Aharanot, July 30, 1989.

over the devolution of Ayatollah Khumayyní's spiritual and political authority, following the dismissal of the designated heir Montazeri in March 1989,[384] the death of Ayatollah Khumayyní left the movement in disarray over its future position in Lebanon.[385] The ouster of Hizb'allah's most staunch ally within Iran's clerical hierarchy, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, by Iran's new president Rafsanjani,[386] came at a time when Hizb'allah experienced Iranian moves to downgrade its support for the movement while it felt increased pressure from Syria to release the Western hostages. In particular, Syria pressured the Hizb'allah through the limited prevention of additional or replacement IRGC from passing through Syria into Lebanon, while Iran's Rafsanjani attempted to replace the exisiting IRGC contingent with one more loyal to the political leadership in Iran.[387] In addition, Hizb'allah's position within Lebanon was directly threatened by the Saudi-brokered Ta'if Accord, concluded with Syrian support in October 1989, which the movement vehemently opposed.[388] In response to the challenges facing the organisation inside Lebanon, the Hizb'allah assembled a major meeting to discuss the challenges the movement faced both within Lebanon and beyond in its rela-

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[384] See: Sunday Times, April 16, 1989; New York Times, May 22, 1989; Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.127; and al-Ahd, November 31, 1986.

[385] See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[386] In Rafsanjani's inaugural speech to the Majlis, he warned that hardliners would have to forego their 'extremism' for new political and economical program, see: Washington Post, August 18, 1989. For a petition, signed by 138 Majlis deputies, urging Rafsanjani to retain Ali-Akhbar Mohtashemi as minister of interior, see: Washington Post, August 20, 1989; and FBIS, August 21, 1989. For Mohtashemi's dismissal, see: Washington Post, August 28, 1989; and Iran Times, March 29, 1991. Also see: Anoushriavan Ehteshami, "After Khomeini: the Structure of Power in the Iranian Second Republic", Political Studies, Vol.34 (1991): pp.148-57.

[387] See: Washington Post, September 22, 1988; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, January 23, 1990; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990.

[388] See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.457-73.

tionship with Iran and the revolutionist faction within the clerical establishment.[389] While the meeting resulted in the ascendancy of Sheikh al-Tufayli as leader of Hizb'allah's command leadership, it also revealed deep splits within the organisation over the future direction of the movement in Lebanon.[390]

While the movement remained divided over its future direction, the abduction of Sheikh Obeid, a leading figure within the *Islamic Resistance*, represented not only a major security problem for the organisation, as Jibshit was a key organisational center for *Islamic Resistance* in its attacks against IDF and SLA positions, but also a shift in tactics by Israel in its confrontation with Hizb'allah. As the Hizb'allah had previously not been immune from Israeli kidnappings of its operational members, as demonstrated by the abduction of Sheikh Jawad Kafsi and three of his colleagues from the south Lebanese village of Tibnin on December 15, 1988,[391] the abduction of Sheikh Obeid forced the organisation into negotiations with Israel over the return of six missing IDF soldiers held by the organisation.[392] While

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[389] In particular, the movement discussed the visit of Mohtashemi to Lebanon prior to the meeting, see: FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[390] See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; Independent, August 10, 1991; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[391] For the kidnapping of Sheikh Kafsi, see: The Times, August 1, 1989. Also see: Samuel M. Katz, The Elite (London: Pocket Books, 1992): pp.270-1. The decision to target Sheikh Kafsi followed information of his role as an operational officer in the *Believers Resistance Movement*, which was holding a missing IDF serviceman, Ron Arad, see: Jerusalem Post, August 2, 1989. Sheikh Kafsi was also a close friend of Mustafa Dirani, see: Foreign Report, January 9, 1992; and Jerusalem Post, May 14, 1990. In retaliation, the *Believers Resistance Movement* kidnapped seven Irish UNIFIL officers in Tibnin. The hostages were released by Amal militiamen, who mounted searches throughout southern Lebanon and arrested almost 200 members of the *Believers Resistance Movement*, see: Ha'aretz, December 18, 1988; and Jerusalem Post, December 18, 1988.

[392] The idea of kidnapping Hizb'allah leaders, as a way of forcing the organisation into negotiations over the missing Israeli servicemen in Lebanon, was originally made by Uri Slonim and General Matan Vilami, who were appointed to coordinate attempts to rescue the missing IDF servicemen in 1987. The two officials presented their proposal in a meeting, held in November 1988, with Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who approved the plan and authorized military planners to select potential Hizb'allah targets, see: The Times, August 6, 1989; and The Sunday Times, August 1, 1989. Also see: R. Reuben Miller, "Political Kidnapping: A Case

the IDF kidnapping of Sheikh Kafsi failed to yield any prisoner exchange, due to the semi-independent status of the *Believers Resistance Movement* and his low-ranking position within this organisation,[393] the decision to abduct Sheikh Obeid was not only due to his leading position as a regional commander within the *Islamic Resistance* but also for his personal involvement in the abductions of two IDF servicemen in February 1986 and Lt.Col. William Higgins in February 1988.[394] Although the fate of the Hizb'allah-held missing Israeli servicemen[395] remained conditional on any Israeli release gesture of Shi'ite Lebanese detainees from Atlit or al-Khiam prisons,[396] Hizb'allah

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Study of Israeli Practice", Low-Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol.2 (1993).

[393] In 1985, Mustafa Dirani created an autonomous militia force in Tyre, the *Believers Resistance Movement*, in order to launch resistance attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon. After his involvement in the kidnapping of Lt.Col. William Higgins in February 1988, Dirani left Amal and took the captured IAF navigator Ron Arad in custody and transferred him under the control of his new organisation. After Amal's attacks against Hizb'allah in the south and the conclusion of the Amal-Hizb'allah accord in 1989, Mustafa Dirani and members of the organisation joined Hizb'allah and transferred Ron Arad to the Pasdaran in the Biq'a valley, see: Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1986; Middle East Reporter, November 14, 1986; Jerusalem Post, May 31, 1991; and MidEast Mirror, August 29, 1991. At the same time as the IDF kidnapping of Kafsi, Israel discovered that Dirani's brother, Ghassan Faris Dirani, was held by the Maronite Christian forces lead by Samir Geagea and he was transferred into Israel's custody as a bait for information on the fate of Ron Arad, see: Foreign Report, August 22, 1991; and Foreign Report, January 9, 1992. Information concerning Ron Arad's detention was provided by a pamphlet published by his family [Free Ron Arad, November 1990] provided by Israel's Ministry of Defence. On May 21, 1994, Israel abducted Dirani from his home in Kasernaba in the eastern Biq'a to gain information about Ron Arad, see: Independent on Sunday, May 22, 1994; and Sunday Times, May 22, 1994.

[394] The two IDF soldiers, Joseph Fink and Rahamim Levi Alsheikh, had been kidnapped on February 17, 1986, while patrolling the security area between Bint Jbeil and Beit Yahun, see: Ma'aretz, Febraury 26, 1986; Middle East Reporter, February 18, 1986; AP, February 20, 1986; Times, February 20, 1986. For involvement by Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, see: Ma'aretz, September 23, 1987. For admission by Sheikh Obeid in these kidnappings, see: Jerusalem Post, August 3, 1989.

[395] The other three IDF soldiers listed as missing-in-action were: Zvi Feldman, Zachary Baumel, and Yehuda Katz, who were captured during a battle in the Sultan Yakoub of the Biq'a valley on June 11, 1982. For information concerning their abductions, see: Free Our Sons: document published by the families of the soldiers missing-in-action, February 1989. Also see: Associated Press, June 11, 1982; La Stampa, June 12, 1982; and Time, June 21, 1982. Also see: Samuel M. Katz, (1992), op.cit.: pp.260-78.

[396] Israel's position was outlined in an interview with Benjamin Netanyahu, Deputy Foreign Minister: "We will insist on getting the minimum we deserve, namely: information and, ultimately, the release of our men in exchange for the assets we are holding. Otherwise, we

remained adamant over its refusal both the release of any IDF soldiers as well as any Western hostages under the more militant leadership of Sheikh al-Tufayli.[397]

Although the more radical elements within Hizb'allah's leadership had control over the movement's activity, it was clear that the organisation faced increased confrontation with both Iran and Syria over its position within a rapidly changing political and military environment in Lebanon.[398] In particular, it became clear that the new Iranian leadership wanted to pursue a more controlled policy in its relationship with the Hizb'allah, as evident by Rafsanjani's appointment of his brother, Mahmud Hashemi, to head the Lebanon desk within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[399] However, it was also clear that Iran had great difficulty in rest-raining Hizb'allah in its clashes with Amal, despite the January 1989 agreement between the two militias and continued Iranian mediation efforts,[400] and that the Pasdaran remained a staunch ally of Hizb'allah throughout its conflict with Amal and in its opposition for the release of foreign hostages, despite efforts by Iran to effect its withdrawal from Lebanon or assign more pragmatic Pasdaran

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will take no action; I promise you that." Israel Educational TV, Tel Aviv 1400 gmt 12 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1150, August 14, 1991.

[397] See: al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Independent, August 10, 1991; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[398] For Hizb'allah's opposition to the Ta'if Accords, see: FBIS, November 5, 1989. Also see: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.1-20. For Syrian raids of the homes of Hizb'allah members in Beirut's southern suburbs, see: FBIS, March 21, 1990.

[399] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hosshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.188. For Hashemi's involvement in the hostage-crisis, see: New York Times, March 5, 1990; and Middle East International, May 11, 1990.

[400] The Iranian mediation team was lead by Foreign Minister Velayati, Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati and former Guard Minister Rafiq Dust, see: Agence France Presse, May 16, 1988; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989. Also see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.: p.135.

units in order to make it more pliable and loyal to the political leadership in Iran.[401] While Hizb'allah, in co-operation with Pasdaran and radical clergy, effectively managed to obstruct the release of hostages in many cases, it's position within Lebanon was dependent on Iran's relationship with Syria.[402] As a result, the hostage-issue for Hizb'allah became increasingly intertwined with insurance for its own survival in a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics under Syrian hegemony.[403] In particular, this was evident by the Syrian-Iranian rapproachement between Hizb'allah and Amal in November 1990 and the re-position of Hizb'allah forces from Beirut to the Biq'a and the South.[404] As the foreign hostages were increasingly used by the Hizb'allah in negotiations with Iran and Syria to ensure its position within Lebanon, the mechanism for their release was facilitated by the resolution of the case of the 15 al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait, who escaped following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.[405] While the release of the 15 al-Da'wa prisoners had eliminated one of Hizb'allah's principal demands, the foreign hostages were used to reach an agreement between Iran and Syria over

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[401] See: New York Times, January 23, 1990; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, April 23, 1990; and Washington Post, January 19, 1992.

[402] See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: p.16.

[403] See: August Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: p.471.

[404] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: p.183. Also see: Ha'aretz, July 16, 1991; and Ha'aretz, July 4, 1991.

[405] The 15 al-Da'wa prisoners were among 1,300 prisoners from Kuwait's Salidia central prison who escaped during the turmoil of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraqi officials took them into custody in Iraq and released them to Iran. A few of these prisoners obtained Iranian and Lebanese documents provided by Iranian embassies in Kuwait and other Gulf states, and made their way back to Lebanon, see: Keyhan, August 23, 1990; Independent, August 5, 1990; Radio Monte Carlo, August 5, 1990; MENA, August 6, 1990; al-Shira, September 10, 1990; and Time, December 16, 1991. Also see: R. Jacquard, The Secret Cards of the Gulf War (Paris: Edition'1, 1991): pp.209-10; and Farhang Jahanpour, (1990), op.cit.: p.186.

the future of Hizb'allah in Lebanon, which was concluded on April 21, 1991.[406] Under this agreement, Hizb'allah was allowed to remain armed as a resistance movement.[407] In turn, Hizb'allah would facilitate the release of all its foreign hostages within the framework of fulfillment of its own requirements as well as in alignment with Iranian and Syrian interests.[408] In order to ensure Hizb'allah's part of the agreement and in line with the movement's position, the command leadership of Hizb'allah decided to elect a new Secretary-General of the movement in May 1991.[409]

Ninth Phase: May 1991 - December 1992

The election of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi as Secretary-General of the Hizb'allah resulted in a new leadership not only closer to the position of Iran but, more importantly, more equipped to deal with both an escalation in the resistance activity against Israel, as he had commanded the movement's military wing, as well as facilitating the release of the hostages by Hizb'allah's SSA, as he had headed the movement's internal security in Beirut.[410] While Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi seemed more pragmatic and less mili-

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[406] For Hizb'allah concerns over disarmament in accordance with Ta'if agreement, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1030, March 26, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed, 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1068, May 10, 1991. For agreement see: Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1061, May 2, 1991.

[407] For Hizb'allah's position as a "resistance" movement, rather than a militia, see: Voice of the Oppressed, 0530 gmt 4 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1064, May 6, 1991; and Voice of Lebanon, 1715 gmt 21 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1053, April 23, 1991.

[408] See: al-Hayat, May 25, 1991. This was confirmed in interviews by the author with unattributable PLO sources close to the Hizb'allah leadership, Cairo, Egypt, April 5, 1994. Also see: Malise Ruthven, "Islamic Politics in the Middle East and North Africa", in The Middle East and North Africa 1993 (London: Europa Publications Ltd, 1992): pp.121-2.

[409] See: Voice of Lebanon, Beirut 1015 gmt 21 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1079, May 23, 1991; Independent, October 9, 1991; and al-Hayah, May 25, 1991.

[410] See: Ha'aretz, October 2, 1987; Independent, March 7, 1990; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; Davar, October 2, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; al-Anba, November 30, 1989; and Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991.

tant than his predecessor, throughout the dénounement of the hostage-crisis under the auspices of the office of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Hizb'allah under his command escalated its confrontation with Israel in southern Lebanon.[111] Although Sheikh al-Musawi managed to receive important concessions, most notably the release of Hizb'allah members from al-Khiam in order to satisfy his followers in southern Lebanon,[112] in the comprehensive hostage-negotiations,[113] any sign of pragmatism was matched by the movement's militancy in the struggle for the "liberation of Jerusalem".[114] While Hizb'allah's militancy reflected the movement's new position within Lebanon, it was also a joint effort by Iran to sabotage the scheduled Middle East peace process.[115] The closer relations between Hizb'allah's command

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[111] For example, see: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.198-99.

[112] The importance of the Lebanese Shi'ite detainees held by Israel for the Hizb'allah was discussed during an interview by the author with Uri Lubrani, Co-ordinator of IDF activity in Lebanon, Ministry of Defense, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 28, 1991. In total, Israel released 77 prisoners and nine Hizb'allah bodies after receiving confirmed information that two IDF soldiers, missing since February 17, 1986, were dead.

[113] See: Time, December 16, 1991. In the hostage-negotiations, Mustafa Badraddin (one of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait who was released following Iraq's invasion) was a key figure in the opening phase. He upset Iran by introducing new elements in the Iranian-UN agreement to end the hostage affair. As a step to boost his standing within the organisation, he expanded any exchange of hostages and prisoners to include Palestinians (not just Lebanese Shi'ites) and imprisoned members held in Europe and the US, see: Foreign Report, November 7, 1991.

[114] In the first six months of 1991, Hizb'allah attacks against SLA and IDF targets in southern Lebanon doubled compared to the same period the previous year, see: Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991. For Hizb'allah's position, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 17 Jul 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1127, July 18, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 10 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1149, August 13, 1991. For a useful insight to Hizb'allah's view on the achievements of hostage-taking, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0550 gmt 16 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1153, August 17, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 21 Nov 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1236, November 22, 1991.

[115] For meetings between Hizb'allah and Iran, see: Voice of the Oppressed 1430 gmt 9 Sept 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1176, September 13, 1991; Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt 30 Oct 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1217, October 31, 1991; and Voice of Israel, Jerusalem 0700 gmt 29 Oct 91 - BBC/SWB/ ME/1216, October 30, 1991. For statement by Mohtashemi, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0450 gmt 30 Oct 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1217, October 31, 1991.

leadership and official Iran was also revealed by substantial Iranian injection of financial resources in southern Lebanon affected by retaliatory warfare between IDF and the *Islamic Resistance*.[116]

The conclusion of the Western hostage-crisis, with the release of the last American hostage Terry Anderson on December 4, 1991, revealed the convergence of interest between Hizb'allah and Iran in response to the transformed political climate in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East.[117] Hizb'allah's volte-face over the hostage-crisis, and its subsequent participation within Lebanon's democratic process, demonstrated not only an ability by Hizb'allah's command leadership to adapt rapidly to shifts in its environment and in its relationship with Iran, as long as hostage-taking served its useful political purposes, but also that the hostage-crisis itself was intimately dependent on the internal position of the movement in Lebanon as well as its relationship within Iran's clerical establishment.[118] While Iranian hardliners had no real desire to block the release of Western foreigners as their value had been reduced due to the course of political events,[119] the appointment of Hojjat al-Islam Mohtashemi as Chairman of the

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[116] The Iranian delegation [Hamayun Alizadeh, Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon; Mohammad Kazem Khansari, Director-General of the Middle East and North African Affairs at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr Vahid-Dastjerdi, Director of the Islamic Red Crescent Society] visited the western Bi'qa region and southern Lebanon for the supervision of Iranian food assistance and distribution, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 12 Nov 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1228, November 13, 1991. It distributed 380 tons of food and medicine to 5,000 families "who had suffered in the recent Israeli bombardments", see: Radio Free Lebanon, November 13, 1991. Also see: Middle East, February 1993: p.12-3.

[117] See: Maskit Burgin, "Western Hostages and Israeli POWs in Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.) The Middle East Military Balance 1990-91 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992): pp.195-97.

[118] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. Also see: Jeune Afrique, March 19-25, 1992; al-Watan al-Arabi, May 8, 1992; al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 18, 1991; and SUNA, January 2, 1992.

[119] For statement by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: Radio Lebanon, Beirut 1530 gmt 9 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1148, August 12, 1991.

Defense Committee of the Iranian *Majlis*, in August 1991, not only increased his political power in Iran but also neutralized any reason for the obstruction of the release of hostages.[420]

Although Hizb'allah obtained substantial concessions from Israel, in the form of the release of 77 imprisoned members from Israel in return for providing information on the fate of missing IDF soldiers, the return of Sheikh Obeid remained deadlocked as long as Hizb'allah refused to make any progress in the case of missing IAF navigator, Ron Arad.[421] After the return of the bodies of Americans, William Buckley and Lt.Col. William Higgins, in late December 1991,[422] Israel's disappointment[423] with the stalemate of negotiations on Israeli POWs and MIAs between Israel and Hizb'allah, through the offices of the UN's special hostage envoy, was expressed by the assassination of Hizb'allah Secretary-General Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi on February 17, 1992.[424]

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[420] See: IRNA, August 11, 1991; Radio Monte Carlo, October 20, 1991; and Foreign Report, May 16, 1991.

[421] For an interview with Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid, see: Israel Broadcasting Authority TV, Jerusalem 1900 gmt 9 Dec 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1252, December 11, 1991. This recording was transferred by Israel to the Hizb'allah two weeks prior to its official show to the public. For Hizb'allah denials of holding Ron Arad, see: Radio Free Lebanon 1545 gmt 4 Dec - BBC/SWB ME/1248, December 6, 1991. While there has been contention whether Ron Arad is held under the control of Hizb'allah and the IRGC in the Bi'qa valley or in Iran, Israel hold Iran solely responsible for his safety, see: IDF Radio, Tel Aviv, 1500gmt 17 Feb - BBC/SWB ME/1308, February 19, 1992. For information on the whereabouts of Arad, see: Israel Broadcasting Authority TV, Jerusalem 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992; and Associated Press, September 8, 1991.

[422] See: Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit.: p.448.

[423] For interview with Uri Lubrani, see: Jerusalem Post, January 4, 1992. Also see: Jerusalem Post, January 11, 1992. Also see: Middle East International, December 20, 1991; and Foreign Report, January 9, 1992.

[424] Sheikh al-Musawi and a number of other high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy attended an annual memorial service to mark the eighth anniversary of the death of Sheikh Raghib Harb in the village of Jibshit. After the ceremony, Sheikh al-Musawi was assassinated by an Israeli heliborne rocket attack in the Touffatha area in southern Lebanon. For details, see: Terrorismus, No.1, March 1992. For excerpts from Abbas al-Musawi's speech in Jibshit prior to his death, see: Radio Free Lebanon, 1645 gmt 16 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1307, February 18, 1992. For his funeral, see: The Times, February 18, 1992.

While Hizb'allah had previously voiced concern over the possibility of any form of American-led military or legal retribution against its SSA members and guards involved in the abduction of foreigners,[425] the selection and timing of the assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi by Israel was symbolic in many ways of his previous responsibility in the kidnapping and death of missing IDF servicemen on February 16, 1986 and in the case of the abduction of American Lt. Col. William Higgins on February 16, 1988.[426]

The immediate election of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, an unsuccessful candidate in the Hizb'allah elections in May 1991,[427] signalled an attempt by the command leadership to unify the movement and control their reaction to the death of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi.[428] Although the death of Sheikh al-Musawi increased the militancy of Hizb'allah in its resistance attacks against Israel, the movement's retaliatory response, a car-bomb outside Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, which caused 30 deaths and 252 injuries,[429] was not only claimed by *Islamic Jihad* in the name of "the

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[425] For moves by US authorities of legal indictements of hostage-takers, see: Independent, December 11, 1991. For Hizb'allah concerns of retribution, see: Independent, November 21, 1991; and Radio Lebanon, Beirut 1030 gmt 15 Oct 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1205, October 17, 1991. For transfer of Hizb'allah SSA to Iran for security reasons, see: Sunday Times, December 8, 1991; al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 21, 1991; and Ha'aretz, October 27, 1991.

[426] For Sheikh al-Musawi's responsibility, see: Ma'aretz, September 23, 1987; Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 28, 1989.

[427] At the funeral of al-Musawi, Nasserallah's prominent role, especially within Hizb'allah's military wing, was evident since he delivered a speech on behalf of the *Islamic Resistance*. It is also interesting to note that Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, a noted hardliner within the leadership delivered a speech on behalf of the Hizb'allah command leadership, see: Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt 19 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992.

[428] For election, see: Voice of the Oppressed, 1250 gmt 18 Feb 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1308, February 19, 1992. The election had been conducted by the members of the Supreme Shura at a meeting in Ba'albek, see: AFP in English 1520 gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992. The Hizb'allah was careful to underline that the decision by the Supreme Shura to elect Sheikh Nasserallah was unanimous, see: Voice of the People, 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1318, March 2, 1992.

[429] See: Noticias Argentinas, May 6, 1992; and Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992.

Martyr Child Hussein", Sheikh al-Mussawi's son, and occurred symbolically on al-Quds day,[130] but the subsequent investigation also revealed close Iranian involvement in the operation.[131] However, the Hizb'allah under the helm of Sheikh Nasserallah demonstrated a firm commitment to not jeopardize its own new position within Lebanon's political environment as well as Iran's foreign policy through hostage-taking and terrorism against the West, rather the movement pursued a carefully coordinated dual-track approach of participation within the democratic process while focusing its resistance activity towards the liberation of Jerusalem through armed attacks against Israel.[132] Although Sheikh Nasserallah was more closely aligned with the line of Iran's radical hardliner Hojjat al-Islam Mohtashemi than his predecessor, the political necessity of close affiliation with Iran's official leadership for its survival in Lebanon took precedence over any other individual or collective agendas within the Hizb'allah as well as motivations by Iran's revolutionist faction.[133] Under the Ta'if agreement, Hizb'allah handed over the Sheikh Abdallah barracks to the Lebanese army in the summer of 1992 while it retained a base for training and weaponry storage in the eastern Biq'a.[134]

Under the leadership of Sheikh Nasserallah, Hizb'allah's decision to participate in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in August/September 1992

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[130] See: Ha'aretz, May 1, 1992; Noticias Argentinas, March 18, 1992; and AFP, March 19, 1992.

[131] For assistance by Iran's embassy in the Hizb'allah operation, see: Yediot Aharanot, March 27, 1992; and New York Times, May 9, 1992. For Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah's meetings in Iran for operational co-ordination, see: Radio Teheran, March 2, 1992; al-Watan al-Arabi, March 13, 1992; and Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992.

[132] See: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993).

[133] See: Voice of the People in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1318, March 2, 1992; FBIS, November 30, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989.

[134] See: al-Nahar, July 31, 1992. More than 100 Pasdaran guards act as advisors in 1994, see: Independent, May 8, 1994.

and its achievement of winning 12 seats out of a total 128 was not only the result of a necessary adaptation to a new military-security and political environment in Lebanon after a decade of civil war but also recognition that the path towards the pan-Islamic goal of an creating an Islamic state in Lebanon would be more easily achieved through the democratic process rather than simply through a militant revolutionary approach.[435] Under the main slogan "faithfullness to Islamic Resistance", Hizb'allah's electoral victory was not only achieved by the increased popularity of the movement's vastly expanded infrastructure of social and financial services to the impoverished Lebanese Shi'ite community[436] but also through a carefully calibrated strategy, in close co-operation with Iran, of using its massive electoral machine in the various districts by transporting voters located in remote areas and by assessment of chances for victory running either independently or in coalition with others.[437] The Supreme Shura also issued a fatwa urging members to vote for Hizb'allah candidates in the election.[438] While the Hizb'allah has pushed in the Lebanese parliament for improvement of the social conditions in the neglected Shi'ite areas of Lebanon, it has also concentrated on demands for the elimination of the confessional system and official recognition of the Islamic Resistance.[439] Although Hizb'allah has shown a willing-

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[435] For interviews with Hizb'allah leaders, see: al-Shira, July 13, 1992; al-Ahd, April 10, 1992; and al-Hayat, August 25, 1992.

[436] See: al-Shira, August 31, 1992.

[437] For a comprehensive overview of Hizb'allah's strategy and electoral results, see: A Nizar Hamzeh, (1993), op.cit.: pp.321-37. Also see: al-Shira, July 13, 1992; al-Safir, September 7, 1992; al-Hayat, August 25, 1992; and al-Shira, August 31, 1992. For claims of Hizb'allah tampering of election, see: Farid El Khazen, "Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Elections, 1993", Middle East Policy, Vol.3, No.1 (1994).

[438] See: Al-Ahd, August 14, 1992.

[439] See: al-Safir, October 17, 1992.

ness to work within the political system rather than from the outside, the revolutionary forces within the movement are dependent on developments in Lebanon and subject to the relationship between Iran and Syria in terms of ties to the movement and strategies for the Middle Eastern arena.[440]

3.6 Conclusion

Analysis of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon yield that Hizb'allah was undisputably responsible for the aforementioned abductions of Westerners despite attempts to shield its complicity through the employment of cover-names. Its organisational framework was not only sophisticated and assimilated according to Iranian clerical designs but also closely integrated with several key Iranian institutions which provided it with both necessary weaponry and training to successfully confront self-proclaimed Islamic enemies and invaluable financial support for it to generate as well as sustain massive support and recruitment among the Shi'a community at the expense of other confessional groups. Hizb'allah's close working relationship with Iranian clergy and official institutions suffered also from major inherent constraints in the projection of Iranian clerical factionalism onto the organisation and in relation to the changing dynamics of Lebanon's civil war environment. These influences were most evidently manifest through Hizb'allah's practise of hostage-taking of Westerners, most notably in the release process rather than decisions to initiate these acts.

The initiation of abduction of Westerners have demonstrated a strong causal linkage between events (internal Lebanese, regional or international) and motivation for hostage-taking acts by the Hizb'allah and often on behalf of Iran. A close convergence of interests between Hizb'allah and Iran governed hostage-taking activity in Lebanon until the end of 1986 without any

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[440] For a useful general overview of the strategy of Islamic movements, see: Dr Millward, "The Rising Tide of Islamic Fundementalism (II)", Commentary, No.31, (April 1993). Also see: Independent, May 8, 1994. Also see: Malise Ruthven, "Islamic Politics in the Middle East and North Africa", in The Middle East and North Africa 1993 (London: Europa Publications, 1993): pp.121-2.

signs or impact of any clerical factionalism either within the organisation or from Iran in the process of abductions or releases of hostages. Subsequent Hizb'allah discord with Iran was a manifestation of rivalry within Iran's clerical establishment which affected the organisation directly as its closest Iranian allies were demoted from positions in institutions at work within the organisation in Lebanon. However, the imposition of Iranian clerical factionalism on the movement's activity has been most notable in the process of the release of Western hostages rather than in the actual abductions. Factional rivalry in Iran was also translated into clerical infighting within the Hizb'allah and disobedience towards Iran, governed by longstanding individual relationships stemming from the Najaf period in Iraq.[441] While efforts to obstruct the release of Western hostages by Iranian opposition factions were designed to undermined more moderate Iranian foreign policy towards the West, the motivations to delay any releases by Hizb'allah was motivated by its preoccupation towards re-adjustment of its position within the Lebanese civil war and internal clerical rivalry within the movement over its present and future direction. As insurance of its position within Lebanon and against retribution by Western governments, the hostage-issue became increasingly dependent on guarantees of Hizb'allah's own survival in post-civil war Lebanon. Hizb'allah's volte face over the hostage issue in 1991 was largely the result of a quid pro quo arrangement with Iran and Syria that strengthened the organisation's position within Lebanon. A reduction of the influence of the more radical Iranian clergy in Iranian politics paralleled a demotion in positions of its closest allies within the Hizb'allah.

The influence of the internal Lebanese environment on any progress for the release of hostages underlines the dynamics of Hizb'allah's relationship

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[441] For differences between leading Hizb'allah clergy, see: Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1987; Ha'aretz, March 30, 1987; Ma'aretz, November 10, 1987; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989.

with Syria, closely determined by the status of the Iranian-Syrian relations in the Lebanese, regional and international arena.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE INFLUENCE OF THE IRANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP OVER THE HIZB'ALLAH

4.1 Introduction

The close involvement by Iran and Syria in the hostage-taking of Western foreigners by the Hizb'allah has been evident in their roles as both active participants in some of the abductions and as facilitators in all negotiations for the release of hostages.[1] Although the Iranian-Syrian partnership over Hizb'allah activity has been a useful foreign policy instrument in the extraction of political and economic concessions from Western governments whose citizens are held hostage, the relationship between Iran and Syria cannot be viewed as monolithic but rather marked by co-operation and friction, at times, projected onto the Lebanese arena. While Iran and Syria found some common ground for operational co-operation against common enemies, most notably against Iraq and Israel, the Iranian-Syrian alliance has also been marked by irreconcilable differences with respect to their interests and aspirations over the future of Lebanon. While Syria's ambition to gain local hegemony over Lebanese affairs stands opposed to Iran's and Hizb'allah's ideological vision of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon, any strain in their relationship also stems from the underlying and contradictory political ideologies of the two regimes.[2] Although the nature of the supra-national pan-Islamic regime of Iran is inherently incompatible with the secular and socialist-oriented pan-Arabism espoused by the Alawite political leadership of Syria,[3] the Iranian-Syrian nexus has converged in a marriage of con-

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[1] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.20-40.

[2] See: Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran", in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (eds.) Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks (London: Croom Helm, 1986): pp.105-24.

[3] For a useful discussion of pan-Islam versus pan-Arabism, see: Mohseen Massarrat, "The Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism versus Pan-Arabism", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (ed.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.28-41. Also see: Charles Caret, "L'alliance contre-nature de la Syrie basiste et de la République Islamique d'Iran", Politique Étrangére, Vol.52, No.2 (1987): pp.381-87.

venience against common enemies in an atmosphere of crisis and political isolation in the Middle East.[4] As such, an understanding of the basis for and evolution of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over the last decade with reference to Lebanon is necessary as it is not only a direct determinant of the position of the Hizb'allah and it's hostage-taking activity. It also influenced the process of the release of foreign hostages as well as the motivation of the two regimes in the resolution of the hostage-crisis in accordance with achievement of economic and political concessions from Western governments.[5]

By admission from many leading Hizb'allah and Iranian clerical officials, the issue of the foreign hostages has not only been intertwined with the nature of the movement's relationship with its patrons over Lebanese issues but also deeply influenced by the dynamics of the Iranian-Syrian relationship either in alignment with, or opposition to, their regional and international agendas.[6]

4.2 The Basis of the Iranian-Syrian Relationship

In the post-revolutionary period of Iran, Syria has remained Iran's closest and only ally in the Arab world. While Syrian-Iranian relations were marked by animosity in the pre-revolutionary period, the basis for the newly-found relationship, which gradually developed into a full-fledged working alliance, was rooted in historical antecedents and regional political developments in the Middle East.

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[4] See: Christin Marschall, "Syria-Iran: a Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991", Orient, Vol.33, No.3 (September 1992): pp.433-46; Christopher Dickey, "Assad in His Allies: Irreconcilable Allies", Foreign Affairs, Vol.66, No.1 (Fall 1987): pp.58-76.

[5] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.20-40.

[6] Admission of this linkage was evident, for example, by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Mustaqbal, December 19, 1988.

Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the hostility between Syria's Ba'ath regime and the Shah's Iran was primarily based on Iran's close relationship with Israel, Syria's self-proclaimed arch-enemy,[7] within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Shah's friendly relations with pro-Western Arab states hostile to Syria.[8] It was, therefore, only natural for Syria to cultivate links with emerging Iranian Shi'a opposition movments led by Ayatollah Khumayyní.[9] While Syria supported individual opponents of the Pahlavi regime, most notably Ibrahim Yazdi, Mustafa Chamran and Sadeq Qotbzadeh,[10] the challenge by the Syrian *Muslim Brotherhood* to the non-Islamic character of the al-Asad regime in 1973 forced the Alawite elite to consolidate links with emerging Shi'a individuals and movements outside Syria.[11] The cultivation of Syrian relations with the leader of the Shi'a community, Imam Musa al-Sadr, proved useful as it extended Syrian involvement with an emerging and important confessional group within Lebanon, a vital

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[7] For Iranian relations under the Shah with Israel, see: Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New York, NY.: Praeger, 1989); R.K. Rãmanzani, "Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Middle East Journal, Vol.32, No.4 (Autumn 1978); and Nader Entessar, "Changing Patterns of Iranian-Arab Relations", Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Vol.9, No.3 (Fall 1984).

[8] See: R.K. Ramazani, "Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy", Orbis, Vol.19 (Winter 1975): pp.1043-69.

[9] See: Joseph Alpher, "The Khomeyni International", The Washington Quarterly, Vol.3 (1980): pp.58-63.

[10] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.188; and Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988): p.352.

[11] For discussions on the Syrian *Muslim Brotherhood*, see: R. Hinnebush, "The Islamic Movement in Syria: Secterian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian Populist Regime", in A.E. Hillal Dessouki (ed.) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York, NY.:): pp.138-69; Hanna Batatu, "The Muslim Brethren", MERIP Report, No.110 (November-December 1982): pp.12-20; Hans Günter Lobmeyer, "Islamic Ideology annd Secular Discourse: the Islamists of Syria", Orient, Vol.32, No.3 (September 1991): pp.395-418; Adrienne L. Edgar, "The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study", Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol.6, No.1 (Spring 1987): pp.82-110; and Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982", Orient (December 1983): pp.589-609.

component of Syria's political ambitions.[12] More importantly, Syria's amicable relations with Musa al-Sadr enhanced the religious credentials of the Syrian ruling regime as al-Sadr issued a fatwa in 1973 which conferred legitimacy on the Alawites as bona fide Shi'i Muslims.[13] Syria's relationship with Musa al-Sadr enhanced not only the positions of both the Alawite regime and the Lebanese Shi'a community but also provided Syria with an important Islamic ally in efforts to consolidate its influence over Lebanon.[14] In fact, Syria's close affiliation with Musa al-Sadr and the training of Iranian oppositionists by the Amal movement facilitated and consolidated co-operation between Syria and the future Iranian clerical leadership.[15] As a result, the Amal movement became an important instrument for Syrian policy in Lebanon.[16]

Syria's vital interests in Lebanon, extending from military and security needs to the political and economic realm, led to unrelenting moves by al-Asad to exploit the Lebanese civil war as a pretext to extend Syrian hegemony over Lebanon and as a means to promote broader aspirations on the inter-Arab scene and against its Zionist enemy, Israel.[17] While Amal remained Asad's

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[12] See: Gudrun Krämer, "Syriens Weg zu regionaler Hegemonie", Europa-Archiv, Vol.42, No.22 (November 25, 1987): pp.665-74.

[13] See: Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit.: pp.174-5.

[14] See: Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985), [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1986): pp.77-125.

[15] See: Salim Nasr, "Mobilisation Communautaire et Symbolique Religieuse: Imam Sadr et les chi'ite du Liban (1970-75) in Olivier Carré et Paul Dumond (eds.) Radicalismes Islamiques: Iran, Liban, Turquie (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1985); and Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.; al-Majallah, November 5-11, 1983; Valeurs Actuelles, April 1, 1985; and Sobhani Sohrab, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New York, NY.: Praeger, 1989): p.106.

[16] For a comprehensive overview of Syria's relationship with the Shi'a movements in Lebanon, see: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.1-20.

[17] For useful analysis of Syrian policy towards Lebanon, see: Moshe Ma'oz, Assad: The Sphinx of Damascus (New York, NY.: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988); Daniel Pipes, "Damascus and the Claim to Lebanon", Orbis, Vol.31, No.4 (Winter 1987): pp.670-80; Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.; and Itamar Rabinovich The War for Lebanon (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press,

loyal proxy in Lebanon, Syrian moves to exploit the Lebanese civil war through continuous realignment with an array of Lebanese confessional factions, in order to maintain a Syrian-controlled military balance between the warring factions which served to preserve and enhance it's interests in Lebanon, was undermined by friction in Syria's inter-Arab relationships during the late 1970s.[18] In particular, Syria felt increasingly isolated following the Egyptian-Israeli rapproachement with the conclusion of the Camp David accord in 1977 and its rapidly deteriorating relations with Jordan and Iraq.[19] As a result, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 provided Syria with an ideal opportunity to redress the imbalances of its intra-Arab relations, to rejuvenate the rejectionist camp in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as to forge and ensure closer ties and continued influence with the Lebanese Shi'a community.[20]

A common opposition against Iraq's ascendancy in inter-Arab politics served as the unifying axis for the newly-found alliance between Ba'athist Syria and Shi'ite Iran.[21] For Syria, an alliance with Iran provided it with a useful means to counter Iraqi subversive activity within both Lebanon and Syria while discrediting the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.[22] Also, Iraq's in-

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[18] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volumes 1976-1977 & 1978-1979 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press).

[19] See: Patrick Seale, (1988), op.cit.

[20] See: Shireen T. Hunter, (1993), op.cit.: p.208-9.

[21] See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990, op.cit.: p.16. Also see: Mohammad-Reza Djalili, "Téhéran-Damas: une alliance équivoque", Politique internationale, Vol.24 (1984): pp.261-69; and New York Times, May 14, 1984.

[22] For the threat of Iraq's ascendancy, see: Phillipe Rondot, "L'Irak: Une Puissance regionale en devenir", Politique Étrangère, Vol.45, No.3 (1980). For the intense Syrian-Iraqi rivalry in Lebanon, see: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.3. For Syria's reasons to discredit the Syrian *Muslim Brotherhood* through alliance with Iran, see: Umar F. Abdallah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1983); and Martin Kramer,

vasion of Iran in 1980 not only threatened the regional balance of power but also detracted from the Arab-Israeli conflict.[23] For Iran, the problem of developing relations with Syria's secular regime quickly disappeared with the implications of Iraq's invasion, especially for strategic expediency in Iran's foreign policy.[24] An alliance with Syria against Iraq eliminated the perception of the Iran-Iraq war as a conflict purely between the Arabs and the Persians.[25] Syrian support against Iraq also provided Iran with invaluable political support and material assistance in its war with Iraq, especially in terms of providing a distraction for Iraq's armed forces for the defence of its other border with Syria and providing alternative channels for the supply of armaments.[26] Apart from the valuable role of Syria as mediator between Iran and the Persian Gulf states,[27] Syria joined Iran in anti-Iraqi economic warfare, most evidently displayed by the closure of the Syrian border to Iraq and cutting off the passage of Iraqi oil via Syria on

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"Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: p.251.

[23] For Syrian statement, see: BBC/SWB, September 26, 1980.

[24] See: Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991): pp.125-28. For Iran's Foreign Minister's views of Iran's relationship with Syria as based on strategic considerations, see: FBIS, April 1, 1983.

[25] See: Mohssen Massarrat, "The Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism versus Pan-Arabism", op.cit.: pp.28-41; and International Herald Tribune, November 16, 1982.

[26] Syria provided in the Iran's arms diversification effort $300 million in weaponry during the Iran-Iraq war, see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1989. Syria also provided Iran with Soviet arms, see: al-Majallah, March 27, 1982. For Syria's contribution to Iraq's military insecurity, see: Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran", in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (eds.) Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, op.cit.: p.107.; Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1981-82: p.308-13; and Mark A. Heller, The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for Third Parties, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Paper no.23 (January 1984): p.25.

[27] For an overview, see: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.176-78.

April 8, 1982.[28] Due to Syrian dependence on Iraqi oil, this measure followed the conclusion of a formal economic agreement between Iran and Syria a month earlier, whereby Iran agreed to supply Syria with 8 million tons of free-bartered crude oil per year.[29] Syria's action was also due to a significant reduction in its financial subventions from Arab regimes hostile to Syria's pro-Iranian policy.[30] While the joint economic agreement between Iran and Syria as well as the closure of the Syrian pipeline transformed the Iranian-Syrian relationship into a full-fledged partnership, Syrian substitution of dependence on Iraqi oil for Iranian oil left it vulnerable to Iranian pressures.[31] As Syria's anti-Iraq policy led it to increased political and economic isolation in the Arab world, it's economic dependency on Iran and its closely pledged allegiance to Teheran's foreign policy produced friction and tension in the Syrian-Iranian alliance as Syria had difficulty in balan-

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[28] While Syria used Iraq's support of the Syrian *Muslim Brotherhood* as a pretext for the closure of Iraq's pipelines, it caused a major economic crisis in Iraq. Iraq's export of 1.4 million barrels per day in August 1981 was reduced to 600,000 barrels per day via Turkey, see: Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Paladin, 1990): pp.57-58. Also see: Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair (New York, NY.: The Free Press, 1988). This curtailed $ 5 billion per year in Iraq's foreign exchange earnings, see: Dilip Hiro, The Iran-Iraq War, in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World, op.cit.: p.48. Also see: An-Nahar Arab Report and Memo (April 1982); and Arab World Weekly (April 17, 1982).

[29] The agreement was for Iran to supply 1 million tons of oil per annum free of charge and 5-7 million tons at a discount of one-third of posted prices. See: David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (London: Holmes & Meier, 1990): p.253; and R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins University Press, 1986): p.81. Also see: Middle East Economic Digest, March 13, 1982; Middle East Economic Digest, April 20, 1984; Middle East Economic Digest, May 6, 1983; Mideast Markets, May 3, 1982; The Economist, April 30, 1983; and Middle East Economic Survey, May 7, 1984.

[30] See: Middle East Economic Digest, September 8, 1989. Under the Baghdad summit of 1978, Syria was pledged to receive $1.8 billion a year from Arab oil states in recognition as its status as a frontline state in the struggle with Israel but actual amounts received have been much lower, see: The Middle East Review 1988: p.162.

[31] For example, disputes over prices and payment lead to a reduction in Iran's supply of oil to Syria, see: Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-86: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988): p.109; and Foreign Report, June 19, 1986. Also see: Middle East Economic Digest, April 20, 1984.

cing Iran's confrontational foreign policy and polemics within the framework of its own relations with the Arab world.[32] Despite this difficulty, Syria has successfully managed to exploit its relationship with Iran by serving as a bridge between Iran and the Arab world, both in terms of providing valuable mediation between the two sides and in persuading Gulf states that Iran's relationship with Syria guarantees their own security.[33]

While Syria's raison d'être for its alliance with Iran against Iraq was based on the detraction of Iraq's defection from Arab ranks in their struggle against Israel, particularly as Iraq's military strength could not only be used against Israel but would also ensure "strategic parity" between the Arabs and Israel,[34] the Arab world remained passive and left Syria to its own devices to confront Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[35] Syria's increased isolation in the Arab world, coupled with Iranian calls for the transformation of the war in Lebanon into a total war against Israel,[36] led to a military agreement between Iran and Syria which allowed the entry of Iranian Pasdaran contingents into Lebanon.[37]

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[32] Among the most evident examples is Syria's participation in the Islamic Conference in Kuwait in January and in the Arab League Summit in Jordan in November 1987 despite vehement Iranian opposition, see: Le Monde, November 13, 1987; Le Monde, October 27, 1987; and IRNA, January 6, 1987.

[33] See: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988): p.183.

[34] See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.) (1990), op.cit.: p.176.

[35] According to al-Asad: "The Iran of Khomeini is anti-Israel. Iran was the only country to send forces when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982", see: al-Qabas, January 24, 1987. Also see: Financial Times, July 8, 1982; Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1981-82; and Husseiyn Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict, Adelphi Papers No.243 (Oxford: Brassey's, Autumn 1989): p.45.

[36] See: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.253; and FBIS, June 16, 1982.

[37] For Syrian-Iranian military agreement, see: al-Nahar, May 26, 1986. Also see: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: pp.697. Also see: Le Point, May 11, 1987; and L'Orient le Jour, November 25, 1982.

The decision by Iran to dispatch a military contingent to Lebanon was a reflection of the success of Iran's massive military offensive in the Gulf war in which all Iraqi-occupied Iranian territory had been recovered while Iraq appeared weak as it used Israel's invasion of Lebanon as an excuse for suggesting an end to hostilities in order to confront the common enemy, Israel.[38] While the diversion of IRGC units from the Iraqi front to Lebanon was intended to reveal for domestic and foreign consumption that Iran's war with Iraq was in progress and in total control, it was also an opportunity for Iran to demonstrate its serious commitment to the "export of the revolution" and its support to all Islamic liberation movements worldwide.[39] As such, the anarchcial environment of Lebanon's civil war, coupled with Iran's close relationships within the Shi'a community, provided Iran with an ideal opportunity to exert its influence and construct a Shi'ite power-base beyond its borders.[40] From Lebanon, Iran could transcend the Persian-Arab linguistic barriers through the Hizb'allah and reach out to a larger Arab audience in the preaching of Islamic ideology and government.[41] More significantly, the presence of an Islamic Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon provided Iran with a window of opportunity to not only actively participate militarily in the

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[38] See: Dilip Hiro, "The Iran-Iraq War", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.47.

[39] See: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.295. Also see: R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.40-62. Also see: Iran Press Digest, April 19, 1983.

[40] See: Martin Kramer, (1988), op.cit.: pp.39-59; and Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.115-30. Also see: Andreas Rieck, "Abschied vom `Revolutionsexport'? Expansion und Rückgang des iranischen Einflusses im Libanon 1979-89, Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung, Vol.20, No.2 (1990): pp.81-104; Politique International, April 1984; al-Nahar, November 27, 1982; and Iran Press Digest, May 3, 1983.

[41] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Third World Quarterly, op.cit.: p.741-42; and Middle East Economic Digest, (September 1987): pp.12-18.

Arab-Israeli conflict via proxy but also to affect the Arab-Israeli and, consequently, wider Middle East conflicts and politics.[42] Iran's presence and influence would also be used to manipulate the behaviour and policies of regional and international actors in any way connected with Lebanese politics through acts of terrorism and hostage-taking.[43]

The establishment of an Iranian headquarters in the Syrian border village of Zebdani and the arrival of the first 800 Pasdaran, later reinforced by another 700 Pasdaran dispersed among villages in the Biq'a, came at the invitation of Syria.[44] For Syria, Iran's incursion into Lebanon provided invaluable support in its efforts to counter both the Western and Israeli presence and intervention in Lebanon.[45] This became increasingly vital in order to oppose the American-endorsed Gemayel regime in Lebanon and to sabotage the Lebanon-Israel Agreement of May 17, 1983.[46] While neither Syria nor Iran wished to engage these enemies directly in Lebanon, the continous harassment by Hizb'allah against the Israeli and American military forces provided them with a valuable instrument to maintain and accomplish their strategic interests in Lebanon, most notably the expulsion of the

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[42] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.186.

[43] See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.250; and John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: pp.150-1.

[44] The Iranian *Majlis* had approved the dispatch of a Pasdaran unit to southern Lebanon to fight Israel in June 1981. See: R.K Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East, op.cit.: p.156. Also see: Robin Wright, (1990), op.cit.: pp.108-9; and Le Point, May 11, 1987.

[45] See: Augustus Richard Norton, External Intervention and the Politics of Lebanon (Washington, DC.: Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984). Also see: IRNA, November 7, 1982; and Radio Damascus, November 9, 1982.

[46] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1983-84; and "The Path of Shi'ite Militancy", Middle East International (March 22, 1985): pp.6-7.

West's political and military presence from Lebanese territory.[47] The emergence of the Hizb'allah provided Iran and Syria with a viable alternative as well as a solution to its previous support of Fatah.[48] Although Iran's military presence supported Syria's strategic objectives in countering internal political developments contrary to its interests and foreign presence on Lebanese soil, Syria remained in firm control over Iran's access to Lebanon in terms of numbers and frequency of visits, as the Pasdaran was dependent on being inserted to the Biq'a via Syria.[49]

The Iranian-Syrian alliance has been manifest in the Lebanese arena, through the Pasdaran's support of the Hizb'allah, as a fluctation between close co-operation and friction determined by internal as well as regional developments while it has demonstrated the conflicting ideological positions of Iran and Syria and their vision for the future of Lebanon.[50] In particular, the conflicts between Iran and Syria basically stemmed from threats to Syrian hegemony and designs over Lebanon in the form of Hizb'allah activity.[51] Apart from the fact that the Hizb'allah's vision of Lebanon stands against the ideological foundations of the Syrian regime, tension in the

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[47] For Mohtashemi's emphasis of the voluntary nature and peaceful presence of the Pasdaran units in Lebanon, see: Iran Press Digest, April 19, 1983. Ali Khameini stressed that the IRGC units would remain in Lebanon "as long as Iran would think it necessary", see: L'Orient le Jour, November 25, 1982.

[48] For Syria's relationship with Fatah, see: Reuven Avi-Ran, "The Syrian-Palestinian Conflict in Lebanon", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.42 (Spring 1987): pp.57-82.

[49] Syrian fears of the dispatch of additional Pasdaran units to Lebanon was exacerbated by the clashes between the Pasdaran and the Lebanese army in November 1982, see: Monday Morning, November 29, 1982; and Iran Press Digest, December 7, 1982.

[50] See: Haleh Vaziri, "Iran's Involvement in Lebanon: Polarization and Radicalization of Militant Islamic Movements", Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.16, No.2 (Winter 1992): pp.1-16.

[51] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a in Lebanon", in Emile Sahliyeh (ed.) Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (New York, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1990): pp.239-40.

Syrian-Iranian axis have come from unpredictable Hizb'allah activity which have worsened Syria's image in the Arab world and in the West.[52] As a result, Syria has not only attempted to distance itself from involvement with, or control over, the Hizb'allah but has also kept the nature of its relationship with Iran low-profile.[53] In some cases, Syria's political and economic relations have been seriously damaged by Hizb'allah hostage-taking activity as Syria has been closely identified with the movement and its patron.[54] While Syria has been forced to crackdown against the Hizb'allah in order to limit its expansion and domination over the Shi'a community, it has also attempted to keep the Hizb'allah under control in order to avoid the possibility of a direct military confrontation with Israel, provoked by the movement's uncontrolled resistance attacks.[55] In turn, friction between the Hizb'allah and Syria must also be measured against the nature of the Syrian-Iranian relationship over time and the impact of Hizb'allah activity on Iran's own geostrategic interests in Lebanon and elsewhere.[56] While the strains between Iran and Syria naturally impacted on the issue of the release of Western hostages, periods of close co-operation have also led to the de-

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[52] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1986: pp.619-621; and Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: p.15. Also see: New York Times, June 27, 1987.

[53] As accurately pointed out by Yosef Olmert, Syria's low-profile of its ties with Iran can be seen by the higher frequency of high-level visits by Iran to Syria than the other way around, see: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990a), op.cit.: p.178. While Syria's low-profile stems from a desire to not offend the other Arab states, Asad's first visit to Iran, after the Islamic revolution, was in September 1990, see: FBIS, September 18, 1990.

[54] See: United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986 (Washington DC.: Office of Counterterrorism, 1987). Also see: The Middle East Review 1988: p.164-65.

[55] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.129-33.

[56] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: pp.188-190; and Graham E. Fuller, (1991), op.cit.: pp.130-33. Also see: Financial Times, August 9, 1991;

cision by Hizb'allah to abduct Western citizens in accordance with the advancement of specific foreign policy objectives by both Iran and Syria.[57] Apart from Hizb'allah's own agenda in the abduction of foreigners, the impact of the often troublesome Syrian-Iranian alliance and its superimposition on the internal Lebanese scene must be viewed in the context of individual motivations by these states to either intitiate hostage-taking or facilitate its resolution in order to advance a specific foreign policy objective within or external to the Lebanon.[58] While the Iranian-Syrian relationship within Lebanon can be characterized by close joint co-operation in the struggle against the Israeli and Western presence until their withdrawal in 1985 and subsequent increased friction due to Syria's attempt to exert its hegemony over Lebanon, it is necessary to balance their internal Lebanese agenda against the Syrian-Iranian requirements in the foreign policy arena on the regional and international level.[59]

4.3 Phase I: Iranian-Syrian Co-operation Against Common Enemies (1982-85)

The introduction of the Pasdaran contingent to Lebanon's Biq'a area was accomplished by the imminent threat posed by Israel's 1982 invasion to Syria and its interests in Lebanon.[60] While the first Hizb'allah abduction of David Dodge came at the behest of the Pasdaran contingent as a result of the previous kidnapping of four Iranian officials of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut,

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[57] See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz (1988), op.cit.: 20-35.

[58] See: Maskit Burgin, "Foreign Hostages in Lebanon - An Update", in Inter: International Terrorism in 1988 (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989); and Maskit Burgin, "Shi'ite International Terrorism", in Inter: International Terrorism in 1989 (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1990): pp.36-60.

[59] Discussions in the panel group on the Middle East during: Dialogue Europe Occidentale - Union Soviétique en Matière de Terrorisme et de Lutte Anti-Terroriste, Paris, June 10, 1991.

[60] See: Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985), op.cit.; and Le Point, May 11, 1987.

most notably IRGC commander Ahmad Moteveselian,[61] the major concern of Syria and Iran was joint co-operation against their external enemies within Lebanon in order to confront Israel and the regime of Amin Gemayel, perceived by Hizb'allah to be protected by the presence of the MNF.[62] The imminent conclusion of the American-sponsored peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel, the 17 May 1983 agreement, precipitated the first car bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983, which clearly revealed the hallmarks of a jointly Iranian-Syrian supervised Hizb'allah operation.[63] While the Hizb'allah, with close Syrian co-operation, continued to confront the MNF in an effort to expel Western influence from Lebanon and to undermine the Gemayel regime, Iran had other foreign policy motivations related to its war with Iraq which accounted for its close involvement in the October 1983 Hizb'allah twin-suicide attacks against the American and French MNF contingents in Lebanon.[64] Although Iran's hostility towards the U.S. administration stemmed from its support for Israel in attacking Lebanon and its direct political and military involvement within the civil war, Iranian concerns over American and French support for Iraq, mainly through the supply of arms, contributed to the decision to strike at these enemies through proxy in

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[61] See: Independent, March 26, 1990; Washington Post, July 24, 1982; Middle East Reporter, July 22, 1983; Middle East Reporter, November 14, 1990; and Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (Febraury 1992): p.33.

[62] This was clearly revealed in Hizb'allah's manifesto, see: "An Open Letter: Hizballah program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.111-16. For an interview with Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, see: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June-July 1985).

[63] For details of Iranian-Syrian complicity in the operation, see: Also see: Jeune Afrique, January 24, 1984; Jerusalem Post, October 27, 1983; Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983; Liberation, March 19, 1985; Valeurs Actuelles, April 1, 1985; Voice of Lebanon, March 26, 1983; Radio Free Lebanon, April 15, 1983; and New York Times, April 19, 1983.

[64] For details of Iranian-Syrian involvement in the Hizb'allah operations, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 14-20, 1984; Voice of Lebanon, October 26, 1983; Le Nouvel Observateur, October 30, 1983; Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983; Ha'aretz, October 23, 1983; Ha'aretz, October 26, 1983; AFP, October 23, 1983; IRNA, November 15, 1983;

Lebanon.[65] In particular, the main point of friction was over French arms deliveries to Iraq of Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet missiles which Iran viewed as the main reason for the survival of the Ba'athist regime and the prolongation of the war.[66] In fact, Iraq owed $7 billion to France and absorbed almost forty percent of all French arms export.[67] At the same time, Iran was particularly angered over the refusal by the French government to pay between $1-1.5 billion owed from the days of the Shah and supply Iran with military-related equipment.[68] Iranian hostility was also due to the decision by the American administration to launch *Operation Staunch* in 1983, halting all shipments of arms to Iran, while it extended $2 billion in trade credit to Iraq.[69] Prior to the suicide operations by Hizb'allah in Lebanon against the American and French MNF contingents, Iran warned that the provision of armaments to Iran's enemies would provoke retaliatory punishment.[70] In particular, Iran charged France to be a co-belligerent in the war after

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[65] See: Newsweek, January 2, 1984; and Economist, October 29, 1983.

[66] For Iranian opposition, see: Kayhan, October 10, 1983; Kayhan, October 13, 1983; and Kayhan, September 19, 1983. Also see: Walter de Bock and Jean-Charles Deniau, Des Armes Pour L'Iran: L'Irangate Européen (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

[67] See: Le Monde, January 8, 1983; Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1983; and Economist, February 23, 1983. Between 1977 and 1985, France sold more than $11.8 billion of high-technology weaponry to Iraq, including 113 Mirage F1 fighter aircrafts and three quarters of French total exports of Exocet missiles, see: Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987. Also see: Mark Heller, (1984), op.cit.

[68] For Iranian claims, see: Kayhan, March 12, 1983; and Ettela'at, August 23, 1983.

[69] See: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-1987: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1987): p.79; and Eric Hooglund, "The Policy of the Reagan Administration Toward Iran", in Nikki Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.269-93. Also see: MERIP Reports (July-September 1984): p.45.

[70] For Iran's threat of retalitory measures, see: Ettela'at, September 17, 1983; Kayhan, September 17, 1983; Kayhan, September 24, 1983; Kayhan, October 13, 1983; Ettela'at, October 8, 1983; and Kayhan, October 26, 1983.

France leased five Super-Etendard aircraft with Exocet missiles to Iraq in October 1983.[71]

While the American and French MNF contingents in Lebanon provided Iran with the ideal targets for retaliation through proxy, Iran also used combined elements from Iraq's *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* and the Lebanese *Islamic Amal* to strike at U.S. and French targets in Kuwait, among the most loyal Arab-monarchies extending military and financial support to Iraq, in December 1983.[72] This subversion by Iran was also intended to persuade Arab Persian Gulf states not to provide financial assistance to the Iraqi war effort.[73] While the arrest and conviction of the 17 *al-Da'wa* terrorists motivated Hizb'allah to abduct five American citizens and one Frenchman, as evident by the connections of the abductions with the progress of the trial in Kuwait, the nature of the targets mirrored also close alignment with Iranian foreign policy in its confrontation with the American and French administrations over support to Iraq.[74] In particular, the close convergence between Hizb'allah abductions and Iranian foreign policy was not only revealed by the

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[71] See: José Garcon, "La France et le conflit Iran-Irak", Politique Etrangere, Vol.2 (1987).

[72] For Iran's subversive activities in the Persian Gulf-states, see: Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.173-86; James Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf", Foreign Affairs, Vol.63, No.1 (Fall 1984): pp.108-27; R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf", Current History, Vol.84 (January 1985): pp.1-41. Between 1983-84, Kuwait provided $7 billion in financial assistance and was second to Saudi Arabia in aiding Iraq, see: Bahman Baktiari, "Revolutionary Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: The Quest for Regional Supremacy", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.77. In 1985, Persian Gulf states provided Iraq with financial contributions in the reange of US$ 40-50 billion, see: Iran and Iraq: The Next Five Years (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1987): p.20.

[73] See: Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1990): p.117. Also see: Ariel Merari and Yosefa (Daiksel) Braunstein, (1984), op.cit.: p.8.

[74] See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.86-8. Also see: Alex von Dornoch, "Iran's violent diplomacy", Aussenpolitik, (May/June 1988).

abduction of William Buckley, the CIA-station chief in Beirut,[75] but also by the kidnappings of two Kuwaitis and a Saudi citizen in 1984.[76]

In Lebanon, Iranian-Syrian co-operation in Hizb'allah's attacks against the MNF was awarded by their withdrawal in February 1984 and the Gemayel regime's abrogation, under heavy Syrian pressure, of the 17 May 1983 accord between Lebanon and Israel.[77] The close bilateral relations between Iran and Syria was evident by the frequency of high-level visits between the two states and by Iran's promised delivery of one million tons of oil free of charge to Syria in 1984.[78] Having accomplished a major victory with the expulsion of the MNF contingent, Hizb'allah concentrated on confrontation with the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, with the active support of both Iran and Syria.[79] While the Hizb'allah held three American hostages, as an American and a French citizen had been rescued and released by Amal in April 1984,[80] the movement's respite in the abduction of foreigners reflected its concentration in the resistance against Israel while Syria and Iran remained pre-occupied with Lebanon and the war effort with Iraq respecti-

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[75] See: Da'var, February 8, 1985; MENA, March 28, 1985; International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1985; and Washington Post, November 25, 1986.

[76] The abduction of the Saudi consul was directly related to Iran's outstanding differences with Saudi Arabia. He was released two days after the Saudi foreign minister visited Iran to settle Iranian-Saudi differences, see: Yediot Aharanot, July 9, 1985. For information on the abduction of Kuwaiti citizens, see: International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984.

[77] See: Helena Cobban, "The Growth of Shi'i Power in Lebanon", in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: p.151; and Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1983-84.

[78] See: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.334; Middle East Economic Digest, April 20, 1984; and Ettela'at, May 24, 1984.

[79] See: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985.

[80] For the rescue of American Frank Regier and Frenchman Christian Joubert, see: International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984.

vely.[81]

At the end of 1984, Iran's involvement with the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner by *Islamic Amal* and the abduction of two American hostages in December 1984 and in January 1985 reflected solidarity with Hizb'allah's concern over the fate of the 17 al-Da'wa prisoners held in Kuwait.[82] While Iran's relations with Kuwait continued to be tense due to the treatment and expulsion of Iranian citizens in Kuwait and over its co-operation with Iraq,[83] the concentration on American citizens as targets reflected the influential position of the U.S. over Kuwait in an effort to pressure for the release of the *al-Da'wa* prisoners.[84] It may have also been due to the US resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq on November 26, 1988.[85] While these efforts failed, Hizb'allah emerged victorious with the announcement of Israel's decision of a three-phase unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, between January 20 and June 6, 1985.[86] Accordingly, the Hizb'allah escalated its abduction campaign of Western foreigners while it accelerated its con-

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[81] See: Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: p.110.

[82] See: International Herald Tribune, December 17, 1984; The Guardian, December 7, 1984; International Herald Tribune, December 8, 1984; Paul Wilkinson, "Hezbollah: A Critical Appraisal", Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1983; Foreign Report, December 13, 1984; Financial Times, December 8, 1984; and Observer, December 9, 1984.

[83] See: Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf", Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.173-88; and James A. Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf", Foreign Affairs (1984).

[84] See: Financial Times, April 24, 1984.

[85] For US-Iraqi rapproachement, see: Dilip Hiro, (1990), op.cit.: pp.159-63.

[86] See: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila al-mustad áfin fi lubnan wa al-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. Also see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; and al-Nahar, June 5, 1985.

frontation with Israel.[87] Although the escalatory Hizb'allah's attacks on Israel suited the strategic designs of both Syria and Iran, a few signs of tension emerged in the Iranian-Syrian relationship. Apart from Syrian differences with Iran over the continuation of the Gulf war and Iran's persistant attacks on Ba'athist ideology, a source of tension stemmed from Syria's rejection of Iranian offers of both sending more IRGC units to Lebanon and allowing those present an active combat role against Israel.[88] However, any tension in their relationship was overshadowed by the Iranian *Majlis*' approval in 1985 to supply Syria yearly with one million tons of crude oil, free of charge, and five million tons at the discount of $2.5 per barrel over a ten-year period to lessen the impact of reduced Arab support.[89]

Apart from Hizb'allah's own reasons for the abduction of Western foreigners, it co-ordinated the kidnappings with Iran as a leverage in its patron's foreign policy disputes with both the American and French administrations.[90] The abduction of five American citizens by the Hizb'allah was not only in response to the continued imprisonment of the *al-Da'wa* members in Kuwait but also to U.S. support for Iraq, in terms of the renewal of diplomatic ties and continued military and financial assistance, and the U.S. refusal to recognize Iranian compensation's claims before the Hague Joint

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[87] See: Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1991); and Andreas Rieck, (1989), op.cit.

[88] See: Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.) The Politics of Islamic Revivalism (Indianapolis, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1988): p.68; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ronald Perron, (1985), op.cit.; and al-Nahar, November 9, 1987.

[89] See: Iran Press Digest, August 12, 1985; Dilip Hiro, (1990), op.cit.: p.157; and David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.372-3.

[90] See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: pp.22-3; 37-39.

Committee.[91] Furthermore, tensions between Iran and the U.S. were exacerbated by the American administration's claims of Iran's role in the sponsoring of terrorism.[92] While the abduction of American citizens represented a mixture of interests by both Hizb'allah and Iran, the case of the abduction of five French citizens was clearly aligned with Iranian foreign policy motivations. Apart from Iranian demands on repayment of the $1 billion loan, made by the Shah's government in 1974 to the French Atomic Energy Commission for a uranium separation plant (Eurodiff project),[93] the abduction of French citizens was connected with France's continued arms shipments to Iraq and Arab Persian Gulf states, most notably the supply of Mirage 2000 aircraft to Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the harbouring of exiled Iranian opposition groups in France.[94] It also represented an effort by Iran to obtain the release of Anis Naccache from France due to his longstanding friendship with Ahmad Khumayyní and Mohsen RafiqDust as well as with leading Hizb'allah members.[95] In order to increase the pressure on France to concede to Iranian demands, the Hizb'allah attacked the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon.[96]

After the completion of the American and Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon, which culminated with Hizb'allah's hijacking of TWA-847 in June

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[91] See: MERIP Reports, Nos.125-26 (July-September, 1984): pp.44-48.

[92] See: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.

[93] See: al-Watan al-Arabi, April 27, 1985; Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; and Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985.

[94] See: International Herald Tribune, January 5, 1989; Newsweek, June 23, 1986; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 2, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; and Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987.

[95] See: International Herald Tribune, July 28-29, 1990; L'Express, July 13, 1984; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28-April 3, 1986; Independent, October 27, 1991; Kayhan, July 28, 1990; and Teheran Times, July 28, 1990.

[96] See: Alan James, (1988), op.cit.: pp.21-24.

1985, Iranian-Syrian differences became apparent over Syria's attempt to impose political hegemony over Lebanon. In an effort to derail Syria's attempt to end the civil war and transform Lebanon into a Syrian satellite, through the so-called Tripartite Agreement,[97] Iran urged the Muslims in Lebanon to rise and establish an Islamic Republic.[98] This marked the beginning of tacit rivalry between Syria and Iranian efforts to expand their influence over Lebanon through Hizb'allah activity.[99] As a result, while Syria moved to confront and crackdown on Hizb'allah activity in order to advance its own political agenda in Lebanon, the movement became increasingly dependent on Iranian support and, more importantly, its ability to influence Syria's policy and position vis-á-vis the Hizb'allah.[100]

4.4 Phase II: Increased Iranian-Syrian Rivalry Over Hizb'allah (1985-92)

While the American administration pursued a confrontational policy towards Iran, the initiation of a clandestine policy of providing armaments to Iran via Israel in August 1985 led to a cessation in the abduction of American hostages by Hizb'allah in co-operation with Iran.[101] Instead, Iran focused on its confrontation with France as it had failed to meet any of its previously stated foreign policy demands for the release of French hos-

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[97] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984-85: pp.535-6.

[98] See: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.; Davar, November 11, 1987; and Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988.

[99] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: 209-10.

[100] See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.13-16.

[101] For useful analysis of Iran's efforts to secure weaponry from the American administration, see chapter 9: "Teheran and the American Arms" in: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: pp.374-85. Also see: Nikki R. Keddie, "Iranian Imbroglios: Who's Irrational?", World Policy Journal, Vol.5 (Winter 1987-88): pp.29-54.

tages.[102] This became manifest in an Iranian-Hizb'allah orchestrated terrorist campaign in France between December 1985 and September 1986, which led to 13 deaths and 303 injuries. This was motivated by Hizb'allah's own organisational requirements and, more significantly, by Iran in an effort to alter French foreign policy.[103] While the abduction of eight French citizens, between February and May 1986, was initiated by Hizb'allah in response to the expulsion of two Iraqi *al-Da'wa* members from France to Iraq, the timing of Iran's escalation of terrorism against France occurred within the framework of the general elections in the country in an effort to force concessions in terms of repayment of the French outstanding debt to Iran and in order to block French arms shipments to Iraq.[104] As Iran also demanded a complete *volte-face* in French foreign policy in the Middle East,[105] it placed additional pressure on France through Hizb'allah attacks against its UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon.[106] The abduction campaign of French citizens

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[102] See: Kayhan, May 22, 1988; Kayhan, October 30, 1985; and Iran Press Digest, October 21, 1985.

[103] See: Jerusalem Post, September 3, 1986; Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; International Herald Tribune, August 3, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, December 24, 1986.

[104] The Hizb'allah emphasized the speed with which the French government responded to their demands prior to the French elections, see: Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; al-Nahar, March 24, 1986; and al-Mustaqbal, March 23, 1986. This tactic was clearly revealed in the 1988 French elections, see: Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988. Hizb'allah's al-Ahd declared that: "the price for the security of Frenchman all over the world is the defeat of Mitterrand's government", see: Le Monde, May 6, 1988. Also see: Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; International Herald Tribune, August 3, 1987; International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1989; Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986; Newsweek, June 23, 1986; International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 17, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, December 1, 1987.

[105] For demands of a change in France's Middle East policy, see: Jerusalem Post, May 8, 1986; AP, June 20, 1986; Jerusalem Post, September 3, 1986; International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1986; and Ha'aretz, August 31, 1986.

[106] See: Ha'aretz, October 30, 1986; Monday Morning, December 12, 1986; al-Shira, September 28, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 4, 1987.

was also motivated by an accelerated effort to gain the release of Anis Naccache as well as to force the expulsion of leading exiled Iranian opposition leaders living in France.[107]

Iranian relations with the member-states of the *Steadfastness Front*, especially Syria and Libya, were brought even closer as a result of the accusations by the West against these three states for their support of terrorism, especially in the aftermath of both the American raid on Libya and the imposition of political and economic sanctions against Syria for its involvement in the Nizar Hindawi affair, of April 1986.[108] Due to the central role of Great Britain in these operations, the Hizb'allah abducted two British citizens with the active support of both Syria and Iran while Syria continuously emphasized the restoration of diplomatic relations as a prerequisite for any attempt to facilitate the release of British hostages.[109] While the West's accusations of Syrian and Iranian involvement in terrorism increased their isolation and strengthened their bilateral relations, areas of disagreement surfaced from Syria with Iran, especially over Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon.[110] Apart from an Iranian-Syrian dispute over oil prices and Syria's inability for repayments, which at the time amounted to over $2

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[107] For the release of Naccache, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, December 1, 1987; Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988; Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986. The Hizb'allah also requested the expulsion of Mujaheddine al-Khalq leaders and Bani Sadr, the last prime minister under the Shah, see: Newsweek, June 23, 1986; Observer, December 6, 1987; Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1987; and Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988.

[108] Great Britain broke diplomatic relations with Syria after the conviction of Nizar Hindawi on October 10, 1986, see: New York Times, October 25, 1986; and Arab News, September 11, 1986. On November 5, 1986, all EC governments adopted sanctions against Syria, see: Washington Post, November 11, 1986; and Washington Post, November 27, 1986. Only France failed to join in the common action against Syria, see: Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 1986.

[109] See: Ha'aretz, October 10, 1988.

[110] See: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, op.cit.: pp.182-4.

billion[111] and led to a reduction in Iran's supply of oil to Syria in mid-1986, Syrian disagreement with Iran came as a response to the escalation in Hizb'allah activity in southern Lebanon which highlighted the lack of control Syria exercised over Lebanon while it directly threatened to bring Israel into an all-out confrontation with Syria.[112] Furthermore, Hizb'allah's abduction of Westerners, with the active support of Iran, also undermined the internal and external perception of Syria's firm control over Lebanese affairs while it damaged its international image in Syrian efforts to rehabilitate its relations with Western governments.[113] As a result, it is not surprising that tension in the Syrian-Iranian relationship surfaced publicly with the leak of the U.S.-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal in the pro-Syrian weekly *al-Shira* in Lebanon.[114] Consequently, while Iran and Syria maintained good relations on the strategic level, ensured by Syria's dependence on Iranian oil which was resupplied after Syrian veiled signals of a possible rapproachement with Iraq,[115] they differed increasingly on the ground in

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[111] The dispute came over Syrian objections to Iran's high prices of discounted oil and Iran's complaints over Syrian non-payment of a $2.3 billion oil debt. See: Foreign Report, June 19, 1986. Also see: Economist, May 3, 1986; International Herald Tribune, June 10, 1986; Middle East International, June 27, 1986; and Associated Press, April 25, 1988. For intelligence on Iranian-Syrian dispute, see: Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, (1993), op.cit.: p.293.

[112] See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.) (1990), op.cit.: p.183.

[113] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1986, pp.619-21. While Syria remained isolated, Iran continued negotiations with the US over the release of Iranian assets in American banks between December 1986 and mid-1987, see: New York Times, December 26, 1986; and Ha'aretz, October 16, 1987.

[114] For the revelation, see: al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; Arab News, December 6, 1986; al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd, November 21, 1986.

[115] After Syria's veiled threat, Iran supplied Syria with 2.5 million tons to cover a period of six months until March 1987, see: BBC/SWB, July 22, 1986; and Middle East International, June 27, 1986. However, Syria's threat of rapproachement with Iraq led also to the kidnapping of Mahmud Ayat, the Syrian charge d'affairs in Iran, see: Middle East, April 1987; and Washington Post, February 4, 1987.

Lebanon over Hizb'allah's activity and designs for the future of Lebanon.[116] This was exacerbated by Syrian disillusionment with Iranian dealings with the US through secret arms-for-hostages deals as well as Iran's significant extension of financial and military support to the Hizb'allah and its rapid expansion of recruitment within the Lebanese Shi'a community at the expense of pro-Syrian Amal.[117]

Although the *al-Shira* revelation of the U.S.-Iranian arms-for-hostages signified tension in the Iranian-Syrian relationship, it also revealed the imposition of Iranian clerical factionalism over Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon.[118] Apart from the three anti-American abductions by Hizb'allah in September-October 1986, which undermined any U.S.-Iranian rapproachement, Hizb'allah's unprecedented campaign of abductions in January 1987 led to a direct Syrian military intervention and clashes with Hizb'allah fighters in Beirut.[119] While the abductions of four Americans, a Frenchman, and a British citizen were motivated as a response to the arrest of leading SSA operatives in Europe, which coincided with a series of Iranian attempts to undermine Kuwait's hosting of the Islamic Conference Organization,[120] Syria's action

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[116] See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.13-6.

[117] See: International Herald Tribune, July 20, 1987; The Sunday Times, December 13, 1987; Teheran Times, February 16, 1984; Middle East International, No.315 (December 19, 1987); Financial Times, July 25, 1987; al-Dustur, October 14, 1985; Jerusalem Post, July 22, 1987; and al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987.

[118] See: FBIS, November 5, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; Marmara, November 25, 1986; and IRNA, March 18, 1987. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah", Foreign Policy, Vol.66 (1987).

[119] See: Ma'ariv, March 2, 1983; and Ha'aretz, July 23, 1987. It was also prompted by Hizb'allah abduction of Syrian soldiers, see: Ma'aretz, Febraury 13, 1987; New York Times, February 13, 1987; and Times, August 12, 1988.

[120] On January 19, 1987, explosions against Kuwaiti oil installations led to the arrest of eleven Shi'ite Kuwaitis with Iranian origin, see: New York Times, Febraury 1, 1987; and Arab News, April 5, 1987. The abduction of Western foreigners by Hizb'allah was used to threaten the Islamic summit due to be held on January 26, 1987, see: New York Times, January 18, 1987. Hizb'allah also kidnapped a Saudi diplomat in Beirut connected with the Islamic Summit in Kuwait, see: Yediot Aharanot, January 14, 1987; and International Herald Tribune,

against the movement, without prior discussions with Iran, signalled an effort to restore its relations with Western governments by acting to resolve the hostage-problem as well as to reassert its authority over Lebanon by limiting the movement's activity in Beirut.[121] These tensions assumed the form of protracted Amal-Hizb'allah warfare in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and retaliatory attacks between Hizb'allah and Syrian military units.[122] The restrictions on the Hizb'allah's freedom of movement and activity led it to a re-orientation from hostage-taking activity to armed confrontation against Israel, as evident by the substantial military and financial support from Iran for the movement's shift from clandestine guerilla operations to semi-regular military units.[123] As evident by the abduction of an American citizen in June 1987, Syria opposed any challenges to its control of Beirut and mounted extensive searches for the hostages while placing pressure on the Pasdaran contingent by confining it to the Biq'a area.[124] While the abduction

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March 19, 1987.

[121] Syria killed 18 Hizb'allah members in Beirut, see: Middle East Economic Digest, February 28, 1987; and al-Anwar, February 24, 1987. For Iran's vehement opposition to Syrian action, see: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1987: pp.643-5; and BBC/SWB, June 27, 1987. Also see: New York Times, June 27, 1987; and Daniel Pipes, "Terrorism: The Syrian Connection", National Interest No.15 (Spring 1989): pp.15-38.

[122] See: Newsweek, February 23, 1987. Hizb'allah also attacked and kidnapped 14 Syrian soldiers in the Shi'ite suburb of al-Basta, see: Ma'aretz, February 13, 1987; Washington Post, February 12, 1987; New York Times, February 13, 1987; and Times, August 12, 1988.

[123] See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1987: pp.418-19; 643-45; al-Ray', December 27, 1987; Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; and Newsweek, August 24, 1987. As a conciliatory measure to Iran, Syria promised support to Hizb'allah in its war with Israel in the South by supplying weaponry to the movement, to allow Hizb'allah fighters to be deployed in the South and allow Iranian Pasdaran to establish command posts in the South, see: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987.

[124] See: Washington Post, June 30, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, June 20, 1987. In fact, the Syrian military signalled a preparedness to attack the Iranian Embassy in Beirut to rescue hostages, see: Ma'aretz, March 18, 1987. For Syrian threats of the use of force against Hizb'allah to free hostages: Ma'aretz, June 22, 1987; and SANA, August 18, 1987. As revealed by the hostages, the Hizb'allah also increased the security in the detention of hostages following Syrian military intervention against the movement in 1987, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987. The French hostages were held under stricter supervision following Syrian intervention in February 1987, see: Jerusalem Post, December 7,

was considered to be a reaction by Iran to the U.S. expanded role in the Gulf (protecting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers)[125] it signified that Hizb'allah abduction of Western foreigners was directly incompatible with Syrian efforts to consolidate its hegemony over Lebanon.[126] As a result, Hizb'allah could no longer count on Syrian tacit co-operation in the abduction of Western foreigners as Syria threatened direct military action against the movement while it made gestures to improve its relationships with Western governments and pressure Iran in negotiations over oil supply.[127] The friction between Iran and Syria over the limitation on Hizb'allah activity and Syrian efforts to break its own isolation, not only towards the West but also Arab states,[128] was clearly evident by Iranian requests for assurances that any hostage release would circumvent the possibility of Syrian custody and credit for their release.[129] It also led to the establishment of a Hizb'allah unit in

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1988.

[125] According to US officials, the abduction was in response to the "reflagging" policy the US started to conduct in the Persian Gulf and it had intercepted radio messages from Iran ordering the abduction of Charles Glass, see: Washington Post, June 20, 1987; Ma'aretz, July 10, 1987; and Washington Post, June 21, 1988.

[126] According to the Syrian foreign minister, the abduction of the hostage was an "unacceptable challenge" to Syria, see: SANA, August 18, 1987.

[127] While Iran's agreement with Syria over oil supply was due for negotiation and renewal in March 1987, Syria and Iran had disagreements over Syria's failure to repay its oil debt to Iran, see: Economist, March 14, 1987; and Financial Times, May 5, 1987. In April 1987, a one-year agreement was reached for the supply of 1m tons of oil free of charge to the Syrian army and 2m tons at OPEC prices on a cash-payment basis, see: OPEC Bulletin, June 1987; and New York Times, May 5, 1987.

[128] For Syria's exploitation of its relationship with Iran through economic inducements from the Arab world, see: International Herald Tribune, July 18-19, 1987. As a result, Iran extended Syria's debt payments and agreed to supply 20,000 barrels/day of free oil, see: Observer, November 1, 1987; The Times, November 5, 1987; and Economist, September 26, 1987.

[129] Iran specifically promised France the release of two hostages if they were not taken to Damascus in order for Syria to claim that it gained their release, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

Beirut to challenge Syria through direct military operations.[130] Consequently, due to the tight Syrian security over Beirut, the Hizb'allah was forced to abstain from any new abduction of Western foreigners rather, it used previously kidnapped hostages as a useful leverage against Iran's enemies, especially in the case of it's intensified dispute with France in June 1987 over French arrests of a Hizb'allah network[131] and siege of the Iranian Embassy in Paris, which lead to the rupture of their diplomatic relations on July 17, 1987.[132] Although the diplomatic confrontation between Iran and France was ostensibly over the release of Wahid Gordji and arrested Hizb'allah members, it also concerned demands by Iran for the repayment of a $1.5 billion Eurodiff loan and the halt of future French arms shipments to Iraq, especially the delay in delivery of twenty Mirage fighter aircraft due in Iraq in 1988.[133] Furthermore, Iran also requested a reduction in the French naval presence in the Persian Gulf as well as the expulsion of a number of anti-Khumayyní activists and Iranian opposition leaders living in

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[130] See: Davar, November 11, 1987.

[131] For the arrest of the Hizb'allah network, most notably Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin's nephew, see: International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; L'Evenement du Jeudi, June 11-17, 1987; Le Soir, March 1987; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988;

[132] The diplomatic crisis emerged after French authorities demanded to investigate an Iranian representative, Wahid Gordji, who was hiding in the Iranian Embassy in Paris, for his involvement in the 1986 September bombings in Paris, see: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Hadashot, July 19, 1987; Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; New York Times, July 17, 1987; Washington Post, July 18, 1987; Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987; New York Times, July 24, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot, July 20, 1987. Also see: FBIS, July 24, 1987.

[133] Iran claimed the Eurodiff loan exceeded $2 billion, including interest, see: Jerusalem Post, December 1, 1987. Iran also demanded an end to the oil boycott for purchases by France of Iranian oil, see: New York Times, December 12, 1987. France ended its oil embargo with Iran in early December 1988, see: New York Times, December 5, 1988. Also see: Observer, December 6, 1987; Economist, May 7, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 6, 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1987; and Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987.

France.[134] The Iranian-French "embassy war" was defused after the exhange of Wahid Gordji for the retaliatory detention of French consul, Paul Torri, in Iran in November 1987.[135]

While the Hizb'allah abduction of British citizen, Terry Waite, in January 1987 had occurred in response to the intermediary's inability to make any progress in the case of the *al-Da'wa* prisoners in Kuwait,[136] it resulted in serious friction between Syria and Iran, most notably through threats of Syrian military action against Iran's Embassy in Beirut where Waite was allegedly held before transferred to the Biq'a.[137] Although Syria attempted to obtain the release of Terry Waite in an effort to restore its relations with Great Britain (Anglo-Iranian relations deteriorated with a diplomatic crisis in May 1987),[138] it became clear that the fate of all British hostages was intertwined with Iranian demands for the release of the four Iranians missing since 1982 as well as the withdrawal of British warships from the

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[134] See: Washington Post, December 8, 1987; New York Times, December 9, 1987; FBIS, January 15, 1988.

[135] See: Washington Post, November 30, 1987; and Arab News, December 1, 1987.

[136] The abduction of Terry Waite occurred symbolically only four days before the hosting by Kuwait of the Islamic Conference Organisation. For reasons relating to the abduction of Waite, see: International Herald Tribune, January 28, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, February 5, 1987.

[137] For Syrian threats against Iran, see: International Herald Tribune, February 9, 1987; and Ma'aretz, March 24, 1987.

[138] The diplomatic crisis, the so-called "Chaplin Affair", stemmed from the abduction and beating of Edward Chaplin, Britain's second ranking diplomat, by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Iran, on May 28, after the arrest of an Iranian diplomat in Manchester on charges of shoplifting, see: FBIS, May 29, 1987. In response, Britain closed the Iranian consulate in Manchester and expelled five Iranian diplomats which led to the retaliatory expulsion of five British diplomats from Iran, see: New York Times, June 5, 1987; FBIS, June 9, 1987; and Washington Post, June 11, 1987.

Persian Gulf and the resumption of normal and full diplomatic relations.[139] As Iranian hostility towards Britain's participation in US naval Gulf operations in August 1987 resulted in the closure of Iranian arms procurement offices in London,[140] Iran focused on the issue of the four missing Iranians as a means of leverage to restore Anglo-Iranian diplomatic relations.[141]

While Syria also linked efforts to release the British hostages with resumption of diplomatic relations, it concentrated on pressuring the Hizb'allah on the issue of the American hostages through coercion as a means of normalising relations with the American administration as well as containing Hizb'allah's con-tinued expansion and incompatible activity with Syrian interests in Lebanon.[142] In the case of the abduction of four American hostages in January 1987, it would appear that the Hizb'allah initiated these kidnappings for its own organisational reasons, which was marked by its close solidarity with the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories as shown by the nature of the demands as well as by the emergence of a new nom dé guerre.[143] Rather than in alignment with Iranian motivations, especially as the movement's most loyal radical allies within Iran's clerical establishment

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[139] See: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1987; BBC, April 11, 1988; Jerusalem Post, August 2, 1988; and Hadashot, June 23, 1988.

[140] See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: p.80. For Iranian demands for the renewal of British weapons supplies, see: Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987.

[141] For Hizb'allah's demands in the case of the British hostages concerning the release of the four missing Iranians, see: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1987; BBC, January 12, BBC/SWB April 11, 1988; Teheran TV, March 24, 1988; Jerusalem Post, August 22, 1988; Hadashot, June 23, 1988; and Ma'aretz, November 4, 1988;

[142] See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: p.14.

[143] For the demands by the *Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine* for the release of 310 Shi'ites and 90 Palestinians in Israel, see: Jerusalem Post, February 1, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, February 8, 1987; International Herald Tribune, February 11, 1987; Jerusalem Post, December 20, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, February 2, 1988.

were relegated to the background[144] at a time when Iran attempted to exert more control over the Hizb'alllah while it was engaged in negotiations with the American administration over the release of Iranian assets.[145] As these abductions were clearly incompatible with Syrian efforts to extend its hegemony over Lebanon, leading to tension and friction in the Iranian-Syrian alliance, the Hizb'allah's new-found solidarity with the Palestinian uprising, by connecting Israel to the hostage-issue, suited Iranian interests as leverage in the economic and political realm against the American administration's refusal to release frozen Iranian assets and to limit its military intervention in the Persian Gulf.[146]

Notwithstanding the convergence of motivations between Hizb'allah and Iran in these abductions, the movement's hostage-taking activity was not only a direct challenge to Syrian efforts to consolidate control over Lebanon but also served to highlight the underlying friction between Syria and Iran, especially in terms of using Lebanon in their own individual foreign policy agendas.[147] Iran's diplomatic intervention in the "war of the camps" in late 1986[148] and its support for anti-Syrian Sunni movements in Lebanon, most

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[144] This relates to the disputes of controlling the *Office of Islamic Movements* between radical and more pragmatic Iranian clergy in December 1986, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.

[145] See: Ha'aretz, October 16, 1987; and Times, June 8, 1988.

[146] See: International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1988; International Herald Tribune, July 6, 1987; Times, June 8, 1986; and Ha'aretz, August 29, 1988. Also see: Eric Hooglund, "The Islamic Republic at War and Peace", Middle East Report, Vol.19, No.1 (January-February 1989).

[147] See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.184-5.

[148] See: Voice of Lebanon, December 10, 1986.

notably the *Tawhid* movement in Tripoli,[149] reinforced the fact that Iran and Syria often worked without consideration for each other's individual agendas in Lebanon.[150] While tension between Iran and Syria over Lebanon was highlighted by requests from Syria to Iran of the handing over of Imad Mughniyya,[151] Iran's challenge to Syrian hegemony was most evident by the protracted warfare between Amal and Hizb'allah, which was initiated with the abduction of Lt. Col. William Higgins by the Hizb'allah in February 1988.[152] While the Amal-Hizb'allah warfare surfaced the tensions between Iran and Syria in the challenge by their proxies for control over Beirut and southern Lebanon, Iranian control over the movement was increasingly difficult to maintain as revealed by Hizb'allah's continued confrontation with Amal despite Iranian efforts to mediate a solution between the warring Shi'a factions.[153] Apart from being a direct affront to Amal's security position, this was clear from the fact that Hizb'allah concentrated on internal Lebanese issues directed against Israel, most notably the withdrawal of Israel's military from Lebanon and the release of all Lebanese and Palestinians held

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[149] For a useful overview of *Harakat al-tawhid al-islami* and its links with Iran, see: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: pp.7-10. Also see: Radio Free Lebanon, December 24, 1986.

[150] See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.14-6.

[151] For Syrian requests to Iran and warrant against Mughniyya, see: FBIS, January 25, 1988; and Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988. For Mugniyya's stay in Iran, see: al-Itthiad al-Ubushi, January 15, 1988; al-Itthiad al-Ubushi, January 31, 1988; Davar, February 1; and Independent, April 26, 1988.

[152] See: Augustus Richard Norton, "The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.130-32. Also see: FBIS, March 29, 1988; Foreign Report, March 17, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 18, 1988.

[153] See: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.: p.135; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989.

by Israel and SLA in the detention camps in south Lebanon,[154] and to undermine the possibility of any Syrian participation in a US-led Middle East peace initiative.[155] In particular, Hizb'allah members protested against the tour of US envoys to Syria and Lebanon by marching in the streets while calling for the execution of kidnapped Lt.Col. William Higgins.[156] Although the kidnapping of the American hostage seems to have been initiated by the movement itself in order to confront Amal's hegemony in southern Lebanon and the presence of UNIFIL,[157] it was also used by Hizb'allah and Iran in an attempt to sabotage the rapproachement between Syria and the American administration, as evidenced by the visit of Richard Murphy, the US undersecretary for the Near East, to Syria in February-March 1988.[158] Furthermore, the concentration in use of American hostages by Iran was also a reflection of the release of France's last hostages in May 1988, on the eve of the French presidential elections, after agreement between Iran and France to settle certain outstanding differences.[159]

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[154] For demands, see: Jerusalem Post, February 19, 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 23, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 19, 1988.

[155] See: NER, February 29, 1988. This is supported by the fact that the Hizb'allah repeatedly rejected any American envoys (Shultz) or intervention in Lebanon in an "effort to contain the uprising in the occupied territories, see: Voice of Resistance, February 19, 1988; and Washington Post, April 4, 1988.

[156] See: Washington Times, February 25, 1988.

[157] Apart from obstructing Hizb'allah's resistance against Israel, UNIFIL was accused of serving as a front for Western intelligence agencies. In particular, Sheikh Fadlallah claimed the French UNIFIL team was conducting large-scale surveys on the political and sectarian affiliations of the inhabitants of south Lebanon, see: Voice of Hope, February 27, 1988.

[158] For discussions on political reform for Lebanon between Asad and Murphy, see: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.130-32.

[159] France repaid over $300 million in a second tranche of the Eurodiff loan in May 1988 (the first occurred in early 1987), see: Ma'ariv, May 8, 1988; Newsweek, May 16, 1988; and Steve M. Berry, "The Release of France's Last Hostages in Lebanon: An Analysis", TVI Report, Volume 8, No.3 (1989): pp.19-22; and Luc Chavin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage

While the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins served as a pretext for a Syrian effort to crackdown on the Hizb'allah through its proxy Amal in the South, in order to advance its designs in Lebanon by demonstrating to the American administration that it was firmly committed to confronting Shi'a extremism in the form of Hizb'allah abductions of foreigners and uncontrolled attacks against Israel, Syria was forced to intervene militarily in order to rescue Amal from defeat in Beirut.[160] Despite the fact that Syria rejected Iranian offers of the insertion of a joint Iranian-Syrian security force in Beirut, Syria had to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the Hizb'allah in order to avoid an escalation of tension in the Iranian-Syrian relationship, evidenced by the Syrian-sponsored May 1988 agreement which implicitly allowed the Hizb'allah to resume its activities in southern Lebanon.[161] The Amal-Hizb'allah cease-fire agreement, sponsored by Syria and Iran, came after the conclusion of a renewed one-year oil agreement in April 1988, in which Iran agreed to supply one million tons of oil free of charge to Syria.[162] However, the continued intra-Shi'ite warfare between Hizb'allah and Amal over the control of southern Lebanon revealed that the movement displayed a greater degree of autonomy from previosuly excerted Iranian influence as Iranian

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Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.99-104. According to Sheikh Fadlallah, the United States as well as the United Kingdom and other states should adopt the policies conducted by France, which brought about the release of all its hostages, see: al-Dustur, March 9, 1989.

[160] See: Middle East International, March 2, 1990. For Hizb'allah's hostile reaction to the Syrian deployment of military forces in Beirut, see: Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1987.

[161] See: FBIS, May 23, 1988; New York Times, May 13, 1988; and al-Safir, May 27, 1988. Also see: Voice of the Oppressed 0930 gmt 2 Jun 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0169, June 4, 1988. In particular, Sheikh Fadlallah announced Hizb'allah had "no strategic disagreement" with Syria, see: Ha'aretz, May 16, 1988; and al-Shira, June 5, 1988.

[162] See: Associated Press, April 25, 1988.

attempts to mediate between the two warring factions proved unsuccessful.[163] Apart from the continued importance of Iran's supply of oil to Syria for the Iranian-Syrian alliance,[164] any differences between Iran and Syria were reduced by a common agenda to confront Iraq's involvement with various militias in Lebanon, in the aftermath of Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598 for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, by unifying Amal-Hizb'allah differences against a common enemy.[165] While the Iranian *volte-face* over its war with Iraq and elsewhere, under the consolidated leadership of Rafsanjani, created dissilusionment within the ranks of the Hizb'allah over the achievement of its broader pan-Islamic goals,[166] Iran's more moderate officials had difficulty in restraining Hizb'allah against Amal in order to avoid tension in its relationship with Syria.[167] In addition, Iranian pressure on Syria through earlier dependence on oil had lost most of its effect as Syria had received no deliveries of free oil from Iran since the end of 1988 and intended no

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[163] See: FBIS, August 28, 1990. For information on the role of Iranian Besharati as the main mediator of negotiations between Amal and Hizb'allah, see: New York Times, December 29, 1989; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989. For Iranian-Syrian mediation, see: FBIS, April 28, 1988; and Washington Post, May 9, 1988. For Hizb'allah clashes with Syrian military, see: New York Times, May 14, 1988.

[164] See: Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.32, No.17 (January 30, 1989); Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria Country Profile, 1989-90: p.32; and Volker Perthes, "The Syrian Economy in the 1980s", Middle East Studies, Vol.46, No.1 (Winter 1992): p.57.

[165] On Iraq's involvement in Lebanon, see: FBIS, November 18, 1988; Middle East Report, July 28, 1988; The Guardian, October 19, 1988; Asad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.400.

[166] See: al-Nahar, July 22, 1988; al-Muntalaq, September 1988; and Ma'aretz, August 24, 1988. However, Sheikh Fadlallah softened his tone towards the US after Iran's acceptance of a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and ceased calling it the "big satan", see: Ma'aretz, August 24, 1988.

[167] For Rafsanjani's own admission of the difficulty of restraining Hizb'allah as well as its loyalty to Mohtashemi, see: Washington Post, January 7, 1990; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990. Also see: Middle East International, January 20, 1989. For example, Hizb'allah also pursued an assassination attempt on the most senior Syrian military officers in May 1988 despite Iranian-Syrian agreement for the deployment of Syrian forces into Beirut, see: Washington Post, May 27, 1988.

additional purchases of Iranian oil at preferential OPEC prices, a reflection of increased Syrian self-sufficiency from the Deir ez-Zor oil production fields.[168]

The common interests between Iran, which desperately needed to attract foreign investment and improve relations with the West in order to repair its war-ravaged economy, and Syria, which also needed to compensate for the reduction of Soviet support by better relations with the US administration and for the consolidation of its hegemony over Lebanon, led to a united front against the Hizb'allah, under the threat of Syrian military intervention which forced the movement to accept a political and military agreement with Amal in January 1989.[169] Under the accord, Hizb'allah was hindered in any planned future abduction of any more Western foreign hostages as it would directly contravene the clauses granting security control in Beirut to Syria and in the South of Lebanon to Amal.[170] It would also appear that Syria pressed the Hizb'allah for the prevention of any release of British hostages as long as Britain was unwilling to restore full diplomatic relations with Syria.[171] At the same time Iran had moved to broaden its relations with other Shi'ite movements in Lebanon in an effort to unify forces against Iraq's in-

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[168] For a statement by the Syrian Minister of Petroleum, see: For a detailed account of Syrian indigenous oil supply and production, see: Middle East International, March 31, 1989; and Financial Times, June 6, 1989. For Syrian-Iranian relations and oil, see: Middle East International, November 17, 1989.

[169] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.210; John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: 1991): p.256; New York Times, May 17, 1988; and Middle East International, February 3, 1989. For the agreement, see: SANA in Arabic 1435 gmt 30 Jan 89 - SWB ME/0373, February 1, 1989. Also see: Middle East International, February 3, 1989; and Middle East International, March 31, 1989.

[170] See: Abbas al-Musawi stated that the agreement signed between Amal and Hizb'allah permits them to "complement each other in anti-Israeli activities in southern Lebanon. We are going to help Amal in their political struggle and they will support us in (anti-Israeli) resistance, see: Jerusalem Post, February 3, 1989.

[171] See: Middle East International, February 17, 1989.

volvement in Lebanon,[172] while it also attempted to exploit internal divisions within the Hizb'allah in an effort to achieve the release of some Western hostages as a leverage to advance its more moderate foreign policy.[173] However, both strategies proved difficult to accomplish for the Iranian political leadership as other Shi'ite movements were less susceptible than Hizb'allah to Iranian influence and as the then current Hizb'allah leadership under the command of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli was more inclined to take orders from the Iranian revolutionist faction than from Rafsanjani.[174]

Iran's problem of excerting pressure on the Hizb'allah to release a few of its Western hostages for foreign policy gains in the international arena was over-shadowed by more important developments in Lebanon, most notably by challenges to Syrian hegemony and the conclusion of the Syrian-sponsored Ta'if agreement, and within Iran itself, most importantly by the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni and the ascendancy of Rafsanjani to the political leadership at the expense of the revolutionist faction.[175] Although the issue of the Western hostages was briefly elevated by Israel's kidnapping of Sheikh Obeid in the summer of 1989, it was also relegated against the background of Syria's preoccupation with the challenges presented by General Aoun's "war of liberation" against the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the changes in

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[172] For Iranian efforts for intra-Shi'a unity, see: Middle East International, October 20, 1989. Also see:

[173] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, (1993), op.cit.: pp.188-9. Also see: Ma'aretz, August 23, 1988.

[174] See: al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; Independent, August 10, 1991; and Middle East International, January 20, 1989. The killing of Lt.Col. Higgins has been seen by analysts as carried out on the orders of Mohtashemi within the framework of an Iranian power-struggle to undermine any improvement in Iranian-US relations as well as in Iranian-Amal relations, see: Middle East International, August 4, 1989.

[175] See: Washington Post, August 18, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.457-73.

Iran's political leadership as well as by the Salman Rushdie affair.[176] While a closer Iranian-Syrian alliance emerged in Lebanon to counter Iraq and support for the regime of Aoun,[177] a common rejection of the Ta'if agreement unified the positions of Iran and the Hizb'allah in Lebanon, especially as the movement would become the main casualty of the Syrian-sponsored agreement and Iran would lose most of its influence in Lebanon.[178]

On the ground, however, Iranian-Hizb'allah relations diverged over the issue of continued intra-Shi'ite warfare between the movement and Amal in southern Lebanon as well as over refusals by the Hizb'allah's to release any foreign hostages.[179] As a result, tension between the Hizb'allah and Iran was heightened by the decision of Rafsanjani to both downgrade financial support for the movement while ousting radical Iranian elements advocating the export of the revolution, most notably Hizb'allah's mentor Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi who lost his position as interior minister in 1989.[180] However, the clerical factionalism within Iran was projected not only onto the issue of the foreign

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[176] See: Middle East International, October 20, 1989. Prior to his death in 1989, Ayatollah Khomayyni's fatwa against the Indian-born British author led to serious confrontation in Iranian-British relations, see: James P. Piscatori, "The Rushdie Affair and the Politics of Ambiguity", International Affairs, Vol.66 (1990): pp.767-89.

[177] See: Middle East International, July 21, 1989; and Guardian, October 12, 1988. Abbas al-Musawi, Amal's Nabih Berri and the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Syria met in Damascus to discuss cooperation against the Christian militia and General Aoun, see: Davar, April 3, 1989.

[178] For Iran's criticism of Ta'if, see: FBIS, November 7, 1989; and John Calabrese, "Iran II: the Damascus Connection", World Today, op.cit.: p.189. For Hizb'allah's rejection of the Ta'if agreement, see: New York Times, September 27, 1989; New York Times, October 5, 1989; and FBIS, October 25, 1989. Also see: Middle East International, October 6, 1989; and Middle East International, January 5, 1990.

[179] See: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.

[180] According to reports, Iran reduced its financial support to Hizb'allah from $5 million a month to $1 million a month, see: Washington Post, January 1, 1990. Also see: Middle East International, August 4, 1989; Middle East International, August 25, 1989; Middle East International, November 17, 1989;

hostages in Lebanon but was also mirrored in Hizb'allah's clerical leadership, divided by the position and future direction of the movement in a post-civil war phase of Lebanon's political and military environment under stricter Syrian control.[181]

Hizb'allah's opposition to the Ta'if agreement was not only based on the creation of a barrier to the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon but also to the plan for comprehensive disarmament of all militias.[182] While the Hizb'allah came under pressure from Syria, through military intervention against the movement in search for the hostages while it blocked the movement of the IRGC units in the Biq'a, and from Iran, through the reduction of financial and military support and the attempt to control the IRGC by assignment of loyal units to Rafsanjani,[183] it became apparent that Syria was staunchly committed to the implementation of the Ta'if agreement to the extent that it would be willing to sacrifice Hizb'allah's political and military presence in the process.[184] At the same time, it was equally clear that Iran was unwilling to abandon the Hizb'allah to the wolves of Lebanese politics, mainly because of its enourmous financial investments in the movement for the expansion of the Shi'a base and as it represented the only means to participate effectively in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[185] Although

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[181] See: Middle East International, May 11, 1990; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.

[182] See: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1030, March 26, 1991.

[183] For Syrian and Iranian pressure, see: Washington Post, September 22, 1988; New York Times, January 23, 1990; The Echo of Iran, February 1990; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, January 23, 1990; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; and Middle East International, March 16, 1990.

[184] See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.470-3.

[185] See: Middle East International, October 6, 1989; Middle East International, March 2, 1990; and Middle East International, July 26, 1991.

this prevented Syria from any immediate attempts to eliminate the Hizb'allah, the hostage issue became increasingly subject to Iranian clerical factionalism while vital as a bargaining instrument for the movement to ensure its position within Lebanon, especially as Syria gradually moved towards full implementation of the Ta'if accord.[186] This became evident by the renewed efforts to enforce an agreement by Syria and Iran in the intra-Shi'ite conflict between Hizb'allah and Amal on November 5, 1990, which reaffirmed the earlier principles and agreements reached in 1988 and 1989.[187] However, the dramatic shifts in the regional political context following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, coupled with the extension of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, overshadowed temporarily any urgency for either Iran and Syria to force the Hizb'allah to hand over its Western hostages.[188]

Apart from providing the Hizb'allah with a detraction from the hostage-issue in Lebanon while it displayed strong solidarity with the fate of Iraqi Shi'ites,[189] the Gulf crisis also provided Iran and Syria with a window of opportunity to break their isolation by repairing relations with Arab states

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[186] For Iranian factionalism on Hizb'allah in early 1990, see: Middle East International, May 11, 1990. For hostages as bargaining instrument, see: Middle East International, May 3, 1991;

[187] For a text of the agreement, see: Syrian Arab TV, Damascus 1840 gmt 5 Nov 90 - BBC/SWB/ME/0915, November 7, 1990. For Amal-Hizb'allah agreement, see: Middle East International, November 9, 1990; Syrian Arab Republic Radio, Damascus 0515 gmt 6 Nov 90 - BBC/SWB/ME/0915, November 7, 1990; Middle East Reporter, November 16, 1990; and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1600 gmt 6 Nov 90 - BBC/SWB/ME/0916, November 8, 1990.

[188] For a brief overview of developments, see: Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit.: pp.33-36. Also see: Financial Times, August 9, 1991.

[189] For Hizb'allah's concern for their co-religionists in Iraq, see: Voice of the Oppressed 1250 gmt 5 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1040, April 8, 1991. Also see: Amatzia Baram, "From Radicalism to Radical Pragmatism: The Shi'ite Fundementalist Opposition Movements of Iraq", in James Piscatori (ed.) Islamic Fundementalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago, Ill: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991): pp.28-51.

and improve their image and position in the West.[190] While Syria had previously moved to improve relations with US regional allies, most notably Egypt, it exploited the Gulf crisis to gain recognition of its suzerainty over Lebanon and to extract financial aid and support from the Persian Gulf states by joining the US-lead coalition against Iraq and by using its influence over Iran to ensure either neutrality or, at least, non-cooperation between Iran and Iraq. In exchange, Syria facilitated mediation for Iran in an effort to improve the latter's relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt.[191] Iran managed also to benefit economically from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, as evident by the removal of sanctions by the EEC in October 1990 and increased trade activity with Western governments.[192] Although Iran and Syria managed to exploit the Gulf crisis for their own ends, a new source of increased tension in the Iranian-Syrian alliance was revealed by Iran's criticism of the continous improvement in the US-Syrian relationship, while the US-Iranian remained frozen, and by Syrian flexibility towards Israel as well as its willingness to participate in the US-initiated Middle East peace process.[193] In particular, Iran was fully aware that any improvement in Iranian-US relations, even gestures of reconciliation towards Iran, depended

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[190] See: Ephraim Kam, "The Gulf Crisis and the Arab Arena", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.), The Middle East Military Balance (1990-1991), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992): pp.82-96. In November 1990, the United Kingdom resumed diplomatic relations with Iran broken off in March 1989 over fatwa on Rushdie, see: Middle East International, December 7, 1990.

[191] For Syrian mediation in Iranian-Egyptian and Iranian-Saudi relations, see: Middle East International, April 3, 1992; and Middle East International, June 12, 1992. For Iranian comments on the resumption of Iranian-Saudi relations on March 26, 1991, see: IRNA in English 0916 gmt 26 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1033, March 29, 1991.

[192] See: Middle East Economic Digest, Vol.34, No.45 (November 16, 1990).

[193] For Iranian reactions to Syria's backing of US plans for a Middle East peace conference, see: Middle East International, July 26, 1991; and Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1430 gmt 2 Aug 91 - SWB ME/1143, August 6, 1991. For Hizb'allah's condemnation of any peace talks, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1430 gmt 2 Aug 91 - SWB ME/1143, August 6, 1991.

on obtaining the release of American hostages in Lebanon.[194] As a result, Syria decided to permit the Hizb'allah to remained armed as a resistance movement, while it completed the disarmament of all other Lebanese militias in April 1991, in an agreement with both Iran, to reduce Iranian-Syrian tensions,[195] and the Hizb'allah, as a means to find a resolution to the hostage crisis and to suit its strategic designs in Lebanon as well as within the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace conferences.[196] The convergence of interest between Iran and Syria was also evident by Syria's permission to allow the presence of Pasdaran in Lebanon contrary to the Ta'if agreement.[197]

As Hizb'allah's dénouement of the hostage affair reflected the movement's re-adjustment within Lebanon's post-war environment, by substituting hostage-taking and terrorism for armed resistance and a willingness to participate within the democratic process, the comprehensive nature of the settlement of the hostage problem revealed close co-operation between Syria and Iran, albeit for their own individual interests.[198] Although Syria's decision to allow the Hizb'allah to remain armed coincided with the formal recognition of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, through the conclusion of the Treaty of

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[194] See: Middle East International, June 28, 1991; Radio Lebanon, West Beirut 1715 gmt 2 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1037, April 4, 1991; Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1600 gmt 5 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1040, April 8, 1991.

[195] See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.210.

[196] For the agreement, see: New York Times, April 30, 1991; Middle East International, May 3, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1061, May 2, 1991.

[197] See: New York Times, April 30, 1991.

[198] For Hizb'allah comments on closer Iranian-Syrian ties, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 27 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1058, April 29, 1991. Also see: Middle East International, August 16, 1991; In return for Hizb'allah's willingness to release hostages, Iran paid the movement US$ 86 million, see: Rolf Tophoven, "State-Supported Terrorism After The Gulf War: The Role of Iran, Iraq and Libya", 9th International Conference on "Democracy Challenged and Put To The Test - The Problem of Combatting Terrorism, Drugs and Organized Crime" (London: Hanns Seidel Foundation, August 1992): pp.226.

Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in May 1991,[199] Syria had a natural interest in securing a resolution to the foreign hostage problem, mainly in order to assure its role in the new regional order within the Arab-Israeli peace conferences as well as to attract Western economic relations and assistance.[200] In particular, this commitment was revealed by the unprecedented Syrian security moves in Beirut in search for a kidnapped French citizen, abducted by a dissident Hizb'allah faction after the initial release of an American and a British hostage in early August 1991.[201]

While Iran's vehement opposition, in concert with the Hizb'allah, to Syrian endorsement of the US-sponsored Middle East peace negotiations,[202] was manifest by a marked escalation in Hizb'allah attacks against Israel, Iranian interests in seeking a comprehensive resolution to the foreign hostage crisis was aligned to a carefully calibrated policy in the foreign policy arena. In an effort to achieve rapproachement with the West,[203] Iran's decision to involve the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, was not only chosen as the only available face-saving instrument for all parties involved in an overt process but also served to detract from both Iranian and Hizb'allah subversive activity elsewhere as well as to advance Iran's own position vis-á-vis Iraq in disputes over the terms of UN

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[199] See: Middle East International, May 31, 1991. For Hizb'allah's praise of the agreement between Syria and Lebanon, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0930 gmt 25 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1082, May 27, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 23 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1082, May 27, 1991.

[200] See: Middle East International, October 11, 1991; and Time, August 19, 1991.

[201] See: New York Times, August 8, 1991; New York Times, August 12, 1991; and Middle East International, August 16, 1991; and Guardian, August 10, 1991.

[202] See: Middle East International, July 26, 1991.

[203] See: The Times, August 13, 1991. For Iranian praise of Britain's handling of the hostage crisis, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0950 gmt 13 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1151, August 15, 1991.

Resolution 598.[204] While the involvement of the United Nations in the hostage negotiations provided the Hizb'allah with a useful shield, in the form of international attention, against unrestrained Israeli reprisals to the movement's resistance activity,[205] it also provided Iran with a diversion from its assassination campaign of political opponents abroad, as clearly evident by the killing of the Shah's last prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, in Paris which coincided with the initiation of the hostage release process in Lebanon.[206] Apart from also providing its proxy in Lebanon with tangible achievements, in the form of the exhange of Western hostages for Lebanese Shi'ites through pressure on Israel,[207] Iran involved not only the United Nations from its previous successful mediation in the Gulf war between Iran and Iraq but also, more importantly, as a measure to bolster its position with the UN Secretary-General regarding the findings of UN Resolution 598, in particular the question of responsibility for starting the Iran-Iraq war,

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[204] See: Middle East International, August 16, 1991; Independent, October 22, 1991; The Times, September 12, 1991; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0930 gmt 30 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1166, September 2, 1991; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1004 gmt 11 Sep 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1176, September 13, 1991; and The Echo of Iran, August/September 1991.

[205] For useful overview of Hizb'allah attacks both prior to and after the initiation of the hostage release process, see: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.198-9; and Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991.

[206] Around 1988, under the leadership of Ahmad Khomeini, an organisation was created with links to SAVAMA/VEVAK (the Vezarat-e Etela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar or the Ministry of Intelligence and Security) for the liquidation of political opponents abroad. After the Gulf war in 1991, Iran gave priority to the assassination of enemies to the Iranian regime, as evident by the killing of Abd al-Rahman Burumand, a close friend of Bakhtiar. For details of the Iranian assassination of Shapour Bakthiar, see: Ha'aretz, August 9, 1991; Le Figaro, October 4, 1991; L'Express, August 22, 1991; Le Quotidien de Paris, August 17-8, 1991; Middle East International, August 16, 1991; Le Figaro, September 3, 1991; Middle East International, September 27, 1991; Le Point, October 5, 1991; Financial Times, August 9, 1991; Newsweek, March 29, 1993; and Foreign Report, March 18, 1993.

[207] The text of a commentary entitled "Hostages: Message Received" by Hizb'allah radio provides an overview of the movement's own sense of achivement by holding hostages, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0550 gmt 16 Aug 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1153, August 17, 1991.

prior to his departure from the post at the end of 1991.[208] This became evident by the final report by the UN Secretary-General, on December 10, 1991, which found Iraq responsible for starting the Iran-Iraq war and made it legally responsible for claims by Iran for damages incurred during the eight-year war.[209]

Although Iran failed to achieve assurances from the American administration of non-retaliatory measures against the Hizb'allah once it relinquished all foreign hostages, acting on behalf of Hizb'allah's command leadership through the offices of the UN, Iran's consolidated strong influence over the movement became apparent after the Israeli assassination of Secretary-General Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi in February 1992.[210] In particular, this was revealed by Iranian exerted moves in the appointment of al-Musawi's successor and restraining Hizb'allah retaliatory measures against

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[208] Under UN Resolution 598 [paragraph 6], the UN Secretary-General had been asked to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into the responsibility for the Iran-Iraq war. When Giandomenico Picco, the UN Secretary-General's representative on the hostage issue, met with Iranian officials in Teheran, the issue of UN Resolution 598 was frequently discussed and it was clearly a high priority for Iran, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0930 gmt 30 Aug 91 - SWB ME/1166, September 2, 1991; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1445 gmt 12 Sep 91 - SWB ME/1177, September 14, 1991. For Iran's demands that UN Secretary-General must enforce resolutions against Iraq, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1004 gmt 11 Sep 91 - SWB/1176, September 13, 1991. Apart from Picco's involvement in the hostage negotiations, he had successfully mediated an end to the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. The Times, November 19, 1991. Iran attempted to exploit the linkage between these two issues before Perez dé Cuellar's term as Secretary-General expired at the end of 1991. Both Hizb'allah and Iran had distrust for the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, because of his close relationship with Egypt's Anwar Sadat and his involvement with the Camp David peace process. See: The Independent, December 20, 1991.

[209] See: Independent, December 11, 1991; and Washington Post, December 11, 1991. On January 1, 1992, the United Nations released a report which claimed Iran had suffered $97.2 billion in damages during the Iran-Iraq war and that it needed international assistance, see: Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1992. For the importance of Iranian financial claims against Iraq, see: Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, Iran and the Arab World, op.cit.: p.111.

[210] See: Independent, November 21, 1991; Ha'aretz, October 27, 1991; Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993; and Foreign Report, June 13, 1991.

Israel in southern Lebanon.[211] While Iran's greater control over the Hizb'allah was a reflection of the movement's readjustment within a post-civil war Lebanese environment, particularly by the movement's decision to participate in the parliamentary elections, it was equally clear that Syrian hegemony took precedence over any Iranian or Hizb'allah plans which would threaten Syria's designs within Lebanon and elsewhere in the region.[212]

4.5 Conclusion:

The comprehensive conclusion of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon revealed the common interests of Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria which converged from the advancement of their own individual agendas in Lebanon, in the region, and in relations with Western governments.[213] While monumental changes in the internal Lebanese and regional environment in the Middle East served to contribute to the complete dénouement of the hostage affair, in a manner conducive and expedient for all parties concerned, it also clearly underlined the nature and importance of the triangular Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria relationship in order to discern the influences and mechanisms exerted by Iran and Syria, both individually and collectively, over the process of abduction and releases of foreign hostages by the Hizb'allah. As demonstrated, this process was subject to the continuous changing relationship and alliance between Iran and Syria over a decade, itself subjected to either confluence or conflict in their own individual political and economic agendas in the Middle East affected by a wide variety of internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. Although the Iranian-Syrian alliance was born out of mutual tactical convenience to confront common enemies in the Middle East, cemented by Syrian

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[211] See: Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; and Foreign Report, May 20, 1993.

[212] See: A. Nizar Hamzeh, (1993), op.cit.: pp.321-37. Hizb'allah handed back the Sheikh Abdallah barracks, its single largest base, in July 1992, see: Independent, July 28, 1992.

[213] See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit.: Rolf Tophoven, (1992), op.cit.: pp.223-9.

economic dependence upon Iran in a hostile Arab environment, the relationship between Iran and Syria has experienced serious tension in conjunction with shifting political and economic conditions in the region. While the larger problems in the Iranian-Syrian nexus highlighted their contradictory political ideologies, they have also been superimposed on the ground in Lebanon over Hizb'allah activity. An understanding of the basis for the Iranian-Syrian alliance, and its subsequent evolution in Lebanon, is necessary not only in terms of examining the way in which the Iranian-Syrian relationship has affected the position and activity of the Hizb'allah in Lebanon but also in the provision of a useful framework for the application of crisis management principles and techniques by Western governments to the hostage-crisis, outlining opportunities and constraints in their application in accordance with tension and co-ordination in the alliance between Iran and Syria over Hizb'allah activity.

The status of the political and economic dimensions of the Iranian-Syrian alliance was closely mirrored in all aspects of Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon. While both Iran and Syria were adept at exploiting the relationship for their own benefit in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, the collusion between Iran and Syria remained uniform in Lebanon in the confrontation against common foreign enemies, coupled with the complete obedience by the Hizb'allah to Iranian orders. This was particularly evident in Syrian and Iranian rejection of the agreement of 17 May 1983 between Lebanon and Israel as well as by their close involvement with Hizb'allah's efforts to strike at the Western and Israeli military presence in Lebanon. After the departure of the MNF in 1984 and, more importantly, Israel in 1985 from Lebanon, the incompatibility of the aims of Iran, seeking to establish an Islamic republic on Iranian lines, and Syria, seeking to consolidate hegemony over Lebanese affairs, came to the surface through intense competition by their clients, Hizb'allah and Amal, over the hearts and minds of the Shi'ite community. The friction between Iranian and Syrian attempts to seek political and

military dominance in Lebanon, as manifest through armed clashes between Amal and Hizb'allah, intensified with an array of other difficulties in their relationship both internal and external to Lebanon. In particular, the underlying economic bond between Syria and Iran, especially Syrian dependence on Iranian oil supplies, experienced several rifts over Syrian refusals to settle outstanding debts over oil payments to Iran between 1986 to 1988 and over subsequent Syrian efforts to lessen its economic dependency on Iran through development of internal Syrian oil production. Although Syria proved adept at exploiting the economic difficulties with Iran to its own advantage, as it positioned itself as a bridge between a politically isolated Iran and the rest of the Arab world, other differences between the two regimes over Lebanon stemmed from incompatibility between Syrian attempts to consolidate its control over Lebanon while seeking a political and economic rapproachement with Western governments after accusations of Syrian involvement in terrorism, and Iranian exploitation of Hizb'allah abductions in the pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives and in the expansion of the movement at the expense of Amal. While both Syria and Iran had an interest in defusing any serious conflict in Lebanon in order to preserve their relationship, the pursuit by the Hizb'allah of a greater independent line from Iran, in the aftermath of Iranian clerical factionalism in late 1986, compounded the problems in any attempts to make the movement answerable to either Iran or Syria for both the control over and the limitation of its activities. Although Syria has avoided a complete crackdown on the Iranian proxy, whenever the Hizb'allah has seriously challenged Syrian authority, the Syrian regime has moved to exercise control over the activity of the Hizb'allah through a blockade of the transfer of Iranian Pasdaran in the Biq'a area and the control of movement of the Hizb'allah in the Biq'a and Beirut areas. However, Syrian restraint in the elimination of the military and political presence of the Hizb'allah was based on its nonexpendable relationship with Iran. Neither Syria nor Iran were willing to sacrifice their alliance on

account of any Hizb'allah activity, rather both regimes have been forced to excerise restraint in their relations with Hizb'allah at various times as to not offend each other. When Hizb'allah activity was harmful to the Iranian-Syrian alliance, as evident by Amal-Hizb'allah armed clashes and certain hostage-taking incidents, both Iran and Syria acted in concert to enforce agreements between their two proxies as well as to place limitations on the abduction of foreigners. While the former was revealed by the three enforced agreements between Amal and Hizb'allah by Iran and Syria (1988-1990), the latter became apparent by the Syrian-Iranian imposed cessation of any abductions by the movement after the January 1987 wave of kidnappings by the Hizb'allah. However, the Iranian-Syrian alliance experienced particular problems in conjunction with the projection of Iranian clerical factionalism onto the Hizb'allah command leadership in attempts by Iran and Syria to use extraction from the hostage-crisis as an instrument in the foreign policy arena.

The unequivocal support for the Hizb'allah from Iran and, to a lesser extent acceptance by Syria, changed concurrently with the changes in the Iranian leadership, following the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni, and with Syrian efforts to consolidate its control over a post civil-war Lebanon with the Ta'if agreement in 1989. While the defeat of the revolutionist faction in control over the political authority in Iran translated into diminished possibility for a radical leadership of the Hizb'allah to be able to confront Syrian efforts to establish political and military hegemony in Lebanon, it also became clear that Syrian designs within Lebanese territory took precedence over any official Iranian interests. Syrian concessions to Hizb'allah and Iran, in the form of allowing the movement to remain armed and for the continued presence of the Pasdaran contingent on Lebanese territory, meant not only that the movement was forced to submit to a reorientation in activity in alignment with Syrian interests in order to survive within Lebanon's post civil-war environment but also underlined the increasingly asymmetrical

nature of the Iranian-Syrian relationship both within and external to Lebanon.

The identification of the individual and the collective motivations as well as an understanding of the process of the triangular Hizb'allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship behind the abduction and the release of Western foreign citizens had profound significance in the application of crisis-management principles and techniques. Apart from deciphering the underlying motivations in incidents involving the abduction of foreigners by the movement, either for internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and Iranian interests, comprehension of the process of the changing interaction between Hizb'allah and the Iranian-Syrian relationship becomes necessary in order to determine not only the direction but also the timing of the application of certain crisis-management principles and techniques.

CHAPTER FIVE: WESTERN RESPONSES TO THE HOSTAGE-CRISIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

> "Government is about crisis management.
> Governments do not think."[1]

5.1 Introduction

The responses by the American, French, and British governments to the abduction of its citizens in Lebanon have underlined the inherent difficulty in striking a balance between their moral obligation towards providing safety and protection for their citizens abroad without having to sacrifice national interests in the conduct of foreign policy.[2] While all three states have pursued a firmly held and co-ordinated public position of no-negotiations with terrorists and no-concessions to their demands in the Lebanese hostage-crisis, the reality of actual conduct behind this facade has revealed not only the conduct of secret negotiations, either directly with the Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria or indirectly through third party intermediaries, over the release of hostages, at times resulting in complex and murky deals,[3] but also that the hostage-issue was intimately influenced by the conduct of foreign policies by these Western states in the Middle East.[4] Although the two Western European states and the United States have shared similar types of problems and challenges in efforts to manage and secure the extraction of its citizens from captivity in Lebanon, each individual state has pursued their

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[1] Sir John Nott, former Tory defence secretary, quoted in The Independent, May 16, 1994.

[2] See: Jeffrey Simon, (1987), op.cit.; New York Times, August 17, 1987; and Independent, August 11, 1989.

[3] See: Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, Guerres Secretes au Liban (Paris: Gallimard, 1987); Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), (1993), op.cit.; Nicholas Tenzer and Franck Magnard, (1987), op.cit.

[4] See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.72-90; and Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.

own overt and covert policies to accomplish this task.[5] Apart from their almost equal standing in Hizb'allah's anti-Western demonology,[6] largely due to their colonial past and present involvement in the Middle East,[7] the divergence of approach to the hostage-crisis reflected not only the individual experiences of these Western states in confronting terrorism within their own borders, but also the nature and status of their relationships with both Iran and Syria as well as their policies in the Middle East, driven by different sets of political motivations as well as economic considerations.[8] The differences from state to state in the frequency, time periods, and number of its citizens abducted by the Hizb'allah, coupled with the specific nature of demands, also contributed to the way in which the Western governments have crafted individual or concerted strategies to the problem of obtaining the release of their citizens from captivity.[9] As a consequence,

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[5] For a brief overview, see: Maskit Burgin Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.

[6] While the United States retained its position as the "big satan" according to Hizb'allah's official manifesto, the United Kingdom and France were considered "lesser satans", see: Nass al-risala al-maftuha allahti wajjaha hizb allah ila mustad áfin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of the Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World), February 16, 1985.

[7] See: Hussein Sirriyeh, (1989), op.cit.

[8] See: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.2-11; Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.90-106; Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.; and Con Coughlin, Hostage (London: Little, Brown, 1993).

[9] American citizens have been most frequently abducted by the Hizb'allah [total of 18 hostages] over extended and distinct time periods. Apart from a single abduction in 1982, five US citizens were kidnapped in 1984, most of which occured in the first six months. Another four US hostages were taken throughout 1985 and another three citizens were kidnapped in late-1986. In January 1987, abductions peaked with three more US hostages. Two other isolated abductions occured in mid-1987 and in early 1988. The abduction of French citizens has been more concentrated than other nationalities [total of 14 hostages]. Apart from a single abduction in 1984, five abductions occured in early 1985 and seven occured in early 1986. A single abduction occured in January 1987. While a total of 11 British hostages have been abducted by the Hizb'allah, only four have been held for an extensive period. Two of these were abducted in April 1986 and a single abduction occured in January 1987. The last abduction of a British citizen took place in May 1989. For a detailed overview, see: Appendix I.

any examination of the pendular responses by the United States and the two West European states to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon within the framework of crisis management must not only take into account the broader environment of Western foreign policy towards the region but also the specific dynamics of the triangular relationships between Hizb'allah and Iran as well as Syria as a key component in the application of successful crisis management. Apart from the evaluation of the performance of Western governments according to the previously outlined requirements for effective crisis management, these will also serve as the framework of this analysis. The underlying criteria for the "successful" application of crisis management is not only *close adherence to the seven essential requirements* of effective crisis management balanced against inherent constraints for Western governments in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy but also the *performance* of their approach in the hostage-crisis based on the previous case-study on the dynamics of the relationships at work between Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria.

5.2 Crisis management: The Limitation of Political Objectives

The responses by the United States and the two West European states to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon have been governed by a uniform policy of refusal to negotiate or make concessions to terrorists under any guise.[10] This policy of no-negotiations and no-concessions to terrorists has been emboddied in a series of unilateral or joint declarations of principles which reflects not only the previous experience of liberal democracies in countering terrorism at home, based on the principled position that hostage-taking constitutes an unforgivable act that must not be rewarded through concessions and that a readiness to negotiate as well as a willingness to concede to demands only encourages further terrorits acts, but also that state support for

[10] See: US News & World Report, December 8, 1986; Independent, May 7, 1990; Times, November 19, 1991; and International Herald Tribune, March 12, 1987. Also see: L. Paul Bremer III, "The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.255-62.

terrorism in any form constitutes unacceptable international behaviour subject to punishment.[11] While principles of US no-concessions policy have been unilaterally proclaimed by policymakers on countless occasions in response to new hostage-takings of American citizens, as outlined by public policy statements and documents,[12] the European states have adopted not only unilateral policies in alignment with the uniform principles of no-concessions but also a concerted European approach to the hostage-problem, as evident by their solemn promise to make "no concessions under duress to terrorists or their sponsors" at the 1986 EC summit in London.[13] The inconsistency between the declaratory policy of not negotiating or conceeding to any demands and the actual conduct by Western governments in dealing with the hostage-crisis in Lebanon can be attributed to the often incompatible nature of firmly held counterterrorism principles as an integral component of foreign policy in the Middle East towards Iran and Syria, who exercise any degree of control over the Hizb'allah movement.[14] Despite the fact that both Iran and Syria have concealed the exact nature of their close relationship with the Hizb'allah, the recognition of Iran and Syria as intermediaries for Western governments in dealing with the Hizb'allah posed problems in upholding a non-flexible no-concessions policy as these states benefitted indirectly from concessions made to influence the movement despite their own complicity in some of the

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[11] See: Paul Wilkinson, (1986), op.cit.; and Independent, May 7, 1990.

[12] For a concise outline of US policy, see: Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (Washington, DC.: USGP, February 1986); and US Department of State, International Terrorism: U.S. Policy on Taking Americans Hostage (Washington, DC.: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1986).

[13] See: Gilbert Guillaume, "France and the Fight Against Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): p.134.

[14] See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.65-75.

movement's terrorist acts.[15] While most Iranian or Syrian demands of concessions for any intercession with Hizb'allah centered on specific outstanding disputes or a shift in foreign policy behaviour by Western governments towards these states,[16] the issue of any deviation from the principles of a no-concessions policy became dependent on the conduct of conciliatory foreign policy by Western states towards either Iran or Syria in alignment with shifts in the regional environment creating opportunities and constraints in the pursuit of wider foreign policy interests.[17] Any perceived breach of the no-negotiations and no-concessions policies must be related to the desire by Western governments to extract its citizens from captivity, heavily influenced by domestic political pressures, and its unwillingness to maintain a non-conciliatory position at the expense of the pursuit of wider foreign policy opportunities in the region.[18] As such, the shifts in the elevation of the political objective to secure the release of hostages must not only be related to the importance of the hostage-issue on the political agenda at home and its impact on the conduct of foreign policy but also in alignment with changes in the Middle East regional environment which determines whether Western governments can afford to discard other foreign policy interests with Iran and Syria over principles of counterterrorism.[19] In turn,

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[15] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.; and Conor Gearty, Terror (London: Faber and Faber, 1991): pp.73-96.

[16] For a broad overview of demands, see: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: p.2

[17] See: Eric Hooglund, "The Policy of the Reagan Administration toward Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: p.180-200; and R.K. Ramazani, (1986), op.cit.

[18] See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.307-40.

[19] See: Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizballah, Occasional Papers no.101 (Tel Aviv University: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, August 1987); Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundementalism (London: Paladin, 1989); and Xavier Raufer, (1987), op.cit.

this evaluation must also be based within the context of the opportunities and constraints in the environment which governs the relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran as well as Syria in order to evaluate the effectiveness of policy initiatives on efforts to secure the release of hostages.[20]

The importance of the hostage-issue on the domestic political agenda and in the conduct of foreign policy has varied between Western states and over specific time periods. This has been subject to the legacy of previous national experience and success of countering internal political violence as well as state-sponsored international terrorism with Middle Eastern origin as well as to the public perception of the adversary and the fate of the hostages as projected through political pressure on decision-makers to act or abstain from any action for the resolution of the hostage-crisis. While the relative absence of Middle East terrorism on American soil has reflected the great impact of the Lebanese hostage-crisis on the US domestic and foreign policy agendas,[21] the calmer treatment of the hostage-crisis by West European public opinion was not only a reflection of past occurences and treatment of indigenous and international terrorism within their borders but also to awareness of the necessity for a more restrained response by their governments to the hostage-crisis in light of the fear of retribution to any over-reactions given the geographical proximity of the Middle East as well as to careful consideration of any responses in view of their effectiveness and potential consequences for the conduct of overall foreign policy

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[20] For a useful example, see: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit.: pp.171-88.

[21] See: David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York, NY.: Harper & Row, 1988); and Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell Arnold (eds.) Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1986).

towards the region.[22]

Apart from the impact of the previous hostage-crisis in Iran which resulted in paralysis of the Carter administration for 444-days, the issue of American hostages in Lebanon was elevated on the US domestic and foreign policy agenda against the backdrop of both the Hizb'allah suicide-attack on the US Marine barracks in October 1983, which inflicted the single worst number of casualties for the US military since the Vietnam war,[23] and exacerbated by the media spectacle surrounding the TWA-hijacking in June 1985.[24] The multiple abduction of four American citizens in early 1984 highlighted not only the impotence of any US efforts to confront the threat of Islamic militancy but also was elevated as a major national security issue as one of the hostages was the CIA station-chief in Beirut, William Buckley.[25] While the media exacerbated the pressure on the Reagan administration to act with resolve to secure the release of all American hostages, as manifest through the modification of US counterterrorism policy in April 1984 through National Security Directive (NSDD) 138 authorizing pre-emptive strikes and reprisal

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[22] For a useful comparison, see: Stanley S. Bedlington, Combatting International Terrorism: U.S.-Allied Cooperation and Political Will (Washington, DC.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, November 1986): pp.34-7. Also see: Ghassan Salamé, "Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era", Middle East Journal, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994): pp.237-40.

[23] See: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: pp.119-120; and Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit.: pp.522-3.

[24] See: Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in the Modern World (Medina, OH.: Alpha Publications, 1990): pp.125-7; and Sunday Times, June 39, 1985.

[25] For Buckley's position as CIA station chief, see: Washington Post, November 25, 1986. While the Hizb'allah announced it had executed Buckley in response to Israel's attack on PLO headquarter in Tunis on October 5, 1985, evidence would suggest that he died from illness on June 3, 1985, see: International Herald Tribune, March 3, 1987. In January 1987, US State Department confirmed the death of Buckley, see: Ma'aretz, January 22, 1987.

raids against terrorists abroad,[26] the US government assigned extraordinary priority to extract William Buckley from captivity as evident from the influence of his case for the initiation of the secret efforts pursued through contacts within Iran's clerical establishment which later culminated in the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages scandal.[27] However, the issue of the US hostages was successfully downplayed by the Reagan administration in the 1984 presidential election campaign.[28] Although the US government resisted pressure from the individual campaigns by hostage's families in the media, even with the addition of more abductions of American citizens in early 1985,[29] it was forced to response to the June 1985 TWA-hijacking which not only highlighted the inaction of efforts on behalf of the US hostages in Lebanon but also marked the beginning of a clandestine policy shift towards a willingness to negotiate with Iranian clergy in a wider effort to improve its relationship with a post-Khomayyni Iran.[30] As the increased pressure from hostage's families exacerbated the problems for the Reagan administration to secure the release of US captives, especially as the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals failed to yield the return of hostages as others were captured to replace those released,[31] the revelation of the affair in November 1986 undermined

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[26] See: Washington Post, April 18, 1984; Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1985; New York Times, June 6, 1984; and Wall Street Journal, March 12, 1984.

[27] See: al-Qabas, March 28, 1985; and Time, August 14, 1989. Also see: Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit.

[28] See: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking of the President 1984-88 (Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).

[29] See: International Herald Tribune, August 1, 1985; and International Herald Tribune, November 15, 1985.

[30] See: Scott Armstrong, Malcolm Byrne, and Tom Blanton, (1987), op.cit.; and Peter Kornblum and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), (1993), op.cit.

[31] See: David Jacobsen, My Life As a Hostage: The Nightmare in Beirut (New York, NY.: S.P.I Books, 1993); and Michael Leeden, Perilious Statecraft (New York, NY.: Macmillan, 1988).

not only the political credibility of the Reagan presidency and its hardline posture against international terrorism at home and with its allies abroad, but also the total viability of any efforts to secure the release of hostages as it was relegated to a more sub-ordinate position in relation to efforts by the Reagan administration to survive politically.[32] The *de facto* departure from US publicly stated policy led not only to the most serious domestic challenge and political turmoil facing the Reagan presidency for its continued survival but also created confusion and anger among its European allies, which had received repeated US pleas not to negotiate with terrorists and not to breach a US sponsored worldwide arms embargo on Iran.[33] Apart from raising questions about US credibility abroad, the coherence of its foreign policy and the management of its intelligence operations,[34] the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals also created serious tensions in American relations with more moderate Arab states.[35] As a consequence, the hostage-issue was effectively abandoned for the remainder of the Reagan administration's tenure in office and confined to token shows of military force against the movement with the spate of abductions of US citizens in

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[32] See: Ben Bradlee Jr., Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North (New York, NY.: Donald I. Fine, 1988); Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit.; and Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters - US Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit, Vol.I-III (1994).

[33] For domestic crisis of confidence in the Reagan presidency, see: New York Times, November 11, 1986; and New York Times, November 19, 1986. For European criticism, see: Dilip Hiro, (1989), op.cit.

[34] See: Bahman Baktiari, "American Foreign Policy and the Iran-Contra Hearings", Comparative Strategy, Vol.7 (1988): pp.427-38; and Congressional Quarterly, The Iran-Contra Puzzle (Washington, DC.: Congressional Quarterly, 1987).

[35] For the implications of the Iran-Contra affair on US relations with Arab states, see: Joseph A. Kechichian, "The Impact of American Policies on Iranian-Arab Relations", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.136-7; Samuel Segev, (1988), op.cit.: pp.27-8; and Eric Hooglund, "The United States and Iran", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: p.42.

January 1987 despite continued pressure from the hostage's families and the media.[36]

The ascendancy of Bush to the US presidency inherited the previous legacy of political constraints to enter into negotiations that would resemble any deal-making. While the Bush administration showed a more conciliatory attitude towards Iran in the aftermath of Ayatollah Khumayyni's death, it downplayed the hostage-issue in order to advance its wider foreign policy objectives in the region in the vacuum created by the end of the Iran-Iraq war.[37] Although the kidnapping of Lt.Col. William Higgins became the first test for the Bush presidency, the response was confined to the show of military force as the hostage-issue became increasingly more dependent on the shifting political environment of the Middle East and elsewhere than to any concerted effort to secure their release in response to media and public campaign pressures.[38] The devaluation of the hostage-issue in the foreign policy agenda reduced the political vulnerability of the Bush administration as it adjusted to the Middle East environment during and after the Gulf-war of 1990/91.[39] Any pressure to act for the release of the US hostages diminished completely as an issue with the UN involvement which resulted in the comprehensive denounement of the hostage-crisis by December 1992.[40]

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[36] See: Newsweek, May 18, 1987.

[37] See: Eric Hooglund, "The United States and Iran, 1981-9", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: p.45; Guardian, April 24, 1990; Time, August 14, 1989; Independent, April 23, 1990; Time, August 19, 1991; and Independent, May 7, 1990.

[38] See: Independent, August 5, 1989; Independent, August 4, 1989; and Observer, December 8, 1991.

[39] See: Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.94-125.

[40] See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit.: pp.33-6; and Maskit Burgin, "Western Hostages and Israeli POWs in Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.) The Middle East Balance 1990-1991 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992).

The high-priority assigned by two successive Republican administrations to secure the release of its citizens in Lebanon was symptomatic not only of a desire to limit the effects of hostage-taking on the US presidency, as epitomized by the downfall of President Carter over the Iranian hostage-crisis,[41] but was also the result from an overexpectation of US ability to achieve the rapid release of its citizens through reliance on coercion without any special consideration for the constraints and opportunities of the political environment in the Middle East which was regulated by its conduct of foreign policy in the region, specifically US policy towards Iran and Syria, and governed by the dynamics of Iran's and Syria's ability to intervene with the Hizb'allah as well as their willingness to intervene in return for tangible rewards.[42] Apart from the strong influence of the media and pressure groups on US policy towards the hostage-crisis, the discrepancy between raised public expectations of the ability by the government to resolve the hostage-incidents rapidly and effectively, created partly by US official hardline policies, and the actual reality of the extremely limited maneuverability of the US government, given the constraints, and by the failure to pursue a consistent and coherent Middle East policy and by the political consequences of the disastrous US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals, contributed to the failure of any success in the achievement of US political objectives.[43] These problems were exacerbated by the US approach to link the hostage-issue as a precondition for wider normalization of its relationship with Iran while it pursued a policy of containment towards Iran and without

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[41] For a useful analysis of the impact of the crisis on Carter's presidency, see: Gary Sick, (1985), op.cit.; and Gary Sick, (1991), op.cit.

[42] See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: pp.254-6; and Independent, August 5, 1989.

[43] See: Grant Wardlaw, "Terror As An Instrument of Foreign Policy", in David C. Rapoport (ed.) Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 1988): p.242.

consideration for Iran's actual ability to coerce the Hizb'allah to release its hostages, compounded by an unwillingness to make any concessions of a substantial nature in return."

The issue of the French hostages assumed a highly elevated position on the domestic and foreign policy agenda as evident by its exploitation by political parties in the 1986/1988 national elections as well as by its integral role in the conduct of foreign policy towards the region and specifically with Iran and Syria." Although the abduction of a number of French journalists, most notably Jean-Paul Kauffman in May 1985 and four TV crew-members of Antenne-2 in March 1986, increased the pressure on the French government to act on behalf of the hostages as their fate was highlighted by a highly visible campaign "in the media," it was exacerbated by the Hizb'allah bomb campaign in Paris which occured in conjunction with the March 1986 French national elections." While the hostage-issue was used as an instrument in the election campaign by the respective presidential candidates to discredit the opponent in efforts to obstruct or secure the release of the

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" For the overall failure of US policy, see: James A. Bill, "The US Overture to Iran, 1985-1986", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.176-7. Also see: Con Coughlin, (1993), op.cit.; and Counter-Terrorism in the 1990's, US State Department, January 1990.

" See: Maskit Burgin, "Shi'ite International Terrorism", in Anat Kurz et.al. Inter 1989 (Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989): pp.46-7; and Luc Chavin, "French Diplomacy and The French Hostage Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.91-106.

" See: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.; and Roger Auque, (1988), op.cit. Inspired by the American news coverage of the 444-day captivity of US hostages in Iran, the French TV channel, Antenne-2, broadcasted daily the pictures of the French hostages and the number of days they had been held by kidnappers, see: New York Times, September 20, 1987.

" See: Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988; al-Nahar, March 26, 1986; al-Mustaqbal, March 23, 1986; The Economist, March 15, 1986; International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; Le Monde, July 15, 1986; and Le Monde, September 7-8, 1986. For a useful overview of French arms sales, see: Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987. There was initial confusion about who was responsible for this bombing campaign, see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: pp.100-3.

hostages prior to the dual elections in France for the presidency and the National Assembly,[48] the French hostages assumed increasing importance after the elections with the rivalry between President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac within the French cohabitation government.[49] This political rivalry was apparent by the employment of various emissaries in individual efforts to secure the release of hostages.[50]

The French hostage-issue was also symptomatic of its conduct of foreign policy in the Middle East, most notably in relation to its close support for Iraq and in any outstanding disputes with Iran.[51] As a major issue in the conduct of French foreign policy in the Middle East, the importance of the hostage-crisis was clearly evident in the decision of the Chirac government to abandon its traditional support and close co-operation with Iraq, crafted by his socialist predecessors, in favour of improved relations with Iran, most notably in order to limit the impact of French public fears of Iran as a major threat.[52] It was also revealed by the reluctance of the French government to impose any sanctions on Syria and Iran despite appeals from

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[48] See: Liberation, May 7-8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1986; Times, March 20, 1986; and Le Figaro, March 7, 1986. During the election campaign, Chirac condemned President Mitterrand's Socialist government for turning France into a "weakened and worried" nation. While Mitterrand's hostage-negotiation efforts failed, conservative candidates indicated that they would adopt a stronger and tougher attitude towards dealing with terrorism, see: Time, March 24, 1986; and Time, March 24, 1986.

[49] See: Independent, November 8, 1989; Le Nouvel Observateur, May 6-12, 1988; Le Nouvel Observateur, May 13-19, 1988; Sunday Times, June 8, 1986; and Time, June 30, 1986.

[50] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.28-9; al-Qabas, April 28, 1988; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Times, May 6, 1988.

[51] See: Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988; International Herald Tribune, August 3, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988; and Jerusalem Post, November 30, 1988.

[52] See: L'Express, February 23, 1987; and Independent, November 8, 1989. Also see: Fred Halliday, "An Elusive Normalization: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution", Middle East Journal, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994): p.313.

its European allies and the United States.[53] As French policy towards Iran vacilliated between accomodation and confrontation in response to the conflicting positions of various political representatives with different institutional responsibility and approach to the hostage-affair,[54] its impact on the French political climate was also evident by the exploitation of the hostage-issue in the build-up to the French presidential elections in May 1988.[55] This was particularly demonstrated by Chirac's last-minute attempt to boost his chances of electoral victory, trailing in the French presidential race, by interrupting a campaign speech in Strasbourg on May 4, 1988, announcing his government achieved the dramatic double releases of French hostages in Beirut and New Caledonia.[56]

The elevated importance of the French hostage-issue on the political agenda has been largely the result of the rivalry between Chirac and Mitterrand for political expediency in the battle for the presidency as well as by Iranian willingness to exact punishment on French soil for its support to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.[57] This institutional rivalry between French

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[53] See: New York Times, October 30, 1986.

[54] See: Washington Post, July 11, 1987; Independent, November 8, 1989; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987.

[55] See: Newsweek, May 16, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988; Washington Post, May 5, 1988; Time, December 14, 1987; and Liberation, May 7-8, 1988. As stated by Interior Minister Pasqua: "[w]e did what we had to do. The hostages are free. We're happy. That's all", see: Time, May 16, 1988.

[56] See: Newsweek, May 16, 1988; Le Monde, May 5-11, 1988; Times, May 5, 1988; Economist, June 11, 1988; Sunday Times, May 8, 1988; and Time, May 16, 1988. As aptly observed by Berry: "[t]he French press has focused quite heavily on this issue, and not without justification. Only a few days before the election, it seemed possible that the hostage release would give Chirac the boost he needed to defeat Francois Mitterrand...[t]he French were initially jubilant, and Chirac happily accepted public plaudits. But uneasiness about the terms of the release soon turned into a political liability", see: Steve M. Berry, (1989), op.cit.: p.22.

[57] For rivalry, see: Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; Yediot Aharanot, May5, 1988; Observer, December 6, 1987; and Le Figaro, November 4, 1988. For French support to Iraq, see: José Garcon, "La France et le Conflit Iran-Irak", Politique Etrangere, Vol.2 (1987); Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.; and Dilip Hiro, (1990), op.cit.

political factions as manifest through the exploitation of the hostage-issue for their own political advantages made any hostage release dependent not only on the ability of different political emissaries to exert their influence over the kidnappers and its patrons through offers of concessions but also on the nature of their political agendas as to whether any release would occur in return for concessions either before or after French national elections.[58] Apart from the dependence of the political objective to secure the release of hostages on French institutional and political rivalry, the hostage-issue was assisted by the subordination of the French judiciary to political authorities in alignment with the traditional sanctuary doctrine and by the unique French approach to Middle East politics and to international terrorism with a proven ability to resist outside pressures from allies while the only serious challenge to any action came from media pressures.[59]

The issue of the British hostages was never of any higher priority for the British government: they were effectively abandoned to their own fate bound by the constraints in the Middle East environment, by the official refusal to either conduct any negotiations with Hizb'allah or its patrons and to concede to any demands.[60] While this hardline position was acceptable to most strands within the government and in the public arena, it was symptomatic of the British experience with, and tough attitudes towards, terrorism on its own soil by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) over the last

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[58] See: Steve M. Berry, "The Release of France's Last Hostages in Lebanon: An Analysis", TVI Report, op.cit.: pp.19-22; and Independent, November 8, 1989.

[59] See: Luc Chauvin, "French Diplomacy and The Hostage Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.91-104; and Nicholas Tenzer and Franck Magnard, (1987), op.cit.

[60] See: Times, November 19, 1991; Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990; Independent, May 7, 1990; and Independent, August 11, 1989,

two decades.[61] The hostages in Lebanon also received low-priority as an issue not only because of Britain's limited involvement in Middle East politics but also as the government operated without any real pressure from either the media or hostage's families, the latter urged by government officials to remain silent to allow progress through quiet diplomacy.[62]

The abandonment of silence with the formation of "Friends of John McCarthy" in January 1988, with no progress in achieving any releases through an official policy of quiet diplomacy, contributed to some public pressure on the British government, most notably after the release of the remaining French hostages in May 1988.[63] While this visible and public media campaign kept the issue of the hostages in the public domain, and highlighted what it claimed to be the inadequacy of any official efforts to extract its citizens from captivity, it failed to yield substantial pressure for a re-evaluation of its hostage-policy as the British government, under the helm of Mrs Thatcher, refused to seek rapproachment with either Iran or Syria.[64] As a consequence, the low-priority assigned to secure the release of hostages by the British government, coupled with its refusal to negotiate with intermediaries connected with the Hizb'allah, was consistently applied until the

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[61] For an overview, see: David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.171-205; and Paul Wilkinson (ed.) British Perspectives on Terrorism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

[62] See: Independent, August 9, 1991; Independent, August 25, 1991; and Independent, August 11, 1991. Also see: John Dickie, Inside The Foreign Office (London: Chapmans, 1992).

[63] See: John McCarthy and Jill Morell, Over Some Other Rainbow (London: Crown, 1993); Jackie and Sunni Mann, (1992), op.cit.; Times, June 17, 1987; Times, June 16, 1988; and Terry Waite, op.cit., 1993); and Brian Keenan, An Evil Cradling (London: Vintage, 1993). After the release of the French hostages in May 1988, the French hostage, Jean-Paul Kaufmann critized openly the US and British government policy by stating in interviews: "I don't understand the American and the British. The hostages must be rescued as soon as possible. The theory that keeping quiet about hostages will speed their release is sterile, even grotesque", see: Time, May 23, 1988. Also see: Sunday Times, May 22, 1988.

[64] See: John Dickie, (1992), op.cit.: pp.302-3; Times, December 9, 1987; and Times, May 6, 1988.

ascendancy of Douglas Hurd to the post of Foreign Secretary and, ultimately, with the resignation of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1990.[65] While the change from Howe to Hurd as Foreign Secretary was significant in the new approach to British relations in the Middle East, it was due more to the opportunities created by a changed Middle East environment in 1990-91 than to any change of ministerial office-holders. Although the new leadership under PM John Major devalued the hostage-issue, it accelerated the necessary process of reconciliation and rapproachment with Iran and Syria in the changed Middle East environment with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which created a window of opportunity for the resolution of the British hostage-crisis. As in the case of American hostages, any pressure on the British government to act on behalf of its citizens in captivity disappeared with the UN involvement providing a comprehensive resolution to the hostage-crisis in 1991.[66]

The complete devaluation of the British hostage-crisis by its government was a reflection not only of previous national experience in effectively countering terrorism at home and abroad which reinforced the public acceptability of the no-negotiations and no-concessions policy, embodied by the hardline policies under Mrs Thatcher,[67] but also of the tacit acceptance by the British government that the fate of the hostages could only be affected by its ability to offer concessions, as evident by the nature of demands, in order to compensate for its reduced influence in the Middle East.[68] Although

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[65] See: Independent, August 9, 1990; Times, November 19, 1991; Independent, August 9, 1991; and Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991.

[66] See: Independent, December 6, 1991; Independent, November 19, 1991; and Observer, November 24, 1991.

[67] See: New York Times, November 24, 1985; Washington Post, December 17, 1985; Independent, August 11, 1989; and Ha'aretz, February 1, 1987. Also see: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds), (1993), op.cit.: pp.89-90.

[68] See: Economist, June 11, 1988.

the British government upheld its publicly stated principles of counter-terrorism successfully without entering into any deal-making, it achieved this at the expense of prolonging the confinement of the hostages without any major benefits in the foreign policy arena.[69] However, this can be attributed to the fact that Britain faced unforeseen insuperable obstacles beyond it's power to control, most notably the row with the US government over the Iran-Contra debacle and the consequences of the Rushdie-affair. As a consequence, any criticism for the lack of progress in the release of British hostages must not only account for the approach of British policy but also, more importantly, the constraints imposed by the political environment in the Middle East, creating obstacles for any British government efforts.

5.3 Crisis Management: Limitation of Means in Pursuit of Political Objectives

The use of the military option by Western governments has been confined to efforts to either punish the Hizb'allah for previous terrorist actions through retaliatory strikes, as a deterrent to prevent the execution of hostages through demonstration of military power or in attempts to rescue hostages from captivity.[70] While both the United States and France have used military actions against known Hizb'allah bases in the Biq'a area as punishment for the October 1983 twin suicide attacks against their MNF contingents, these actions have revealed the major weakness of applying military force as an instrument to extract retribution for terrorist acts in a manner which would seriously undermine the operational activity of the movement.[71] This

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[69] See: Independent, May 7, 1990; Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990; and Independent, August 11, 1989.

[70] For the major types of military operations, see: Brian Jenkins, Combatting Terrorism Becomes War (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1984): p.4. Also see: Rex A. Hudson, "Dealing with International Hostage-Taking: Alternatives to Reactive Counterterrorist Assaults", Terrorism, Vol.12, No.5 (1989); and Lawrence H. Garrett, "Terrorism and the Use of Military Force", Defense 87 (May-June 1987): pp.26-32.

[71] For difficulty in affecting or penetrating the operational activity of Hizb'allah, see: Times, October 5, 1984; Ha'aretz, November 3, 1986; Da'var, January 11, 1987; Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); Newsweek, February 27, 1989; and Martin Kramer, (1988), op.cit.: pp.39-59.

was demonstrated by the failure of the French raid against an Hizb'allah training camp, the Sheikh Abdallah barracks, south of Ba'albek on November 17, 1983,[72] and the shelling by American naval aircrafts against Syrian and Hizb'allah positions in the Biq'a area in December 1983.[73] The identification of the Sheikh Abdallah barracks as a main center for co-ordination between Hizb'allah and Iranian Pasdaran was accurate, but a major failure for these military operations stemmed from the inherent difficulties in the conduct of military actions within an extremely hostile civil-war environment.[74] Apart from the lack of precise intelligence on the location of Hizb'allah command centers, this was compounded by the need to employ only limited levels of military violence against the movement in order to avoid a wider confrontation with Syria in and over Lebanon.[75] The utility of using retaliatory military actions against the Hizb'allah had diminished in conjunction with extreme measure of operational secrecy adopted by the Hizb'allah, the nature of the organisational structure of the Hizb'allah, and, more importantly, with the abduction of foreigners by the movement, held at several different locations as a shield against military retribution by Western

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[72] For details of this operation, see: Annie Laurent and Antione Basbous, (1987), op.cit.: pp.299-304. Also see: Pierre Marion, La Mission Impossible (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991): p.233.

[73] For a detailed account, see: David C. Martin and John Walcott, op.cit.: pp.133-44.

[74] See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; International Herald Tribune, January 10, 1984; al-Dustur, November 6, 1989; Time, August 14, 1989; Independent, July 28, 1992; and al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987. According to Reagan: "I wholeheartedly agree with the Long Commission's finding that the military is not adequately equipped to fight state-sponsored terrorists. The US needs to systematically redevelop our approach to the problem", see: New York Times, February 9, 1984.

[75] For the difficulties in the collection of intelligence on Hizb'allah targets, see: New York Times, August 6, 1989; Ma'aretz, February 2, 1987; Newsweek, February 27, 1989; and Foreign Report, March 8, 1990.

governments.[76] Although Israel was successful in the abduction of senior Hizb'allah leaders and members in southern Lebanon in December 1988 and in July 1989 and in the assassination of its Secretary-General in February 1992, the increased militancy of the Hizb'allah in response to these IDF operations demonstrated not only that the military approach failed to yield any of the underlying political objectives but also that it contributed to a spiral of escalation.[77] Infact, uncoordinated military action against any Hizb'allah base or member, especially through a third state, may have severe adverse consequences for the fate of Western hostages, as revealed by the murder of Lt.Col. William Higgins following the IDF kidnapping of Sheikh Obeid in southern Lebanon.[78] The case of the assassination of Sheikh Raghib Harb in February 1984 demonstrated early that the death of any Hizb'allah leader exacerbates the Shi'ite sense of martyrdom and the willingness by Hizb'allah fighters to sacrifice their own lives in the struggle against Israel and the

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[76] For example, PLO's Salah Khalef stated that Hizb'allah maintained the foreign hostages as insurance against retaliation by the US, Syria or any other force, see: Washington Post, February 21, 1987. Also see: Independent, October 22, 1991; and Independent, December 1, 1991.

[77] According to Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi: "America should think a million times before carrying out any foolish action: There will be no limits whatsoever to our reprisals", see: Independent, August 3, 1989. See: Independent, June 15, 1992; Yediot Aharanot, July 30, 1989; New York Times, August 1, 1989; Times, August 29, 1986; Washington Post, July 31, 1989; and New York Times, July 31, 1989. For Hizb'allah warning of retribution against the US, see: Independent, November 21, 1991. Also see: Dilip Hiro, (1988), op.cit.: pp.224-5. The IDF assassination of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi led to the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina the following month, see: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992; and Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992.

[78] See: New York Times, August 3, 1989; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, August 4, 1989; Washington Post, August 8, 1989; and Washington Post, August 3, 1989. In response to the murder of Lt.Col. William Higgins, US officials revealed military plans to attack Hizb'allah strongholds had another US hostage been killed, see: New York Times, August 4, 1989.

West.[79] The extreme operational security adopted by Hizb'allah SSA members and its institutional position within the organisational structure of the movement, coupled with the decentralized nature of Hizb'allah's command leadership, have contributed to the difficulty in the selection of available targets as well as the limited effectiveness of military strikes against individual leaders or command centers to undermine the actual operations of the movement.[80] This was clearly demonstrated by the IDF assassination of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, which strengthened the radicalism of Hizb'allah's command leadership and contributed to increased operational security of the Islamic Resistance, its military wing, in the conduct of anti-Israeli attacks, and in due course led to the major bombing attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.[81]

Apart from the failed retaliatory response to the twin-suicide attacks against the American and French MNF contingents in 1983, the reluctance by Western governments to use military force in retribution has not only been based on inadequate access to good intelligence on the location of Hizb'allah leaders and command centers but also closely linked to the political restraints of avoiding any military involvement in a civil war environment at the expense of their political agenda towards Lebanon and Syria as well as Iran.[82] As a consequence, the emphasis by the American administration

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[79] See: Times, February 2, 1984; Politique International, April 1984; Liberation, March 19, 1985; al-Nahar, October 5, 1984; and Liberation, September 26, 1985. The absence of Hizb'allah leaders through kidnappings or deaths are more valuable for the movement than living leaders. This was discussed in an interview with Dr Martin Kramer, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 1991.

[80] For example, the abduction of Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid failed to reduce any of the movement's military activity against Israel. For Hizb'allah attempts to devalue the importance of Sheikh Obeid for the movement, see: New York Times, August 6, 1989.

[81] See: Independent, February 18, 1992; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993; and Foreign Report, April 30, 1992. Also see: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992; and AFP, March 19, 1992.

[82] See: Time, August 14, 1989; and David C. Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit.

on the use of military means to preempt and counter terrorism, embodied by U.S. National Security Directive 138,[83] was not only ill-suited to the actual environment of the hostage-takings in Lebanon and to the actual military as well as intelligence capabilities in support for such operations but also served to erode the credibility of the Reagan administration in conjunction with unfulfilled threats of US military actions against the kidnappers despite continuous hostage-taking acts of American citizens by the Hizb'allah.[84]

The demonstration of military force as a deterrent measure to the abduction of foreigners was only used by the United States in response to the multiple kidnappings of American citizens in January 1987 and in response to threats against the lives of hostages after Israel's kidnapping of Sheikh Obeid in July 1989.[85] While the United States signalled a military threat to the Hizb'allah in 1987, through the position of the Sixth Fleet off the Lebanese coastline, it led to a serious escalation of the hostage-crisis whereby the movement threatened the execution of Western hostages in the event of the employment of American military force in Lebanon.[86] Unwillingness to use the show of military force against unknown targets and for unknown political objectives again undermined the credibility of the American administration and its overall response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.[87]

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[83] See: Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, US Strategy, and Reagan Policies (London: Mansell Publishers, 1987); George Bush, "Prelude to Retaliation: Building a Governmental Consensus on Terrorism", SAIS Review, (Winter-Spring 1987): pp.1-9; and New York Times, April 24, 1986.

[84] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.

[85] See: Middle East International, August 25, 1989; and Times, February 2, 1987.

[86] See: Washington Post, January 30, 1987; Wall Street Journal, February 5, 1987; and Washington Post, February 5, 1987.

[87] See: Time, December 16, 1991; Independent, August 3, 1989; Independent, August 5, 1989; In contrast, any French fleet presence in the area has been coupled with assurances to the Muslim community that they had no plans to intervene militarily in Lebanon, see: New York Times, August 22, 1989.

Although US officials claimed that its show of military force against the Hizb'allah in 1989 actually prevented the execution of American hostages, its main effectiveness must be placed within the context of an overall reluctance by the movement to execute its hostages,[88] and can be attributed to veiled threats of using US military force against Iran in order to control the movement's actions in Lebanon.[89] However, the effectiveness of use of military force against Iran to prevent the execution of foreign hostages in Lebanon is questionable as Hizb'allah's murder of Lt.Col. Higgins alledgedly occured from orders issued by Iranian radicals, most notably Mohtashemi, in an effort to derail any improvement in the US-Iranian relationship.[90]

The use of military rescue operations by the Western governments for the release of foreigners have also suffered from the constraints of the complex civil war environment in Lebanon.[91] A major problem for Western intelligence agencies was the identification of the exact locations where the hostages were being held, compounded by the fact that many hostages were dispersed in the three regional areas of Lebanon and continously moved by the Hizb'allah

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[88] Although it was reported that Bush had ordered the aircraft carrier Coral Sea to launch strikes against Hizb'allah strongholds in Ba'albek if any hostages were executed, other reports claim there were no definite plans to use military force, see: New York Times, August 3, 1989; International Herald Tribune, August 6, 1989; and Washington Post, August 6, 1989. For low ratio between threats and actual executions by Hizb'allah, see: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.14-17.

[89] For US threats against Iran, see: FBIS, August 7, 1989; Independent, August 5, 1989; Independent, August 7, 1989; and New York Times, August 5, 1989.

[90] See: New York Times, August 2, 1989; and Independent, August 3, 1989. Although Iran's Rafsanjani cannot control the exact activity of the Hizb'allah, the absence of further executions of foreign hostages can be attributed to Iranian threats to cut financial and military assistance if the movement took any actions without prior consultation from Iran, see: Independent, August 5, 1989; and Independent, August 7, 1989.

[91] See: William V. Cowan, "Intelligence, Rescue, Retaliation, and Decision Making", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.1-22.

for security reasons.[92] Although information about the possible location of the Western captives emerged with the release of each hostage or through escapes, problems of rapidly confirming and acting on the information undermined any opportunity or desire by Western governments to launch any rescue operations in which failure would almost certainly guarantee the death of hostages.[93] As a number of Western hostages were held in the Biq'a area, any rescue operation was constrained by a logistical difficulty of gaining access to an area both firmly controlled by Hizb'allah militiamen and an Iranian Pasdaran contingent as well as surrounded by the Syrian military. This problem led to the direct or indirect employment of local militias by Western governments in efforts to search for the hostages in Beirut and in southern Lebanon, as evident by the successful rescue of two hostages in 1984 by Amal and the same movement's search for the abducted American military officer in February 1988.[94] However, Amal's ability to locate hostages and mount any rescue operations diminished early in conjunction with the expansion of the Hizb'allah at the the expense of the Amal movement and with the endemic Amal-Hizb'allah warfare between 1987 until 1990.[95] Equally, the employment of the Druze militia in the search for Terry Waite in 1987 demonstrated the limited

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[92] For reports of the hostages held in the Iranian embassy, see: Washington Post, May 17, 1988; For reports of moving the foreign hostages by Hizb'allah, see: New York Times, May 28, 1988; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, June 8, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, May 11, 1986; and Ha'aretz, April 1, 1988. For reports of the hostages held in Beirut, see: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, June 22, 1988; Independent, December 1, 1991; and Ma'ariv, February 2, 1987.

[93] See: Independent, August 3, 1989; Newsweek, February 9, 1987; and Independent on Sunday, March 11, 1990.

[94] See: Ha'aretz, February, 18. 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 23, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 19, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 10, 1988; Foreign Report, March 17, 1988; and FBIS, April 18, 1988.

[95] See: Middle East International, March 2, 1990; Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1987; and Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.) , (1990), op.cit.: pp.130-32.

ability of local militias on the ground in Lebanon to gain access to reliable intelligence on the location of the Western hostages.[96]

Apart from the lack of available information on any plans or attempts by the French or British government[97] to rescue its citizens from captivity in Lebanon, all efforts by the American administration were channeled through the Hostage Location Task Force, firmly established in December 1985.[98] While a number of unsuccessful and unconventional attempts were made to identify the location of American captives, most notably through the purchase of information from local informants and in the establishment of a counter-terrorism programme for the Lebanese intelligence,[99] the failure of these methods underlined not only the immense security precautions adopted by Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus (SSA) but also that the military approach was inadequate in dealing with and in resolving these types of hostage-taking situations.[100] As revealed by the concealment of Lt.Col. Higgins despite a massive search operation by Amal and the arrest warrents

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[96] See: Ma'aretz, February 16, 1987. Also see: Gavin Hewitt, (1991), op.cit.

[97] According to Captain Paul Barril, former head of GIGN (French counterterrorism force), the French military considered a military intervention to rescue its hostages in 1986. After survey of the Lebanese terrain, it concluded any rescue attempt was not only too risky but also impossible, see: Newsweek, February 9, 1987.

[98] See: David C. Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit.: pp.213-4.

[99] See: Washington Post, March 18, 1988; For a US-Israeli hostage rescue plan in the TWA-incident in 1985, see: Time, December 16, 1991; and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle (New York, NY.: Free Press, 1988): p.143. For a US planned rescue operation in the autumn of 1985 after only the release of one hostage within the framework of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal, see: Yediot Aharanot, December 24, 1986; Washington Post, August 9, 1987; and US Congress. Joint Committee. The Iran-Contra Affair. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. 100th Cong., 1st sess. 1987: p.175. For a US military rescue plan in the autumn of 1986, see: Newsday, August 11, 1989; Independent, August 16, 1989; Times, August 16, 1989; and Tower Commission Report (New York, NY.: Times/Bantam Books, 1987): pp.351-2. For President Reagan's admission of a planned rescue attempt in January 1987, see: Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

[100] For Hizb'allah-Iranian secrecy of communication, see: Independent, March 7, 1990.

against Imad Mughniya, it is alleged that even Syrian military intelligence was unable to locate the whereabouts of hostages and wanted terrorists.[101] While the application of military pressure through proxy, most notably by Syrian military, has been a successful means to prevent additional abductions of foreigners and to prevent the execution of hostages, it has been limited to the political environment in the Lebanon and in relation to the status of Syria's relationship with Iran as well as with Western governments.[102] As demonstrated by Syrian consolidation of its hegemony in Lebanon, which prevented the abduction of foreigners by the Hizb'allah after 1987 through the deployment of the Syrian military in Beirut,[103] any Syrian willingness to apply military pressure on the Shi'ite movement has been always governed by a desire not to jeopardize its wider relationship with Iran[104] and in conjunction with opportunities to safeguard its interests in Lebanon as well as with an improvement of its relations with Western governments.[105] Despite the fact that Syrian military intelligence know the identity of main officials within Hizb'allah's SSA, this has meant that Syrian moves towards Hizb'allah must be considered mainly gestures towards the West, in alignment

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[101] For arrest warrents against Imad Mughniya in 1987, see: al-Ittihad, January 31, 1988; Da'var, November 13, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; and Da'var, February 1, 1988.

[102] For threats by Syria against Hizb'allah to release hostages, see: New York Times, March 27, 1987; For Syrian storm attempts of Hizb'allah buildings in search for West German hostages, see: FBIS, January 28, 1988. Also see: Independent, May 15, 1989.

[103] See: Middle East Economic Digest, February 28, 1987; Middle East International, March 2, 1990; and John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.256.

[104] For Syrian assurances to Iran of resistance to crackdown on Hizb'allah, see: New York Times, March 11, 1987; New York Times, May 23, 1988; and Independent, May 15, 1989. Also see: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988): p.184.

[105] The Syrian Brigadier General, Ghazi Kanaan, ruled out any rescue operations to release hostages because it carried too much risk to the foreigner's lives, see: Washington Post, February 27, 1987. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.210.

with its wider interests in Lebanon of preventing Hizb'allah to become too strong at the expense of other militias, rather than any real willingness to offend its partner Iran.[106] Apart from the continued presence of the IRGC contingent in Lebanon, a clear indication of this is the lack of Syrian efforts to control the activities of the Hizb'allah and Iranian Pasdaran in the Bi'qa area, as it could effectively isolate their movement beyond this area as well as their resistance activity against Israel since the overall military command center of the Islamic Resistance is situated near Ba'albek.[107]

The restrictions in the application of military force to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon must also be viewed in a broader context.[108] While it can be argued that a military approach should only be adopted as a last resort when non-military means are exhausted, it is important to recognize that the application of military force against the Hizb'allah has not only fuelled the militancy of the movement and provided it with many new members and recruits among the Shi'ite community but also strengthened the allegiance of Hizb'allah's command leadership to the more radical clergy within Iran's clerical establishment.[109] While retaliatory strikes may seem morally justi-

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[106] An exception to this rule related to the abduction of four Soviet embassy employees by Hizb'allah in September 1985. Due to the strategic importance of the Syrian-Soviet relationship, Syrian intelligence provided the Soviet Union with information about responsible Hizb'allah SSA operatives in the abduction. After the Hizb'allah execution of one diplomat, a number of KGB operatives with the assistance of Syrian military intelligence abducted three assistants of Imad Mughniya. These three SSA officials were murdered by the KGB and their bodies were sent back to the Hizb'allah with accompanied threats that it would continue to hunt down and execute SSA members if the remaining three diplomats were not released. For information, see: Da'var, November 1, 1985; and Ma'ariv, February 27, 1986. This information was confirmed in discussions with senior KGB officials at West European / Soviet Dialogue on International Cooperation Against Terrorism, Paris, June 10-11, 1991.

[107] See: Independent, August 3, 1988; Foreign Report, May 20, 1993; and Foreign Report, May 13, 1993.

[108] For a general overview, see: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.203-7.

[109] For Hizb'allah statements that martyrs strengthen the movement's cause, see: Voice of the Oppressed, 0530 gmt 25 May 92 - BBC/SWB ME/1390, May 26, 1992. Also see: Independent, October 8, 1991.

fiable in response to terrorist atrocities, the questionable legality of any type of unilateral military response not only cause strain for regional or international co-operation against terrorism but also will result in a high probability of collateral damage against civilian targets given the limited qualitity of intelligence on the Hizb'allah.[110] This was clearly demonstrated in the failed assassination attempt of Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Fadlallah, at his residence in the Bir al-'Abed quarter in the southern suburbs of Beirut, in which at least 80 civilians were killed and injured 200 others.[111] The reluctance by the US government to execute any type of rescue operation must also be viewed within the context of previously failed attempts, most notably the failure of the 1980 Iranian hostage-rescue attempt.[112]

Apart from its limited effectiveness in the reduction of terrorism, another main limitation of using the military approach to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon relates to the constraints in the political environment within which it is applied. In order to avoid a military confrontation with other state actors, applying military force to the hostage-crisis by Western governments has been constrained by the political and military risks of Syrian involvement and response to any action.[113] As a consequence, the mili-

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[110] See: International Herald Tribune, September 22-23, 1984. For example, the United States was strongly cautioned by Britain, France and West Germany from staging a military strike in Lebanon, see: Washington Post, February 5, 1987. Discord was also revealed by the refusal by France, supported by Britain and West Germany, to attend a seven-nation anti-terrorism meeting in Rome because of apprehension of the possibility of a US military strike, see: Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1987. Also see: Newsweek, February 9, 1987.

[111] See: The Guardian, March 8, 1985; International Herald Tribune, May 17, 1985; Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1985; and Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1985.

[112] See: Warren Christopher, (1985), op.cit.

[113] In response to the 1987 US naval deployment, Syria accused the American administration of using the hostage-situation as an excuse for a possible attack against Lebanon, see: Wall Street Journal, February 5, 1987. For Syrian-Soviet agreement to protect Syrians in the Biq'a area, see: Ha'aretz, June 28, 1985.

tary option by Western governments for the resolution of the hostage-crisis have not been a viable and realistic option given the intelligence constraints in identifying responsible Hizb'allah individuals and bases in the civil war environment as well as the political constraints in avoiding an escalation or a wider confrontation with either Syria or Iran.[114]

In the absence of an effective military option, Western governments have utilized other instruments of statecraft in the political, economic and legal realm in pursuit of political objectives to secure the release of its citizens from captivity in Lebanon.[115] The political options used by Western governments have been geared towards forcing Iran and Syria to intercede with the Hizb'allah for the release of hostages through a combination of either sanctions or conciliatory diplomatic and political measures. While the underlying political objective has been to make it clear to Iran and Syria that support for terrorism in any form constitutes unacceptable international behaviour,[116] the employment of political sanctions as punishment, through the withdrawal of diplomatic relations and increased political pressure in the regional and international context, has rested on the assumption that it would generate a change in the behaviour of Iran and Syria to abstain from its close support of the Hizb'allah and to force these states to influence the movement to intercede on their behalf for the release of Western captives.[117] However, the disruption or absence of relations between Western

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[114] See: International Herald Tribune, September 22-23, 1984.

[115] The range of instruments used vary from economic sanctions, diplomatic protest, quiet diplomacy to rupture of relations, see: Henry Bienen and Robert Gilpin, "Economic Sanction as a Response to Terrorism", Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (May 1980): pp.89-98.

[116] For a seminal work on these aspects, see: Paul Wilkinson, (1986), op.cit.

[117] See: Independent, December 3, 1987; and Independent, August 30, 1989.

governments and Iran as well as Syria have neither been the result of any Iranian or Syrian involvement with Hizb'allah nor yielded the release of any foreign captives, rather it has been in response to specific diplomatic incidents and in the wider context of the conduct of foreign policy.[118] This was evidently displayed by the French decision to maintain relations with both Iran and Syria despite their complicity in the 1983 suicide attack against the French MNF contingent in Lebanon.[119] The reluctance of the French government to sever ties with Syria in 1986, despite EC efforts to impose comprehensive sanctions, out of political expediency in the conduct of foreign policy demonstrated also the weakness of using punitive measures without the mechanism to enforce a uniform approach.[120] Apart from the permanence of US policy of diplomatic isolation towards Iran, the absence of relations with Iran and Syria by other Western governments has more often hindered the pursuit of foreign policy interests towards the region and prevented a direct dialogue with these states over the hostage-issue rather than assisted in the reduction of terrorism or procured the release of the foreign captives.[121]

The effectiveness of the diplomatic option of punishing Iran and Syria

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[118] For Syrian threats against the imposition of sanctions and its obstructive effect in negotiations, see: New York Times, December 1, 1986. For an overview, see: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mansour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.

[119] For details of Iranian-Syrian involvement in the Hizb'allah operations, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 14-20, 1984; Voice of Lebanon, October 26, 1983; Le Nouvel Observateur, October 30, 1983; Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983; Ha'aretz, October 23, 1983; Ha'aretz, October 26, 1983; AFP, October 23, 1983; and IRNA, November 15, 1983.

[120] See: Middle East International, November 21, 1986; and Times, October 29, 1986. For a useful overview of the difficulty among EC states to adopt a common policy, see: Juliet Lodge, "The European Community and Terrorism: From Principles to Concerted Action", in Juliet Lodge (ed.) The Threat of Terrorism (London: Wheatsheaf, 1988): pp.229-64.

[121] Unattributable interview with French counterterrorism official, Paris, June 1991.

through the withdrawal of diplomatic relations is closely dependent on using conciliatory political measures as a complement, through offers for their restoration in the event Syria and Iran uses their influence with the Hizb'allah to secure the release of foreigners from captivity. In the case of US-Syrian diplomatic relations, the US government has consistently applied a pragmatic approach towards Syria in the absence of any relations with Iran and as it has been the main channel used for intercession with the Hizb'allah over the hostage-issue.[122] Despite the fact that Syria has remained on the US State Department list of state-sponsors of terrorism, the reluctance by the US government to punish Syrian involvement with the Hizb'allah or pressure it to exert its influence over the movement was evidently displayed by the brief application of sanctions between mid-1986 until the autumn the following year.[123] Although Syria has occupied the role as the main channel for US efforts to release its hostages, despite Syria's limited ability to intervene with the Hizb'allah, the desire to disrupt US-Syrian relations has decreased with the elevated role of Syria in the region and within Lebanon as well as with its key participatory role within the Middle East peace process.[124] In contrast to Syria, the US government has persistently refused to remove sanctions towards Iran as it has pursued a subversive and aggressive foreign

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[122] See: Patrick Seale, (1988), op.cit.

[123] See: New York Times, June 27, 1987; Washington Post, September 3, 1987; and New York Times, September 11, 1987. Syria has remained on the US State Department's list of state-sponsors between 1986-1994, see: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US State Department, (1987-94).

[124] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.; Middle East International, October 11, 1991; Time, August 19, 1991; and Economist, September 28, 1991.

policy in the region.[125] Although the dichotomy of full US diplomatic relations with Syria and their absence vis-á-vis Iran has been guided by other foreign policy considerations in the region, the unwillingness by the US government to punish Syria for its involvement and, at the same time, be conciliatory towards Iran have undermined not only the utility of placing pressure on these states, through sanctions and conciliatory moves, to intervene more forcefully with Hizb'allah in Lebanon for the release of hostages, but also blocked any overall progress in negotiations over the hostage-crisis.[126]

The French approach to political sanctions and conciliatory gestures has been uniformly one-sided as France has maintained diplomatic relations with both Iran and Syria despite efforts by the EC to impose sanctions on Syria in late-1986.[127] Unlike its European allies, the French government has accommodated Syria in the region despite its clear involvement in terrorism against French interests,[128] and has maintained relations with Iran, with the exception of a brief period over diplomatic incidents from July until

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[125] See: Rolf Tophoven, "State-Supported Terrorism After the Gulf War: The Role of Iran, Iraq and Libya", in 9th Int. Conf. on "Democracy Challenged and Put To The Test - The problem of Combatting Terrorism, Drugs and Organized Crime", (London: Hans Seidel Foundation, August 1992): pp.219-231; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1990).

[126] Unattributable interview with senior official in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, August 1991.

[127] On November 10, 1986, the EC member states, except Greece and France, adopted sanctions against Syria which included an arms embargo, suspension of high-level visits, investigation of Syrian diplomats and tightened security around the operations of Syrian airlines, see: Washington Post, November 11, 1986; and Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 1986. On July 14, 1987, the EC lifted its ban on high-level contacts, see: Washington Post, July 14, 1987.

[128] In connection with the EC-sanctions, President Asad threatened to retaliate against each country which adopted sanctions, see: Arab News, November 9, 1986. Also see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.

November 1987.[129] While the French refusal to disrupt relations has been based on its wider foreign policy interests in the Middle East, it has also closely mirrored the French approach to negotiations with Iran and Syria over the hostage-crisis.[130] In the French case, the use of sanctions against Iran and Syria could be seen as unnecessary as its negotiation position was assumed to have warranted the exploitation of Syrian and Iranian influence over the movement, and this was coupled with an overall willingness to make concessions to Iranian and Hizb'allah demands.[131]

While French unwillingness to sever relations with Syria in alignment with other EC states has undermined the effectiveness of sanctions,[132] the British approach to the employment of sanctions and conciliatory measures has been contrary to the approach adopted by the US government, as it has applied uncompromising sanctions against Syria between mid-1986 until November 1990 while its relations with Iran have been limited and relations temporarily severed over specific issues and incidents. As British-Syrian relations were permanently disrupted by the Nizar Hindawi affair,[133] the British government adamantly refused to restore relations with Syria until it fulfilled certain

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[129] See: Washington Post, July 18, 1987; Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987; New York Times, July 24, 1987; and Washington Post, July 18, 1987.

[130] Prime Minister Chirac argued that Syria played a key role in any solution to the chaos in Lebanon and would retain relations with Syria, see: Washington Post, November 6, 1986. Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.

[131] See: Alex von Dornoch, "Iran's Violent Diplomacy", Survival (May/June 1988): pp.252-66; Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, (1988), op.cit.: pp.26-7; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; New York Times, May 5, 1988; and Liberation, May 7-8, 1988.

[132] For the purpose of employing sanctions, see: Kim Richard Nossal, "International Sanctions as International Punishment", International Organization, Vol.43, No.2 (Spring 1989): pp.301-22.

[133] See: Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (London: Hutchinson, 1992): pp.247-52.

preconditions and distanced itself from sponsoring terrorism.[134] The refusal by the British government to restore relations until November 1990, despite assurances by Syria that it had fulfilled these necessary preconditions, demonstrated the concentration on Iran as a limited channel for influencing the Hizb'allah to release its citizens from captivity. The policy also ignored the fact that the absence of relations obstructed any Syrian efforts or willingness to facilitate their release,[135] while the policies of PM Thatcher, which overruled requests by the Foreign Office to renew ties with Syria, derailed any opportunity to secure the freedom of its hostages.[136] This was clearly evident by the volte-face in the restoration of British relations with Syria immediately after the resignation of PM Thatcher in the autumn of 1990.[137] Although the UK government has concentrated on Iran as the key to the release of its hostages, the Anglo-Iranian relationship suffered by a series of diplomatic incidents in mid-1987.[138] The improvement in Anglo-Iranian relations, culminating in the formal reopening of Britain's embassy in Teheran in December 1988, was shortlived as Iran severed diplomatic relations in March 1989 after Ayatollah Khomayyni's fatwa against Salman

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[134] The major conditions by Britain were: the closure of Abu Nidal's offices in the country, the punishment of General Mohammed al-Kholi and Col. Haitham Said, the responsible intelligence officers in the Hindawi-affair and the Syrian Ambassador, Lutfallah Haydar, see: Times, November 19, 1991.

[135] For Syria's own admission that unfriendly relations blocked any efforts to secure British hostages, see: Ha'aretz, January 13, 1989.

[136] For Thatcher's obstruction of relations, see: Independent, August 9, 1991; Time, August 9, 1991; and Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991. Also see: John Dickie, (1992), op.cit.

[137] See: Daily Telegraph, July 14, 1991; and Times, November 19, 1991.

[138] See: Washington Post, June 11, 1987; and New York Times, June 5, 1987.

Rushdie.[139] Following the ascendancy of Douglas Hurd as foreign secretary there were negotiations with Iran over the restoration of relations. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait contributed to the British urgency of resolving outstanding differences with Iran through diplomatic representation.[140]

The varied individual approach by these three Western governments to the use of sanctions and conciliatory political measures as instruments to pressure both Iran and Syria to intercede with the Hizb'allah has been governed not only by their wider foreign policy interests in the region but also by differences in the approach to negotiations adopted by these states in terms of the selection of certain channels to influence the movement in Lebanon to release foreign hostages. Apart from the French approach to maintain diplomatic relations with both Iran and France, the absence of Anglo-Syrian and US-Iranian diplomatic relations without a willingness to use conciliatory measures served not only to undermine any possibility for progress in securing the release of their citizens in captivity, but also demonstrated disregard for the opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Iran as well as the political environment within Lebanon in which the Hizb'allah operates and exists. This has been evident by the failure to rely on either Iran or Syria as the only channel in negotiations over hostages without reference to their individual ability to exert its influence over the movement in accordance with shifts in their ties to Hizb'allah's command leadership between 1987-1991 and, more importantly, to the status of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as evidently displayed by the increased friction between 1986 and 1988.[141]

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[139] For the Rushdie affair, see: Graham E. Fuller, (1991), The "Center of the Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1991): pp.254-5.

[140] See: Independent, August 9, 1991.

[141] For example, see: Independent, August 30, 1989.

A major weakness in the Anglo-American approach has been the uncoordinated employment of opposite channels through either Iran or Syria in efforts to secure the release of hostages in Lebanon and the varied approach as well as consistency in applying santions or making conciliatory gestures. This problem was evidently displayed by the indisciminate approach to comprehensive sanctions on Syria by the European allies and the United States. The lack of comprehensiveness of these sanctions, as displayed by French refusal to join a concerted EC-effort and by the decision of the US government to abandon them the following year, rendered any pressure on Syria useless to forcefully intervene and limit the activities of the Hizb'allah, notwithstanding its already limited ability to avoid offending Iran.[142]

The use of the economic option by Western governments has also assumed the form of the combined use of sanctions and conciliatory gestures towards Iran and Syria.[143] While the status of economic relations between the US and Iran has been governed and regulated by any progress in negotiations at the US-Iranian Claims Tribunal in the Hague under the 1980 Algiers agreement, any impairment of economic relations with Iran by either the French or British governments has been avoided due to their alledged neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war and, more importantly, for the advancement of wider commercial interests in the Middle East.[144] This was evident by the continued position of Iran as the second most important Middle East market in 1988 for the United Kingdom, and by France to a limited degree despite its close role as

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[142] See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.

[143] See: "Economic Sanctions to Combat International Terrorism", Department of State Special Report (July 1986 & October 1986).

[144] See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.; and New York Times, April 11, 1987.

arms supplier to Iraq.[145] Despite official observance by Britain of the arms embargo on Iran, it allowed the continuation of Iranian arms purchasing activity in London until September 1987.[146] France also placed an embargo against the purchase of Iranian oil after its relations with Iran was severed over the Gordji-affair in mid-1987.[147] A resolution of the US-Iranian financial disputes has been a central issue to Iran as emphasized by the conditional linkage between any efforts to intercede with the Hizb'allah preceeded by the release of Iranian assets frozen in American banks.[148] While in some cases the release of US hostages has occured in conjunction with the payment of assets, the slow mechanism of adjudication in the US-Iranian financial disputes, coupled with a delay in the release of frozen Iranian assets by the US government, served to obstruct the release of any American hostages. However, any US unwillingness for a speedy resolution to the financial disputes with Iran must be viewed within the context of the Iran-Iraq war and its economic consequences for internal Iranian politics as well as regional developments affecting other US national interests.[149]

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[145] Ibid: p.76.

[146] The main offices of Iranian arms purchases in Europe was in London under the auspices of the Iranian National Oil Company, see: Hermann Moll, Broker of Death (London: Macmillan, 1988): p.55. See: George Joffe, "Iran, the southern Mediterranian and Europe: terrorism and hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mansour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.80. An offer by Iran for renewal of British arms supplies to Iran, transferred via France, was rejected by the British government, see: Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987. Iran was also displeased with Saudi Arabia's conclusion of a $30 billion arms purchase agreement with Britain in mid-1988, see: Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington, IL.: Indiana University Press, 1990): pp.63-78.

[147] See: Jerusalem Post, December 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 5, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, December 12, 1987; and New York Times, May 19, 1988.

[148] See: Maskit Burgin, "Shi'ite International Terrorism", in Anat Kurz (ed.), (1989), op.cit.: pp.51-2.

[149] See: Counter-Terrorism in the 1990's, US State Department, January 1990. Also see: Kate Gillespie, "US Corporations and Iran at the Hague", Middle East Journal, Vol.44, No.1 (Winter 1990): pp.18-36.; Stuart S. Malawer, "Rewarding Terrorism: The U.S.-Iranian Hostage Accords", International Security Review (Winter 1981-82); and Middle East Economic Digest, August 18, 1989.

The case of economic sanctions and conciliatory gestures towards Syria has been used by Western governments in alignment with the imposed political sanctions after Syrian involvement in the Hindawi-affair in mid-November 1986. While French reservations about EC-sanctions against Syria coincided with the release of two French hostages in November 1986,[150] the effectiveness of using economic sanctions was undermined not only by the re-establishment of EC and US relations with Syria in mid-1987, due to Syria's role in any negotiations in the Middle East peace process and the closure of Abu Nidal's offices in Damascus,[151] but also by the continued close support provided to Syria by the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf states as well as by Iran.[152] Although any EC financial aid to Syria was blocked by a British veto until September 1990,[153] any Syrian financial difficulties in the interim were circumvented by the Assad regime through adept exploitation of its relationship with Iran as well as within the Arab world and with its patron the Soviet Union.[154] This was particularly evident by Syrian moves towards a rapproachment with Iraq within the context of Syrian-Iranian rivalry over debt re-

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[150] See: Middle East International, November 21, 1986; and Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.

[151] See: New York Times, June 27, 1987.

[152] See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.171-88.

[153] See: Guardian, September 8, 1990.

[154] Between 1977 and 1988, Syria received a total of $42 billion in external aid of which: $23 billion was supplied from the Soviet Union; $3 billion from Iran; $12 billion from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states; and $4 billion from the West, see: Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1989. Also see: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, (1988), op.cit.: pp.179-87.

payments from supplied oil to Syria.[155] While Western governments failed to utilize Syria's dependency on Soviet or Arab financing as a leverage over Syria, through pressure on these states, the vulnerability of Syria was reinforced by the gradual reduction in aid from the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf states in conjunction with their own economic difficulties in and after 1989. Yet, Syrian moves towards strengthening its position within Lebanon, through the Ta'if accord, its key role in leading the Arab forces within the UN-coalition during the Gulf war, and its participation in the American-sponsored Middle East peace process led to an economic rapproachment with Western governments.[156] The elevated political role of Syria within the Arab world in the aftermath of the Gulf war facilitated Syrian willingness to intercede with Hizb'allah to persuade the movement to release the foreign hostages in close cooperation with Iran.[157]

The legal approach by the Western governments has been related to the active apprehension and prosecution of Hizb'allah members and the extradition of arrested suspects. While the US government has actively encouraged the apprehension of leading Hizb'allah members after the TWA-incident in 1985, through rewards leading to the location and apprehension of terrorist suspects as well as through increased proactive legislation,[158] the absence of any Hizb'allah actions on US soil and and any case of apprehension or prosecution of Hizb'allah members by US law enforcement agencies has led to a

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[155] See: International Herald Tribune, July 18-19; and Observer, November 1, 1987.

[156] See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1990), op.cit.: pp.33-36.

[157] See: Reuven Avi-Ran, "Syria Tightens Its Grip on Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.), (1992), op.cit.: pp.162-71.

[158] The US government issued arrest warrants for Ali Atwa, Hassan Izz al-Din, and Muhammad Hamadi and a reward of $250,000 for information leading to their arrest, see: Middle East Reporter, October 18, 1985; New York Times, January 16, 1986; New York Times, April 16, 1988; and International Herald Tribune, July 4, 1985. Also see: G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990): p.76.

concentration of efforts to pressure its allies in Europe to apprehend Hizb'allah suspects and to request the extradition of those members responsible for terrorist activity involving US citizens and property.[159] This was clearly evident in US efforts for the extradition of Muhammad Hamadi, who was responsible for the hijacking of TWA-847 following his arrest in West Germany in January 1987.[160] Despite unsuccessful efforts by US officials to persuade the Bonn government to extradite Hamadi, it actively assisted in preparation of the prosecution case, leading to the conviction which sentenced Muhammad Hamadi to life-imprisonment.[161] While unsuccessful efforts were made by Hizb'allah SSA officials to influence the legal process in the Hamadi-case through threats and abductions of West German citizens in Lebanon, the US government has received less co-operation from other states in efforts to apprehend, prosecute or extradite Hizb'allah members, mostly for the fear of retribution by the movement and for political expediency. This was demonstrated by Algeria's refusal to apprehend and extradite Izz al-Din for his involvement in the TWA-847 hijacking in their handling of the resolution of the KU422-hijacking in 1988.[162] It was also clearly revealed by the French failure to apprehend Imad Mughniya during his known visit to Paris

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[159] See: Stanley S. Bedlington, (1987), op.cit.

[160] See: Independent, January 28, 1987; International Herald Tribune, January 24-5, 1987; Newsweek, February 9, 1987; Times, June 25, 1987; and Washington Post, January 19, 1987.

[161] The extradition treaty between the United States and West Germany was signed in June 1978, see: AP, January 16, 1987.

[162] US officials believed Izz al-Din was involved in the KU-422 hijacking and wanted him to stand trial in Germany, see: New York Times, April 16, 1988; and Sunday Times, April 24, 1988. Also see: William Zartman, "Negotiating Effectively with Terrorists", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.188. For information about Izz al-Din, see: Independent, May 15, 1989.

on November 10-16, 1985, despite US requests for his arrest.[163]

Although French law enforcement has been successful in the apprehension of a number of other Hizb'allah members, most notably a whole network in March 1987, it has been simultaneously undermined by a French willingness to circumvent the legal process in certain cases for political expediency in relation to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.[164] Apart from the Gordji affair, a main case was the arrest of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin's nephew, Mohammed Mouhajer, who occupied a senior position as co-ordinator of the French pro-Iranian network and Hizb'allah in Lebanon, and his subsequent release in March 1988 prior to the complete resolution of the French hostage-crisis.[165] While French political interference in the judicial process was also evident in the release of Anis Naccache and his three accomplices in July 1990,[166] it has underlined the French application of the sanctuary doctrine in order to avert violence on its own soil through the expulsion of terrorist suspects rather than allowing the legal process to take its full course.[167] Although

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[163] See: Le Quotidien de Paris, February 27, 1986; Le Figaro, February 26, 1986 Le Figaro, March 7, 1986; Independent, April 26, 1988; and Ma'aretz, February 4, 1987.

[164] See: Michel Wieviorka, "French Politics and Strategy on Terrorism", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.61-90.

[165] See: Liberation, March 26-27, 1988; Le Monde, March 28, 1987; Le Monde, April 11, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, April 3-10, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; Le Monde, May 28, 1988; Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989; Washington Post, April 6, 1988; Newsweek, April 6, 1987; International Herald Tribune, March 28-29, 1987; and Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988.

[166] For President Mitterrand's promise for the release of Naccache, see: International Herald Tribune, January 31, 1990. For their release, see: Jerusalem Post, July 29, 1990; Ma'aretz, July 29, 1990; and Ma'aretz, July 31, 1990.

[167] For a discussion of the sanctuary principle, the granting of concessions to terrorist groups of presence in, and free passage through, France on the understanding that no terrorist incidents would be conducted on French soil, see: Edwy Plenel, "La France et le Terrorisme: la Tentation du Sanctuaire", Politique Étrangere, Vol.4 (1986); and Michel Wieviorka and Dominique Wolton, Terrorisme a la Une: Media, Terrorisme et Democratie (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). Also see: Washington Post, April 4, 1986.

the French has pursued a tough policy of capturing and punishing terrorists at home, as evident by the arrests of a pro-Iranian network in 1987 and by its co-operation with Spanish authorities in 1989,[168] it has avoided the arrest and prosecution of any leading Lebanese Hizb'allah member in alignment with the sanctuary principle and to agreements entered with Iran.[169] This has been evident, for example, by the presence and activity of the Ahl al-Beit center in Paris headed by Muhammad Bakir Fadlallah, the brother of Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Fadlallah.[170] Although a French magistrate issued arrest warrants against seven Hizb'allah members in Lebanon in April 1989 for involvement in the 1986 Paris bombings, there is limited ability as well as probability for French authorities to apprehend these suspects.[171]

The absence of overt Hizb'allah members or activity on British soil has prevented the apprehension and prosecution of any Hizb'allah-affiliated individuals which has led to a concentration by British authorities on the expulsion of any Iranian and Syrian diplomats using their embassies as a

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[168] In November 1989, Spanish authorities arrested eight Hizb'allah members in possession of more than 1,000kgs of explosives concealed in over 30,000 cans of preserves which were to be shipped and used in France, see: al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 27, 1989; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 8, 1989; International Herald Tribune, December 15, 1989; al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 30, 1989; Washington Post, December 16, 1989; and Le Figaro, December 8, 1989.

[169] The French government has admitted it reached an understanding with Iran over the cessation of terrorist acts on French soil, see: International Herald Tribune, December 15, 1989.

[170] The Ahl al-Beit Islamic Cultural Center in Paris served as a citadel for pro-Iranian and Hizb'allah members for meetings and recruitment, as evident by the involvement of Muhajir and Salah in its activities, see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.: pp.289-90. Sheikh Fadlallah's brother also operated a book store used as a communication center for Hizb'allah, see: Le Quotidien de Paris, June 5, 1987. Also see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: pp.100-1.

[171] The arrest warrent, issued on 89.04.27, named Abd al-Hadi Hamadi, Ibrahim Aqil, Hassan Ghosn, Hussein Mazbou, Hassan Ali, Mizar Lelzein, and Muhammad Mehdi Diab, see: Jerusalem Post, April 28, 1989. Evidence of French unwillingness to pursue suspects was demonstrated by its expulsion of Shapour Bakhtiar's presumed assassins to Iran despite Swiss protests, see: International Herald Tribune, January 8-9, 1994.

cover for activities connected with terrorism and on pressure against states for the extradition of any Hizb'allah members.[172] While British authorities have continued to expel a significant number of Iranian diplomats and individuals, it has strongly condemned other states, most notably France and Algeria, for their decisions to release several key Hizb'allah suspects. This was evident in British official protests to the Quai d'Orsay after every French concession[173] and by the attempts of the British government to organize a boycott against Algeria for its decision to allow the hijackers free passage out of the country after the KU422-hijacking incident in 1988.[174]

5.4 Accurate and Timely Intelligence on Adversary and Crisis

The lack of available intelligence on Hizb'allah and its activities can be attributed not only to the chaotic environment of Lebanon's civil war, but also to the extreme operational security of the Hizb'allah governing its own operations and its relationship with Iran and Syria.[175] While the US intelligence capability had been almost completely stymied by the Hizb'allah car-bomb attack against the US embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983,[176] and by the

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[172] See: Grant V. McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity (London: Hurst, 1989).

[173] See: Times, November 19, 1991; Financial Times, January 16, 1988; and New York Times, December 2, 1987. Britain also voiced its opposition to French concessions in bilateral discussions with French representatives prior to, and at, the December 1987 Copenhagen summit, see: Europe, December 2, 1987; and Europe, November 7, 1987. Also see: Economist, December 5, 1987.

[174] See: Times, April 21, 1988; and Washington Post, May 3, 1988. Also see: John Dickie, (1992), op.cit.: pp.197-99.

[175] See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut, 1986); Davar, January 30, 1987. As stated by US President Bush: "[w]e are dealing with less than a full deck of information. Its very hard...to get all the information that you need to make a decision", see: Newsweek, August 14, 1989. Also see: New York Times, December 29, 1983; and New York Times, September 27, 1984.

[176] The car-bomb explosion killed Robert Ames, renouned as the best CIA-analyst in the Middle East who was in close liason with Palestinian intelligence, and Kenneth Haas, CIA station chief as well as most other intelligence employees at the embassy, see: L. Pintak, Beirut Outtakes (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1988). For information concerning the September 1984 Hizb'allah bombing of the US embassy annexe, see: US Congress, U.S. Intelligence Performance and the September 20, 1984, Beirut Bombing, Permanent Select

kidnapping of William Buckley on March 16, 1984,[177] any subsequent collection of intelligence on the Hizb'allah was almost solely confined to signal and photo intelligence efforts by US embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo in the absence of human intelligence resources on the ground in Lebanon.[178] Although these methods were successful in monitoring the activities of the Iranian Pasdaran contingent in Ba'albek and the interaction between the Iranian embassies in Beirut and Damascus, they failed to yield accurate intelligence on the Hizb'allah or to predict any terrorist attacks against US citizens and property in Lebanon.[179] Apart from protection through increased physical security for any remaining US facilities in Lebanon and provision of counter-terrorism training for the Lebanese intelligence,[180] US intelligence efforts focused on finding the location of hostages and available Hizb'allah targets in the event of a rescue operation or retaliatory strikes.[181] These intelli-

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Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ocotber 3, 1984. Also see: John B. Wolf, Antiterrorist Initatives (London: Plenum Press, 1989).

[177] William Buckley had been tortured by the Hizb'allah to reveal CIA activity and Middle East policy which was contained in a document of over 400 pages, see: U.S. Congress. Joint Committee. The Iran-Contra Affair. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. 100th Cong., 1st sess. 1987: pp.252 and 265.

[178] Unattributable interview with US counter-terrorism official, Washington DC, September 29, 1993. For a very useful analysis of CIA-activity in Lebanon, see: David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta, Lebanon and the Intelligence Community, (Cambridge, MA.: JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 1988).

[179] For security reasons, the Iranian embassy in Syria liasie with Hizb'allah due to Iranian fears of intelligence surveillance of satellite and other communications by US against the Iranian embassy in Beirut, see: Independent, March 7, 1990.

[180] US Congress authorized the expenditure of $365 million to secure USA's 262 embassies abroad secure against terrorist attacks, see: G. Davidson Smith, (1990), op.cit.: p.232. Also see: Joel M. Woldman, "The Security of US Embassies and Other Overseas Civilian Installations", Congressional Research Service Review (April 1985): pp.2-3; and Washington Post, May 12, 1985.

[181] See: Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liason: The Inside Story of the US-Israeli Covert Relationship (New York, NY.: Harper Collins, 1991): p.337.

gence efforts were assisted by limited co-operation from Israel's military intelligence in pinpointing specific Hizb'allah command centers.[182] However, the inability of even the IDF to penetrate the Hizb'allah through human intelligence underlined the inherent constraints of efforts to track down not only Western hostages but also missing IDF soldiers held by the Hizb'allah or to predict its modus operandi, as evident by Hizb'allah's suicide-bombing of IDF headquarters in Tyre in 1984.[183] Despite successful IDF abductions of leading Hizb'allah members in southern Lebanon, most notably Sheikh Obeid, it failed to yield any new or useful information about the organisation due to its compartmentalized structure and obsession with security.[184] As American and Israeli intelligence efforts to collect high-quality information on Hizb'allah remained unsuccessful, the efforts by the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DSGE) within Lebanon were limited to close liason with the Lebanese intelligence community[185] while the British GCHQ in Cyprus assumed responsibility for signal intelligence collection.[186] These intelligence collecting activities were not only a reflection of individual capability through actual physical presence within Lebanon but also to the way in which the individual states approached negotiations with the

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[182] For limitations in US-Israeli intelligence sharing, see: Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit.: pp.380.

[183] See: Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1992): p.319; Newsweek, February 27, 1989; and Ariel Merari and Yosefa (Daiksel) Braunstein, (1984), op.cit.: pp.7-10. Also see: Samuel M. Katz, (1992), op.cit.: pp.270-81.

[184] Unattributable interview with senior IDF official, Tel Aviv, August 1991.

[185] A French hostage, Marcel Coudry, belonged to the anti-terrorist department of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DSGE-General Directorate for External Security) in east Beirut, see: AP, September 25, 1986. Also see: Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, (1987), op.cit.; Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.; Pierre Marion, (1991), op.cit.; and Sunday Times, August 5, 1990.

[186] Unattributable interview with British intelligence specialist, April 1994.

Hizb'allah in accordance with their strategies.

In the absence of accurate information on the exact location of foreign hostages, it was possible to discern certain weaknesses in a number of areas of Hizb'allah activity, vulnerabilities which made the movement susceptible to pressures and offers of accomodation as an instrument of leverage by Western governments to maximise the utility of the application of crisis management techniques and the possibility for a resolution to the hostage-crisis. It is also possible to identify weaknesses in the Iranian-Syrian relationship as superimposed over the movement's activity in Lebanon in order to evaluate the utility of crisis management to the hostage-crisis in accordance with opportunities and constraints within the context of the Lebanese political environment and, more importantly, within the multi-dimensional and triangular relations between Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria.

While the collective and centralized nature of Hizb'allah's command leadership made the movement's decision-making process towards the hostage-issue strictly the affair of the highest authority within the movement, most notably by the most senior and powerful cleric who occupy the position of Secretary-General at the time, it was also closely influenced by the personal allegiance of the Hizb'allah leader and other influential members with individual factions within the clerical establishment in Iran.[187] This meant that increased intensity in Iranian clerical factionalism manifested itself through Hizb'allah activity, most notably visible with the diminished power of the Iranian radical cleric Mohtashemi as the movement has pursued a more independent line from official Iran since 1987.[188] While the projection of

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[187] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; and Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), op.cit.

[188] See: Washington Post, August 18, 1989; Independent, March 7, 1990; FBIS, November 30, 1989; Washington Post, August 20, 1989; Washington Post, August 28, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Washington Post, May 15, 1990; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and Independent, October 23, 1991. Also see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.

Iranian clerical factionalism onto the Hizb'allah was clearly evident in efforts by Iranian radicals to obstruct efforts to release Western hostages in alignment with pressures from its rival clerical colleagues after the ascendancy of President Rafsanjani in 1989, it was also displayed by the downgrading of official Iran's financial support to the movement.[189] Previously Iran had also maintained close supervision of most Hizb'allah activity through the presence of two Iranian members within Hizb'allah's main Majlis al-Shura, whose presence was gradually reduced with Iranian pressures.[190] As a consequence, the status of Iranian clerical factionalism and its manifestations through the Hizb'allah, as well as the nature of personal allegiances of its leaders manifested through its own clerical factionalism, have been vital to gauge in order to determine the exact ability of Iran to pressure the movement to release foreign captives.[191] This must be balanced against the constraint of Iran's inherent reluctance to pressure the Hizb'allah beyond a certain point, given Iran's enormous financial investments to the movement and the fact that it constitutes the most successful example of Iran's ability to export the revolution.[192] The intensity of clerical factionalism either within Iran or the Hizb'allah translated effectively into a limited ability of official Iran to exert its influence over the Hizb'allah than at any other times.[193] Although Iranian pressure on the

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[189] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.188.

[190] Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, Israel, December 30, 1991.

[191] See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189. Also see: Sean K. Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: pp.19-34.

[192] See: Shireen T. Hunter, (1988), op.cit.: pp.730-49.

[193] See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.190.

Hizb'allah led to a closer allegiance by the movement's command leadership to Iran's radical clergy, it was dependent on the vulnerability of the position of the movement within the context of militia warfare and in a post-civil war environment of Lebanon.[194]

As the Hizb'allah strengthened and consolidated its position within Lebanon in conjunction with the witdrawal of Western MNF contingents in 1984 and Israel in 1985,[195] a main source of vulnerability for the movement was its frictional relationship with Syria, which has been most manifest through its protracted warfare with Amal between 1987-1990.[196] While Syria was forced to crackdown on the Hizb'allah to maintain its control over Lebanon, it exercised considerable restraint in its relationship with the movement in order to safeguard its relationship with Iran.[197] However, strains in the Iranian-Syrian relationship have also been clearly manifest by the degree of Syrian crackdown on Hizb'allah activity, most notably displayed in 1987.[198] The occurence of this friction provided a window of opportunity for Western governments to exert maximum amount of pressure on Syria to intervene with the Hizb'allah to procure the release of the foreign hostages and undermine the Syrian-Iranian alliance through economic and political offers to substi-

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[194] See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.

[195] See: Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), (1988), op.cit.: pp.69-70; and Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.

[196] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.

[197] See: Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, "Iranian-Arab Relations in Transition", in idem (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.13.

[198] See: Jerusalem Post, November 29, 1987; Washington Post, June 30, 1987; International Herald Tribune, March 4, 1988; Ma'aretz, March 2, 1987; and Le Matin, November 28, 1987.

tute Syria's dependence, most notably of oil supply, from Iran.[199]

A major source of potential pressure on the Hizb'allah relates to the presence of the Iranian Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon as it has been crucial to the movement in supplying training and weaponry as well as in the extension of ideological indoctrination and moral support.[200] While the Hizb'allah has been dependent on the interaction with the Pasdaran for the rapid transformation of the movement into a well-organized milita and for its ability to recruit new members, any early efforts to isolate or remove the Pasdaran presence would have disabled the extent to which the Hizb'allah has been able to expand and carry out its operational activity.[201] This has been underlined by the role of the Biq'a as the transit point for not only the infusion of Iranian financial assistance and massive weaponry to the movement but also as it serves as the major command and control center for the movement's resistance activity against Israel in southern Lebanon.[202] The closeness of the relationship between Hizb'allah and the Iranian Pasdaran was also evident by the unsuccessful efforts of President Rafsanjani to reassign Pasdaran members more loyal to his clerical faction in order to influence progress in securing the release of Western hostages.[203] Any limitation to the 2,000-man

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[199] See: Middle East International, June 27, 1986; Economist, March 14, 1987; and Financial Times, May 5, 1987.

[200] See: al-Amal, May 19, 1984; International Herald Tribune, October 1, 1984;

[201] As aptly summarized by a leading Hizb'allah member, the achievements made by the movement until now would have taken at least fifty years without any Iranian support, see: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.106.

[202] See: Independent, August 3, 1988; Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990.

[203] See: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; New York Times, March 5, 1990; Independent, july 1, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990. For a valuable overview, see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.: pp.135-6.

strong IRGC presence in the Biq'a has always been dependent on Syrian ability and willingness to intercede at the expense of its wider relationship with Iran.[204] While a major opportunity was presented to Syria with the implementation of the Ta'if agreement in early 1991, Syrian reluctance to offend its ally Iran was clearly revealed by its agreement to allow the continued presence of the Pasdaran contingent within Lebanon.[205]

Another pre-emptive measure to limit the early expansion and the militancy of the Hizb'allah relates to finding means and ways to both block the financial channels from Iran to the movement in Lebanon as well as providing economic substitution to the Shi'ite community through any third party or militia to undermine the purely economic attractiveness of Hizb'allah's recruitment for potential members.[206] As seen by the massive defections from other confessional movements to Hizb'allah, most notably by Amal members, the ability to provide economic assistance in the absence of a functioning state has been a key component for popularity of the movement and of Hizb'allah's electoral victory, when it gained the largest single block of seats in Lebanon's post-war parliamentary elections.[207]

Despite the absence of precise intelligence on the Hizb'allah, analysis of the environment in which the movement is confined as well as assessment

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[204] See: New York Times, January 23, 1990; Ha'aretz, May 4, 1986; Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984. For a wider discussion, see: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.

[205] See: Independent, May 8, 1994. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.457-73.

[206] This was discussed by the author with Col. Menarchik, Office of Secretary for Defense, US Department of Defense, in 1993. For Hizb'allah financial links with BCCI, see: Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1991. Also see: Stephen Sackur's film "Allah's Army" shown on BBC2 series Assignment, May 10, 1994.

[207] For example, Hizb'allah trainee fighters in the Biq'a receive £200 per month while the SLA and Amal pay their fighters below £50 a month, see: Times, November 14, 1987. Also see: Independent, May 8, 1994; Foreign Report, September 17, 1992; Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6; and The Middle East, February 1992.

of the reactions by the movement to pressure on the movement and to changes in its position within Lebanon is possible. It is also essential in the determination of the vulnerability of the adversaries in the employment of crisis management techniques with an objective of securing the release of its citizens in captivity. While the weaknesses of the movement usually correspond to the shifts in the relationship between Iran and Syria and their own vulnerability to pressures and offers of accommodation, it is vital to accurately assess the weak links in the triangular relationship between Hizb'allah and its patrons through exploitation of crisis management within not only the framework of the regional environment but also the boundaries of the ability and willingness of these states to intercede on behalf of the Western governments. A measurement of Western governments' understanding of the dynamics of this triangular relationship can be viewed in terms of their selection of negotiation channels and the direction of pressure on either Iran and Syria to force the movement to relinquish its foreign captives.

5.5 Maintanence of Communication Channels with Adversary

The effectiveness of crisis management in negotiations with the adversary is not only directly dependent on the selection of communication channels with the adversary through either direct dialogue or the employment of intermediaries as well as on decisions to conduct negotiations in public or secret, but also on their employment in relation to the opportunities and constraints in the political environment which governs the possibility for either success or failure in the resolution of the hostage-crisis. While the actual types of communication channels have been bound by the constraints of the political environment and selected on the basis of being successful in influencing the dynamics of the hostage-crisis for its resolution, their effectiveness have also been closely influenced by the willingness to enter into negotiations backed by the ability to grant at least minimum concessions. The employment of vastly different channels by the French, American, and British governments in their approach to negotiations has changed

in accordance with the status of their relationships with Iran and Syria as well as with the actual willingness and ability of these states to intercede with the Hizb'allah for the release of foreign hostages. This has been closely influenced by the level of willingness and ability of Western governments to grant specific concessions to these states measured against the political acceptability and expediency of caving in or holding out to any demands.[208]

Unlike Britiain's adamant refusals to negotiate with the Hizb'allah or with those states closely identified with the movement in Lebanon, both the French and the American experience with negotiations in the hostage-crisis have revealed a shared willingness to explore almost all channels available to them while they have significantly differed in approach to the negotiations, the selection of intermediaries and the willingness to concede to any demands for the release of their citizens.[209] The effectiveness of these different approaches to negotiations must be evaluated in terms of the suitability of intermediaries in relation to the opportunities and constraints of the political environment in which they have been applied to as well as the actual mechanics of the process of individual negotiations by Western governments.

The approach to negotiations by the French government in response to the multiple abductions in 1985 assumed several simultaneous strategies directed towards direct discussions with Iran and Syria as well as towards the establishment of indirect contacts with individual members of the Hizb'allah.[210] After the discovery of Amal's limited influence to act as an intermediary

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[208] See: Richard Clutterbuck, "Negotiating with Terrorists", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.263-87.

[209] See: Times, November 19, 1991.

[210] See: Ha'aretz, November 20, 1985; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Jerusalem Post, March 27, 1986; and Jerusalem Post, March 10, 1986.

despite its close involvement in negotiations over the TWA 847-incident,[211] Mitterrand's government dispatched Dr. Raza Raad, a Shi'ite French medical doctor with close contacts within the Lebanese Shi'a community, to establish channels with the Hizb'allah in November 1985 in response to the earlier kidnappings of four French citizens.[212] Although these negotiations lasted until early 1986 and failed to yield any positive results,[213] as evident by Hizb'allah's terrorist campaign in Paris,[214] the subsequent efforts by French intermediaries towards indirect negotiations with the kidnappers reflected political rivalry between President Francois Mitterrand and the newly elected Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, as evident by their dual independent efforts through personal envoys.[215] While Mitterrand employed Syrian businessman Omran

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[211] See: Bassma Kodmani-Darwish, "L'Iran, Nouvel Acteur Fort au Liban?" in Liban: Espoirs et Realities (Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 1986).

[212] See: Ha'aretz, November 20, 1985; Time, March 24, 1986; and Jerusalem Post, March 10, 1986. It has been alledged that Imad Mughniya's visit to Paris between November 10-16, 1985, was related to negotiations with French officials, see: Le Quotidien de Paris, February 27, 1986; and Le Figaro, March 7, 1986. A senior Pasdaran official, Mohammad Sadek (head of security), was reportedly in France in January 1986 and closely involved in the negotiations with French officials for the release of Anis Naccache, see: Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986. Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.: pp.169-252. For information about Raad, see declassified US diplomatic cable from the American embassy in Beirut to Secretary of State (March 1986), No. 0 11 1353Z Mar 86.

[213] While France offered Syria long-term international credits on easy terms for its intervention with Hizb'allah for the release of its hostages, Iranian intervention undermined any progress, see: Foreign Report, September 5, 1985. The French negotiations with Iran and Syria were led by: Lt.Col. Jean-Louis Esquivier (head of antiterrorism unit at the Champs de l'Élysée); d'Hubert Védrine, an aide to Mitterrand; and Jean-Claude Cousseran (later head of DGSE), see: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.410.

[214] These attacks were initiated to pressure the French government during national elections in order to gain the release of Anis Naccache and halt French arms shipments to Iraq, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; New York Times, January 30, 1990; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; al-Nahar, March 26, 1986; al-Mustaqbal, March 23, 1986; Le Monde, July 15, 1986; Le Monde, September 7-8, 1986; and Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987.

[215] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.28-9. This rivalry was exploited through rumours that Mitterand's emissaries had offered to pay the Hizb'allah $10 million not to release the hostages until after the French presidential elections in May 1988, see: Liberation, May 7, 1988. For negotiation efforts, see: Mary Seurat, Les Corbeaux d'Alep (Paris: L'Age d'Homme, 1988); Independent, November 8, 1989; and

Adham as its new intermediary after the abduction of four more French citizens in Lebanon,[216] the Chirac government intensified its own efforts through Dr. Raza Raad and, more importantly, through the employment of Jean-Charles Marchiani, alias Alexandre Stefani,[217] a personal envoy of the Interior Minister Charles Pasqua.[218] The central role of Marchiani as the main French emissary in the negotiations with representatives of the Hizb'allah reflected not only the lead effort by the Chirac government in securing the release of its citizens through mainly Iran as a channel, in contrast to Mitterrand's efforts via Syria through Omran Adham, but also that French institutional responsibility for the hostage-issue was increasingly delegated through the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Interior rather than through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[219] The lead role of the Ministry of Interior in the process of negotiations for the release of its citizens from Hizb'allah captivity was also revealed by certain actions which undermined efforts to normalize relations with Iran by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[220] This was

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Times, March 20, 1986.

[216] Apart from Omran Adham, two other individuals close to Mitterand involved in negotiations were: Francois de Grossouvre and Eric Rouleau, see: al-Qabas, April 28, 1988. Also see: Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1987; Le Figaro, May 7, 1988; and Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988.

[217] See: Ma'aretz, November 29, 1987; Times, November 19, 1991; Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; and Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988. For a profile, see: Times, May 6, 1988.

[218] See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Le Nouvel Observateur, May 6-12, 1988; and Le Nouvel Observateur, May 13-19, 1988.

[219] See: Michel Wieviorka, "French Politics and Strategy on Terrorism", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.82-4. Also see: Washington Post, July 11, 1987; Independent, November 8, 1989; and Middle East International, November 21, 1986. The rivalry between using Iran and Syria as channels through various emissaries was revealed by the arrests of the pro-Iranian network in France in April 1987. Despite the fact that the French DST indicated Iranian involvement, the Chirac government advocated Syrian involvement, see: Le Monde, April 27, 1987; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987.

[220] See: Independent, November 8, 1989.

evident by the expulsion of Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya members to Iraq, the arrest of a number of leading pro-Iranian Hizb'allah members in France and, more significantly, by the Gordji affair which led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Iran.[221] While Wahid Gordji had occupied a central role in negotiations between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Iran towards normalized relations, efforts by the Ministry of Interior to arrest him also revealed the intense rivalry between the various ministries controlled by either Chirac and Mitterrand linked in some ways to the hostage-affair.[222] The elevated role of the Ministry of the Interior was also displayed in exploiting these actions in negotiations with Iran and the Hizb'allah over the hostage-issue, as evidently displayed by the expulsion of political opponents of the Khomayyni regime, most notably the leader of Mujahidin al-Khalq organisation, and its interference in and control over the French judicial process which lead to the release of several key Iranian and Hizb'allah terrorist suspects.[223] While the expulsion of Mahmoud Rajavi led to the release of two French hostages in June 1986, the release by France of $330 million of the $1 billion loan to Iran in November 1986 contributed to the release of three other French hostages.[224]

The negotiating efforts by Marchiani, aided by the enlistment of

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[221] See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987; New York Times, July 24, 1987; Hadashot, July 19, 1987; Washington Post, July 18, 1987; International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; and Le Soir, March 1987.

[222] The rivalry between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior was revealed by the claims by Gordji that French foreign ministry officials had warned him to go into hiding prior to attempts by the police to arrest him, see: Guardian, October 21, 1987; and Financial Times, December 2, 1987.

[223] See: Sunday Times, June 8, 1986; and Time, June 30, 1986.

[224] See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988. Iran and France agreed on the payment of the $1 billion loan granted by the Shah to the French Atomic Energy Commission on October 29, 1986, see: FBIS, October 30, 1986. For French payment, see: International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1986; and Ma'ariv, November 12, 1986.

Iskandar Safa in July 1987,[225] progressed with the release of several French hostages in conjunction with a number of concessions to Iran.[226] While Marchiani received a carte blanche by Chirac to pursue the complete resolution of the hostage-crisis prior to the May 1988 national elections, as evident by the release of Mohammad Mohajer in March 1988,[227] rivalry between the two French political factions was manifest through the expulsion of Mitterrand's envoy, Omar Adham, by Interior Minister Charles Pasqua from both any participatory role in French negotiations with Hizb'allah on the hostages and from France itself on May 3, 1988.[228] Although Marchiani managed to secure the release of the last French hostage on May 5, 1988, three days before the final round of the French presidential elections, Jacques Chirac lost the

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[225] Iskandar Safa was a Lebanese Christian businessman well-connected within Lebanon and the Iranian clerical establishment, see: Steve Berry, (1989), op.cit.: p.21. Also see: Le Nouvel Observateur, May 6-12, 1988; Time, December 14, 1987; and Le Nouvel Observateur, May 13-19, 1988. The approach used by Marchiani, backed by the security of twelve GIGN members, in meetings with Hizb'allah officials was to reveal the names of the relatives of the Hizb'allah negotiators living in France, who would be harmed in the event that anything happened to Marchiani. This was revealed in an unattributable interview with French counterterrorism official in Paris in June 1990. Apart from Marchiani, negotiations were led by Bernard Gérard, Director of the DST, and Philippe Rondot, from the disbanded paramilitary force Service d'Action Civique, see: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.410.

[226] See: Washington Post, December 1, 1987; Le Monde, November 28, 1987; Independent, December 1, 1987; and New York Times, December 2, 1987. At the same time as these concessions were made to Iran, l'affair Luchiare emerged in late October and early November of 1987 which alledged that the Mitterrand government had allowed illegal arms sales to Iran from 1983 through 1986. The relative limited attacks by the conservative Chirac government led to speculations that it feared publicity about their own concessions to Iran, see: Le Figaro, November 4, 1988. Also see: Dilip Hiro, (1989), op.cit.: pp.165; and Walter de Bock and Jean-Charles Deniau, (1988), op.cit.

[227] See: New York Times, May 19, 1988; and Times, March 7, 1988.

[228] See: Times, May 5, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988; New York Times, May 5, 1988; Washington Post, May 5, 1988; New York Times, May 6, 1988; Sunday Times, May 8, 1988; and Liberation, May 7-8, 1988. Adham was believed to have been behind the leaked information published by the Lebanese newspaper al-Haqiqa that Chirac's emissaries had attempted to delay the release of the French hostages until after the 1986 parliamentary elections and that a ransom of $8.8 million were paid to secure the release of two French hostages in November 1987.

election to the incumbent, Francois Mitterrand.[229] While the Interior Minister Pasqua insisted that no deals had been entered into with Iran, though acknowledging that France had agreed to repay a second installment of $330 related to its outstanding Eurodif loan,[230] Mitterrand's electoral victory created problems in the implementation of any prior deals made by Marchiani, most notably the release of Anis Naccache as evident from denials by Prime Minister Michel Rochard that he had any record of such deals, despite Iranian insistance.[231] The Iranian dispute with the French government continued over the case of Anis Naccache was resolved in July 1990 when he was pardoned by President Mitterand,[232] while the last tranche of $330 million to Iran was settled by France in December 1991.[233]

The unique French approach to negotiations over the hostage-issue concentrated on the employment of unofficial intermediaries in direct contact with leading Hizb'allah members rather than through formal and high-level

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[229] See: Newsweek, May 16, 1988; Pierre Marion, (1991), op.cit.: p.244; and Steve M. Berry, (1988), op.cit.: pp.19-22.

[230] The French government repaid a second installment of $330 million to Iran while it recalled French warships in the Persian Gulf, refused to supply Iraq with Mirage aircraft, and lifted a sixteen-month embargo against the purchase of Iranian oil, see: Ha'aretz, April 5, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; International Herald Tribune, December 12, 1987; Middle East International, September 22, 1989; New York Times, May 19, 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 2, 1987; New York Times, May 19, 1988; and FBIS, June 23, 1988. It also included a deal for financial compensation to captors and to families of the IRGC killed in the French retaliatory raid on Ba'albek in 1983, see: Observer, December 6, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988.

[231] See: Economist, August 4, 1990; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; New York Times, January 31, 1990; New York Times, January 31, 1990; and International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1989.

[232] See: International Herald Tribune, July 28-29, 1990; Independent, August 11, 1991; and al-Hayat, July 30, 1990.

[233] On October 25, 1991, France agreed to pay the outstanding debt to Iran, see: Financial Times, December 30, 1991.

representatives of the French government in talks with Iran and Syria.[234] This posture towards negotiations was greatly assisted by the rivalry between Chirac and Mitterand through their individual emissaries, who were able to exploit initiatives with either Iran and Syria to the advantage for a resolution of the French hostage-crisis.[235] While it is clear that Hizb'allah and Iran preferred to deal with unofficial French emissaries to ensure deniability in their responsibility in the hostage-affair, the French government also used the offices of a third state, Algeria, to guarantee the terms of any agreement with Iran. The acceptable role of Algeria for the kidnappers had been highlighted by their previous involvement as interlocuter in the resolution of 1980 US embassy siege in Iran as well as Hizb'allah's hijacking of KU422 in April 1988 in which it guaranteed the security of the hijackers and their free passage out of the country.[236]

The effectiveness of French negotiation efforts have not only been related to an expressed willingness to grant major concessions in order to secure the release of its citizens from captivity but also to the approach of direct negotiations with Hizb'allah officials assisted by the maintanence of diplomatic relations with Syria and Iran, which was exploited by the rivalry between the various French emissaries.[237] Although these emissaries were able use their close influence with either Iran or Syria to place simultaneous pressure on the Hizb'allah for the release of French citizens, it

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[234] See: Luc Chavin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.91-106.

[235] See: Independent, November 8, 1989; Observer, July 27, 1987; and Steve M. Berry, (1988), op.cit.: pp.19-22.

[236] See: New York Times, April 14, 1988; Times, April 21, 1988; Financial Times, April 21, 1988; Washington Post, May 3, 1988; and New York Times, April 21, 1988.

[237] See: Independent, November 8, 1989; and Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.28-9.

also fuelled the competition between Iran and Syria in efforts to receive benefits from any release of hostages.[238] This was revealed by Syrian warnings against the execution of French hostages by the Hizb'allah,[239] while Iran attempted to circumvent Syria in the release process in order to receive the credit for the release of French hostages for political advantage in negotiations with other states whose nationals were held hostage in Lebanon.[240] The employment of individual emissaries with close contacts with either Iran and Syria benefitted from the tension and rivalry in the wider Iranian-Syrian relationship and on the ground in Lebanon between 1986 and 1988.[241] However, the political rivalry between the emissaries was also exploited by the Hizb'allah and Iran as they were able to raise the level of concessions in conjunction with the political expediency in having French citizens released before or after the presidential elections.[242] Although Charles Pasqua claimed that France had refrained from paying any price for the release of French hostages, the admission by Sheikh Fadlallah that France had made concessions to secure the release of its citizens from captivity also predicted that the movement would be equally successful in its negotiations with the US government.[243]

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[238] For example, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.

[239] Unlike its EC partners, France not only maintained diplomatic relations with Syria but also praised Syrian involvement for any resolution to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, see: Edwy Plenel, (1986, op.cit. For Syrian warnings, see: al-Nahar, March 19, 1987; New York Times, March 23, 1987; Ha'aretz, July 23, 1987; and Ha'aretz, April 15, 1988.

[240] See: Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit.

[241] See: Yosef Olmert, "The Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.184-5; and As'ad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.14-6.

[242] See: Steve M. Berry, (1988), op.cit: pp.19-22.

[243] Charles Pasqua declared that: "[w]e have not granted ransom to anyone. We have not yielded to any claims. Not a franc, not a dollar, not a deutschmark. If you like, not even an Iranian rial." See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Time, May 7, 1988. For Sheikh Fadlallah's

In contrast to the French approach to the negotiations with the Hizb'allah, the strategy employed by the United States to the hostage-crisis was based on a refusal to deal directly with the Hizb'allah on the ground in Lebanon.[244] While the the US refusal to negotiate directly with the kidnappers was a direct reflection of a major weakness to cultivate and employ useful local contacts within the Shi'a community, it can also be attributed to limitations of direct negotiations given the extremely hostile attitude of the Hizb'allah, to the manner in which American officials viewed the relationship between the Hizb'allah and its patrons Iran and Syria, as well as to the limited ability to grant concessions to any demands given the constraints of political accountability both at home and abroad.[245] Although the American administration had successfully resolved the earlier abduction of US citizens through mainly negotiations with Syria, and rescue operations by its proxy Amal,[246] the handling of the TWA 847-hijacking became a landmark event in which the personal intervention by Iran's Hashemi Rafsanjani with Hizb'allah fostered the initiative by US officials to exploit Iranian clerical factionalism through an exchange of arms-for-hostages as a key component in an wider effort to re-establish relations with "moderate" officials in Iran for a more pro-Western policy after the death of Khumayyni.[247] Apart from Iranian intervention for the resolution of the TWA-847 incident and the close involvement

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statement, see: Ma'ariv, November 12, 1986; and al-Nahar, July 21, 1986.

[244] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.24.

[245] See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.

[246] American Frank Regier and Frenchman Christian Joubert were freed by Amal on April 15, 1984, see: International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984.

[247] For a detailed analysis of this initiative, see: Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), (1993), op.cit.

of Syria and Amal in the negotiations,[248] the release of 766 Shi'ite prisoners in exchange for American passengers also revealed a willingness by the US government to employ Israel as a conduit and shield for any direct concessions to the Hizb'allah.[249]

While the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal between August 1985 until its disclosure in the pro-Syrian Lebanese weekly, al-Shira, in November 1986 yielded the release of three American hostages,[250] the failure of this initiative demonstrated not only a severely flawed analysis by US officials of Hizb'allah's closer allegiance to the more radical clergy within Iran's clerical establishment, but also exposed the dangers associated with reliance on Iran as the only channel at the expense of any Syrian involvement.[251] The failure of the arms-for-hostages affair highlighted also the major problems of efforts to use the comprehensive solution of the hostage-issue as a key component in US attempts to normalize relations with Iran without a willingness to make any concessions.[252] While the previous option of using Syria as a vechicle for negotiations by the Reagan administration had been curtailed by the imposition of sanctions due to Syria's close involvement in the

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[248] See: New York Times, June 22, 1987; Times, June 26, 1985; and Sunday Times, June 30, 1985.

[249] See: Margaret Barry, Bargaining without Concessions: the 1985 TWA Hostage Negotiations (Washington, DC.: Conflict Management Program, SAIS, 1987).

[250] In a series of arms-for-hostages exchanges, a pattern developed with the release of an American hostage in exchange for the delivery of military equipment to Iran. A total of 2,004 TOW and eighteen HAWK missiles, 240 HAWK spare parts and intelligence on Iraq was delivered by the US government via Israel to Iran in exchange for the release of three American hostages in July and September 1986 as well as in November 1986, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: p.22; and Theodore Draper, op.cit.

[251] See: al-Shira, Ocotber 28, 1986; al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; and al-Ahd, November 21, 1986.

[252] See: Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.65-8. Also see: Washington Post, May 1, 1990.

Hindawi-affair in mid-1986,[253] the US government was forced to renew its dialogue with Syria over the hostage-issue in the absence of ties with Iran and in the absence of other negotiation channels with the Hizb'allah after the exposure of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals.[254] The decision by the Reagan administration to devalue the issue of the hostages in January 1987,[255] accompanied by an official decree barring travel to Lebanon by American citizens,[256] came not only as a direct response to efforts to limit the hostage issue on the political agenda, following the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair and the abduction of four American citizens during that month, but also reflected the lack of available negotiation channels for the US government, especially as the British independent envoy Terry Waite was abducted by the Hizb'allah, and an unwillingness to offer any kind of concessions to either the Hizb'allah or Iran. Although the PLO had offered to act as an intermediary with the Hizb'allah over the hostages in 1986, especially as Imad Mughniyya of the Hizb'allah SSA had been a member of Fatah Force 17, all efforts failed as PLO's contacts within the movement were in no position to act independently as Hizb'allah's main leadership rejected any PLO overtures.[257] In addition, the option of using Israel as a third party, through

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[253] For visit by William Casey, director of CIA, to Syria, see: Times, July 30, 1986. Also see: United States Department of State, Syrian Support for International Terrorism: 1983-86 Special Report No.157 (Washington, DC.: Bureau of Public Affairs, December 1986).

[254] See: New York Times, June 23, 1987.

[255] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.?3. For statement by Reagan that recent US hostages had stayed in Lebanon "at their own risk and at their own responsibility", see: New York Times, January 27, 1987. For the new policy, see: Newsweek, May 18, 1987.

[256] See: Newsweek, February 9, 1987; and Washington Post, January 29, 1987.

[257] The independent efforts to mediate by the PLO leadership was discussed with a senior PLO official in Egypt, April 8, 1994. Also see: Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, (1990), op.cit.: p.272-4.

the release of imprisoned Lebanese Shi'ites in a similar exchange surrounding the TWA-847 incident, was also curtailed as Israel linked any release of prisoners with the return of its missing IDF servicemen held by Hizb'allah and as any reciprocal moves towards a hostage-release process would exacerbate the political damage created by the Iran-Contra affair.[258]

Apart from an array of unofficial and independent mediation attempts by private individuals and businesses,[259] the only available channel towards Iran used by the US government in relation to the hostage-issue was through the financial negotiations at the US-Iranian Claims Tribunal in the Hague, which was initiated in December 1986 and lasted until mid-1987.[260] However, the official American rejection to link the issue of the release of US citizens in Lebanon with the return of frozen Iranian assets, while it also publicly disawoved any efforts by private mediators, left limited scope for maneuver in any negotiations for the resolution of the hostage-crisis.[261] Although the concentration on Syria for negotiations by the Reagan administration yielded progress in the cessation of abduction of American citizens, as revealed by the Syrian intervention in response to the kidnapping of Charles Glass in June 1987,[262] it is important to recognize that these results can mainly be attributed to Syrian efforts to consolidate its hegemony over Lebanon rather than to any American success in persuading Syria to act for

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[258] See: Samuel Segev, (1988), op.cit.

[259] For US official encouragement of private initiatives in 1985, see: Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985. For examples of unauthorized mediation efforts during 1988, see: Los Angeles Times, October 19, 1988; and Newsweek, November 7, 1988.

[260] After the Iran-Contra debacle, the US government and Iran resumed negotiations over the release of Iranian deposits in American banks, see: New York Times, December 26, 1986; and Ha'aretz, October 16, 1987.

[261] See: New York Times, October 7, 1988; and Newsweek, November 7, 1988.

[262] See: FBIS, June 22, 1987; and Washington Post, June 30, 1987.

the resolution of the hostage-crisis.[263] The reliance on Syria as a main channel for negotiations resulted in limited progress for the release of any hostages given the increased tension between Iran and Syria as well as by the Hizb'allah-Amal warfare in Lebanon.

The succession of Bush to the US presidency in 1989 represented an opportunity and a major shift in the way in which the American administration approached channels of negotiations and the issue of concessions to the hostage-crisis.[264] This shift was first revealed in October 1988 by overt US signals towards Iran of a willingness to open a dialogue on the hostage-issue through a third party.[265] While the US government used Algerian, Swiss, and Pakistani officials as channels to pass messages to the Iranian regime,[266] the Bush administration overtly signaled the Iranian regime that the use its influence with the Hizb'allah for the release of American hostages would be rewarded in some way, especially with the ascendancy of Rafsanjani in the aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khumayyní.[267] In an effort to facilitate this process through good-will gestures, the US government agreed to return $567 million to Iran, in an agreement under the auspices of the US-Iranian Claims Tribunal in November 1989, coupled with a willingness to compensate

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[263] See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.

[264] See: Independent, November 14, 1989.

[265] See: Jerusalem Post, December 5, 1988; and International Herald Tribune, October 23, 1988. This led to the visit by four leading Hizb'allah members to Iran for discussions for the release of US hostages, see: International Herald Tribune, October 25, 1988.

[266] Algeria formed a special political-military group to deal with any hostage-exchange, see: Ma'aretz, August 8, 1989. For the involvement of Algeria and Switzerland as intermediaries, see: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, August 10, 1989; Independent, August 5, 1989; and Washington Post, August 11, 1989. For the involvement of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: Jerusalem Post, August 17, 1989; New York Times, August 12, 1989; Washington Post, August 12, 1989; and Teheran Times, August 10, 1989.

[267] See: FBIS, August 8, 1989; and New York Times, August 9, 1989.

the families of the victims of the Iranian airbus mistakenly shot down by USS Vincennes in July 1988.[268] While Hizb'allah clerical rivalry and efforts by Iran's Rafsanjani to consolidate the Iranian revolution at home prevented the release of any US hostages,[269] Iranian signals that 1990 would be the last year for foreigners in captivity led to the release of two American hostages in April 1990, through Swiss mediation,[270] prior to scheduled talks at the US-Iranian Claims Tribunal in the Hague.[271] Yet, US officials adopted the position that it would withhold tangible incentives or rewards until the remaining American hostages were released.[272] However, the changes in the strategic environment in the Middle East following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which led to the freedom of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait, blocked any significant progress in the hostage-crisis as it increasingly became dependent on Middle Eastern politics rather than on individual initiatives by Western govern-

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[268] For US goodwill gestures, see: Washington Post, September 5, 1989; New York Times, November 7, 1989; Washington Post, November 13, 1989; Independent, November 8, 1989; New York Times, July 18, 1989; and Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1989. The US administration had also assisted in obtaining the release of 17 Iranians held hostage for a year by the Lebanese Forces. For Iranian demands for their release, see: Washington Post, October 24, 1989.

[269] For opposition to any hostage-release by Iran's radical clergy, see: FBIS, March 12, 1990; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990. Also see: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) (1993), op.cit.: p.190.

[270] For Iranian signals, see: Independent, March 7, 1990; Washington Post, February 23, 1990; and Financial Times, March 8, 1990. For US admission of indirect talks with Iran, see: Washington Post, March 6, 1990. The release of Polhill and Reed was accomplished through assistance by the Swiss government with aid from the International Red Cross and involved the release of Shia Muslim prisoners held by the SLA, see: Terry Anderson, (1993), op.cit.: p.313. The success of Swiss mediation have been related to the release of two Swiss Red Cross officials on August 8, 1990, see: Ha'aretz, August 14, 1990.

[271] See: Washington Post, January 19, 1992; and New York Times, May 8, 1990.

[272] See: Guardian, April 24, 1990.

ments.[273]

The personal involvement of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar and his personal envoy, Giandomenico Picco, in efforts to find a comprehensive resolution to the hostage-crisis through a triangular hostage-release process in which the Hizb'allah would release Western hostages and missing IDF servicemen in return for Israel's release of imprisoned Shi'ites,[274] came at the invitation of Iran and provided the necessary face-saving solution for all involved parties as well as a shield for any indirect involvement by the Bush administration.[275] Apart from the removal of a major impediment to hostage-negotiations in the form of the release of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait, the success of the negotiation efforts by the UN envoy was rooted in not only the personal efforts by Giandomenico Picco to find a satisfactory overall solution to demands of all parties through secretive dialogue,[276] but also, more importantly, that his negotiation efforts were backed by assurances to Iran that the UN Secretary-General would release the findings with regard to UN Resolution 598 prior to the expiry of his term of office on December 31, 1991.[277] While the Bush administration rejected demands by the Hizb'allah, via the UN envoy, that the US government would refrain from retributions with the release of the last American hostage, it was privately

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[273] See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit.: pp.33-6; and Independent, December 5, 1991.

[274] See: Time, December 16, 1991. Also see: Maskit Burgin, "Western Hostages and Israeli POWs in Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.), (1992), op.cit.: pp.195-7.

[275] See: Guardian, August 10, 1991; and Times, August 15, 1991.

[276] The contacts between Picco and Iran as well as Hizb'allah was initiated in 1990, see: Times, August 10, 1991. See: Independent, October 22, 1991; A main Hizb'allah negotiator with Picco was allegedly Husayn al-Musawi, see: Foreign Report, November 7, 1991. Also see: Giandomenico Picco, "A Personal Journey through the Middle East", Middle East Journal, Vol.48, No.1 (Winter 1994): pp.108-12.

[277] See: Independent, December 1, 1991.

agreed to in communications with Iran and Syria.[278] A major contribution to the release of the American hostages was the settlement of outstanding financial disputes between the US government and Iran under the ten-year old Algiers agreement most notably in December 1991 and February 1992.[279]

The American approach to negotiations over the hostage-issue has been characterized by the employment of an array of official and unofficial intermediaries without a clear consideration for opportunities and constraints created by the political environment within Lebanon and in the region. This has been evident in the continous and erratic shifts in the direction of any US dialogue with Iran and Syria as well as through the nature and employment of intermediaries. While the limited achievements by US negotiation efforts can be attributed to the absence of diplomatic relations with Iran and to its refusal to deal directly with the Hizb'allah in Lebanon, it can also be explained by the reliance on Syria as the only vehicle for intercession with the movement in light of the limited ability and willingness by the Syrian regime to intervene at the expense of its wider relationship with Iran.[280] Any

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[278] Prior to the release of the last American hostage, Terry Anderson, reports surfaced that the US government was seeking legal indictments against the hostage-takers, see: Independent, December 1, 1991; and Observer, December 8, 1991. For Hizb'allah warning of retribution for any US attempts to capture or kill hostage-takers, see: Independent, November 21, 1991.

[279] See: Ha'aretz, August 29, 1988; Ma'aretz, August 5, 1988; Independent, March 11, 1990; Independent, October 24, 1989; Washington Post, October 24, 1989; and Washington Post, November 13, 1989. The U.S.-Iranian Tribunal in the Hague ruled the U.S. government to return $500 million to Iran in September 1986, see: Middle East Economic Digest, September 22, 1986. For U.S. refusal to link American hostages and frozen Iranian assets, see: Washington Post, January 31, 1987; and Independent, August 9, 1989. In May 1987, the U.S. government returned $451 million to Iran, see: Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1987. In early November 1989, it was agreed that the U.S. government would repay $567 million to Iran of the $12 billion held, see: Independent, November 8, 1989; Middle East International, November 17, 1989; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990. The following amount has been payed by the U.S. government to Iran over the years: Jan. & June 1984 ($8.15 million); May & Nov. 1987 ($517 million); April-May 1988 ($38.2 million); May-Dec 1989 ($15.6 million); Jan.-Feb. 1990 ($925,000); Dec. 1991 ($278 million); and Feb. 1992 ($134.1 million), see: David Jacobsen, My Life As a Hostage (New York, NY.: S.P.I Books, 1993): pp.311-14.

[280] See: Independent, August 3, 1989; and Independent, April 25, 1990.

Syrian intercession with the Hizb'allah from 1984 to the TWA-847 incident in 1985 had been possible with the active support and knowledge of both Hizb'allah and Iran to position itself as a useful intermediary in an effort to exploit the hostage-crisis for political purposes and to distance itself from the activity of the movement despite complicity in these Hizb'allah operations.[281] The use of Syrian influence over the Hizb'allah had been limited by its revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal and by intensified Iranian-Syrian rivalry over Syria's unwillingness to settle its outstanding payments for oil to Iran.[282] As a consequence, Syrian inability to effect the release of Western hostages was increasingly weakened in conjunction with the Amal-Hizb'allah warfare in Lebanon and by the increased standing of the Hizb'allah as a movement at the expense of Amal as well as by the overriding interests to maintain its useful relationship with Iran as a leverage in the wider inter-Arab politics.[283] This tendency for overestimation of the ability by certain intermediaries to persuade or intervene with Hizb'allah's command leadership for the release of American hostages was also evident in the approach adopted by US officials in the efforts to use rivalry within Iran's clerical establishment to its advantage in the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages initiative.[284] The exclusion of Hizballah officials from any negotiations also ignored the effects of clerical rivalry within the

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[281] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.37-8.

[282] See: International Herald Tribune, July 18-19, 1987; Observer, November 1, 1987; Economist, March 14, 1987; and Financial Times, May 5, 1987. Also see: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.188-9.

[283] For a useful overview, see: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.198-216. Also see: John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: pp.150-51.

[284] For an example of the failure to exploit clerical factionalism, see: Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit.: pp.453-6.

movement itself as well as its allegiance with more radical Iranian clergy.[285] This was clearly demonstrated by the obstruction of any progress in the release of US hostages by the Hizb'allah command leadership with the active support of the radical Iranian clerical faction between 1988 and 1990.[286]

Another major drawback of US negotiation efforts have been related to the non-secretive nature of dialogue conducted through intermediaries with Iran and Syria which has undermined the willingness by American administrations to grant any concessions for progress in negotiations which resemble any deal-making.[287] In many cases, the negotiation efforts by the US government have been not only severely weakened by the employment of non-conciliatory rhetoric and posturing towards Iran and the Hizb'allah,[288] exacerbated by the announcement of new and hardline counterterrorist policies,[289] but also undermined by negotiation efforts through intermediaries without the actual ability or mandate to make any concessions. As a consequence, US negotiation efforts have sent mixed signals to the Hizb'allah and Iran through the contradiction between privately conciliatory positions and publicly

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[285] See: Washington Post, August 18, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Independent, October 23, 1991; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990.

[286] See: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Middle East International, August 4, 1989; and Independent, August 10, 1991.

[287] See Grant Wardlaw's chapter entitled "Terrorist Hostage-Takings", in Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.154-7.

[288] As stated by leading Hizb'allah members: "US morilizing statements will not resolve the hostage-crisis", see: AP, August 9, 1986. Also see: Xavier Raufer, "Middle East Terrorism: Rules of the Game", Political Warfare (Fall 1991): p.11.

[289] For an overview of US policies in the 1980s, see: Marc A. Chalmer, (1987), op.cit.

stated hardline positions.[290]

The British approach to negotiations has been characterized by a firm and uncompromising refusal to negotiate not only with the Hizb'allah but also with either Iran or Syria over the hostage-crisis.[291] Although never officially sanctioned by the British government,[292] the independent mediatory role of Terry Waite, a special envoy to the Archbishop of Canterbury, has been the only available option for the release of the two British citizens abducted by the Hizb'allah in April 1986.[293] While the negotiation efforts by Terry Waite in Lebanon had been formally initiated on November 14, 1985, ostensibly by American requests and on behalf of a humanitarian effort to secure US hostages,[294] the issue of the British hostages was linked by default in his efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Western hostage-problem.[295] As the case of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait remained a central

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[290] As noted by Amir Taheri: "[t]o them any concession given is a sign of weakness and automatically invites further aggression on their part. The wielding of the stick by the West, on the other hand, is considered to be perfectly normal and a temporary hardship which has to be endured", see: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.197.

[291] See: Financial Times, January 16, 1988; Times, November 19, 1991; Financial Times, August 9, 1991; and Independent, May 7, 1990. On October 21, 1986, the British Foreign Office advised its nationals in Lebanon to take maximum security precautions or leave the country.

[292] The British government has repeatedly distanced itself from Waite and made it clear that his missions to Beirut were unofficial and that it could provide no assistance in the event of trouble for Waite, see: Newsweek, February 9, 1987; and Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.33.

[293] See: New York Times, April 19, 1986; Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1990; and al-Nahar, November 22, 1986.

[294] For a useful overview of Waite's negotiation efforts, see: Gavin Hewitt, (1991), op.cit.

[295] See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.89.

demand for the kidnappers in Lebanon,[296] Waite concentrated on this issue in secret face-to-face meetings with Hizb'allah officials in Beirut and through repeated requests to the Kuwaiti government to allow him entry and permission to visit the al-Da'wa prisoners.[297] While his two missions to Lebanon, in November and December 1985, failed, as the Kuwaiti government firmly refused to grant him an entry visa, it underlined the failure of the conduct of clandestine negotiations with any Hizb'allah officials privately and, at the same time, maintaining a highly visible outward profile and spearheading a humanitarian mission without the ability to make any concessions in efforts to influence the Kuwaiti government over the fate of the al-Da'wa prisoners.[298] Due to his discredited position, being closely associated with US officials involved in the Iran-Contra affair in the aftermath of its revelation in November 1986 coupled with an inability to affect any progress in the case of the al-Da'wa prisoners despite promises, Waite's return for a direct dialogue with the Hizb'allah in Lebanon resulted in his own captivity in January 1987.[299]

Apart from an unsuccessful attempt by the Irish Republican Army to persuade the Hizb'allah to release Brian Keenan through the visit of a two-

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[296] See: Le Point, August 3, 1987; Da'var, May 6, 1988; and Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988.

[297] See: Gavin Hewitt, (1991), op.cit.

[298] For Waite's failure to secure permission to enter Kuwait, see: Time, November 10, 1986; and Observer, November 24, 1991.

[299] See: Washington Post, November 18, 1986; Times, November 19, 1991; New York Times, January 29, 1987; and Independent, March 26, 1990. Hizb'allah's own newspaper, al-Ahd, advised Waite to leave Lebanon prior to his abduction, see: Independent, November 19, 1991. Terry Waite had left a message before his abduction which urged the British government not to pay any ransom for his release or use any military options, see: Ma'aretz, February 1, 1987. As revealed by a declassified document, the principal architect of the Iran-Contra affair, Oliver North, jeopardized Waite's mission as an independent negotiator by informing Iranians that he was in close contact with Waite and could be used as a shield for the US and Iranians, see: Times, May 12, 1994.

man IRA delegation to Beirut in December 1987,[300] any mediation attempts on behalf of the British hostages were confined to independent humanitarian efforts towards Iran by representatives of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the absence of British diplomatic relations with Syria and with the limitation of dialogue with Iran after diplomatic incidents in late 1987.[301] The involvement of John Lyttle in efforts to conduct a dialogue with Iran and Hizb'allah over the hostage-issue was useful as he served as a conduit between the British Foreign Office and Iran.[302] Although the British government pursued a dialogue with Iran over improvement of relations and over the hostage-issue, these efforts were interrupted by Iran's fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989.[303] In the absence of British relations with either Iran or Syria, the Republic of Ireland used the issue of the dual nationality of hostage Brian Keenan for its own political advantage in direct negotiations

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[300] The pro-Syrian al-Shira reported that the IRA-delegation consisted of Joe Austin and Denis Donaldson, who arrived in west Beirut and attempted to establish contacts with Hizb'allah's SSA. Apart from a holding a meeting with Sheikh Fadlallah, the IRA representatives offered false Irish passports in return for the release of Brian Keenan, which would grant the movement a major propaganda coup. However, Hizb'allah were more interested in establishing a working relationship with the IRA through the supply of weapons, safe-houses, and other assistance for its terrorist networks in Britain. IRA refused. For information on the IRA visit, see: al-Shira, December 30, 1987; Ian Gelldard and Keith Craig, IRA, INLA: Foreign Support and International Connections (London: Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1988): p.77; Martin Dillon, The Dirty War (London: Arrow Books, 1990): pp.430-1; Ma'aretz, December 31, 1987; Independent, May 5, 1990; and Times, December 31, 1987.

[301] See: Independent, March 26, 1990.

[302] For allegations that Britain negotiated with Iran since September 1987 until November 1987, suspended due to the release of French hostages, see: Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987. Also see: Observer, November 24, 1991; Times, November 19, 1991; and Guardian, November 19, 1991. In June 1988, Lyttle organized a British parliamentary visit to Iran which served to improve British-Iranian relations, see: Hadashot, June 23, 1988; and New York Times, August 15, 1988.

[303] For reports of direct talks, see: Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, September 18, 1988; al-Shira, October 10, 1988; Independent, May 7, 1990; Independent on Sunday, May 13, 1990; and Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987. Also see: FBIS, August 7, 1989; Time, January 30, 1989; Ha'aretz, February 10, 1989; Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1990; and Independent, November 2, 1989.

with the Hizb'allah, Syria and Iran.[304] While the release of Keenan in August 1990 represented a diplomatic triumph for Irish diplomacy in contrast to the British failure to negotiate with anyone over their hostages, it was achieved by Iranian willingness to use the Irish hosting of the EC presidency as a vechicle to improve its relations with the EC member states and as a means to induce improved relations with the UK government, which had indicated a shift in approach to relations with Iran with the ascendancy of Douglas Hurd as the Foreign Minister in late 1989.[305] In a similar fashion to the resolution of the American hostage-crisis, the shifts in the Middle East by the impact of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait facilitated the normalisation of relations between the UK government and Iran as well as Syria while any limited British efforts for the release of its citizens was overtaken by the UN mediation of the comprehensive denounement of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon in 1991.[306]

The British approach to the hostage-crisis, characterized by a strict observance of a no-negotiations and no-concessions policy as it has refused to deal with the Hizb'allah or even those states who have influence over the movement, has been closely influenced by the absence of any friendly diplomatic relations with Iran and Syria.[307] Apart from the unsuccessful efforts

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[304] For Irish negotiation efforts, see: Independent on Sunday, July 8, 1990; Independent, May 17, 1990; Guardian, July 10, 1990; Middle East International, May 25, 1990; Jerusalem Post, January 30, 1989; Financial Times, January 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, February 10, 1989; Independent, August 29, 1990; and Independent, July 9, 1990. Ireland made a generous contribution to Iran in the form of £100,000 in earthquake relief, see: Independent on Sunday, July 8, 1990.

[305] For the shift in British policy, see: Independent, August 9, 1990; Times, November 19, 1991; Independent, August 9, 1991; and Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991. For Irish-British tensions, see: Time, January 30, 1989.

[306] See: Times, November 19, 1991; Inependent, December 5, 1991; and Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit.: pp.33-6.

[307] See: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.2-11.

by independent negotiators, any British official contacts over the hostage-issue have been veiled behind larger issues of improvement of UK-Iranian diplomatic relations while it has also concentrated solely on Iran as the channel for their release at the expense of Syrian involvement or any contacts with the kidnappers themselves. Unlike the French or American hostage-cases, the British government has been exempt from any outstanding financial disputes in demands for the release of its citizens. Any progress for their release has been completely dependent on the willingness by British officials to grant Iran and Syria limited political concessions.[308] Although Britain has chosen to maintain an uncompromising lead role in adhering to its publicly stated counterterrorism principles, it also faced unseperable and unavoidable barriers, most notably the Rushdie affair, which prevented any volte face in its position and to any negotiated solution to the British hostage-crisis.

Apart from the selection of various negotiation channels to communicate with the adversaries, the success of these efforts are dependent on the functions of the existing crisis management machinery in limiting the effects of the crisis on the policymakers in Western governments.

5.6 Functioning Machinery to Limit Effects of Crisis

All three Western governments have instituted and developed sophisticated crisis management machinery specificially designated to deal and counter incidents of terrorism within and beyond their own borders.[309] While the type and function of these crisis management machinery reflect the individual governmental structures and varying threats of terrorism, they all share a common purpose of providing essential support mechanisms for both reducing the effect of terrorism on the agenda for poliymakers as an advisory and

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[308] See: Independent, May 7, 1990; and Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990.

[309] The specific type of bureaucracy or operational functions of these individual crisis management machinery will not be dealt with in this study as they have been covered adequately elsewhere, see: G. Davidson Smith, (1990), op.cit.: pp.92-129; and Richard Clutterbuck, (1992), op.cit.: pp.263-87.

policy directing body as well as coordinating any response as an operational body.[310] Despite the diversity of exisiting machinery, measurement of success lies in their ability to shield the effects of pressure from terrorism on the higher echelons of decisionmakers and to provide a coordinated response to the specific terrorist situations. Unlike other types of terrorism, the prolonged duration of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon has placed special burdens on the machinery to operate effectively over a sustained period.[311] In most cases, the crucial role of crisis management machinery has been evident in the acute and periodic short-term pressures created by Hizb'allah's threats of execution of hostages unless Western governments meet certain ultimatums.[312]

The role of the media and its impact on the effective functioning of Western government decision-making in such short-term pressure situations has undoubtedly played an instrumental role in exacerbating the acceleration and type of any responses to the hostage-crisis.[313] This has been clearly displayed by the American media's coverage of hijackings and abduction of US citizens by the Hizb'allah, most notably the TWA-847 hijacking in 1985 and in response to the unprecedented number of abductions in January 1987 during the furor surrounding the revelation of the Iran-Contra debacle at home and

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[310] See: Louis Jean Duclos, "Le Traitement Francais du Terrorisme", Études Polémologiques, No.49 (January 1989): pp.75-110; Uriel Rosenthal, P.T. Hart, and M. Charles, (1989), op.cit.; and Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward and Howard Meckin, Developments in French Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990): pp.225-36.

[311] See: Alex von Dornoch, (1988), op.cit.: p.262.

[312] See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.14-19.

[313] See: Edward M. Joyce, "Reporting Hostage Crises: Who's in Charge of Television", SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 1986): pp.169-76. Also see: Alex von Dornoch, (1989), op.cit.; Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.151-7; and Newsweek, February 16, 1987.

abroad.[314] While US media coverage of the Lebanese hostage-crisis has failed by itself to precipitate any government response, as shown by the restraints in using military force, it has significantly served to elevate the hostage-issue on the US foreign and domestic agendas.[315] The inability of US administrations to deal with and limit the effects of media coverage on the fate of American hostages have acted as a major constraint for any effective response as any action or inaction towards the crisis has either been scrutinized for any resemblance of concessions or underlined the impotence of government response to terrorism, reaffirming the failure to deal effectively with the 1980 US embassy siege in Iran.[316] Although the subsequent US administrations have been constrained by Carter's legacy and the critical role of the media in shaping US foreign policy, the ineffective role of crisis management machinery as an operational body was also underlined by the political crisis caused by the covert US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals.[317] The revelation of the so-called Iran-Contra affair became a pivotal event as it not only completely discredited the US-led campaign against international

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[314] See: Newsweek, July 1, 1985; and Sunday Times, June 30, 1985. Also see: D. Elliott, "Family Ties: A Case Study of Coverage of Families and Friends During the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847", Political Communication and Persuasion, No.5 (1988): pp.67-75; and W.C. Adams, "The Beirut Hostages: ABC and NBC Seize an Opportunity", Public Opinion, Vol.8 (August/September 1985): pp.45-8.

[315] See: Laurence Zuckerman, "The Dilemma of the 'Forgotten Hostages", Columbia Journalism Review (July-August 1986): pp.30-4. Also see: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit.; Peter Stoler, The War Against the Press: Politics, Pressure and Intimidation in the 80s (New York, NY.: Dodd, Mead, 1986): pp.110-11; US News and World Report, July 1, 1985; and Time, August 14, 1989.

[316] See: US House of Representatives, The Media, Diplomacy, and Terrorism in the Middle East (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs) (Washington DC.: Government Printing Office, 1985); and Roland D. Crelinsten, "Victims' Perspectives", in David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), Terrorism and the Media (London: Sage, 1992): pp.208-38.

[317] See: E. Gilboa, "Effects of Televised Presidential Addresses on Public Opinion: President Reagan and Terrorism in the Middle East", Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.20 (1990): pp.43-54.

terrorism, undermining previous and current efforts by its allies, but also caused a severe political crisis for the Reagan presidency which his administration never completely recovered from, as the truth about the Iran-Contra scandal remains to be resolved.[318] The political fall-out of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals severely curtailed any official US efforts to procure the release of its citizens from captivity as it also had severe political consequences in Iran.[319] As a result, any subsequent ability of the US government to act vis-á-vis the American hostages was severely limited by the political environment in the Middle East, tarnished by the Iran-Contra affair, despite the existance of a well-deliniated machinery for dealing with terrorism.[320]

In the French case, the role of the media has not only elevated the importance of the hostage-crisis on the French domestic and foreign political agendas but has also been exploited by the various political parties for expediency in the two elections in 1986 and 1988.[321] While the circumvention of any coordination between existing and responsible crisis management bodies was a reflection of the nature of the French "cohabitation" government, the absence of any overall response, facilitated by the political rivalry betwee

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[318] See: William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell, Men of Zeal: A Candide Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings (New York, NY.: Penguin, 1989); and Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, (1993), op.cit.

[319] For the internal consequences of the Iran-Contra affair in Iran, see: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: pp.374-85.

[320] See: Marc Celmer, (1987), op.cit. Also see: Michel Wieviorka, "Defining and Implementing Foreign Policy: The US Experience in Anti-Terrorism", in Yonah Alexander and Abraham H. Foxman (eds.) The Annuals of Terrorism: 1988-1989 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990): pp.171-201. Also see: Stephen Sloan, "US Anti-Terrorism Policies: Lessons to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing Threat", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.5, No.1 (Spring 1993): pp.106-121.

[321] See: Luc Chauvin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage-Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), op.cit.: pp.91-106; and Time, March 24, 1986. Also see: Steve M. Berry, (1989), op.cit.: pp.19-22.

Chirac and Mitterrand, contributed to severe friction and cross-purpos
vity between responsible French ministries and agencies, most notably
lations with Iran.[322] Although this rivalry worked to the advantag
speedy resolution of the French hostage-crisis in conjunction with ele
the role of the media exacerbated the search for accomodation with Hiz
and Iranian demands in which French foreign policy became bound
urgency for solutions to the hostage-crisis for political expedien
also served to give the impression that the French judiciary was sub
to the political masters, most notably in relation to the Gordji-af

The British experience with countering domestic terrorism has le
development and existence of a well-defined crisis management st
minimizing interagency rivalry, as well as a reduction in media pre
the decision-making process.[323] Apart from the moral leadership of the
government in its crusade against terrorism, these functions contri
a complete devaluation of the hostage-crisis as an issue for poliy
facilitated by broad cross-party support, until the 1988 emer
hostage-pressure groups and political observers questioning governme

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[322] See: Newsweek, December 14, 1987; Time, July 27, 1987; Observer, July 26, 1
Economist, December 5, 1987.

[323] See: Independent, November 8, 1989; The Spectator, November 9, 1991; and
November 13, 1988. Also see: George Joffee, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and E
Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), op.
pp.77-9.

[324] See: Alex von Dornoch, (1988), op.cit.: pp.260-1.

[325] See: David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terror
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (1992): pp.171-205.

[326] The British Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office require its employees
disclaimers that neither any official extraordinary measures will be taken beyond t
conduct of foreign policy nor will the British government alter its policy for conc
individual welfare. This was discussed in an unattributable interview by the autho
former FCO diplomat in November 1992.

in the aftermath of apparent French concessions assisting in the complete resolution of its own hostage-crisis in Lebanon.[127] While the inflexibility of PM Thatcher deflected criticism from within and the public for its refusal to conduct any dialogue at all despite Britain's longstanding position and contacts in the Middle East, any real pressures from critics were kept at bay by the inner sanctum of British policymaking and over-shadowed by the imposition of the Iranian fatwa on Rushdie and developments in the region eminating from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which limited the government's manuverability and urgency to resolve the crisis.[128]

Despite the existence of fully functional crisis management machinery in all these three Western governments, the inability to shield policymakers from the effect of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon demonstrates not only the vulnerability of Western democratic states with a free press to this form of crisis, aptly exploited by these terrorist groups and their patrons, but also the inadequate functioning of the crisis management devices in educating the public and pressure groups on the constraints and opportunities of the complex environment under which they operate under in efforts to extract its fellow citizens from captivity.[129] The revelation of the Iran-Contra affair had an enourmous impact not only on the ability by the US presidency to

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[127] See: John McCarthy and Jill Morell, (1993), op.cit.; and George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.89-90.

[128] See: John Dickie, (1992), op.cit.: pp.199-200. Also see: Independent, June 23, 1988; Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991; and Times, November 19, 1991.

[129] As stated by Ambassador Robert Oakley: "[t]he highest officials are torn between maintaining a national and governmental posture of strength, based on antiterrorist principles, and a policy more in keeping with their humanitarian and domestic political concerns. Public opinion and media pressures are similarily schizophrenic, one day calling for toughness and no concessions to terrorists, but the next day moved by the phlight of the hostages and the appeals of their families", see: Robert Oakley, "International Terrorism", Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3 (1986). Also see: Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Hostage taking, the presidency, and stress", in Walter Reich (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.211-29.

function but also made any British and even French responses to their own hostage-crisis in Lebanon look relatively less damaging or at least more politically defensible in comparison. Efforts to limit media impact must form the first line of defense in the search for better adaptability of exisiting crisis management machinery to the hostage-crisis as these incidents exhibit unique features, distinguishing them from other forms of terrorism in longevity and in the complexity of the environment.

5.7 Broad Platform of Support for Measures

The options of response selected by Western governments are not only a reflection of their capability to adapt its crisis management techniques and machinery to the dynamics of the hostage-crisis environment, but also mirror the urgency created by domestic pressures as well as the political acceptability of any response both at home and abroad. While the number and frequency of hostage-takings differ among various governments, the degree to which Western governments are willing to bend an uncompromising no-concessions policy depends on elevated public expectations of the perceived ability by their governments to deliver the freedom of citizens held in captivity in accordance with made promises without a visible sacrifice of any principled positions against terrorism.[330]

The support by the public for any military reply to terrorism has been strongest in the United States as evident by the domestic popular support for the retaliatory raid on Libya in 1986 and the military interception of the aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro perpetrators in 1985.[331] Notwithstanding the questionable legality of these actions and the strains caused in alliances with friendly states, the creation of false expectations for the American

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[330] See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit. As phrased by Peggy Say, sister of Terry Anderson: "I have to wonder if quiet diplomacy is a code word for no diplomacy", see: Time, May 23, 1988.

[331] See: Rex A. Hudson, (1989), op.cit.: pp.364-5; and Time, April 28, 1986.

public in the utility of using military force in the response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon undermined the credibility of the US government in its resolve to exact swift and effective retribution and exacerbated the pressures on the policymakers to find alternative ways to extracticate the US from previously made guarantees to return its citizens home safely.[332]

The issue of negotiations with the Hizb'allah and its patrons over the hostages has also to be seen in the context of a switch from support of hard-line policies to more conciliatory tones in conjunction with the duration of the crises.[333] While the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals totally discredited US hardline rhetoric against state sponsored terrorism, the US public increasingly recognized the value of negotiation with the ascendancy of the Bush administration and, at the same time, the limits of military response in retaliation or rescue attempts in the event of deaths of hostages.[334] The Iran-Contra affair certainly had a very adverse effect on Reagan's standing with the US public, as evident in opinion polls which found Reagan's approval rating plummeting drastically as the largest single drop for any US president in history.[335] Although Western governments moved to limit their responsibility towards citizens by either issuing, in the case of Britain, warnings to nationals to adopt extreme security precautions or

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[332] While US public opinion polls indicated a 77% approval for the retaliatory actions against Libya, opposition to the action was evident in France, who refused permission for US aircrafts to use French airspace, and in Britain, by its condemnation accounting for 59% of the population, see: New York Times, April 21, 1986; and Time, April 28, 1986.

[333] See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, (1992), op.cit.: pp.307-40.

[334] In a poll conducted by TIME/CNN in August 1989, over 58% of respondents favoured negotiations with the terrorist groups for the hostages' release, see: Time, August 14, 1989.

[335] A New York Times/CBS News poll recorded a drop in Reagan's approval rating from 67% to 46% in November 1986, see: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit.: p.292 & 437. Another New York Times/CBS News poll found that 53% of the public believed that the president was lying about the Iran-Contra affair, while only 34% believed he was telling the truth, see: New York Times, July 18, 1987.

leave Lebanon, or barring travel to and stay in Lebanon, in the case of the US government,[336] an overwhelming majority of Western public consider it still a duty for their governments to do whatever they can to free its citizens taken hostage.[337] This trend was echoed by the British public who overwhelmingly supported negotiations for the hostages' release, after the 1990 release of two American hostages without any apparent sacrifice of principle.[338] The French case underlined the acceptability of conducting negotiations and entering into concessions, shielded by tough visible hardline policies, for the public as long as these in the end yielded the freedom of the all the hostages.[339]

While entering into deals with the Hizb'allah and Iran received limited degree of acceptability in the domestic arena for Western governments with the return of released hostages, it created serious friction in friendly alliances as decisions to deviate from commonly agreed principles seriously undermined the position of those Western governments, most notably Britain, who chose to adhere to a rigid refusal to either negotiate or conduct behind-the-scenes deals for the release of its citizens.[340] This was evidently displayed by the British outcry against the US covert policy with Iran, trading arms for hostages.[341] It was also a serious source of tension in Anglo-French

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[336] See: New York Times, January 27, 1987; and Newsweek, May 18, 1987.

[337] See: Time, August 14, 1989.

[338] The poll, conducted on May 8, 1990, yielded over 75% in favour of negotiations, see: Middle East International, May 11, 1990.

[339] See: Independent, May 7, 1990. Also see: Élie Vannier, "Les Otages au Liban", Études Polémologiques, Vol.49, No.1 (1989): pp.157-64.

[340] See: Financial Times, August 9, 1991.

[341] Two high-level British officials, Sir Anthony Ackland and Sir Percy Cradock, visited Washington to inquire about allegations of US-Iranian deal-making and lodged a formal complaint in June 1986. For a useful account, see: Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit.: pp.312-3; and Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: The Bodley Head, 1990).

relations with public and private condemnations after every release of French hostages.[342] This became clear by the decision of Chirac to request the French parliament for a surprise vote of confidence, on the eve of the December 1987 Copenhagen EC summit, in order to provide extra protection against criticism from British PM Thatcher.[343] These unilateral actions by Western governments may have served their immediate national interests and alleviated public pressures, yet it seriously impaired the collective political will and credibility of any closer international co-operation between states in the field of counter-terrorism.[344] It also rendered the effectiveness of coercive instruments of crisis management in pressuring state-sponsors of terrorism useless as Western states often circumvented collective action for short-term political expediency in pursuit of their own individual national interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.

5.8 Crisis Management: Consideration of Precedent Effect of Crisis Behaviour

A major underlying assumption of adhering to the principles of no-negotiation and no-concession for Western governments to the hostage-crisis is that terrorism must not be rewarded and that appeasement through concessions will only encourage further acts of terrorism.[345] While the under-

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[342] See: Independent, May 7, 1990; Times, December 1, 1987; Times, May 5, 1988; and Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990.

[343] See: Economist, December 5, 1987; and Time, December 14, 1987.

[344] See: Independent, December 3, 1987; Independent, August 11, 1989; and Time, August 14, 1989. Also see: Alex von Dornoch, (1989), op.cit.; and Stanley S. Bedlington, (1986), op.cit.

[345] According to President Reagan: "concessions to terrorists only serve to encourage them to resort to more terror to obtain their political objectives, thereby endangering still more innocent lives. If terrorists understand that a government steadfastly refuses to give in to their demands...this will serve as a strong deterrent", as quoted in: Robert M. Sayer, "Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization", Department of State Bulletin, (1982): pp.1-17. Also see: Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 1988. According to France's Prime Minister Chirac: "[w]hen you negotiate with people who take hostages you are obliged, in the negotiation, to give something. It may be just a little, it may be a lot, but you have to give something. Once you have given something, the kidnappers gains from his action. So what

pinnings of these principled assumptions are based on absolute standards in alignment with common moral values in the West, their transformation from theory into practise vis-á-vis the Western hostage-crisis in Lebanon revealed inconsistency and hypocrisy as these standards were gradually discarded for other overriding concerns in the foreign and domestic arenas.[346] The difficulty of applying these principles consistently into practise underlines the inseperable nature of responses to terrorism and the conduct of Western foreign policy in the Middle East. In short, there are other factors at work here. As such, Western government dealings with hostage-taking incidents became dependent on each government's own foreign policy behaviour towards those states, most notably Iran and Syria, with influence over the Hizb'allah as well as constrained by events in the overall political environment in the Middle East. The commonly accepted assertion, providing the foundation for the principles of no-negotiations and no-concessions, that softening the tough line through dealing with, and providing concessions to, the Hizb'allah only rewards and encourages more hostage-taking must be examined within the framework of the dynamics of Middle East politics rather than in isolation.[347] While US experience with hostage-takings in Lebanon supports the assertion that conceeding to Hizb'allah demands leads to further kidnappings, the experience of the French and the British governments in their approach to the hostage-crisis provide ample contradictory evidence.[348] Despite major

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is his normal and spontaneous reaction? He does it again, thinking that is a way of obtaining what he cannot obtain by other means. So you get caught in a process. Naturally you can get maybe two, three or four hostages freed. But you immediately give the kidnapper an inducement to seize another three, four, five or six. So it is an extraordinary dangerous and irresponsible process. That is why I don't negotiate", see: Economist, June 11, 1988.

[346] See: Paul Wilkinson, (1986), op.cit.; Independent, August 11, 1989; and Times, February, 30, 1988.

[347] For a useful example, see: Independent, August 30, 1989.

[348] See: Independent, May 7, 1990; and Economist, June 11, 1988.

French concessions to the Hizb'allah and its patrons, no new French hostages were abducted after January 1987.[349] Although most of these French concessions related to the settlement of legitimate outstanding foreign policy disputes with Iran, a number of French concessions, most notably the expulsion of anti-Iranian opposition leaders and the release of imprisoned terrorists were serious breaches of the highly principled moral position of Western governments.[350] Equally, British policy towards negotiation and concessions failed to provoke either new hostage-takings or any resolution to existing hostage-incidents.[351]

The virtous principles of no-negotiation and no-concession can neither be applied in a vacuum nor in absolute terms.[352] As the announcement of setting these rigid principles on one's own conduct frequently fail to conform to the realities of pursuing foreign policy in highly dynamic hostage-situations, as other interests in the Middle East takes precedence over the hostage-crisis, it is bound to invite charges of hypocrisy and double-standards at home and by allies.[353]

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[349] See: Independent, August 11, 1989. Also see: Appendix I.

[350] See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.157-9.

[351] See: Independent, May 7, 1990; and Economist, November 8, 1986.

[352] See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, (1992), op.cit.: pp.307-40.

[353] As aptly observed by Ronald Crelinsten: "[l]ike a child clamoring for forbidden toys, the public expects the government simultaneously to give in and to hold fast", see: Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems", Political Communication and Persuasion, Vol.6, No.3 (1989): p.312. According to Robert Fisk: "[w]hatever the Western nations, including Britain, may say about never bowing to terrorism, money will have to be paid for the release of all the hostages...in one way or another the hostages will have to be bought back because money has to be paid for everything in Lebanon.", see: Independent, August 5, 1989.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

> "To release a hostage, it is necessary to identify the group and the country that supports that group. There is no single country in the region that alone can wield pressure on all the groups: indeed, different political groups of the same country have been known to patronise differing Beirut groups. These groups, interact with each other and exchange information: but each has its own hierarchy, its own allegiance and each guards its hostages dearly...[I]n their war against the outside enemy, these groups will do with their hostages what best serves their interests: whether it be demands for political moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the release of fighters from Israeli prisons, the purchase of arms and spare parts, or the freeing of assets in Western banks. It is a war without arms."[1]

6.1. Introduction

The interaction between the dynamics of the foreign hostage-crisis in Lebanon and the responses by the American, French, and British governments, in efforts to secure the release of their citizens from Hizb'allah captivity, has demonstrated the difficulty for Western states in reconciling their firmly-held principles of no-negotiations and no-concessions in dealing with either the Hizb'allah or its patrons with the actual and practical realities governing any resolution to the foreign hostage-situations in Lebanon. This difficulty has been not only based on the uniqueness and complexity of the triangular and multi-dimensional interactions between Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria that governed motivations for any release of foreign captives but also on the manner in which these Western governments actually responded to the hostage-crisis itself, given the framework of opportunities and constraints in the crisis environment. This study has provided a methodological approach which not only evaluates the inner dynamics of Hizb'allah and its continous interaction with the Lebanese environment as well as with Iran and Syria but

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[1] Statement by former Lebanese hostage Jamil Nasser, "The Uncostly War", New Statesman, February 20, 1987: p.10.

also provides a framework, integrating the principles of crisis-management, which makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of Western government responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. This combined analysis has yielded new and valuable insights on the individual level through the case-study into the mechanisms that govern the behaviour of one of the most dangerous and militant Middle Eastern terrorist organisations (the Hizb'allah) within its environment in Lebanon, as well as its relationship with those states providing direct or indirect support (Iran and Syria). The thesis also provided a new analytical framework in the study of terrorism for the evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of Western government responses to the foreign hostage-crisis, using traditional crisis management techniques, which were evaluated against the actual crisis environment. This chapter will discuss the most important findings of the case-study of Hizb'allah and its patrons, Iran and Syria, and whether the American, British, and French governments were effective in their approach to the hostage-crisis using crisis management techniques in terms of their adherence to previously delineated requirements as well as to the dynamics of the crisis environment itself. It will also briefly discuss the applicability and lessons of crisis management techniques based on these findings for Western governments and the international system as a whole, most notably in order to more closely resolve the dilemma of fulfillment of the duty by these states to protect their citizens taken hostage abroad, without any major sacrifice in the conduct of foreign policy.

6.2 Findings of the Case-Study on Hizb'allah

This case-study demonstrated, contrary to the longstanding conventional wisdom of most academic scholars, analysts, and policymakers, that an in-depth analysis of one of the most complex and secretive terrorist organisations in the Middle East cannot only be accomplished despite the subject's

complexity but also yield predictable patterns and conclusions for a fuller comprehension of the inner dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. Moreover, the case-study achieved these results through the linkage of the findings throughout the analysis into an aggregate whole, which provided a new mechanism for understanding the behaviour of the Hizb'allah and its interaction with Iran and Syria with special reference to the process of hostage-taking of Westerners.

A main task of this case-study was to answer the underlying questions of why the Hizb'allah resorted to hostage-taking and what mechanisms governed the initiation and resolution of the hostage-incidents. An essential starting point to find answers to these questions was to discard the prevalent assumptions in the West that the Hizb'allah movement emerged on the Lebanese scene in 1982 as a mere creation of Iran and acted to a large extent as an Iranian autonom, principally as it ignored the importance of the historical antecedents to the formation of the Hizb'allah, which fundamentally shaped its ideological outlook as well as its current behaviour. In particular, it was argued that the shared theological experience between future Hizb'allah and Iranian clergy in Najaf, Iraq, provided the basis for close personal friendships which have been instrumental in governing the Lebanese movement's ideological deference to the Islamic Republic of Iran and provided the basis for the evolution of a series of complex clerical networks which governed previous and present activity. While this Najaf-experience has been traditionally overlooked, despite its major importance in explaining the origins and depth of the continued close personal relationships which extended between a number of Iranian and Hizb'allah clerics, it also explained the movement's ready assimilation of, and close adherence to, Islamic Iran's ideological doctrines, especially as most of Hizb'allah's clerical elite were influenced by Ayatollah Khumayyni during his exile in Najaf between 1964

and 1978.

This contextual approach, stressing the importance of the shared theological experience in Najaf between leading Hizb'allah clergy and members of Iran's clerical establishment, was a necessary prelude for a fuller understanding of the Hizb'allah as an militant Shi'ite organisation and for the underlying mechanisms that governed its hostage-taking activity. Firstly, it explained the nature and scope of the underlying personal relationships between Hizb'allah and Iranian clerics, which fundementally served to regulate and govern the movement's previous and present activity. Secondly, it was used also to explain the Hizb'allah's ideological and spiritual deference to Islamic Iran's pan-Islamic vision and authority within the context of the way in which it has influenced and translated into the movement's own revolutionary struggle and activity in Lebanon.

In what way did the shared theological experience in Najaf between leading Hizb'allah clergy and members of Iran's clerical establishment influence and govern the previous and present activity of the movement? It was demonstrated that the collective Najaf-experience played a pivotal role in the actual formation of the Hizb'allah in 1982 and the subsequent guidance provided by its former Iranian Najaf-educated clerical colleagues, most notably from Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi. The strengths of these ties were evident in the pre-Hizb'allah period not only through the close assistance provided by Lebanese Shi'ites to its Iranian clerical colleagues in their anti-Shah revolutionary activity but also within the parallel activities of the Lebanese al-Da'wa party and Shi'ite educational institutions, led by Najaf-educated Lebanese clerics. These clerics became a natural and conducive source for Iranian clergy to spread the revolutionary Islamic ideology in Lebanon as defined and led by Imam Khumayyni through increased political activism of the Lebanese al-Da'wa party and challenges by its more radical

and loyal followers within Amal to the movement's moderate and secular orientation. It was demonstrated that these ties between Lebanese Shi'ites and Iranian clergy consolidated with Israel's 1982 invasion, influenced by an array of other key preceding events which accelerated the political radicalization of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, and translated into the formation of the Hizb'allah under the active supervision and guidance of leading Iranian clergy, closely assisted by the presence of an Iranian Pasdaran contingent in the Biq'a area. Apart from the strong influence of Najaf-educated Iranian clergy over its Lebanese counterparts in the actual creation of Hizb'allah, it was demonstrated that these ties increasingly assumed importance as Najaf-schooled Iranian clergy, most notably members of the so-called revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment, were appointed to head the major official Iranian institutions at work within Hizb'allah and to act as main official liaison with the Lebanese movement. This meant that the Hizb'allah was not only closely dependent on its Iranian allies for material support for the survival and rapid expansion of the movement but also most closely attuned to the uncompromising radical ideology of the Iranian revolutionist faction and, consequently, very susceptible to clerical factionalism in Iran. It was shown that the dismissal and appointment of Iran's radical clergy within these Iranian institutions at work within the Hizb'allah determined the degree of obedience displayed by the movement to Islamic Iran's official leadership and orders, most notably revealed by Hizb'allah's willingness to release its Western hostages. The close influence of the Iranian revolutionist faction over members of Hizb'allah's command leadership was used, at times, as an instrument by these Iranian clergy to both sabotage moderate and pragmatic overtures by the Iranian official leadership in the foreign policy arena as well as to bolster the faction's own positions within Iranian clerical power-struggles. This

faction was assisted by the Iranian Pasdaran's active and close involvement with the Hizb'allah, as it often acted in opposition to the policy directions and goals of its civilian superiors, in order to further its own hardline revolutionary principles. It was demonstrated that the dismissal of Hizb'allah's closest Iranian allies from Iranian institutional positions at work within the movement strongly affected the behaviour of the movement towards official Iran, beginning in late 1986 and intensifying after the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni in 1989.[2]

While the collective Najaf-experience was useful in explaining the strong personal relationships between the Hizb'allah leadership and Iranian clerics, which fundementally governed and regulated the hostage-taking activity of the Lebanese Shi'ite movement, it was also used to explain the way in which Hizb'allah's ideological and spiritual deference to Islamic Iran's pan-Islamic vision and authority influenced and translated into the movement's own revolutionary struggle and activity in Lebanon. It was clearly shown that Hizb'allah's rapid growth and popularity within Lebanon was achieved not only by a successful combination of ideological indoctrination and material inducement by the movement through Iranian assistance, but also by the ability of Hizb'allah leaders to mobilize and unite the Lebanese Shi'ite community within the framework of an organisation with clearly defined and articulated political objectives. While Hizb'allah's ideological deference to Ayatollah Khumayyni's pan-Islamic vision and authority was instrumental in shaping the nature of the movement's organisational structure

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[2] This was demonstrated most notably by the dismissal of Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi from his post of Interior Minister in the 1989 post-Khumayyni Cabinet; the arrest and execution of Medhi Hashemi, head of the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements, in late 1986; the demotion of Hosein Sheikh-ol-Islam's and Javad Mansuri's positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the replacement of Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi in 1989 from his post as head of the Martyr's Foundation. See Chapter Three (pp.135-47) for specific details.

and the manner in which the movement sought to implement its pan-Islamic strategy of overthrowing the confessional system and establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon governed by Islamic law, Hizb'allah's mastery of political violence became an essential component in the pursuit of its pan-Islamic goals as it projected itself as the spearhead of the struggle against the enemies of Islam, namely the United States and Israel. In turn, this pan-Islamic premise provided the ideological raison d'etré for most of the movement's political and military activity in Lebanon and acts as a defining characteristic of the movement's symbiotic relationship with Iran, which underlines their close co-operation and converging interests.[3]

While it was demonstrated that these pan-Islamic goals have provided the Hizb'allah with a sense of purpose and mission as a revolutionary movement and that it's activity closely converges with Iranian foreign policy interests, the Iranian-Hizb'allah relationship experienced tension and friction when Islamic Iran's ruling clergy was forced to subordinate the radical philosophy of the revolution for the pragmatic interests of the state. This reinforced the close allegiance between Hizb'allah leaders and members of Iran's revolutionist faction. Despite the fact that Hizb'allah veils its revolutionary struggle in uncompromising pan-Islamic motifs, the movement has demonstrated greater flexibility in readjusting to the realities of constraints imposed by Lebanon's multiconfessional civil war environment and by Syria's wider ambition to establish hegemony over Lebanon.

While Hizb'allah's leading clergy adhere to Iran's pan-Islamic vision and profess absolute allegiance to the authority and guidance of Ayatollah

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[3] Hizb'allah's grand Pan-Islamic strategy for Lebanon is set to proceed in four stages: armed confrontation with Israel; overthrow of the Lebanese regime; the liberation of any form of intervention by the Great Powers in Lebanon; and the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon (later joined by other Muslims in the creation of a single Islamic community).

Khumayyni, it was established that the rank and file of the movement are far from monolithic but rather bound by their own complex allegiances and subject to frequent disagreements within the movement. Intra-Hizb'allah disagreements have been most evidently focused on the degree to which the movement should conform to Iranian and Syrian foreign policy interests in Lebanon, especially any quest for the resolution of the Western hostage-issue at the expense of compromising the movement's own agenda. In particular, Hizb'allah's "democratization process", whereby elections were held every two years for senior positions in the Consultative and Executive Shura, was not merely a rotation of responsibility among a core group of senior Hizb'allah clergy but also reflected the internal dynamics of the power struggle for the leadership between the more moderate and radical factions within the organisations. As such, any election that either maintains the status quo or yields significant changes within the Hizb'allah hierarchy reveals not only the degree of radicalism of a Hizb'allah leader, which subsequently will influence the direction of the organisation, but also where the allegiance of that leader lies within Iran's clerical establishment. At another level, the Hizb'allah elections were not merely a useful guide to monitor Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran but also indications of challenges confronting the organisation inside Lebanon. This was clear from the ascendancy of both Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi in May 1991, which allowed a resolution to the Western hostage-crisis in return for Hizb'allah's permission to remain the only armed movement in Lebanon's post-civil war environment, and Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah in February 1992, which led to Hizb'allah's decision to participate in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in the autumn of that year. This illustrates that an understanding of the behaviour of the Hizb'allah movement depends on the depth and allegiance of closely forged relationships between individual Hizb'allah leaders and Iranian clergy as well as the adaptability of a parti-

cular Hizb'allah leader to suit the movement's activity to the political requirements of the environment within which it operates. As a result, it was demonstrated that any analysis of Hizb'allah requires not only an understanding of the movement itself but also its interaction with elements within Iran's clerical establishment as well as with Iranian institutions. Furthermore, Hizb'allah is far from a unified body, as displayed by continous clerical factionalism between its leading members over the direction of the movement and its constant readjustments within Lebanon.

Any analysis of Hizb'allah's involvement in the process of hostage-taking of Westerners must not only take into account these mechanism of relationships that control and govern the movement's activities but also the influences of the multilayered Lebanese, regional, and international politics. These influences affect the process of the hostage-crisis as Westerners are abducted and released for individual Hizb'allah motives or in convergence with Iranian, and to a lesser extent, Syrian interests. This involves examination of the nature and dynamics of Hizb'allah's command leadership and its decision-making process, which must be balanced against the dynamics of Hizb'allah's institutional relationships with Iran and Syria in Lebanon in accordance with internal Lebanese factors and external developments, creating opportunities and constraints in the practise of hostage-taking.

It was demonstrated that the use of different cover names by the Hizb'allah, when engaged in hostage-takings and other covert operations, is a remnant of the Shi'a tradition of concealment as practised when religiously persecuted in ancient times in order to confuse the enemy. Apart from providing a shield against persecution or reprisals, Hizb'allah's use of cover names has also signified the different currents and concerns within the movement at specific periods, reflecting the movement's political and military orientation. While the involvement of a specific and small number of

Hizb'allah clans in the actual hostage-takings underlined that clan-loyalty and individual clerical relationships provided the basis for the movement, it also showed that it functioned under a centralized and well-organized leadership structure, governed by a supreme politico-religious board of authority, composed of a small and select group of Najaf-educated uluma. The absolute nature of the supreme religious authority of Hizb'allah's command leadership debunked the idea that any of Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity was pursued independently by individual Hizb'allah clans. This was reinforced by Hizb'allah's institutionalized cooperation and coordination with Iran and Syria in some of these operations. This has meant that Hizb'allah initiated its hostage-taking activity within the context of the collective interests of the organisation as a whole. As a consequence, it was necessary to analyze the nature of Hizb'allah's command leadership, its decision-making structure as well as policy with specific reference to the movement's hostage-taking activity. This made it also necessary to examine the role and influence of Iranian clergy and institutions at work within the movement as well as Syria's influence within and over Hizb'allah activity.

While the highest authority within Hizb'allah's command leadership reflected the individual Shi'ite clergy that assisted in the foundation of the movement in July 1982, it was also detailed that the main clergymen who exercise control over the movement are the ones responsible for a specific committee or portfolio, especially since the 1989 restructuring of the movement with the addition of two new organs, the Executive Shura, and a Politbureau, leading to greater decentralization of decision-making as well as increased factionalism over specific portfolios. It was established that Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity was executed by a separate Hizb'allah body, the so-called Special Security Apparatus (SSA), whose members maintained close liaison with Iranian diplomatic representatives in Beirut and

Damascus as well as with Iranian Pasdaran officials and Syrian military intelligence. The relations between Hizb'allah's SSA and Syrian military intelligence have been characterized by periods of conflict and co-operation, dictated by the shifting internal situation in Lebanon. Syria has pursued a calibrated policy of tacit co-operation with Hizb'allah and support for its abductions of foreigners, as long as they were in accordance with Syrian strategic interest in Lebanon.

Apart from the Hizb'allah decision-making apparatus and the institutionalized relationship with Iran and Syria through military and civilian channels at work in Lebanon, it was shown that Hizb'allah's mechanism for hostage-taking was also subject to influence from clerical factionalism within the organisation itself and to a web of clerical relationships extending from members of the national Majlis al-Shura to various clergy within Iran's civilian and military establishment. It demonstrated that the degree of divergence between Hizb'allah's subordination, in principle, to the supreme religious and political authority of Ayatollah Khumayyni, and the disobedience and disagreements displayed within Hizb'allah ranks towards Iran's official leadership, was dependent on Hizb'allah's and individual clergymen's interaction with official Iranian institutions as well as on clerical factionalism in Iran. In turn, any friction in Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran was influenced by the impact of Iranian clerical factionalism on the institutions at work in Hizb'allah.

It has been shown that the Hizb'allah, as a revolutionary movement, was most closely attuned to the revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment, stemming from the involvement of these Iranian clergy prior to and in the actual formation and development of Hizb'allah, which translated into the appointment of these Iranian clergy to the official Iranian institutions at work in Hizb'allah, ranging from the Pasdaran contingent and

personal Iranian representatives in Damascus and Beirut to Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Martyrs' Foundation. As a result, the Hizb'allah became gradually susceptible to clerical factionalism in Iran, as evident by the dismissal and appointment of Iran's redical clergy within these institutions after 1986. It was demonstrated that the Hizb'allah has been affected by the availability of Iranian financial and material resources to sustain its massive services and project for the Shi'a community, while the Iranian Pasdaran has remained the most reliable and loyal ally of the Hizb'allah.

Hizb'allah's abduction of Western citizens was initiated in specific and limited time periods, or phases, which indicated they were directly influenced by a number of factors and events affecting the organisation within Lebanon, either for the purposes of survival or for the advancement of its pan-Islamic goals. It was also recognized that Hizb'allah activity was directly related to the collective as well as individual interests of high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy. This was examined also through the influence and involvement of Iranian clergy and institutions at work on Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity, which was governed by the array of official and unofficial interaction between the Hizb'allah and Iran as manifest through hostage-taking, either in alignment with the motivations of official Iran or as a manifestation of clerical factionalism. This assessment was balanced against Hizb'allah's own requirements for its position within the internal Lebanese environment, especially in terms of Syrian influence over its activity.

The initiation of abductions of Westerners demonstrated a strong causal linkage between events (internal Lebanese, regional or international) and motivation for hostage-taking acts by the Hizb'allah, often on behalf of Iran. This was clearly highlighted by Hizb'allah's first four abduction cam-

paigns of American, French, and British citizens, lasting until the autumn of 1986, in which the movement's activity was closely co-ordinated with Iran and Syria. Apart from Hizb'allah's co-operation with Iran and Syria in a wider attempt to rid Lebanon of all foreign presence through suicide-attacks, the kidnappings of Westerners were motivated by the movement's support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and in an attempt to free imprisoned members held in Europe and the Middle East, most notably in Kuwait and Israel. This phase also underlined the heavy influence of certain Iranian revolutionary clergy within and over Hizb'allah's decision-making process.

The close convergence of interests between Hizb'allah and Iran governed hostage-taking activity in Lebanon until the end of 1986 without major signs or impact of any clerical factionalism either within the organisation or from Iran in the process of abductions or releases of hostages. The following phases revealed discord between Hizb'allah and Iran which was largely the result of rivalry within Iran's clerical establishment which affected the organisation directly as its closest Iranian allies were demoted from positions in institutions at work within the organisation in Lebanon. It was demonstrated that the imposition of Iranian clerical factionalism on the movement's activity was most notable in the process of the release of Western hostages rather than in the actual abductions. This Iranian factional rivalry was also translated into clerical in-fighting within the Hizb'allah. Although efforts to obstruct the release of Western hostages by the Iranian revolutionist factions were designed to undermine more moderate Iranian foreign policy towards the West, this phase revealed that efforts to delay any releases by Hizb'allah were also motivated by its preoccupation towards readjustment of its position within the Lebanese civil war and internal rivalry within the movement over its present and future direction. As such, the Western hostages were not only abducted for causal motivations but also kept

as insurance of its position within Lebanon and against retribution by Western governments.

While the January 1987 spate of kidnappings of Westerners was motivated by the arrest of leading Hizb'allah members in Europe as well as reflected clerical factionalism in Iran in the aftermath of the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals, it also underlined Hizb'allah's escalatory efforts to confront IDF and SLA militarily in southern Lebanon and its competion with Amal, supported by Syria, over the control of the Shi'a community and territory. The protracted Amal-Hizb'allah warfare between 1987 until 1989 produced friction with Syria, as it threatened military intervention against the movement with the extension of its hegemony in Lebanon, which prevented the abduction of any further Westerners. While the Hizb'allah used the Western captives as leverage against Syria and the West, it increasingly concentrated on the expansion of its political and military influence and presence in southern Lebanon, especially after the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni and the conclusion of the Ta'if accord in 1989.

It was demonstrated that the devolution of Ayatollah Khumayyni's spiritual and political authority, coupled with the ouster of the movement's staunchest allies within Iran's clerical hierarchy, led to a crisis within Hizb'allah's command leadership and increased clerical factionalism over the direction of the movement, especially as Iran downgraded its support while the movement felt increased pressure from Syria to release its hostages. Although the Hizb'allah, in co-operation with the Pasdaran, managed to obstruct the release of hostages, the movement's position was increasingly dependent on Iran's relationship with Syria and the hostage-issue became closely connected to its own survival in a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics under Syrian hegemony. Ultimately, the hostage-issue was used by the Hizb'allah to reach an agreement between Iran and Syria over its future in

Lebanon, under which the movement was allowed to remain armed as an resistance movement in return for the release of its foreign hostages within the framework of fulfillment of its own requirements as well as in alignment with Iranian and Syrian interests. It was demonstrated that the ascendancy of a new Secretary-General of the movement, which led to both the comprehensive conclusion of the Western hostage-crisis under UN-auspices in 1991 as well as its participation in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections, underlined that ultimately the political necessity of close affiliation with Iran's official leadership for its survival in Lebanon took precedence over any individual or collective agendas within the Hizb'allah as well as motivations by Iran's revolutionist faction. It was underlined that a reduction of the influence of the more Iranian clergy in Iranian politics paralleled a demotion in positions of its closest allies within the Hizb'allah.

The understanding of the influences exerted for the process of release of hostages depended not only on the impact of the relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran at various levels as well as the internal Lebanese environment but also on the movement's relationship with Syria, closely determined by the status of the Iranian-Syrian relations in the Lebanese, regional and international arena.

6.3 Findings of the Influence of Iranian-Syrian Relations Over Hizb'allah

The nature and dynamics of the triangular Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria relationship has been vital in order to discern the influences and mechanisms exerted by Iran and Syria, both individually and collectively, over the process of abduction and, more importantly, releases of foreign hostages by the Hizb'allah. It was shown that this process was subordinate to continuous changing relationship and alliance between Iran and Syria over a decade, itself subjected to either confluence or conflict in their own individual political and economic agendas in the Middle East affected by a wide variety

of internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. In particular, the Iranian-Syrian relationship was shown to experience serious tension in conjunction with shifting political and economic conditions in the region, especially marked by irreconcilable differences with respect to their interests and aspirations over the future of Lebanon. Apart from underlining their contradictory political ideologies, the larger problems between the two states were also superimposed on the ground in Lebanon over Hizb'allah activity. It was argued that the way in which the Iranian-Syrian relationship affected the position and activity of the movement in Lebanon fundamentally shaped the application of Western crisis management techniques with the opportunities and constraints in their application in accordance with tension and co-ordination in the alliance between Iran and Syria over Hizb'allah activity, especially as these two states acted as facilitators in all negotiations for the release of hostages.

It was clearly demonstrated that any friction or co-operation in the political and economic relationship between Iran and Syria affected all aspects of Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon. While both Iran and Syria were adept at exploiting the relationship for their own benefit in Lebanon or elsewhere in the region, their close collusion remained uniform in Lebanon in the confrontation against common foreign enemies, coupled with complete obedience by the Hizb'allah to Iranian wishes and orders. However, after the success of Hizb'allah's activity in ridding Lebanon of foreign influence, the incompatible aims by Iran, seeking the establishment of an Islamic republic on Iranian lines, and by Syria, seeking consolidation of its hegemony over Lebanese affairs, became visible through intense competion by their clients, Amal and Hizb'allah, over the hearts and minds of the Shi'ite community. The underlying friction between Iranian and Syrian attempts to seek political and military dominance in Lebanon, as manifest through Amal-Hizb'allah warfare,

was exacerbated by other difficulties in their alliance both internal and external to Lebanon. Specifically, the underlying economic bond between Syria and Iran, especially Syrian dependence on Iranian oil supplies, demonstrated several rifts over Syrian refusals to settle out-standing debts over oil payments to Iran between 1986 and 1988 and over subsequent Syrian efforts to lessen its economic dependency on Iran through internal Syrian oil production. While Syria exploited the economic disputes with Iran to its own advantage, it was demonstrated that other differences over Lebanon stemmed from the incompatibility between Syrian attempts to consolidate its control over Lebanon while seeking a political and economic rapprochement with Western governments after accusations of Syrian involvement in terrorism, and Iranian exploitation of Hizb'allah's abductions in the pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives and in the expansion of the movement at the expense of Amal.

Both Syria and Iran have shown an interest to defuse any serious conflict in Lebanon in order to preserve their relationship. However, Hizb'allah's pursuit of a greater independent line from Iran, in the aftermath of clerical factionalism in late 1986, compounded the problems in any attempts to make the movement answerable to either Iran or Syria for both the control over and the limitation of its activities. Although Syria avoided a complete crackdown on the Iranian proxy, whenever the Hizb'allah seriously challenged Syrian authority, the Syrian regime moved to exercise control over the activity of the Hizb'allah through a blockade of the transfer of Iranian Pasdaran in the Biq'a area and control of movement of the Hizb'allah in the Biq'a and Beirut areas. However, the underlying factor for any Syrian restraint in the elimination of the military and political presence of the Hizb'allah was based on its nonexpendable relationship with Iran. It was clearly shown that neither Syria nor Iran have been willing to sacrifice

their alliance on account of any Hizb'allah activity, rather both regimes have been forced to exercise restraint in their relations with Hizb'allah at various times as to not offend each other. When Hizb'allah activity was harmful to the Iranian-Syrian alliance, as evident by Amal-Hizb'allah armed clashes and certain hostage-taking incidents, both Iran and Syria acted in concert to enforce agreements between their two proxies as well as to place limitations on the abduction of foreigners. However, the Iranian-Syrian alliance experienced particular problems in conjunction with the projection of Iranian clerical factionalism onto the Hizb'allah command leadership in attempts by Iran and Syria to use extraction from the hostage-crisis as an instrument in the foreign policy arena in their dealings with Western governments.

It was demonstrated that the support for the Hizb'allah from Iran and, to a lesser extent acceptance by Syria, changed concurrently with the changes in the Iranian leadership, following the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni, and with Syrian efforts to consolidate its control over a post civil-war Lebanon with the Ta'if agreement in 1989. While the defeat of the revolutionist faction in control over the political authority in Iran translated into diminished possibility for a radical leadership of the Hizb'allah to be able to confront Syrian efforts to establish political and military hegemony in Lebanon, it also became clear that Syrian designs within Lebanese territory took precedence over any official Iranian interests. Syrian concessions to Hizb'allah and Iran, in the form of allowing the movement to remain armed and for the continued presence of the Pasdaran contingent on Lebanese territory, meant that the movement was forced to submit to a reorientation in activity in alignment with Syrian interests in order to survive within Lebanon's post-civil war environment.

6.4 Conclusion

In a larger context, the unravelling of these complex mechanisms of the Hizb'allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship that governed the movement's hostage-taking activity have been essential in providing answers to why the Western hostage-crisis occured and what mechanisms governed the initiation and resolution of these hostage-incidents. However, it is also essential to address the reasons why the hostage-crisis ultimately became resolvable; what the hostage-crisis achieved for the Hizb'allah, for the Iranian regime, as well as for the Lebanese Shi'a community; and, ultimately, what the future course is for the Hizb'allah, especially whether its transformation over a decade from a revolutionary movement to a political party has meant the abandonement of political violence as a principal means to achieve its pan-Islamic goals.

While the abduction of foreigners by the Hizb'allah almost always converged with the interests of Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria, the process of releasing Western hostages became a source of frequent disagreement within the Hizb'allah movement itself and in its relationship with Iran and Syria as well as a source of constant friction in the Iranian-Syrian alliance. The complete closure of the Western hostage-file in 1991, under the auspices of the United Nations, was explained by many analysts as a result of the fact that Western hostages had outlived their usefulness to Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria. However, the breakthrough in the comprehensive release of Western hostages was not merely a way to resolve an issue which had become a liability question for those involved but rather the combined result of the dynamics at work of the Hizb'allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship, which had been profoundly influenced by a confluence of regional and international events. Apart from the profound changes and influences in the Middle East, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which facilitated the release of the 15 al-Da'wa prisoners, Hizb'allah's responsiveness to close the hostage-file was based

on its own threatened position in a post-civil war Lebanon and a convergence of interests with Iran, who needed to resolve the hostage-issue in order to rehabilitate itself economically and politically with the West, and Syria, who had lost its traditional support from the Soviet Union when it had an opportunity to expand its influence over Lebanon and participate in regional political processes. As the Western hostages constituted an asset for the Hizb'allah in its relations with Iran and Syria, the movement agreed to release the hostages as a quid pro quo for Syrian guarantees that the movement was permitted to remain armed, when all other militias were disarmed, in order to confront Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Syrian aquiescence to Hizb'allah's armed struggle also served its interests in both pressuring Israel in the Arab-Israeli peace talks as well as waging a proxy war against Israel which ensured Syrian deniability. Hizb'allah's own initiative of inviting the UN Secretary-General as the mediator in the hostage-release process highlighted the movement's continued close consideration for Iranian interests, most notably as a means to pursue Iran's outstanding disputes with Iraq under UN Resolution 598. The denounement of the Western hostage-crisis in 1991 demonstrated not only the importance of understanding the mechanics of the Hizb'allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship but also that they were all extremely adept at using the hostage-crisis to their own advantage.

While the Hizb'allah and Iran have demonstrated skillful adaptation to changes in their environment, they have equally been skilled at exploiting the hostage-issue to extract political and economic concessions. However, what did the hostage-crisis actually achieve for the Hizb'allah, and Iran, as well as the Lebanese Shi'a community? Hizb'allah's practise of hostage-taking has meant different levels of achievement for the organisation itself, for varying factions within Iran's clerical establishment and for the Lebanese Shi'a community as a whole. For the Hizb'allah movement itself, the

hostage-taking activity has served many important functions which reinforced the movement's ideological and political raison d'etré, assisted in the expansion of its influence within the Lebanese Shi'ite community as well as defined and forged the movement's ties to Iran's clerical establishment. In many ways, Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity has been a total success for the movement in the advancement of its pan-Islamic cause on the strategic level and as an instrument to achieve practical and tactical goals for the organisation itself. As a practical instrument, the hostage-issue was used to accomplish specific organisational requirements for the movement, most notably to force the release of imprisoned Shi'ites in Europe and Israel while it shielded the movement from retaliation when waging its relentless armed warfare against foreign presence in Lebanon. In many ways, the hostage-issue also insured the movement against any serious confrontation with Syria and, in the end, translated into ensuring and consolidating the very survival of the movement in a post-civil war Lebanon. As the movement used the hostage-issue in close convergence with Iranian foreign policy interests vis-á-vis the West, its hostage-taking activity served to ensure continued close Iranian support and material assistance for the movement, which was essential for its expansion within the Shi'a community. In a wider sense, Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity also served to enhance its revolutionary credence and image as the true defender of the Lebanese Shi'a community against the enemies of Islam, especially as it played an instrumental role in expelling foreign forces out of Lebanon and through its tireless armed campaign against Israel. In this revolutionary struggle, the Hizb'allah was very successful in achieving not only its practical goals but also in accomplishing a psychological athmosphere of fear in the West of the actual threat and capability of the movement which served to enhance the status of the movement within Lebanon and beyond as a major nemisis of Western governments.

As the most successful example of Iran's export of the revolution, the Hizb'allah and its hostage-taking have also greatly benefitted Iran as an instrument of proxy in the foreign policy arena towards the West. While the Hizb'allah served a vital role for Iran providing it with a translator and conduit to spread Iran's Islamic revolutionary message to the Islamic masses of the Arab world and the possibility to actively participate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the movement's hostage-taking activity provided Iran with a means to force the gradual improvement of economic and, to a lesser extent, political relations with Western governments. During the Iran-Iraq war, Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity was used to pressure Western governments to concede military and economic assistance to Iran vital to its continued war efforts, as evidenced by the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal and by French financial concessions. While Hizb'allah's hostage-taking failed to influence the West's Middle East policies to any great extent, as any arms sales to Iran were equally matched by military and financial support to Iraq, the hostage-issue was increasingly used by various factions within Iran's clerical establishment for any array of political purposes. For the revolutionist faction, which enjoyed close ties to Hizb'allah's leadership, the movement's hostage-taking activity was used as an instrument to sabotage pragmatic moves by the official Iranian leadership towards the West by blocking the release of hostages. The increasing difficulty for Iran's official leadership to control the movement to release Western hostages has had serious consequences for Iran in accordance with its need to rehabilitate its war-ravaged economy through improved relations with the West. This often served to enhance the position of the radical clergy in Iran and to undermine any more moderate signs of rapproachement between Iran and the West.

For Lebanon's Shi'a community, the Hizb'allah and its hostage-taking activity have served to propel a traditionally impoverished and passive

community into political action and militancy within Lebanon's civil war and at the forefront of Lebanese politics. While Hizb'allah activity served to consolidate Iran's material assistance to the movement, its rapid transformation from a rag-tag militia into a tightly organised movement with an impressive military and extensive social services programme for the Shi'a community meant that the Hizb'allah positioned itself as a true political, ideological, and economic defender of the Shi'a community, filling the vacuum in place of the scant protection and assistance provided by the Lebanese government and other militias. In this process, Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity ensured financial backing from Iran, as it suited the patron's interests, which it used for the expansion of the movement's popularity and influence over the Shi'a community through a skillful combination of material inducement and ideological indoctrination. While Hizb'allah's terrorism stereotyped the image of Lebanon's Shi'ites as religious fanatics bent on martyrdom in the Western world, the profound role and service of the Hizb'allah movement, fighting and buying its way into the hearts and minds of the Shi'ite community, far outweighed the consequences of any non-Islamic moral constraints imposed by Western public opinion. Apart from the fact that Hizb'allah veiled its justifications of violent activity solely to Muslim believers and according to Islamic law, the movement also provided the dispossessed Shi'ite community within a lawless civil war environment with a divine Islamic purpose and mission, which transformed from revolutionary struggle to a political vechicle aimed at addressing Shi'ite grievances and enhance its wider agenda in Lebanon.

The transformation of the Hizb'allah from a revolutionary movement to a political party in Lebanon's post-civil war environment raises the question whether the movement has abandoned the use of political violence, especially hostage-taking, to achieve its pan-Islamic goals. While the Hizb'allah has

demonstrated a mastery of political violence in its quest for enhancement of its position and agenda within Lebanon and beyond, the movement also demonstrated it was very susceptible of, and adaptable to, changes within its own environment. However, every sign indicates that it has retained the same degree of its pan-Islamic zeal and militancy. While Hizb'allah's reorientation in activity, substituting hostage-taking for participation within the political process, occured to suit the realities of a post-civil war Lebanon, the movement has also escalated its committment and struggle to confront Israel and achieve its pan-Islamic goal of liberating Jerusalem both within Lebanon and beyond. The intensification of the movement's attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon can be attributed to efforts to sabotage any prospect for any Arab-Israeli peace, which would de facto jeopardize its very existence and its accomplishments hitherto within Lebanon. While the Hizb'allah has increased its Islamic extremism by continuing its guerilla attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon, the movement also launched a new form of terrorism, car-bomb attacks, specifically aimed against Israeli high-profile targets outside the region since March 1992, most notably in South America and in Europe, both in revenge for Israeli actions against the Hizb'allah as well as to sabotage any emerging signs of Arab-Israeli peace. Although the Hizb'allah discovered that it can subvert the system from within through its participation within Lebanese electoral politics, its vanguard position of Islamic extremism with its messianic aspirations for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon and the eradication of Israel, means that the movement for the moment will intensify its concentration of attacks against Israel through bombs to avert any emerging Arab-Israeli rapproachement rather than on hostage-taking against the West. Ultimately, the degree to which the movement's position is threatened, coupled with the ability of Iran to sustain its revolutionary pan-Islamic zeal at home and

abroad, will determine the means and levels of political violence employed by the Hizb'allah in the future. This case-study laid the foundation for understanding and predicting these mechanisms which governed Hizb'allah's employment of terrorism in the past and for the future.

6.5 Western Responses to the Hostage Crisis in Lebanon: Effectiveness of Crisis Management Techniques

In view of the complexity of the preceding case-study of the Hizb'allah and its interaction with Iran and Syria, the balance-sheet for Western responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon has not surprisingly reinforced the fact that these states have experienced difficulty in not only adapting to the crisis environment itself but also in balancing their individual responsibility towards their citizens taken hostage abroad with their requirements to safeguard the maintanence of other collective national interests. This recognition that the hostage-crisis in Lebanon constituted a unique form of foreign policy crisis for Western governments, in which the Western policy of no-negotiations and no-concessions severely restricted the maneuverability in the selection of response to the hostage-crisis, led to the employment of traditional principles and techniques of crisis management as a useful instrument for the evaluation of the crisis itself as well as a guideline in order to cope and manage this complex form of crisis more effectively and successfully.

The highly context-dependent nature of crisis management necessitated the deliniation of seven political and operational requirements for its effective application to terrorist crisis situations, especially within the framework of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. An underlying common feature of these crisis-management requirements was close considerations of the crisis-environment, most notably as it determined the effectiveness in the selection, direction, and timing of crisis management techniques. The underlying

criteria for the successful application of crisis management was determined to be not only close adherence to the seven essential requirements of effective crisis management balanced against the inherent constraints for Western governments in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy but also the performance of their approach in the hostage-crisis based on the previous case-study on the dynamics of the relationship at work between Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria.

The evaluation of Western government performance in accordance to the employment of specific crisis mangement techniques in alignment with opportunities and constraints in the crisis environment cannot be adequately judged solely on the ability by these states to achieve the rapid release of its citizens from captivity. As all three Western governments eventually achieved the release of their hostages in Lebanon, a complete balance-sheet of Western response must also account for the gains and losses incurred individually and collectively by the behaviour of these governments in their efforts to extract their citizens from captivity. As a consequence, what are the lessons and insights from Western responses, using crisis management techniques, to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon? What is the balance-sheet of Western responses in terms of gains and losses in the selection of their individual and collective approach to the hostage-crisis? And finally, what are the general lessons of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon for Western governments and for the international system as a whole?

A main problem for the inconsistency between the West's declaratory policy of not negotiating or conceeding to any demands and the actual conduct by these governments in dealing with the hostage-crisis in Lebanon can be explained by the often incompatible nature of firmly held counterterrorism principles as an integral component of foreign policy in the Middle East towards Iran and Syria, who exercise any degree of control over the Hizb'allah

movement. The fact that Iran and Syria acted as intermediaries for Western governments in dealing with the Hizb'allah posed problems in upholding a non-flexible no-concessions policy as these states benefitted indirectly from concessions made to influence the movement despite their own complicity in some of these terrorist acts. While most Iranian and Syrian demands of concessions for any intercession with the Lebanese movement focused on specific outstanding disputes in the foreign policy behaviour by Western governments towards these states, it was shown that any deviation from the principles of a no-concessions policy was dependent on the conduct of conciliatory foreign policy by Western states towards Iran or Syria in alignment with shifts in the regional environment creating opportunities and constraints in the pursuit of wider foreign policy interests. In turn, this had to be balanced against the desire by Western governments to extract its citizens from captivity, closely influenced by domestic political pressures and its unwillingness to maintain a non-conciliatory position at the expense of the pursuit of wider foreign policy opportunities in the region. The balance-sheet for the American, British, and French efforts to limit their political objectives towards the hostage-crisis and their means employed in pursuit of those objectives demonstrated not only the urgency of the crisis on the political agenda and the expected ability by these states to secure the release of its citizens from captivity but also the way in which these governments adapted to the crisis environment through the selection and employment of crisis management techniques.

The lessons from the US experience in responding to the hostage-crisis are multifold. Firstly, the American approach to the hostage-crisis has been a complete failure in terms of deviating from the principle of limited objectives in the crisis and limited means in pursuit of these objectives. While the hostage-issue was elevated on the US political agenda, mainly as the

result of its previous traumatic experience with the 1979 Iranian hostage-crisis, the problems for the US policymakers were exacerbated by its own creation of unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved given the restrictions imposed by the crisis environment. Despite the fact that the Lebanese hostage-crisis differed fundementally from the previous Iranian hostage-situation, the US government approached the Lebanese hostage-crisis from the same vantage point, as any US manoeuverability was curtailed by its non-flexible public policy of no-negotiations and no-consessions while it assumed a lead-role in the West's containment of Iran, which US policymakers viewed as the main culprit behind these acts of terrorism. Contrary to limited political objectives in the hostage-crisis, the US government assured its domestic constituency of the rapid release of its citizens from captivity without any negotiation with, or concessions to, either Iran or Hizb'allah, a policy pursued only through the means of coercion and force. A major problem with this approach was that the release of American hostages could not be achieved through the reliance of force and coercion, especially as this only strengthened the militancy and popularity of the movement itself and the strength of Iranian radical clergy within Iran's official leadership.

Secondly, the US response to the hostage-crisis demonstrated a failure to adequately understand the dynamics and mechanisms of the hostage-crisis and the configuration between the Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria, which ultimately governed the release of American citizens from captivity. This was revealed by its reliance of force and coercion as the main crisis management technique employed against the Hizb'allah as well as Iran and, more importantly, in the flawed selection of communication channels with the adversaries. This was most clearly demonstrated by the behaviour of certain policymakers behind the clandestine US-Iranian arms-for-hostages initiative, which attempted to use the hostage-issue to open a new strategic relationship with

Iran. This flawed uni-dimensional approach, which demonstrated both a lacking knowledge of the configuration of the Hizb'allah-Iranian relationship and the psychology behind Iranian moves, led not only to the most serious crisis for the political survival of the Reagan administration and the credibility of its counter-terrorism posture among its allies but also set back any prospects for a US-Iranian rapproachement for many years. It also totally undermined any propects for progress on the US hostage-front, as the issue was devalued immediately after the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair in President Reagan's battle for political survival at home. Although his presidential successor treated the hostage-issue with extreme caution, the failure of US reliance on military force to coerce the Hizb'allah and Iran, coupled with the disarray of channels pursued in the crisis, revealed the continued inability of US leaders to recogize ways to limit the hostage-issue on the political agenda and of their own limited maneuverability in responding as well as resolving the hostage-crisis. However, any criticism of the way in which the US administration tackled the hostage-issue in the period following the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals must also recognize that any maneuverability or avenues for negotiation or resolution of the American hostage-crisis in Lebanon were completely closed, especially given the public scrutiny of any US moves which even slightly resembled concessions and given the fervent anti-US hostility displayed by both Iran and the Hizb'allah. It was demonstrated throughout the case-study that limited intelligence on the behaviour of the Hizb'allah and its allies does not translate into limited knowledge of how the movement operates and interacts with Iran and Syria, rather it can be determined by examining the boundaries of the dynamics governing this complex triangular relationship, yielding opportunities and constraints in the crisis environment which should serve as the basis for the selection of crisis management techniques and the

evaluation of their likely effect in eliciting a favourable response from either Iran or Hizb'allah. A main problem with the US response was this disregard for the opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Iran as well as the political environment within Lebanon in which the Hizb'allah operates and exists. This became clear by the failure to rely on either Iran or Syria as the only channel in negotiations over hostages without reference to their individual ability to exert its influence over the movement in accordance with shifts in their ties to Hizb'allah's command leadership between 1987-1991 and, more importantly, to the status of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as evidently displayed by the increased friction between 1986 and 1988.

Thirdly, the US response to the hostage-crisis also demonstrated that the release of Americans from captivity could only be achieved in exchange for US direct or indirect concessions to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria. While it was demonstrated that a causal relationship existed between Hizb'allah's abduction of American citizens and internal as well as external Lebanese events, it was also clear that their release were contingent on the removal of underlying points of friction in the US-Iranian relationship, most notably the US return of Iranian frozen assets and a change in US foreign policy towards the region, and in the wider US-Syrian relationship, especially US willingness to recognize Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. Despite the fact that the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal in real terms only achieved a temporary cessation in the abduction of Americans, as more hostages were taken to replace those released, Hizb'allah's willingness to release its hostages seemed to occur in conjunction with US conciliatory measures, especially with the release of Iranian assets, and, more importantly, with the changes in the regional environment which made the refusal to release US hostages more of a liability than an asset for Iran and Hizb'allah in the

advancement of their own agendas. This has meant that the fate of the US hostages was more bound by US flexibility in resolving its foreign policy disputes with Iran rather than through non-conciliatory positions and reliance on coercion. It was also underlined that Syria's ability to pressure the release of the US hostages remained limited and governed by its wider relationship with Iran. However, any Syrian pressure on Hizb'allah to release US hostages increased with the American approval of the Ta'if agreement which confered recognition of Syria's role over Lebanese affairs.

Fourthly, the US response to the hostage-crisis showed also that the existing crisis management machinery remains unable to shield US policymakers from the effects exerted by the mass media as they continue to exacerbate the pressures of any type of response. It was argued that a major effort must be made by US policymakers to educate the mass media and the public of the complex dynamics which governs the Lebanese hostage-crisis and any subsequent response by the US government. Furthermore, it is important to discuss publicly the consequences of any US government response not only to highlight the limitations imposed by the crisis environment in securing the release of US hostages but also to safeguard broad support for any measures at home and abroad among allies. The inability of US policymakers to conduct its dealings over the hostage-crisis in the open contributed to the need for initiating clandestine operations to meet the demands of public expectations and to resort to short-term coercive measures rather than a more calculated long-term foreign policy approach in the region.

The lessons of the French experience in dealing with the hostage-crisis have been unique to the nature of political rivalries within France's cohabitation period between 1986 and 1988 as well as to its individualistic style and manner in dealing with Middle East terrorism in the past. Firstly, the French political objectives in the hostage-crisis were contingent on the

political rivalry between Mitterrand and Chirac for political expediency in the battle for the French presidency, whether the delay or immediate release of French hostages benefitted the political agenda of respective candidate, in the 1986/1988 national elections. This political rivalry between the two candidates was also manifest through institutional rivalry between specific French ministries in some way in charge of issues connected with the hostage-crisis. It was determined that the achievement of the individual political objectives in the hostage-crisis and the means employed in pursuit of these were directly dependent on the strategy of the two political candidates in negotiations with Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria. This strategy was directly manifest through the dispatch of individual emissaries to conduct negotiations directly with the Hizb'allah and with either Iran or Syria. Although the French political and institutional rivalry over the hostage-issue constituted an asset in its efforts to limit Iranian retribution over French support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, through the process of individual offers to grant concessions in outstanding disputes with Iran, it also became a liability as Iran and the Hizb'allah were able to use this political rivalry to achieve maximum concessions to their own advantage and as the difficulties in meeting already agreed concessions to Iran continued long after the release of the last French hostage.

Secondly, the French response to the hostage-crisis demonstrated not only a very sharp understanding of the mechanisms that governed the behaviour of the Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria but also adept ability to utilize the dynamics of the crisis environment for its own advantage in securing the rapid release of French hostages prior to the May 1988 elections. It is beyond doubt that the degree to which the French government was able to exploit this configuration for the advancement of foreign policy in the region and to secure the release of French hostages was directly related to the

nature of the analomy of "cohabitation" in the French political system. While the success of the French approach was related to the unique exploitation of the crisis environment, which translated into the employment of unofficial intermediaries in direct contact with the Hizb'allah rather than through formal and highlevel contacts with Iran or Syria, it can also be attributed to the fact that the French pursued its own policy in the Middle East without any close consideration of its allies or any substantial pressure from the domestic media. The former was clear by the use of individual emissaries with close ties to either Iran or Syria, who benefitted from the tension and rivalry in the wider Iranian-Syrian relationship and on the ground in Lebanon between 1986 and 1988. The latter was demonstrated by the French ability and willingness to grant major concessions while withstanding criticism from its allies and the mass media, a task assisted by the subordination of the judiciary to political expediency.

Thirdly, the French handling of the hostage-issue also showed the value of using crisis management techniques through a mixture of accomodation and coercion. Although French reluctance to impose sanctions on Iran and Syria reflected the underlying political strategy to the hostage-crisis and the uniqueness of its foreign policy in the region, any tension in the French-Iranian relationship was equally manifest of, and exploited by, the French political rivalry. However, the French approach underlined the advantages of a mixture of coercion and accomodation in relations with Iran and Syria rather than strict reliance on punishment through the rupture of diplomatic ties or through sanctions, as exemplified by the US and British approach. The latter approach only served to contribute to limiting the options available for Western governments.

The lessons of the British response to the hostage-crisis are related to its uncompromising policy of refusal to conduct any negotiations with the

Hizb'allah and Iran as well as Syria or concede to any demands, coupled with its successful ability to limit the hostage-issue on the political agenda. Firstly, the British government managed to successfully subordinate and limit its political objectives by relegating the issue of the British hostages on the foreign policy agenda. This devaluation of the British hostage-issue reflected not only its previous experience in countering terrorism at home and abroad, which was reinforced by a public acceptability of a hardline policy, but also a wider recognition that the hostage-issue was bound by wider constraints of the Middle East environment, most notably restricted initially by the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages debacle and later by the Rushdie-affair. The adamant policy by the British government that there would be no deals with terrorists and no ransom paid under any guise from the outset of the hostage-crisis, reinforced by public support, contributed to consistency and effectiveness in subordinating the hostage-issue on the political agenda. A contributing factor to this success was the relatively limited number of British citizens in captivity compared to the American and French hostage-problem. It was also recognized that the British hostage-takings occured in conjunction with major events in the Middle East, many which affected the hostage-issue, which directly led to a limited degree of manoeuverability for the British government in employing crisis management techniques.

Secondly, the British response to the hostage-crisis showed also limited comprehension of the mechanisms that governed any release of British hostages. Apart from the fact that the British government faced insuperable obstacles in the Middle East which hampered any response to the hostage-crisis, the limited efforts of using indirect negotiation channels and its almost permanent imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran and Syria demonstrated clearly that its behaviour was not attuned to the realities of the crisis environment. This was clearly evident by its individual

insistence of maintaining sanctions against Syria long after its allies removed them while it also concentrated on using Iran as the only limited vechicle towards the resolution of the British hostage-crisis. While it may be argued that Britain and its policy towards the hostage-crisis could afford to neglect a close understanding of the crisis dynamics, most notably as it refused to alter its counterterrorism policy and was faced with huge obstacles in the conduct of foreign policy towards the Middle East, it also created problems for the British government when faced with increasing criticism at home after the release of other hostages of different nationality and for unnecessarily prolonging the agony of its citizens in captivity due to its inflexible and principled stand against terrorism. Despite the fact that the mass media increasingly raised the profile of the hostages on the political agenda, the British government never faced a serious problem in limiting the effects of publicity critical of its approach and the way it meet its responsibility towards securing the release of its citizens.

These individual lessons of the American, French, and British responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon have shown that crisis management can be used as an instrument to better understand why Western governments have experienced difficulty or success in efforts to secure the release of their citizens from captivity. More importantly, the context-dependent nature of crisis management and its application to the dynamics of the crisis environment made it possible to bridge the diversity of circumstances surrounding the hostage-crisis for each individual Western government with a means to evaluate the effectiveness of their individual response. However, adaptability to the crisis-environment constitutes only a facet of judging the effectiveness of Western government response to the hostage-crisis as it cannot only be measured by the speed of which the freedom of Western hostages was secured. It also requires the provision of a balance-sheet of Western responses in terms

of gains and losses in the selection of their individual and collective approach to the hostage-crisis.

The previous lessons of the Western hostage-crisis demonstrated the difficulty for Western states in adapting crisis management techniques to the crisis environment while also balancing their individual responsibility towards their citizens taken hostage abroad with their requirements to safeguard the maintenance of other collective national interests. How serious were the setbacks and reverberations of Western responses to the hostage-crisis both individually and collectively, and what was ultimately lost and gained in this process?

The overall American response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon clearly demonstrated its continued vulnerability to this form of terrorism and that it was slow in learning from previous lessons and in adapting to the crisis environment. The US policymakers' preoccupation with the safety and well-being of American hostages in Lebanon, elevated to the status of a major national security concern in response to the grave damages caused by the Hizb'allah's suicide- and abduction campaigns as well as to its own public's fear and alarm of Iranian-inspired Shi'ite terrorism, contributed to the disastrous US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal which had serious consequences not only for its domestic credibility but also in its inability to conduct foreign policy in the Middle East and justify its actions to its allies. The misperception of the dynamics of the crisis situation and its own ability to resolve the crisis quickly and with coercion which led to the Iran-Contra affair contributed to one of the most serious crises in constitutional US government in recent history. It also totally undermined the credibility of the US-lead effort in counterterrorism and cooperation among its allies, whose steadfastness in refusing to concede to terrorist demands seriously damaged its own and its allies prospects of securing the release of its

citizens from captivity. US willingness to engage in concessions with Iran and the Hizb'allah not only signalled to its adversaries that hostage-taking was an extremely useful instrument in extracting political and financial concessions from the West but also undermined any credibility of US criticism of other states' deviation from the principles of no-negotiation and no-concession to terrorists and their demands. It also exacerbated the problems for the US in the conduct of its foreign policy in the Middle East, most notably in the Iran-Iraq war and its involvement in Lebanon, as the hostage-issue became a pressure-point used by Iran for its own regional interests and designs. As the political fall-out reverberated within the US and among its allies for a very long time, the restricted manoeuverability of any US response led to the overreliance on the use of force to respond to the hostage-crisis. Apart from the limited utility of the US military option given the intelligence constraints in identifying responsible Hizb'allah individuals and bases within a civil war environment and the political constraints in avoiding a wider confrontation with either Iran and Syria, it also undermined the process of negotiation by other Western states as coercion strengthened the militancy of the movement and the position of the more radicial Iranian leaders within Iran's clerical establishment. The legacy of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal restricted the options available for US policymakers, which devalued the hostage-issue from a prominent position on the political agenda and placed its resolution in the fate of the underlying shifting currents of Middle East politics.

The overall French response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon showed that it firmly understood the dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon and the requirements for successfully conducting business in the Middle East, most notably with Iran and Syria. While the inner dynamics of the French response were bound by internal political rivalry between Chirac and Mitterand, the

salience of the hostage-issue was clearly felt as an electoral issue in 1986 and 1988 as well as with an increase in retaliatory Iranian measure against French policy in the Middle East. While the French political rivalry skillfully dictated the fate of its hostages in Lebanon and exploited the crisis dynamics through complex negotiations, the reverberations of the French conduct of granting political and financial concessions to Iran and the release of imprisoned Hizb'allah members to the movement in Lebanon were largely felt abroad rather than at home. The French subordination of the judiciary to the political authorities through the release of suspected Hizb'allah members not only seriously impaired the success and collective will of the West's wider efforts to apprehend and prosecute terrorists but also gravely dented the reputation of French counterterrorism and cooperation with its allied agencies. It also totally undermined any progress by the efforts of those Western states which continued to adhere to a no-negotiations and no-concessions policy out of principle. Unlike other Western states that refused or were slow to adapt to changing conditions, the French government managed to master the art of maneuvering between Iran, the Hizb'allah, and Syria. However, French willingness to readily concede to demands for political expediency for its domestic constituency and in the foreign arena had also a price. This was manifest with the bombing campaign in Paris which aimed to force the French government to give into the demands of Iran and the Hizb'allah. It must also be recognized that the consequences of French behaviour did not cease with the release of its last citizen from captivity, most notably as the difficulty in fulfilling outstanding concessions to Iran created tension and friction in France's wider conduct of foreign policy in the Middle East over an extended period. This was clearly revealed by the anger displayed by Iran over the difficulty for, and unwillingness of, Mitterrand to fulfill promises made by his predecessor.

The overall British response to the hostage-crisis managed successfully to minimize any damage to its reputation as the unsurpassed champion of hardline counterterrorist policy. While the British approach was unable to use the crisis dynamics to its own advantage in attempts to resolve the hostage-crisis, it was clearly recognized that the British government faced insuperable problems in the foreign policy arena beyond its power to control, most notably as its options towards the hostage-issue were restricted by its adversarial relationship with both Iran and Syria as well as by the disclosure of deals by its allies with the hostage-takers themselves. However, increased domestic political criticism focused on the applicability of this type of hardline counterterrorist policy in conjunction with the clandestine deals made by Britain's allies with the release of hostages with different nationalities. In particular, a major source of criticism focused on the perceived limited efforts made by British officials in utilizing its contacts in the Middle East to explore possible avenues for securing the release of its citizens from captivity. Nothwithstanding the validity of this criticism, it raises the question whether negotiating or conceding to terrorist demands actually encourages or leads to further kidnappings. While the French and the British behaviour towards the hostage-crisis provide evidence that this is not necessarily the case, it underlines the problem of applying firmly established counterterrorism principles in a vacuum without consideration for the dynamics of the crisis environment. This is at the heart of the dilemma for Western governments in attempting to balance its individual responsibility towards its citizens while maintaining its overall national interests.

What are the general lessons of the hostage-crisis for Western governments and for the international system as a whole? Unlike any other previous studies of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon or the way in which Western states have response to it, this study has merged the dynamics of the crisis envi-

ronment surrounding the hostage-incidents with the instruments and techniques of crisis mangement in order to more closely reconcile the underlying policy dilemma for Western governments and to improve the successfullness and effectiveness of any response. While this case-study provided an indepth understanding of the mechanisms that governed the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, the employment of crisis management offered a uniform manner in which to judge the different individual Western responses. Although the Hizb'allah and its hostage-taking activity represented an isolated phenomenon of unparalleled sophistication in the use of terrorism for political purposes in the Middle East in the 1980's, which served to paralyze the capability of many Western governments to function in the domestic and foreign policy arena, the nature of the post-Cold war environment in the Middle East with the rise of militant Shi'ite movements and with the possibility of these groups abducting Western hostages within civil war environments necessitates this type of approach to both understand Islamic movements and their use of terrorism within a political context but also to begin a move away from applying generalized counter-terrorism guidelines to context-specific problems.

APPENDIX I: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF HIZB'ALLAH



* This organisational structure drew from various sources in the Arabic press and from interviews with Western government officials. In particular, this structure was adapted from: (1) A Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accomodation", Third World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (1993): pp.327-28; and (2) The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (1993): p.7.

APPENDIX II

American, British, and French Hostages Held in Lebanon, 1982-92:

Date Kidnapped:	Name/Nationality:	Kidnapped Claimed By:	Status:[1]
82/07/19	David Dodge [US]	-	Re:83/07/21
84/02/10	Frank Regier [US]	Islamic Jihad	Re:84/04/15
84/02/15	Christian Joubert [Fr]	-	Re:84/04/15
84/03/07	Jeremy Levin [US]	Islamic Jihad	Es:85/02/14
84/03/16	William Buckley [US]	Islamic Jihad	D: 85/10/05
84/05/08	Benjamin Weir [US]	Islamic Jihad	Re:85/09/14
84/08/29	Jonathan Wright [UK]	Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims	Es:84/09/16
84/12/03	Peter Kilburn [US]	Revolutionary Commando Cells	D: 86/04/17
85/01/08	Lawrence Jenco [US]	Islamic Jihad	Re:86/07/26
85/03/14	Geoffrey Nash [UK]	Islamic Jihad - Khaibar Brigade	Re:85/03/27
85/03/15	Brian Levick [UK]	Islamic Jihad - Khaibar Brigade	Re:85/03/30
85/03/16	Terry Anderson [US]	Islamic Jihad	Re:91/12/05
85/03/22	Marcel Carton [Fr]	Islamic Jihad & Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re.88/05/04
	Marcel Fontaine [Fr]	Islamic Jihad & LARF	Re:88/05/03
	Danielle Perez [Fr]	Islamic Jihad	Re:85/03/31
85/03/25	Alec Collett [UK]	Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims	D: 86/04/23
85/05/22	Jean-Paul Kaufmann [Fr]	Islamic Jihad	Re:88/05/04
	Michel Seurat [Fr]	Islamic Jihad	D: 86/03/05
85/05/27	Dennis Hill [UK]	Islamic Jihad	D: 85/05/29
85/05/28	David Jacobsen [US]	Islamic Jihad	Re:86/11/02
85/06/09	Thomas Sutherland [US]	Islamic Jihad	Re:91/11/18
86/02/?	Marcel Coudari [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:86/11/11
86/03/08	Jean-Louis Normandin [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:87/11/27
	Phillipe Rochot [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:86/06/20
	Aurel Cornea [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:86/06/20
	Georges Hansen [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:86/06/20
86/03/28	Leigh Douglas [UK]	Arab Revolutionary Cells	D: 86/04/17
	Phillip Padfield [UK]	Arab Revolutionary Cells	D: 86/04/17
86/04/08	Michel Brian [Fr]	Siffine Islamic Organisation	Re:86/04/11
86/04/11	Brian Keenan [UK]	Organisation of Islamic Dawn	Re:90/09/25
86/04/17	John McCarthy [UK]	Arab Commando Cells	Re:91/08/08
86/05/07	Camille Sontag [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:86/11/10
86/09/09	Frank Reed [US]	Arab Revolutionary Cells - Omar Mukhtar Brigade	Re:90/04/31
86/09/12	Joseph Cicippio [US]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:91/12/02
86/09/28	Jean-Marc Sroussi [Fr]	-	Es:86/10/01
86/10/21	Edward Austin Tracy [US]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:91/08/08

[1] The abbreviations indicate the following status: [re]: released; [d]: died in captivity either by execution or natural causes; [es]: escaped.

87/01/13	Roger Auque [Fr]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:87/11/27
87/01/20	Terry Waite [UK]	Revolutionary Justice Organisation	Re:91/11/18
87/01/24	Jesse Turner [US]	Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Re:91/10/21
	Robert Polhill [US]	Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Re:90/04/22
	Alan Steen [US]	Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Re:91/12/03
87/06/17	Charles Glass [US]	Organisation for the Defense of Free People	Es:87/08/18
88/02/17	William R. Higgins [US]	Organisation of the Oppressed on Earth	D: 89/02/17
89/05/12	Jack Mann [UK]	Armed Struggle Cells	Re:91/09/24

APPENDIX III: CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN LEBANON FOR THE HIZB'ALLAH

1958

After the Iraqi revolution, a number of leading religious scholars in Najaf (Iraq) form an underground political organisation, Jama'at al-'Uluma'fi Najaf al-Ashraf (the Association of Najaf 'uluma') in order to counter the threat of communism over the Shi'a religious community. The main leader was Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who served as the ideological moving force behind the Shi'a resurgence at the theological schools in Najaf. This organisation served as the direct antecedent to the formation of the Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya which would later contribute to the establishment of the Lebanese al-Da'wa movement. Sheikh Fadlallah works closely with al-Sadr in advocating Shi'ite activism.

1964

Rúhallah al-Khomayyní arrives in Najaf from exile where he joins the emerging circles of militant younger uluma. While al-Khumayyní's period in Najaf (1964-78) fostered his radical ideology and vision of Islamic order, he taught and forged close-knit personal relationships with a small number of radical uluma and students to whom he offered inspiration and ideological guidance. Almost all future Hizb'allah leaders came into contact with al-Khumayyní at Najaf where they received their theological education.

1966

Sheikh Fadlallah arrived in al-Nab'a, a slum district of northeastern Beirut, from Najaf where he established several religious and cultural institutions. His position was elevated from his work among the poor Shi'a community in al-Nab'a as well as for his teaching of Shi'ite activism to students at the Islamic Shari'i Institute.

1968/9

The establishment of al-Da'wa al-Islamiya, a clandestine organisation composed of a secret network of Najaf clergy, came as a response to the Ba'ath regime's campaign aimed at suppressing the activities of the radical uluma and institutions in Najaf and Karbala. Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr holds a meeting where he discuss the idea of a Shi'a revolution in Lebanon for the first time with a number of his younger and radical disciples.

1970

Shi'a unrest and violent confrontations between the Shi'a and the Ba'ath regime resulted in mass arrests and closures of religious institutions. It also led to mass deportations of foreign uluma and students. Many Lebanese clerics return to Lebanon, where they established a number of religious institutions in Beirut, Ba'albek and southern Lebanon in an attempt to replicate their own experience in Najaf for a new generation of Lebanese Shi'ite activists. These hawsats received ideological inspiration and guidance from Najaf as well as considerable financial support. Among the more important founders of these hawzats in Lebanon were Sheikh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq and Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek. Parallel to this activity, other Najaf-educated clerics founded the Lebanese Islamic al-Da'wa. This provided newly arrived Najaf-graduates with an organizational framework. The Lebanese al-Da'wa concentrated on recruitment and indoctrination of young Shi'ites through cooperation with the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students, especially graduates from the Arab University of Beirut. This student organisation convenes under the leadership of Sheikh Fadlallah. He was adopted as the spiritual leader of the Lebanese al-Da'wa.

1974

March 17: Imam Musa al-Sadr announced the creation of the Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Disinherited), a mulitsecterian political action movement aimed at a non-violent struggle against the

Lebanese government for its failure to address social grievances and security needs.

1975

The outbreak of civil war in Lebanon. Harakat al-Mahrumin established an adjunct armed militia, Amal, ostensibly to defend the Shi'a community and to fight Israeli incursions in southern Lebanon, as a first authentically armed Shi'a organisation in Lebanon.

1976

June: Sheikh Fadlallah was evicted from the al- Nab'a by the Christian militias of the Lebanese Front. This led to his more activist position as evident by his major political work, Islam and the Logic of Force, in which he advocates political force as a means to preserve and defend Islam against secular and non-Islamic movements.

1978

March: Israel invaded southern Lebanon which led to a massive exodus of Shi'ites from the South to Beirut. It also led to the transformation of Shi'a grievances into armed resistance which contributed to the resurgence of Amal in the active defense of the Shi'a community.

August 25: Imam Musa al-Sadr disappearence during a visit to Libya became an important and symbolic event to the Amal movement and the Shi'a community in Lebanon. It revived a near dormant Amal from marginalization to the forefront of Shi'ite activism. It also exposed Amal to internal rivalry over the leadership.

1979

The establishment of an Islamic Republic of Iran, following the overthrow of the Shah, served as a demonstration for the Shi'a community in Lebanon of the possible achievements that a well-organized and mobilized Shi'a community could accomplish in the face of oppression and injustice.

1980

The Lebanese al-Da'wa is dissolved as an independent organisation. The inability of the organisation to mobilize the Shi'a community into political action led to the decision to use Amal as a vechicle to dissimenate revolutionary ideas through infiltration of former al-Da'wa members into Amal. Some of these members managed to rise through the ranks of Amal and pose a serious threat to Nabih Berri's leadership of the organisation.

1982

June 6: Israel invades Lebanon.

June 7: Colonel Sayyed Shirazi, the Iranian commander of the Islamic Army's Ground Forces, signs a military agreement with Syria which allows the deployment of a small Iranian Pasdaran contingent into Lebanon. An 800-man strong Pasdaran con-tingent, led by Mohsen Rafiqdust, is deployed into Ba'albek. It is later reinfor-ced by another 700 Pasdaran, dispersed among the villages in the Biq'a.

June 11: Three IDF soldiers, Zvi Feldman, Zachary Baumel, and Yehuda Katz, are listed missing-in-action, captured during a battle in the Sultan Yakoub of the Biq'a valley. The return of these soldiers become a core demand for Israel in any negotiations for the release of any Shi'ite prisoners.

June 21: In Ba'albek, Husayn al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of Amal, announce the creation of Islamic Amal when Nabih Berri participates in the first session of the National Salvation

Committee. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, Amal's representative in Iran, criticize Nabih Berri and announces his split from Amal.

July 4: Four Iranians are kidnapped by the Christian Phalange militia. They are: Ahmad Motevaselian, the Ba'albek commander of the Pasdaran contingent; Mohsen Musavi, the Iranian chargé d'affaires; Akhaven Kazem; and Moghadam Naghi Rastgtae. In response, Islamic Amal kidnap the first American citizen, David Dodge, two weeks later.

August 25: US Marines arrived in Lebanon, along with Italian and French military forces to evacuate PLO from Beirut. These troops withdraw on September 10.

September 16-18: Over 2,000 palestinians are massacred by the Phalange militia in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut.

September 29: US Marines return to Beirut with Italian and French military forces. Israeli military leaves Beirut.

December 26: Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli is appointed "president of the Islamic Republic" in Ba'albek.

December 28: Tripartite discussions begin between Lebanon, Israel and the United States on a draft Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty.

1983

April: The Iranian Pasdaran expands from Ba'albek into Beirut.

April 18: An Hizb'allah car-bombing of the US embassy in West Beirut results in 69 deaths.

May 17: Israel signs the Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty after the Lebanese parliament adopts it by sixty-four votes to two.

September 4: IDF withdraw from the Schouf mountains east of Beirut to southern Lebanon. Fighting between Druze-PLO elements and the Lebanese army leads to US and French intervention in support of the Lebanese army.

October 23: A twin-suicide attack by the Hizb'allah against the US and French military headquarters of MNF contingents results in the death of 241 US Marines and 58 French soldiers.

November 4: A Hizb'allah suicide-attack against the IDF headquarters in Tyre results in 60 deaths.

November 17: French military bomb the Sheikh Abdallah barracks in Ba'albek in retaliation for the suicide attacks against their headquarters.

November 23: Lebanon severs diplomatic relations with Iran after attacks by the Iranian Pasdaran on the remaining Lebanese army presence in the Biq'a.

December: Three members of the Lebanese al-Da'wa are arrested for the series of bombings in Kuwait (December 12), most notably against American and French targets. Two of the arrested are closely related to leading Islamic Amal and Hizb'allah members.

1984

February 7: The United States announces the redeployment of its Marines to American warships in the Mediterranean from Lebanon. France, Britain and Italy also withdraw from Lebanon.

February 16: Sheikh Raghib Harb, the Imam of the village of Jibshit in southern Lebanon, is

assassinated by unidentified gunmen. Hizb'allah blames Israel and Sheikh Harb becomes a central figure in the movement's martyrology, known as the "sheikh of the martyrs".

March 5: Lebanese parliament abrogates the May 17-agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

September 20: A Hizb'allah suicide car-bomb attack against the U.S. Embassy Annexe in East Beirut results in 23 deaths and 60 injuries.

1985

February 16: At a meeting in Shyah in the southern suburb of Beirut, Hizb'allah publicly announces for the first time its ideological programme and strategy in a manifesto entitled "Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Down-trodden in Lebanon and the World". Hizb'allah also appears for the first time as a unified organisation with a command leadership.

March 8: A car-bomb planted by Lebanese intelligence, in cooperation with CIA, fail to kill Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, near his residence in the Bir al-'Abed quarter in the southern suburbs of Beirut, but leads to 80 deaths and 200 injured.

June 6: Israel completes it's military withdrawal from Lebanon.

June 14: Hizb'allah operatives, Hassan Iz el-Din and Muhammad Ali Hamadi, hijack TWA 847 with 39 American passengers. The hijacking ends on June 30 after Syrian and Iranian intervention.

1986

February 17: Two IDF soldiers, Joseph Fink and Rahamim Levi Alsheikh, are kidnapped while patrolling the security area between Bint Jbeil and Beit Yahun by Hizb'allah men loyal to Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Obeid.

May 28: The Majlis al-Shura [Consultative Council], the supreme decision-making body of the Hizb'allah adjournes for the first time.

November 3: Beirut-based magazine, al-Shira, reveals that the US government has secretly sold arms to Iran and that former US National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, has visit Iran. The source of the information is Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in Lebanon, Sheikh Ismail al-Khaliq, a leading Hizb'allah cleric.

1987

January 15: Muhammad Ali Hammadi is arrested in Frankfurt, West Germany, and the Hizb'allah retaliate in Lebanon with an unprecedented wave of abduction of foreigners.

February 22: Syrian military intervention into West Beirut to restore order.

February 24: Syrian military kills 23 Hizb'allah members in the Basta district of Beirut.

June 16: Hizb'allah-Amal clashes in Beirut.

1988

February 17: Amal-Hizb'allah clashes after the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins, the American Chief of UNTSO, by Hizb'allah's Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi.

April: Heavy armed clashes between Amal and Hizb'allah in southern Lebanon.

April 4: Amal attacks Hizb'allah's positions in the Nabatiya area and captures the area in battles resulting in over 51 deaths and 130 injured. Amal expelled Hizb'allah members to Biq'a.

April 5-17: Hizb'allah hijack a Kuwaiti aircraft, KU 422, and demands the release of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait.

May 6: Hizb'allah initiates warfare against Amal in Beirut. Within three days, Hizb'allah captures central and southern parts of Beirut. The fighting results in over 525 casualties on both sides.

May 28: Ceasefire agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah. Under the agreement, Syrian troops are deployed throughout the southern suburbs; all militia offices are converted into political offices; Hizb'allah is allowed to remain armed and maintain its Hay al-Mahdi barracks and military presence along the Green Line with East Beirut; and most of Syrian troops to be gradually withdrawn and replaced by Lebanese internal security forces. Hizb'allah dispatches its armed forces to Sidon in order to challenge Amal's control over southern Lebanon.

December 15: Sheikh Javad Kafsi, operational officer in the Believer's Resistance Movement, and four of his colleagues are kidnapped by Israeli military units in the village of Jibshit in an Israeli effort to trade him for the missing Israeli soldiers.

1989

January: Mustafa Dirani, the former head of Amal's security service defects to Hizb'allah.

January 30: An agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah announced after Iranian-Syrian diplomatic efforts which recognizes Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon while Hizb'allah is permitted to conduct only nonmilitary activity.

March 14: General Michel Aoun declares a "war of liberation" against Syria.

July 28: Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid, a senior Hizb'allah cleric and regional military commander of the Islamic Resistance, is abducted by elité Israeli military units from his home in the village of Jibshit.

October: A major Hizb'allah meeting takes place to confront challenges presented by the death of Ayatollah Khomayyni in Iran and to a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics with the Ta'if accord. Factionalism is revealed within the clerical leadership of the organization. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli assumes control over the organisation as Secretary-General.

October 22: The National Reconciliation Charter (Ta'if agreement) approved by the Lebanese MPs in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.

December 7: Amal-Hizb'allah clashes resume in Beirut.

December 23: Amal-Hizb'allah clashes in the Iqlim al-Touffah area southeast of Sidon which killed at least 23 fighters.

1990

October 31: Cease-fire agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah.

November 5: Amal and Hizb'allah sign a peace agreement after Iranian-Syrian diplomatic efforts. On November 10, all Lebanese militias are withdrawn from Beirut. Hizb'allah redeploy their military from Beirut to the Biq'a.

1991

April 21: An agreement between Syria and Iran permits the Hizb'allah to remain armed as a resistance movement while all other militias are disarmed in accordance with implementation of the Ta'if agreement.

May 22: Syria and Lebanon sign a Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination.

May 23: Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi is elected Secretary-General of the Hizb'allah and Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin as his deputy.

August 6 - December 5: A comprehensive hostage-exchange under the auspices of the United Nations leads to the complete release of Western hostages.

1992

February 16: Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi is assassinated in an Israeli heliborne attack after he and other high-ranking Hizb'allah officials attend an annual memorial service in the village of Jibshit in order to mark the eight anniversary of the death of Sheikh Raghib Harb.

February 18: Hizb'allah announces the unanimous election of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah as the new Secretary-General of the movement.

August 23 - September 6: Hizb'allah participates in the Lebanese parliamentary elections and wins eight seats out of 128.

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